

Boston College
The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Department of Philosophy

**THE GENESIS OF HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF LIFE:
A TRANSLATION OF THE 1803 AND 1805 JENA LECTURES
ON THE ORGANIC
WITH AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY**

a dissertation
by
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

September 1997

UMI Number: 9818608

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



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1997

BOSTON COLLEGE
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS & SCIENCES

The thesis of Erich D. Freiburger
entitled The Genesis of Hegel's Concept of Life: A
Translation of the 1803 and 1805 Jena Lectures on the
Organic with an Historical Introduction and Commentary
submitted to the Department of Philosophy
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences has been read
and approved by the Committee:

Date October 15, 1996

ABSTRACT

The Genesis of Hegel's Concept of Life: A Translation of the 1803 and 1805 Jena Lectures on the Organic with an Historical Introduction and Commentary

To understand the genesis of Hegel's concept of organic life is to grasp how this concept integrates the most central themes of modern philosophy into a single principle which animates the whole of his philosophical system. This study proposes to introduce Hegel's Jena 1803 and 1805 Philosophy of Organic Nature by examining how the concept of organic life emerges out of the rationalist tradition in modern philosophy and incorporates its principal themes. In the first chapter I will briefly sketch Hegel's relation to the rationalist tradition, in order to suggest how his concept of life weaves pre- and post-Kantian elements into a systematic whole. The second chapter examines how Kant already prepared the ground for this integration by conceiving of the *Critique of Teleological Judgment* as a reconciliation of the conflicting doctrines of Spinoza and Leibniz. I argue that *The Critique of Judgment* uses the ascesis of Spinoza's critique of final causality as a critical tool by which Kant corrects Leibniz' metaphysics in order to bring it into line with his critical project. The third chapter turns to Schelling's appropriation of Spinoza and Leibniz in *Dogmatism and Criticism* and *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, and shows how Schelling unites Spinoza's notion of intellectual intuition with Leibniz' notion of a substantial union in order to envision the project of a philosophy of nature which articulates the connection between the subjective intuition of the supersensible ground of nature and our phenomenal experience. On the basis of this examination of Schelling's appropriation of Leibniz and Spinoza I argue that Hegel's appropriation of Leibniz' concept of organic life permits him to overcome Schelling's Spinozism and to claim to have fully realized what Schelling leaves as a practical task. Chapter four examines Schelling's concept of organic life in *The System of Transcendental Idealism* and shows how Schelling's *Potenzenlehre* constitutes the point of departure for Hegel's treatment of the organic.

Erich D. Freiburger

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I. Hegel's Integration of the Central themes of Modern Philosophy

We require something like a mental gyration of the heel. We need so rapid a revolution of all things about a central point of sight that, while the minutiae vanish altogether, even the more conspicuous objects become blended into one. Among the vanishing minutiae, in a survey of this kind, would be all exclusively terrestrial matters. The earth would be considered in its planetary relations alone. A man in this view becomes mankind; mankind a member of the cosmical variety of intelligences.

- E.A. Poe, *Eureka*

To understand the genesis of Hegel's concept of organic life is to grasp how this concept integrates the most central themes of modern philosophy into a single principle which animates the whole of his philosophical system. This study proposes to introduce Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Organic Nature by examining how the concept of organic life emerges out of the rationalist tradition in modern philosophy and incorporates its principal themes. In the first chapter I will briefly sketch Hegel's relation to the rationalist tradition, in order to suggest how his concept of life weaves pre-and post Kantian elements into a systematic whole. The second chapter examines how Kant already prepared the ground for this integration by conceiving of the *Critique of Teleological Judgment* as a reconciliation of the conflicting doctrines of Spinoza and Leibniz. The third chapter turns to Schelling's appropriation of Spinoza and Leibniz in *Dogmatism and Criticism* and *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, and shows how Schelling unites Spinoza's notion of intellectual intuition with Leibniz' notion of a substantial union in order to envision the project of a philosophy of nature which articulates the connection between the subjective intuition of the supersensible ground of nature and our phenomenal experience. Chapter four shows how

Hegel's appropriation of Leibniz' concept of organic life permits him to overcome Schelling's Spinozism and to claim to have fully realized what Schelling leaves as a practical task. Chapter Five consists of a review of the extant scholarship on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Nature, and a commentary on the translations of the 1803 and 1805 Philosophies of Organic Nature presented in part two.

Before proceeding to a detailed account of how Hegel's Philosophy of Nature emerges from the thought of Kant and Schelling, let us consider how Hegel is situated with respect to the rationalist tradition in the history of modern philosophy. Because of the number of sources this involves, this means that I will be painting the history of modern philosophy in very broad, and hence, necessarily incomplete, strokes. But this procedure has the virtue of comprehending in a single brief account, a development which, perhaps because of its complexity, is all too rarely explained in a single step. My comments fit into a simple rubric, for all I propose is that the development of German Idealism from Fichte through Schelling and Hegel is best understood as a more complex repetition of the development of early modern philosophy from Descartes through Spinoza to Leibniz. The link between the two developments is of course, the great philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose "Copernican revolution" in knowledge led to the subjectivization of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. Kant's copernican revolution transforms Leibniz' metaphysical use of this principle into a principle of subjective knowledge so that the development of his successors comes to repeat the main themes of early modern metaphysics on the inner plane of subjective knowledge. After tracing out how this development is repeated in German idealism, I will try to suggest how Hegel's system integrates the central features of his predecessors.

I. Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz

Let us turn to Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, the three great continental rationalists. To understand what is at issue in the development which is unleashed by Descartes philosophy, let me begin by asking a question. It has become a common place that Descartes is the father of modern philosophy. But what does this mean?

Almost everyone has heard the famous quotation from Descartes' *Discourse*: I think, therefore I am (*Cogito ergo sum*). But how does this represents a new beginning? In the *Meditations*, where this statement appears, we find that Descartes is concerned with grounding subjective knowledge on an unshakable foundation, so that he can be absolutely certain of what he knows. But what does this really tell us? Why should this lead us to regard him as the father of modern philosophy? The difficulty of explaining this statement which one hears mentioned so often that it has become a *cliché* is even more pronounced when one finds that this assertion of the subjective foundation is immediately followed by a proof for the existence of God. How then can he be considered the inaugurator of modern thinking? If the modern period is concerned with the growth of science and technology, how can this concern with proving the existence of God be considered modern? The answer is that Descartes is indeed concerned with firm foundations, but in spite of his apparent concern with proving the existence of God and arguing for the immortality of the soul in the *Meditations*, what he is really interested in is laying the foundations of a mathematical physics. Thus, Descartes is the father of modern philosophy because he is concerned with the question of how knowledge of the objective world can be grounded, so that we develop a science and technology which will enable us to become (in the words of

the *Discourse on Method*) “the lords and masters of nature”¹ — a phrase in which the technological aim of his work becomes startlingly clear.

Spinoza

The best approach to Spinoza’s elaborate geometric system is to understand him as a critic of Descartes’ dualism which divides the world into thinking substance and extended substance, or soul and body. On Spinoza’s view, this division raises the question of how my mind can know what is going on in the extended realm that constitutes my body if the two are really distinct from each other, as Descartes claims? For Descartes, this problem was resolved through the appeal to God. Thus, he reasons from his thoughts to God’s existence to the idea that God’s perfection prevents him from deceiving me about the external world. In this way the existence of God constitutes the link between thought and extension. For Spinoza, in contrast, this elaborate chain of reasoning is unnecessarily complex. It also fails to explain how unextended substance, which is something independent, should create extended substance, for why would substance interact with anything else if it were already independent? Why not, he proposes, simply argue that God is one infinite substance which contains the entirety of thought and extension within itself? If there is only one substance then both the problem of creation and the ensuing problem of the mediation between thought and extension disappear. What remains is a definition of God’s essence that places him on par with nature, such that Spinoza’s system valorizes the study of natural science in the same way Descartes did. For Spinoza’s language of modes and attributes provides a way of distinguishing between the underlying unity of God’s

¹Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Rene Descartes*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: University Press, 1985) 143.

essence, and the modifications of that essence which constitute the strictly determined order of natural events (e.g. between *Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata*). , cf. Spinoza, *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, Vol. I, trans and ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton:University Press, 1985) 91. Thus particular modes are governed by universal modes, in the same way, that the laws of physics govern the motion of individual entities. This means that the language of modes and attributes is simply Spinoza's way of integrating Descartes scientific project within a more systematic metaphysics which overcomes the disadvantages of Cartesian dualism.

Leibniz

Whereas Spinoza described a world where there was only one substance, Leibniz in contrast will describe a world in which there are an infinity of simple substances which are completely isolated from each other. Thus, for Leibniz the world is composed of an infinity of windowless monads, which only interact with each other through the mediation of God. Like Descartes' philosophy, Leibniz' thought is dualistic, in as much as it posits a distinction between the soul and the body. But where Descartes simply appealed to the soul to justify what he could claim to know about the external, bodily world, Leibniz will give an equal emphasis to both. Thus, the soul and the body each follow a separate set of laws, which are united in a pre-established harmony ordained by God (*Monadology* §78). To quote §81 of the *Monadology*, "According to this system, bodies act as if there were no souls (though this is impossible); and souls act as if there were no bodies; and both act as if they influenced the other."² Apart from the obvious difference of the number of substances

²Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989) 223, and *Die Philosophische Schriften von G.W. Leibniz*, vol.VI (Herausg. C.I. Gerhardt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1960) 621: "Ce système fait, que les corps agissent comme si (par impossible) il

he proposes, Leibniz's system would be strikingly similar to Spinoza's, were it not that Leibniz leaves a place for human freedom. By claiming that the body and the soul fall under the two distinct legislations of the realms of nature (which rules the body through natural laws) and grace (which rules the soul through spiritual laws), Leibniz is able to critique Descartes account of the interaction between the soul and the body, without lapsing into Spinoza's determinism.

But what is most crucial for our concerns is Leibniz' conception of life. In contrast to Descartes' understanding of the living being as a machine, Leibniz proposed that organic life was a divine machine, which was also a machine in each of its parts *ad infinitum* (§64). Thus, Descartes' analogy is preserved, but in a way that suggests the inadequacy of understanding life on the analogy of a machine, and in a way that also suggests God's function as the sufficient or final cause of organic life. For Leibniz each monad becomes a living mirror of the universe which expresses all the others (§56). Each part contains a confused representation of the whole. When we discuss Hegel we will see how the life of the concept transforms this confused representation of the whole in every part into an actual presence of the whole in every part. In other words, we will see how he transforms what Leibniz claims is only a dimly perceived notion of the whole into a completely transparent grasp of the whole, like the grasp which Leibniz' metaphysics accorded to God (§38, 48, 60). For Hegel this transformation is possible because he believes that the life of reason (which transforms the disconnected abstractions of the particular sciences into a living whole) renders subjective consciousness capable of engaging in an encyclopedic account of the whole that is analogous to the infinite analysis, or the infinite grasp of detail which

n'y avoit point d'Ames, et que les Ames agissent comme s'il n'y avoit point de corps, et que tous deux agissent comme si l'un influoit sur l'autre."

Leibniz accorded to God (§37-39, 64).

The Principle of Sufficient Reason

Leibniz' tells us that there are two great principles which govern human reasoning: the principle of sufficient reason, and the principle of contradiction (§31,32). There is nothing arcane about either of these principles. For both are part of our every day thinking. What is unique about Leibniz' use of them is the way that his metaphysics carries them to their ultimate consequences. The principle of non-contradiction simply states, that if you can derive a contradiction from one of the premises of your argument then your conclusion must be false. The principle of sufficient reason, sounds somewhat more ominous, but it just means, that everything has a cause. In other words, Leibniz is simply carrying this idea to its ultimate extreme by claiming that there is an ultimate reason, and hence, an ultimate purpose, for everything. Now in itself, there is nothing remarkable about this view. But right away we can see that if everything has a cause, then everything is determined. Which means that there is an ultimate determination for everything. Leibniz employed this principle in an attempt to argue for the existence of God, reasoning as follows. Let us suppose that the world is eternal. On this supposition everything is caused by something else to eternity, and there is no sufficient reason within the world for why the world is the way it is. Thus, the problem faced by Leibniz' metaphysics is to show how the chain of causes which we see at work in this world incline us to conceive of God as the sufficient reason for why the world exists as it does. Having granted that the world is eternal Leibniz is forced to conceive of creation as God's choice among an infinity of possible worlds (*Philosophical Essays* 151/*Philosophische Schriften*, VII, 303-4). Thus, God chose this world because it was the best among the infinity of possible worlds he might have created,

but chose not to. In other words, Leibniz is proposing that God chose this world because it is a world where everything is arranged for the best, in as much as the causes which function here lead to the best of all possible results. If this is not immediately evident to those of us in the world, then this is because we cannot comprehend the world from God's infinite perspective. So for Leibniz, the principle of sufficient reason is a principle of determination which falls outside, or transcends the world, and completely determines it, so that everything in it has a reason. Kant will simply invert this metaphysical perspective by placing the principle of determination inside the knowing subject, so that it is not God who determines the structure of objective knowledge, but the human subject, whose objective knowledge is henceforth regarded as a necessary construction of the human mind.

II. Kant's Copernican Revolution

We have now arrived at Kant's copernican revolution. Just as Copernicus proposed that it is not the earth, but the sun which is the center of the heavens, so Kant will argue that it is not the object, which determines our knowing, but the structure of the human mind.³ We can illustrate this with a simple image. The traditional view of knowing conceives the mind as corresponding to the object. Thus, to visualize this we can imagine that the Mind is revolving around the object. Kant's "revolution" reverses this relationship. Now the object is conceived as revolving around the mind. In other words, Kant's copernican revolution means that objects now conform to the structure of the mind. Immediately we can see that this revolution has a startling consequence. We no longer know the world as it is, instead, we only know it to the degree that it conforms to the

³Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965) 22, Bxvi.

dictates and structure of our understanding; that is, we only know it as we have constructed it (Bxii, Bxviii).

This revolution has a variety of important consequences, of which I shall only name two: the first is that on this view the subject knows itself only as an appearance (Bxx, B164-165), *e.g.* In the same way that it knows itself as an object, and not as it is in itself (a point which will have important consequences when we get to Fichte). The second consequence is that Kant can no longer move from our knowledge of things to a knowledge of God, as did Leibniz. If our understanding of the objective world is only that of an appearance which is constructed according to the structure of the human understanding, then metaphysics is impossible. This means we can no longer reason from nature to God. Thus, for Kant, the status of our knowledge of nature has been reduced from a more or less adequate knowledge of objective existence (as it was for the rationalists) to a subjectively determined knowledge of appearances which is shown to be objectively valid by critiquing (or distinguishing) the limits of human knowledge. Thus, in a way that combines both the rationalist and empiricist traditions, Kant is claiming that reason is only valid to the extent that it is united with experience. What unites or combines these two great stems of our knowledge (*e.g.*, sensibility and understanding), which correspond respectively to the empirical and the rational is the transcendental synthesis of apperception in the transcendental ego. There is no need to fear Kant's technical jargon here, for the crux of the matter is that Kant has displaced Leibniz's account of sufficient reason into the subject, just as Copernicus displaced the sun into the center of the solar system. In other words, Kant has replaced the traditional account of knowledge, in which the mind's knowledge is measured according to how adequately it reflects an object which is ultimately determined by God, with an account in which the mind's knowledge is

measured according to its own principle of determination. Thus, Kant Copernican revolution has brought Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason out of the heavens and placed it inside the subject, so that it becomes the principle of determination wielded by the synthesis of the Transcendental ego in its uniting of sensibility and understanding.

This means that, like Descartes' *Meditations*, Kant's first *Critique* only demonstrates so much objective validity to experience as is required for physics. Beyond the limits of motion and duration in time and space, there is no objective knowledge. Thus, the project of traditional metaphysics, which is to know God as a cause beyond the world, is now dismissed as subjective illusion.

But although Kant closed the door to metaphysics, he didn't lock it, for all Kant said, was that God's existence was not a subject about which human understanding could validly speak. Thus, Kant never claimed that God did not exist, rather he simply claimed that God was not an object accessible to the human understanding. This meant that he left open the possibility that faith might discover God beyond the limits of objective knowledge.

It also meant that he left open the possibility that beyond the strictly deterministic world of modern science, where every event is causally determined by another, there exists a realm of freedom where human actions are not determined by causal laws. Thus, in spite of his deterministic view of nature, Human beings can also be conceived of as free, because nothing prevents us from imagining that there is an alternative to the rigidly deterministic laws of nature. Kant's solution to the problem of human freedom adopts Leibniz' distinction between the two realms of nature and grace. Like Leibniz, Kant will argue that events are determined by the law of cause and effect in the realm of nature, but that the soul can be a cause in the realm of freedom. The difference is that Kant's disavowal

of dogmatic metaphysics (e.g., any metaphysics which proceeds without a prior critique of the limits of the cognitive faculty, cf. Bxxxv) does not permit him to claim that either of these two realms is governed by God. Instead, Kant will argue that nothing prevents us from regarding our actions as free, provided we do not claim to have any objective knowledge of this metaphysical realm. Thus, the second part of Kant's critical philosophy, the critique of practical reason, will try to explain how moral actions can be free (or autonomous, and hence, distinct from the laws of nature) without basing that freedom on the idea of pre-established harmony arranged by God. Kant's solution to this problem will involve claiming that the pure form of reason can be disentangled from the judgments of nature such that reason in its purity can become the standard for a moral legislation which is both free and universally binding.

III. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel

We are now prepared to show how the development from Fichte to Hegel integrates and repeats the development from Descartes to Leibniz. But before we continue, I would like you to pause, and consider for a moment the enormity of the transformation, which Kant undergoes at the hands of his successors. How is it possible, that out of Kant's assertion of reason's limits, there should arise a movement which leads to its supreme deification?⁴ In what follows I hope to show that this remarkable transformation arises out of his Fichte and Schelling's assimilation of the problems of early modern metaphysics into the problematic of the Kantian subject.

⁴Joseph L. Esposito, *Schelling's Idealism and the Philosophy of Nature* (Lewisburg: Bucknell, 1977) 23.

Fichte

For Fichte the great scandal of Kant's philosophy was that if all knowledge was knowledge of appearances, then the moral subject could have no knowledge of itself as a cause of moral action.⁵ As we have already seen, this arose from the sharp division which Kant posited between the realms of nature and freedom. Thus, Kant maintained that the transcendental ego, which synthesizes the *a priori* representations of space and time, is transcendent to the I which I know myself to be as an object. In other words, the I which knows is different from the I that thinks. This means that the I that thinks and unifies my representations into a single whole is a "thing in itself" which can never be known. To grasp this "I think", as the source of moral action, Fichte proposes that the self simply "posit itself" so that its thinking no longer depends on an unknowable thing-in-itself, but rather on the assumption of freedom. Thus, he says that the first act of freedom is freedom itself, which means that we are free because we will ourselves to be so.

The third antinomy in the first *Critique* showed that free causality in the realm of nature could be neither proven nor disproved according to the dictates of the understanding. At best, reason could provide contradictory arguments both for and against it. As a result of this antinomy, Kant insisted that reason was limited to the scope of the human understanding - which is to say that it only yields valid knowledge when it is united with sensory intuition. On its own, reason leads us into a realm of metaphysical illusion, which is how

⁵This scandal cut to the core of the Kantian project, and Kant was explicitly aware of it: "it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of knowledge, even that of our inner sense), must be accepted merely on *faith*, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts with any satisfactory proof"(BxI). Indeed, it is immediately after this discussion that Kant first refers to the possibility of an intellectual intuition which would end the scandal by making our awareness of ourselves dependent upon something other than external, or sensory intuition. Fichte thus discovered the means of overcoming Kant, in Kant himself.

Kant would describe the knowledge of God which is claimed by the metaphysical speculations of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. What Fichte does is to reverse Kant's argument against freedom of the will, in the third of Kant's four antinomies, by positing the self as an "absolutely first beginning" which "is not a beginning in time, but in causality" (B479).⁶

By thus positing the self as free, Fichte opens the door to the eventual dismantling of the separation between nature and freedom by Schelling and Hegel. This means that we can regard Fichte as the Descartes of post-Kantian German idealism. Like Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*, his conception of the self-positing moral subject leads to the dissolution of Kant's distinction between nature and freedom, and inaugurates a movement that will eventually lead to Schelling's notion of an intellectual intuition of the absolute identity of nature and thought (or subject and object as Schelling puts it).⁷ Thus Fichte is a subjective idealist, who merely sets the stage for the objective idealism of Schelling and Hegel.

Schelling

If Fichte is the Descartes of this period, then Schelling is clearly the Spinoza, for Schelling is generally opposed to the Kant's dualistic division of the world into realms of

⁶The thesis argues that we are free, and the antithesis, starts out assuming we are free only to show that the assumption of freedom would "render all unity of experience impossible" and must, therefore, be false. Thus, Fichte affirms the idea of an absolute cause which the thesis denies. Cf. Luc Ferry, *The System of Philosophies of History*, trans. Franklin Philip (Chicago: University Press, 1992) 128-133, and Alexis Philonenko, *La Liberté Humaine* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1966) 76-94.

⁷One can already see this identity as implicit in Fichte's assumption of freedom. All Schelling will really do is transpose Fichte's first "absolute beginning in causality" into an absolute beginning of both time and causality, so that nature and history are construed as a progressive development. Thus, nature is shown to incorporate a series of levels, or *Potenzen*, and history is shown to progress through a series of stages before humanity becomes capable of intuiting itself as the highest expression of the more primordial productive activity at work in nature.

freedom and realms of nature which are completely disconnected from each other. Like Fichte, Schelling wants to show how these two realms emerge out of a common root. But rather than talk about the self-positing of the moral subject, Schelling claims to have an intellectual intuition of this unity, in a way that strongly recalls Spinoza's account of intuition as the highest kind of rational knowledge.⁸ Thus Schelling sees the necessity of

⁸Cf. *Ethics*, II, 40, *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton University Press, 1985) 477, 478. Spinoza describes intuition as follows "this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God, to the adequate knowledge of the [NS: formal] essence of things." With the phrase "formal essence of certain attributes," Spinoza is referring to the geometric method, which forms the foundation of his own attempt to intuit the absolute by taking his clue from the intuition of space as the underlying structure of extension. Thus, arguing in a way that parallels the arguments of geometry, Spinoza will propose that an intuition of the unity of substance is the implicit structure of thought. This means that philosophy involves an intuition of the unity of substance in the same way that geometry involves spatial intuition. On this reading Spinoza's account of intuition is quite similar to Leibniz' account of sufficient reason, for both move from the order and structure of the world, to the divine essence. As it is appropriated by Schelling, Spinoza's move from a knowledge of the attributes to a knowledge of the divine essence is transformed into a move from the structure of natural forms to the intuition of the absolute indifference of freedom and necessity. Thus, Schelling reads Fichte's self-positing subject through Spinoza's notion of the one substance in such a way that the finite subject is regarded as a mode of the absolute subject. This in turn permits Schelling to appropriate everything which Kant attributed to intellectual intuition in the Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (BxI), and in sections §76 and §77 of the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*. For Schelling is not really claiming to actually possess an intuitive understanding himself (e.g., he is not claiming to be a god) so much as he is claiming to have an intuition of the existence of such a necessary being in a way that Kant's philosophy explicitly forbids: "der Begriff eines absolutnotwendigen Wesens zwar ein unentbehrliche Vernunftidee, aber ein für den Menschlichen Verstand unerreichbarer problematischer Begriff"/"the concept of such an absolutely necessary being, though an indispensable idea of reason, is an unattainable problematic concept for the human understanding" (§76, *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Meiner Philosophische Bibliothek: Hamburg, 1990) 341/268). Thus, Schelling is using Spinoza's notion of intuition to correct Kant's injunction against metaphysics. By rehabilitating Spinoza's claim that intuition is the highest level of thought, Schelling will argue that reason provides an "intellectual intuition" of the absolute in a way that mere understanding does not. But once one grants the existence of this intuition of the whole, then Schelling can use Kant's own argument against him, by moving from the presence of the idea in the intuition, to its actual existence in a way that retrieves Spinoza's use of the ontological argument: "Ist er sich dessen als in der Anschauung gegeben bewusst, so ist es wirklich, ohne sich hierbei zu irgend etwas von Möglichkeit zu denken"/"if [the understanding] is conscious of it as given in intuition, then the thing is actual, without thereby having to think of it as something possible" (§76). What Kant says of the understanding, Schelling will henceforth apply to reason: If there is an intellectual intuition of the absolute, then it must actually exist. Thus, the real inspiration behind Schelling's "intellectual intuition" is Spinoza's employment of the ontological argument. All Schelling has done is to dress it up in Kantian language, and insist that it conforms to Kant's project.

the world of nature and the freedom of the world of thought as two aspects of a single nature, in much the same way Spinoza sees thought and extension as two attributes of a single substance. Fichte had already used the phrase “intellectual intuition” to describe the intuition by which the self posits its own freedom.⁹ What distinguishes Schelling’s use of this notion is the way he explicitly links it to Spinoza’s conception of the unity of the divine substance in order to criticize Fichte’s conception of nature.

In Schelling’s view, Fichte is too pre-occupied with morality to see the larger implications of his theory. If the assumption of freedom demands that everything be regarded as falling within the power of the subject, then why stop with the moral subject, why not rather, assume that there is a free causality in the realm of natural phenomena, as well? In other words, what prevents us from regarding nature as the expression of this absolutely free consciousness, rather than as a mere limitation on our subjective activity? This question stood Fichte’s philosophy on its head, so that rather than saying the self posits absolute freedom, Schelling is proposing that absolute freedom posits the Self. You don’t posit it so much as it posits you.¹⁰ It is no longer just a subjective positing of the

⁹The Fichte’s earliest use of this phrase in the *Anesidemus Review* appears to have been motivated more by Kant’s appeal to the possibility of such an intuition to distinguish it from sensory intuition (especially in the preface to the first Critique BxI) than by a serious confrontation with Spinoza. Cf. “Review of *Anesidemus*” in: *Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale (Cornell: University Press, 1988) 70 where it is referred to as a transcendental idea. Note also that in a letter to Reinhold, July, 1795 Fichte says “he is particularly fond “ of Schelling’s “references to Spinoza” in *On the I as the Principle of Philosophy* “on the basis of whose system mine can most properly be explained” (Early Writings 401), suggesting that he finds Schelling’s approach to Spinoza to be somehow novel.

¹⁰The *System of Transcendental Idealism* claims that finite restrictedness in which consciousness consists is created through the same act as the absolute synthesis: “in one and the same act there arises at once for the intelligence both the universe and the particular point of evolution to which its consciousness is attached; or more briefly, there arises for the intelligence both the first and the second types of restriction, of which the latter appears incomprehensible only because it is posited along with the first, yet without being derivable therefrom in its determinacy” (115-6). *In other words, empirical consciousness does not posit the absolute synthesis, but rather, the absolute synthesis posits empirical consciousness.*

unconditional ground of freedom, rather it is the recognition of an objective cognition at work in nature. As Dilthey puts it, “Fichte and Schelling passed then from Kant’s recognition of an oppositional cognition to the recognition of an objective cognition, in that they sought to expound stages of this unconditional creative I in consciousness and before consciousness in nature”/“Fichte und Schelling gingen nun von Kants Anerkennung einer gegenständlichen Erkenntnis zu der einer objectiven Erkenntnis über, in dem sie in dem Bewusstsein und vor dem Bewusstsein in der Natur Stufen dieses unbedingten schöpferischen Ich darzutun suchten” (Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, IV (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1959) 223). With this inversion, Schelling unites Fichte’s absolute self with Spinoza’s idea of God as one substance uniting thought and extension. The result is that Schelling has transformed Fichte’s self-positing moral subject from an absolute ground of freedom into an infinite consciousness diffused through out all of nature that first becomes aware of itself in intellectual and artistic intuition. Thus, human thought is the highest mode or expression of this consciousness because philosophy and art represent the moments where this consciousness first becomes aware of itself.

It is important however, that we understand that Schelling was not claiming to have actually attained this absolute consciousness (i.e., he was not claiming to be God), but rather he was claiming to have intuited it in himself. This means that human self-consciousness and absolute consciousness were essentially linked in the same way that Spinoza regarded thought and extension as two attributes of one substance. In other words, Schelling is proposing that both human knowledge and the world of nature are separate attributes of one primordial activity; nature is its unconscious expression, while history is the ongoing process of its becoming aware of its self in nature. As human thought only has an intuition of this complete identity of thought with the whole of nature, human history

remains a continual striving towards this perfect correspondence between thought and being. Schelling comes to see both nature and history as representing a series of developmental stages which end in an intuition of the absolute, which can never be determinately known, but remains only an intuition of the absolute indifference, or an identity of all things which is still in the process of becoming.

Hegel

Hegel, began his philosophical career as an associate of Schelling, but he soon became dissatisfied with Schelling's failure to show how this intuition of the absolute can be determinately known. For Schelling it remains simply an intuition of a perfect identity which human consciousness can never fully attain, but can only strive for as it asymptotically approaches its perfection, just as Spinoza described how modes strive to attain the perfection of the divine essence in the *Ethics*. As a critique of this view, Hegel argues that this intuition of the absolute identity of all things cannot really be counted as knowledge of the absolute unless it can be determinately stated in a rational account. In other words, unless the finite subject is capable of giving a complete (and hence, encyclopedic) account of how spirit is present in nature, and comes to realize itself there in the history of human thought, then this intuition is without any determinate content. It is no better than mysticism, or worse, than a nihilism, in as much as everything is posited as being a part of this absolute identity, without our being able to show how this identity comes about, or is realized in nature and discovered in human history.¹¹ This required a

¹¹Most people fail to understand how even Hegel's view of history, is shaped by the Philosophy of nature which precedes it. The goal of history can only be adequately understood if it is grasped in conjunction with it, as that moment where human consciousness becomes capable of articulating the absolute identity between nature and spirit. Hegel tried to show this moment in the *Phenomenology*, for he came to realize not so much that nature was irrelevant, as Hyppolite claims (cf. *The Genesis and Structure*

phenomenology which could account for the history of the forms of consciousness which spirit must pass through before it becomes capable of articulating the absolute unity of nature and spirit in a single encyclopedic account, which precisely shows how spirit is present in nature, and emerges out of nature by explaining that development from start to finish (e.g., from mechanics, chemistry and organics all the way through the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*).

It was precisely because Schelling's intellectual intuition fell short of such a complete encyclopedic account that Hegel could claim, in the preface to the *Phenomenology*, that Schelling's absolute was "a night in which all cows are black." As a mere intuition of the absolute, it failed to give a sufficiently determinate account of the absolute unity of nature and freedom, or of the subject and object, that it pretended to explain.

Having already suggested how Hegel's Jena period involved a search for the proper

of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 30), but that the juncture of nature and freedom (or nature and spirit) had to be explained as the result of an historical development. In other words, it had to be explained in terms of how human consciousness actually arrives at that standpoint. To give an adequate account of this progression required a phenomenology, which shows how consciousness develops from within (from the successive collapse of each of its attempts to account for the whole), rather than through a philosophy of spirit, which attempted to provide an external account of this development, e.g., one which was not immanent to the development of consciousness itself. One can see this, for example, in the first philosophy of nature which Hegel published at Jena. This text, proceeds 1) from a discussion of speech, the tool, and the family, to 2) their negation, to 3) their integration in a people. The text breaks off after Hegel attempts to describe how this development is integrated in a people. The reason it breaks off is that Hegel was unable to adequately explain how spirit could attain an insight into the unity of nature and spirit, without articulating that development from the inside. In the external perspective which he adopted from Schelling's philosophy of nature, the best Hegel could do was to describe spirit as the negation of nature: "As absolute ethical spirit is essentially as the infinite negative, the superseding of nature, in which it *has only become an other, the positing of nature as itself*, and then the absolute enjoyment of itself, in as much as it has taken nature back into itself." (*First Philosophy of Spirit*, 243). He was not yet able to show how this standpoint could account for the unity of nature and spirit. This, I propose, is the reason why this 1803 text breaks off and is left incomplete, and why the 1806 philosophy of nature, is soon followed by the *Phenomenology*. Hegel found that he was incapable of giving an account of the unity of nature and spirit without providing a genetic account of the history of the forms which conscious spirit must pass through before it becomes capable of articulating this unity in a single encyclopedic account.

standpoint from which to launch an adequate account of the absolute, it remains only to show how Hegel's appropriation of Leibniz lead him to see the need for such a complete account. The easiest way to explain this is through Leibniz's conception of life. We have already seen both how Leibniz appealed to the principle of sufficient reason in his metaphysics, and how Kant's Copernican revolution involved the transformation of the principle of sufficient reason into a subjective principle determinative of appearances. If we now consider what would happen to Leibniz' conception of organic life as a result of this inversion of the principle of sufficient reason, we discover a concise illustration of Hegel's own philosophy of organism. For Leibniz' organic life is "inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons" and is distinguished from Descartes' mechanical understanding of life (Descartes 44,219), by the infinite complexity of its detail. Thus, living bodies are divine machines which are also machines in each of their parts ad infinitum (§64). They present a complexity of detail which is only grasped by the infinite wisdom of God. But following Schelling and Spinoza, Hegel, in contrast, conceives God, or the absolute, as immanent in the world, rather than transcendent to it. As a result, for Hegel, organic life is that which binds the disparate parts of the living being into an organic whole, such that the whole is actually present in every part. Thus Hegel's conception of life can be seen as a transformation of Leibniz' conception of life. What Leibniz describes as a dim perception of the whole which is present in every part, Hegel has transformed into a living presence of the whole that is fully present in every part through the circulatory processes of life. This means that organic life is not just a confused or abstract representation of the parts in the whole, but an actual living presence of the whole in every part. Thus, the determining principle of the whole, which was the presence of the monad to God's infinite life, has now been transformed into the concept which makes the life of the whole present in every

part through its infinite circulation.

IV. The Hegelian Synthesis

Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a recombination and synthesis of elements from the philosophies of Leibniz, Spinoza and Descartes as they are reinterpreted by Kant, Fichte and Schelling. From Leibniz, Hegel adopts the notion of life as the presence of the infinite in the finite, with the difference that now it is reinterpreted in accord with the internalization of the principle of sufficient reason. From Spinoza, he adopts the idea that God is immanent in the world in such a way that the unity of thought and extension implies that logical implication and physical causation are one in the same ("the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" *Ethics* II, P7, 451). But the difference is that in Hegel this unity is reinterpreted in accord with Schelling's philosophy of nature, so that it is conceived as the unfolding of the divine mind in nature and history. Thus, the relation between nature and the human body and spirit and human thought is precisely analogous to Spinoza's account of the relation between modes and attributes, for both nature and spirit are conceived as two expressions of one substance, or Idea (where the idea is understood as the real unity of both). The result is a chiasm of the philosophies of Leibniz and Spinoza, in which Leibniz' notion of the monad as a substantial union of form and matter (*Philosophical Writings* 162/*Philosophische Schriften*, IV,) is interpreted through Spinoza's concept of nature as the unity of the one substance, and vice-versa. This relation between finite Spirit and infinite Spirit is something which poses the greatest obstacle to those studying Hegel for the first time, and what I hope I

have suggested is that it cannot be truly understood without reference to Spinoza.¹²

Finally, From Descartes Hegel adopts the idea of starting from the subjective foundation of the *ego cogito*. But here again, this foundation has been put on an entirely subjective foundation by Kant's inversion of the principle of sufficient reason and Fichte's reversal of the antithesis of Kant's third antinomy. The result is that the Cartesian subject, whose certainty is grounded on God, becomes conceived as an absolute subject whose certainty is grounded not in an intellectual intuition of itself, but in its complete transparency to itself. In this way, Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as incorporating the entire development of modern rationalist philosophy in an attempt to complete Descartes' project of attaining a complete mastery and control over nature. For Hegel genuinely believes that he has attained such an absolute mastery in as much as he has demonstrated that the concept is actually present in every phase of both nature and the history of spirit which emerges out of it.

One can perhaps understand this more clearly from the perspective of Hegel's concept of organic life. As we discover at the end of the *Logic*, Hegel's thinking involves the curious claim that the concept is the equivalent of organic life in as much as it is the life of the concept which is discovered to be the unifying ground which animates both nature and spirit. This means that there is a thoroughgoing organicism which permeates every aspect of Hegel's thinking, whether it is about logic, nature, or society and politics.¹³ Thus, when Hegel describes life as the whole which is present in every part, it is an attempt

¹²Note also how this is sufficient to account for what Taminiaux describes as a move from methodological productivism to ontological productivism in "Hobbes to Hegel," in: *Dialectic and Difference*, trans. by James Decker and Robert Crease (New Jersey: Macmillan, Humanities Press, 1985) 29.

¹³Cf. Taminiaux "Hobbes and Hegel" in *Dialectic and Difference* (New Jersey: Macmillan, Humanities Press, 1985) 15.

to show that life can be conceptually mastered through an account which doubles the actuality of organic life with the life of the concept, in order to show that the concept is actually present in the world of nature. Like the two attributes of thought and extension in Spinoza, the two accounts are understood as representing one substance, or what Hegel calls the Idea, or the concrete universal. Thus, Cartesian dualism is overcome via a conceptual demonstration which actually portrays animate life. This means that Hegel's philosophy is a subjective construction which can only claim to be objectively actual, or true, by showing that both nature and the history of human spirit are products of the Idea. In other words, it is an account that claims to heal the division of Cartesian dualism (between thinking and extended substance) by putting itself along side, and thus doubling, the very actuality it professes to realize. But this is not to say that it is something extraneous, for if it were not for the fact that spirit doubles nature by arising out of it to subsist over and against it as something real, then there would be nothing to distinguish humanity from the rest of animate life. Thus, Spirit too, must have its own reality, which must in turn be shown to be complete.¹⁴ And this is the reason why Hegel can claim to be completing the actuality of life by doubling it with a portrayal of its unity, for in the final instance, the life it portrays is really only the life of human spirit.¹⁵ If in the end this

¹⁴As I remarked in note 5, it was only after his repeated failure to show this reality from outside consciousness, that Hegel was led to the idea of describing the standpoint of this completion in terms of the immanent development of consciousness successive failures to attain the absolute.

¹⁵Spirit is a conventional construction. Like the realm of convention in Hobbes, it begins in principles which lie in us (cf. The article on Hobbes in *The Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. H.S. Haldane and Frances Simon (London: Routledge, Keagan and Paul, 1896) 315. This means that in spite of its crude materialism the conventionalism of Hobbes' *Leviathan* is actually closer to Hegel's position than any of the rationalist positions we have considered thus far. Taminiaux makes this influence especially clear in "Hobbes and Hegel" in *Dialectic and Difference*. One can see this by considering Hobbes' notion of representation which tries to make Hobbes' sovereign, who is the principle of the whole, into the sole representative of each of its parts. Hegel's appropriation of Leibniz permits him to transform the artificial life of Hobbes' *Leviathan*, whose sovereign is regarded as a determining principle of

dialectical account of life must be classified as a metaphysics, it is less for its appropriation of Leibniz' view of the infinite complexity of the organic, than it is for its appropriation of Spinoza's claim that the order of thought and the order of being are the same. Indeed, it is this insistence that spiritual life and natural life are somehow linked, which is both his greatest inspiration and the perhaps the deepest flaw in Hegel's thought.

As I argue in my commentary in chapter five, Schelling's appropriation of Spinoza's conception of the unity of thought and nature leads him to explicitly conceive of the *Naturphilosophie* in terms of Bruno's hermetic animism.¹⁶ Henceforth, nature is to be construed as the product of a single living consciousness, which constitutes the bond that unites and animates all of its parts into a single whole. This means that nature is to be transformed into invisible spirit, and spirit into visible nature, until they can be exhibited as

the whole which is only abstractly united with his subjects, into an organic unity in which the whole is actually present in each of its parts through the fluidity of organic life. Hegel's account of life as the concrete realization of the infinite in the finite realizes the Leibnizian aim of replacing Hobbes' "Mortal God," with Leibniz's truly infinite God who governs the republic of spirits. But now this absolute governance is seen as something which can be grasped by subjective consciousness, which is the final stage of its actualization. Rather than banishing God beyond the limits of the world, the infinite life of the spirit is rendered as something infinitely present in the concrete, which the subject is capable of thinking through speculatively by tracing the path of its own development to the moment of its self-recognition. Thus, the thoughts of Leibniz' God are made present to finite consciousness, but only to the extent they are recaptured in a system which sees subjective "principles in us" as the highest stage of a developmental process in which Spirit comes to recognize itself as such. What this means is that Spirit no longer needs to span what "reflection" imagines to be the distance between the finite and the infinite, because it effectively comprehends both in the infinite cycle of synthesis and dissolution that constitutes the life of the concept.

¹⁶Cf. *Bruno: or on the World Soul*, which was published in 1802. The influence of Bruno, however, was, already present in the first articulation of the *Naturphilosophie* in 1797, as can be seen in the famous citation at the end of the Introduction to the *Ideas for the Philosophy of Nature*: "Nature should be mind made visible, mind invisible nature" [Schelling, *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, tr. E.E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge: University Press, 1988), 42], which echoes the following citation from Bruno's *Of the Cause, Principle and Unity*, "that it is by the same ladder that nature descends to the production of things and the intellect ascends to the knowledge of them; and that the one and the other proceeds from unity and returns to unity" (as cited in Frances Yates article on "Giordano Bruno," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967) 407).

constituting a unified whole exhibiting the one in the all and the all in the one.¹⁷ Although Schelling only claims the cognition of this bond as a task for future research,¹⁸ Hegel believes he can exhibit this bond as a present actuality, and thereby strip the veil from nature's secrets to exhibit the concept as the universally sublimating/fixative process—as the universal elixir, as it were — which governs the cycle of the elements. Thus, the very terms which Hegel uses to describe the cycles of these elemental processes suggest a conscious appropriation of the rhetoric of alchemy and hermetic animism to express the metaphysical claim that forms the core of Hegel's entire system: namely, that the concept and the animating principle of organic life are one and the same. Once this identity is granted, nature's structure can be completely unlocked by the concept in as much as it essentially is the concept. From this perspective the fact that the precise manner of nature's integration of the concept has not yet been fully grasped can be dismissed as the fault of empirical science, rather than of the philosophy of nature, which need only provide a general treatment, or “a likely story,” in terms of elemental processes that are in no way fixed in themselves.¹⁹ The essential is to grasp the concept as the ground of life: “Life is essentially this perfect fluid penetration of all parts of the latter, α parts, i.e., such which are indifferent against the whole; they are no chemical abstractions; rather they are

¹⁷Schelling *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, 42.

¹⁸Indeed, his thought remains transcendental only the degree that the characterization of this ground remains a future task. Cf. *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, 42: “This essay does not begin from above ... but from below. Only when I have reached the goal which I have set for myself will it be permissible for me to retrace in reverse the course which has been run.”

¹⁹As in the *Timaeus* the elements are nothing fixed in themselves, but indeterminate qualities (49c-d). This lack of fixity is perhaps one reason why *Timaeus'* account is no more than a “likely story.” (29d). The theory of the elements permits Hegel to present a similarly plausible account without requiring the complete specification of detail in every case.

substantially its own whole life — and a life of the parts, which restlessly dissolves itself in itself, and only brings forth the whole. — *The whole* is the universal substance, the ground, as it is the resulting totality; — and the whole is the latter as *actuality*; it is the One which in its freedom contains the parts bound together in itself; the One divides itself in the parts, gives them its universal life, and holds them in itself as their negative, as their force;” (*Gesammelte Werke*, Volume VIII, the translation is mine, 119-120).

To better grasp how Hegel believes he can justify this fantastic account, let us turn to an analysis of the concept of organic life in Kant (chapter II), and Schelling (chapter’s III and IV).

II. Kant's Staging of the Conflict between Leibniz and Spinoza

For attempting to overcome all the difficulties and errors that prevent one from arriving at knowledge of the truth is indeed a matter of fighting battles
 -Descartes¹

Thus far I have depicted a progression from Descartes to Hegel and I have suggested how Hegel's thought can be regarded as integrating this entire development. I would now like to present a more detailed exposition of this progression which demonstrates that the history of German Idealism can be conceived as a series of attempts to integrate Leibniz's teleological metaphysics with Spinoza's critique of final causality. But before I begin, let me briefly review the central features of our earlier discussion. The main argument is that Kant's copernican revolution brings about the internalization of Leibniz' principle of sufficient reason. If we take this internalization as the moment where the objective reason of metaphysics gets transposed into the subjective reason of German idealism, then we discover that German idealism can be regarded as a repetition of the development of the metaphysical progression from Descartes to Spinoza and Leibniz, on the inner plane of subjective knowledge. Thus, Fichte's notion of the self-positing subject makes him the Descartes of this new epoch, Schelling's explicit return to the idea of the unity of thought and being in philosophy of nature makes him the Spinoza, and Hegel's appeal to Leibniz' conception of life to critique Schelling's view makes him the Leibniz of German idealism.

What I will now show is how German idealism from Kant to Hegel can be grasped

¹*The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, I, 145.

as a progressive struggle between the central doctrines of Leibniz and Spinoza.

Kant's *Critique of Teleological Judgment* first enacts this struggle, by attempting to correct and save the phenomena of Leibniz' metaphysics through the critical ascesis of Spinoza's critique of final causality. The result is that Kant conceives teleological judgments as subjectively necessary apriori, even though they cannot be objectively determined.

Although space does not permit me to address Fichte in detail, we can at least see that Fichte's notion of the self-positing moral subject only stages this struggle in a way that fails to come to terms with it as such (just as one might argue that Descartes' dualism failed to adequately address the interaction between thinking and extended substance). By conceiving of an absolute subject in opposition to the realm of nature, Fichte preserves the Spinozistic emphasis in Kant's account of nature as mechanism even as he attempts to think the necessity of the ground which transcends it; thus, Fichte fails to resolve the conflict because he never genuinely acknowledges the problem. It was not until Schelling transformed Fichte's notion of the absolute subject into an absolute intelligence which produces nature as its product that this conflict reemerged again.

By reappropriating Spinoza's notion of intuition Schelling believed he could transcend the apriori subjective purposiveness of the teleological judgment to attain an insight into the existence of a supersensible basis of nature. In accord with Kant's account of the idea of a divine or intellectual intuition which is different from human sensory intuition, Schelling grasped this imagined basis² — which is *eo ipso* a product of human

²I use the word imagined in reference to Spinoza's notion that final causes involve a mistaking of the imagination for the intellect in the appendix to Chapter I of the *Ethics* in *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, Vol I. (Princeton: University Press, 1985), 444.

thought — “as the *cause* that makes the product possible.”³ In other words, Schelling was able to maintain that this imagined origin was the actual basis of nature, because he conceived human thought as a mode of this original consciousness in the same way that Spinoza grasped human thought as a mode of the divine substance. In this way Schelling can move from finite human thought to the idea of an intellectual intuition animating all of nature, because he conceives our thinking as a mode of this consciousness just as Spinoza conceives human thought as a mode of the attribute of divine thought. By thus combining Spinoza’s notion of a simple substance with Leibniz’ idea of a purposive intelligence (a combination which Kant had suggested in §80 of the *Critique of Judgment*), Schelling transforms the subjective purposiveness of Kant’s reflective teleological judgments into an intuition of the ground of the objective purposiveness of nature. What this means is that Schelling can now claim to have an intuitive insight into the ground of objective purposiveness, without being able to objectively determine it. In this way Schelling believes he has attained an insight into the ground of nature without claiming to have an objective cognition of it that would violate Kant’s critique of limits of subjective intuition. Thus, in spite of this apparent reversal of Spinoza’s critique of final causality Schelling nevertheless maintains a limit to our insight into the nature of this original cause, just as Spinoza denies we have any insight into the divine essence. In other words, by not claiming to understand God’s will, Schelling will essentially respect Spinoza’s critique of the limits of human imagination, in a way that Hegel will not. This means that Schelling has combined Spinoza’s devastating critique of final causality, with Kant’s critique of Spinoza with the result that Spinoza’s simple substance is conceived in accord with Kant’s

³Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgment*. trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) 292.

insistence that we must think this ground as an intelligence (*CJ* 307). Thus, Schelling unites Leibniz' teleology and Spinoza's denial of final causality into a single account which transforms Kant's idea of a teleological judgment that is subjectively purposive for human sensory intuition, into a *rational or intellectual* intuition of the intelligent ground of the objective purposiveness of nature.

Hegel will finally resolve this conflict between Leibniz' teleology and Spinoza's metaphysics by transforming Schelling's absolute intuition into a determinate cognition of the absolute. Thus, Hegel resolves this struggle between Leibniz and Spinoza by decisively rejecting Spinoza's critique of final causality at the same time as he embraces his denial of contingency. With this rejection, German idealism is able to digest and reconcile the contradiction between teleology and mechanism, but only at the cost of transforming the objective cognition of nature into a metaphysics of life which abandons the central feature of Kant's mechanistic account of nature: the contingency of objects for our understanding. To better understand how Hegel's claim to have attained absolute knowledge resolves this conflict, we must first turn to a more detailed examination of the appropriation of Leibniz and Spinoza in Kant and Schelling.

Kant's Appropriation of Leibniz and Spinoza in *The Critique of Judgment*

As we have just seen, Kant's *Critique of Teleological Judgment* reconciles Leibniz's teleology with Spinoza's critique of Final causality. Kant effects this reconciliation between teleology and mechanism by insisting that teleology only has a subjective, or reflective use for guiding our cognition of nature. With this resolution of the antinomy of teleological judgment Kant proceeds to examine whether the use of final causes in the study of organized beings in nature proves that nature has a special kind of

causality, or whether this causality merely works through the causality of mechanism. Since either alternative finds “something purposelike in nature’s products” Kant distinguishes between an unintentional and an intentional technic (e.g., causality) of nature: “By an intentional technic I mean that nature’s ability to produce [things] in terms of final causes must be considered a special kind of causality; by an unintentional technic I mean that this ability is basically quite identical with the mechanism of nature, and that we have falsely interpreted the contingent agreement of that ability with our concepts and rules of art, namely as a special kind of natural production” (*CJ* 271). With this distinction Kant believes he can characterize the dogmatic approaches that try to explain nature in terms of final causes: “one interprets final causes *idealistically*, the other *realistically*” (*CJ* 272). The idealistic interpretation of final causes will be identified with Spinoza, while the realistic interpretation is clearly associated with Leibniz, although he is not mentioned by name.⁴

The ensuing sections of the dialectic of Teleological judgment make it even clearer that what is at issue is an evaluation of the perspectives of Spinoza and Leibniz. Section 73 argues that neither of these systems accomplishes what it alleges. Spinoza’s attempt to provide a unified basis “that will explain why things of nature are connected in terms of purposes (something it does not deny),” (*CJ* 274) fails because its assertion of ontological unity does not yet amount to the unity of a purpose. In other words, Kant is claiming that

⁴Realism is associated with two central notions in Leibniz’s thought: hylozoism and theism. According to Kant, the realistic interpretation is either physical or hyperphysical. The physical version of the realistic interpretation of final causes [Hylozoism] “where life is either in the matter, or due to an inner animating principle” (*CJ* 273) as in the *Monadology* (cf. §19, 56, 63, 69, 70, 75) while the hyperphysical version of the realistic interpretation, or theism as Kant defines it “derives the purposiveness of nature from the original basis of the universe,” which is Leibniz’ position as well (cf. “De rerum originatione radicali” in *Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, VII, 302-303. For an English translation see “On the Ultimate Origin of Things” in *G.W. Leibniz. Philosophical Essays*, 149-151). The two together account for the physical and the metaphysical role of Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason. God is the original ground of the universe who sufficiently determines the principles animating every monad, and thereby establishes a harmony between monads, and between the realm of nature and the realm of grace.

Spinoza is implicitly trying to discover a purposive form as ideally or unintentionally present at the ground of nature, but the mere idea of unity cannot sustain this implicit purposiveness “because the mere presentation of the unity of the substrate cannot give rise to the idea of even so much as an unintentional purposiveness”(CJ 275). Thus, Spinoza’s system, which maintains the ideality of final causes, cannot base that ideality of purposes in the supersensible idea of the unity of the one substance, for such an idea does not give rise to any purposiveness whatsoever.

Leibniz’ claim to have an insight into a special kind of causality that can explain natural purposes also fails. First, because living matter is a contradiction. And even if we can imagine it to be endowed with life by something else, and that nature as a whole were thus an animal, experience does not justify applying this hypothesis to the whole of nature. Without any apriori insight into such a possibility, our explanation can only move in a circle: “we try to derive the natural purposiveness in organized beings from the life of matter, while yet we are familiar with this life only in organized beings and hence cannot form a concept of this purposiveness unless we have experienced such beings”(CJ 276,§73). Second, theism cannot dogmatically provide a basis for natural purposes either. It can, however, rescue the purposiveness of nature from idealism by attributing natural purposes to an intentional causality.

For theism to succeed in explaining natural causes, the mechanistic explanation would have to be shown to fail. “Only such a proof would enable us to postulate determinately that the basis of this proof lies beyond nature”(CJ 276), but the character and limits of our cognitive powers force us to give up any attempt to find a reference to a principle in matter. As a result, the only way we can represent a nature’s production of things as natural purposes is by a reflective judgment which represents a supreme

understanding as cause of the world.

Section 74 argues that it is impossible to treat the technic of nature dogmatically because it tries to subsume nature under a causality that is conceivable only to reason. Such a subsumption is unwarranted because before we could subsume anything under the concept of a natural purpose, we would first have to be certain it existed, and although the concept of a natural purpose is only possible under conditions given in experience, it cannot be abstracted from experience, but is a concept which is only possible in terms of a rational principle that we use in judging the object. This means it is impossible to judge whether it has objective reality. As the purposiveness of the object is simultaneously determined by two distinct bases, one natural and empirical, the other supersensible and rational, there is no way to prove the objective reality of a natural purpose. Indeed, “we cannot even ask the question” (CJ 278), for the concept of a natural purpose “must contain not only a natural basis that makes the thing possible, but also a basis that makes possible nature itself, and its reference to something that is not empirically cognizable nature (but is supersensible) and hence is not cognizable for us at all.... This explains why all the systems that might be devised to treat dogmatically the concept of natural purposes and the concept of nature as a whole having coherence in terms of final causes cannot decide anything whatsoever by way of either objective affirmation or objective negation” (CJ 278-9). In other words, dogmatism cannot decide whether or not a ground of natural purposes exists, because such grounds are not capable of being rendered objective to human knowledge.

In section 75 Kant introduces the idea that “*the peculiar character of my cognitive powers* is such that the only way I can judge [how] ... things are possible and produced is by conceiving, [to account] for this production, a cause that acts according to intentions,

and hence, a being that produces [things] in a way that is analogous to the causality of our understanding”(CJ 280). In Section 76 he establishes that the contingency of objects for the human understanding still must be combined in a unified and lawful way that is nevertheless wholly subjective. e.g., in a way that is regulative, rather than constitutive for human judgment: “Now in this [kind of case] the following maxim always holds: where cognizing [certain] objects is beyond the ability of our understanding, we must think them in accordance with the subjective conditions for exercising [our] powers, conditions that attach necessarily to our (i.e., human) nature. And if the judgments we make in this way cannot be constitutive principles that determine the character of the object, ... they can still be regulative principles, safe and immanent in their employment, and commensurate with the human point of view”(CJ 286). In section 77 Kant unites the idea of the peculiarity of our cognitive power requiring us to conceive of an intentional cause analogous to that of our understanding, with the idea of subjective necessity, in order to show how it is possible for us to form the concept of a natural purpose. Provided we do not mistake our teleological conception of such a purpose for an objective determination of natural objects, we can discover a principle which is subjectively necessary, without being objectively determinative. Indeed, Kant will go so far as to say that our cognitive power is so constituted, that when it seeks to explain combinations in terms of purposes, that it is actually forced to seek the basis for such combinations in a supreme cause of the world. Thus, rather than entitling this section: “On the Peculiarity of the Human Understanding that Makes the Concept of a Natural Purpose Possible for us.” Kant might just as well have entitled it: “On the Peculiarity of the Understanding that Makes the Concept of a Natural Purpose *Necessary* for us.”

Kant argues that the concept of a natural purpose is a consequence of the limited

scope of human reason. Because our intuition is finite, reason cannot validly claim to know the cause of a natural purpose without falling into dialectical illusion. “[Hence] the concept of the causality of nature which implies that nature is a being acting according to purposes seems to turn the idea of a natural purpose into a principle that is constitutive of the natural purpose”(CJ 288). In other words, by transforming the idea of a natural purpose into a principle that is constitutive, reason appears to have isolated the cause of this natural purpose. But in fact, the idea of a natural purpose is only relative to the finitude of our intuition, and the corresponding uncertain character of reason when it is applied to concepts without intuition to give it content. What is at issue is an attempt to unite Kant’s transcendental exploration of the limits of human reason, with teleology, in order to show that the subjective necessity of teleological judgments is such that they are indispensable for human judgment: “Indeed, absolutely no human understanding... can hope to understand, in terms of nothing but mechanical causes, how so much as a mere blade of grass is produced. For it seems that [*wenn*] judgment is quite unable to study even if it restricts itself to experience as its guide, [how] such objects are possible, without [using] the teleological connection of causes and effects” (CJ 294).

The crux of the problem is that the concept of the causality of nature leads us to imagine that our idea of a natural purpose is actually constitutive of nature’s actual purpose (*e.g.*, that it is its true origin). In other words, “the concept of the causality of nature which implies that nature is a being acting according to purposes seems to turn the idea of a natural purpose into an idea that is constitutive of the natural purpose” (CJ 288). Thus, the peculiarity of our understanding (*viz.*, our inability to form a concept of how the world is possible without thinking it as the product of an intentional cause) misleads us into believing we have grasped nature’s causality, whereas in fact we have only grasped our

own idea of it.

The point is quite similar to Spinoza's criticism of the anthropomorphic nature of final causes in book one of the *Ethics*: "Men commonly suppose that all natural things act as men do, on account of an end; indeed, they maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end, for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship God" (*The Collected Works of Spinoza*, 439-440). Like Spinoza, Kant is proposing that final causes are nothing but "human fictions" which "turn nature completely upside down" (442) and are the last "sanctuary of ignorance" (443), if they are not kept within their critical limits. Indeed, Kant's critical philosophy as a whole, can be seen in terms of its adherence to the Spinozistic principle that the "order in things" is nothing more than "a relation to our imagination" (444), so to "say that God has created all things" is to "attribute imagination to God" (444), i.e., it is to conceive God on a human scale.

What this means is that Kant's argument about natural purposes parallels Spinoza's critique of final causality. Thus, the idea of a natural purpose is "necessary" (CJ 288) for us, because the limitations of our intuition cannot grasp the complexity of the causality (be it mechanical or otherwise) at work in nature. Thus, Kant argues, a critique of judgment is required to show how this principle is necessary for our understanding even though it is not constitutive for the natural purpose. The point is that what appears to be a constitutive idea is not. It is merely a principle of reason "for the power of judgement not for the understanding" (CJ 289). This principle arises from the peculiarity of our understanding, and we are justified in making subjective use of it. Thus, the concept of a natural purpose is intelligible for our understanding, provided we do not assume it to be constitutive of nature (CJ 280). This means that "it is a principle [that helps us] merely to apply understanding

generally to possible objects of experience, namely, in those cases where we cannot judge determinatively, but can judge merely reflectively” (289).

The Modern Origins of the Problem

To illustrate what is at issue in reflective teleological judgments, it will be useful to examine how Hobbes’ account of the natural basis of religion anticipates Kant’s account of reflective judgement. In chapter eleven of *Leviathan* Hobbes argues that “curiosity, or love of knowledge of causes, draws man from consideration of the effect to seek the cause, and again the cause of that cause, till of necessity he must come to this thought at last: there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal, which men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God eternal, though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind answerable to his nature.”⁵ In other words, Hobbes is arguing that we are inclined to believe that the world has an origin in a first cause even though we cannot determinately think or attain this idea with any adequacy. Thus, already in Hobbes, we find the idea of a mere “consideration” - or reflective idea - inclining us to believe there is an origin of the world, that is only relative to our own power of thought. So far so good. The difficulty is that it is not at all clear that Hobbes understands this “consideration” to limit the scope of our knowledge of God in the same way that Kant does. Indeed, in spite of his cautious and suggestive language, which speaks of “considerations”, “inclinations” and men standing “in awe of the power of their own imaginations”, etc., Hobbes appears to accept this argument as sound, as is made evident by his subsequent example: “For as a man that is

⁵Thomas Hobbes, *The Collected Works of Thomas Hobbes*, Vol.III, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: Routledge, 199) 92).

born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive and assure himself there is somewhat there, which men call *fire* and is the cause of the heat such as they have that see it; so also, by the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of him in his mind”(Hobbes 92-93). Apart from the ambiguous character of this image (in which there is still a sensory basis for the judgment, viz., felt warmth instead of sight), Hobbes clearly believes the argument to be sound. The problem is that it is in contradiction with other elements in his philosophy, for the argument asserts a knowledge of God as a first cause on the order of natural fact at the same time as he holds that the conventional character of knowledge makes all knowledge of natural fact impossible: “No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or to come. For as knowledge of fact, it is originally sense, and ever after memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute but conditional” (Hobbes 52). Thus, Hobbes’ account of natural religion appeals to the existence of an absolute causal chain on the order of natural fact at the same time that his mechanistic psychology and the conventional account of knowledge which is based upon it asserts that all knowledge of fact is impossible.

But what does Hobbes have to do with Kant? Or for that matter Hegel? The link is Leibniz, whose entire metaphysics can be grasped as an attempt to resolve the contradiction implicit in the attempt to prove the existence of God on mechanistic grounds. Leibniz’ diagnosis of the contradiction in Hobbes’ account of our natural knowledge of God, constitutes an unwitting anticipation of Kant’s antinomies. Although its manifest theme is perhaps closest to the fourth antinomy in the first *Critique*, it is closely related to the

antinomy of teleological judgment as well. Thus, in a manner that seems expressly designed to correct the defect in Hobbes' account of natural religion, Leibniz will argue that the cause of the world must be sought outside the chain of efficient causes in a reason that is final, sufficient, and metaphysically necessary (Leibniz, *Philosophischen Schriften*, VII, 302-303/*Philosophical Essays* 151). But this metaphysical solution to Hobbes' difficulty has scarcely resolved it, for in a way that represents a step back to a pre-modern perspective, Leibniz presupposes that there is a link between our human reason and the ultimate origin of the world. Thus, what is required in the critique of teleological judgment is an argument which shows the antinomy in this pre-modern metaphysical perspective. Hence, what is at issue in the dialectic of teleological judgment is an attempt to reappropriate Leibniz' metaphysics by wielding Spinoza's critique of final causality as a critical tool by which to distinguish and preserve as much of Leibniz' teleology as can legitimately remain within the domain of the critical philosophy.

Kant is standing before the same problem which was articulated in Hobbes: namely, that "man is inclined ... to believe there is one God eternal, though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind answerable to his nature" (*Hobbes* 92). To rephrase this in Kant's terms, finite consciousness cannot "*determinately judge* in conformity with the idea" of an origin, "but can only reflect on it" (*CJ* 289). At best, our thought of the origin can only remain a reflective appearance, or Hobbesian "fancy" - although, unlike Hobbes, we cannot even assume that this fancy is an "appearance... of a body without us" (*Hobbes* 1). The difference from Hobbes' account is that, in the wake of Leibniz and Spinoza, Kant both recognizes the difficulty and possesses the critical tools which are capable of resolving it. Thus, Kant will both acknowledge the inherent limitations of teleological judgment at the same time acknowledging their necessity for finite consciousness - e.g., for a

consciousness whose peculiarity is that its objects are contingent rather than necessary.

What this means is that Kant now recognizes that reflective judgment in relation to the idea of an origin necessarily presupposes “the idea of some possible understanding different from the human one.... Only by presupposing this idea can we say that because of the special character of our understanding *must we consider* certain natural products, as to [how] they are possible, as having been produced intentionally and as purposes” (CJ 289). This is to say that Hobbes’ error is inevitable for a consciousness constructed such as ours, “in which objects only count as appearances” and that we cannot avoid grasping nature as having been constructed according to a purpose - even if no such purposiveness can actually be attributed to it. In other words, a consciousness constructed such as ours cannot avoid grasping nature as constructed according to purposes, although this need not imply “that the basis that makes such products of nature possible could not be found, even by an understanding different from (higher than) the human one, in the very mechanism of nature, i.e., in a causal connection that does not necessarily [*ausschliessungsweise*] presuppose an understanding as a cause”(CJ 290). Although this may sound obscure, the point is quite simple: because of the “peculiarity” constituted by its finitude, human consciousness cannot help but attribute a purposiveness to nature. In other words, because of our limitation, (*viz.*, the contingency of objects for our understanding [CJ 290, 291])⁶ we simply cannot grasp the infinite complexity in the mechanism of nature, and hence, we immediately refer it to the idea of an understanding which caused it, even though nothing would prevent a higher understanding from discovering a causal connection in the

⁶“Our understanding has this peculiarity as regards judgment: when cognition occurs through our understanding, the particular is not determined by the universal and therefore cannot be derived from it alone. And yet this particular in nature’s diversity must (through concepts and laws) harmonize with the universal in order that the particular can be subsumed under the universal”(CJ 291).

mechanism of nature which would not require nature to be conceived as an intentional product.

The whole discussion (in the dialectic of teleological judgment - from §72 to §78) is an attempt to correct Leibniz's metaphysics through Spinoza's critique of final causality and will, with the result that final causes are conceived as necessary for us, if indemonstrable in themselves. Kant's *Critique of Teleological Judgment* can be seen as already attempting to digest and reconcile the thought of these two great predecessors - a task which is taken up in turn by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. The unanticipated result of German Idealism's attempt to digest and assimilate the thought of Leibniz and Spinoza is that Hegel will claim to have actually realized a mode of understanding, which Kant had merely represented as possible in order to distinguish it from the limits of human understanding.

By contrasting our human mode of understanding, whose objects are contingent, with a divine understanding, whose objects are necessary, Kant is trying to explain the harmony of our concepts with the characteristics of the natural world. Since our understanding of that world is contingent, how is it that we are capable of grasping this contingency in a manner that accords with our reason? This he argues, leads us inevitably to the idea of a natural purpose, which we can frame for ourselves, without thereby asserting that this purpose is in any way determinative for our judgment. Thus Kant is attempting to admit the validity of Spinoza's critique of final causality, while simultaneously acknowledging that the structure of our understanding is such that we cannot avoid the representation of a natural purpose. "How then can we at least conceive of the possibility of such a harmony — one that is presented as contingent and hence as possible only through the purpose that aims at it — between the things of nature and our judgment? To do this, we must at the same time conceive of a different understanding:

without as yet attributing any [concept of a] purpose to this understanding, we can then present this harmony between the [particular] natural laws and our judgement as *necessary* relative to that understanding, [even though] our own understanding can conceive of this harmony only as mediated by purposes" (CJ 291).

This solution saves the phenomena of Leibniz' metaphysics, at the same time as it acknowledges the truth of Spinoza's critique of final causality. Our cognition cannot determine the particular because it proceeds from concepts to the empirical intuition that is given: "Instead (under the supposition that the intuition is a natural product) our understanding must wait until the subsumption of the empirical intuition under the concept provides this determination for the power of judgment" (CJ 291). This leads us to the idea of a non-discursive, intuitive understanding which proceeds "from the *synthetically universal* (the intuition of the whole as whole) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts. Hence, such an understanding as well as its presentation of the whole has no *contingency* in the combination of the parts in order to make a determinate form of the whole possible. Our understanding, on the other hand requires this contingency," because it moves from the parts to the whole (CJ 291). Thus, we "can regard a real whole of nature only as the joint effect of the motive forces of the parts" (CJ 292).

The problem is that when we try to represent "the possibility of the parts in their character and combination, as dependent on the whole" (CJ 292), we cannot do so, because the whole is not given as such to our intuition. Hence, "the only way that we can present the possibility of the parts as dependent on the whole is by having the *presentation* of [the] whole contain the basis that makes possible the form of that whole as well as the connection of the parts required to [make] this [form possible]. Hence, such a whole would be the an effect, a *product*, the *presentation* of which is regarded as the *cause* that makes the

product possible. But the product of a cause that determines its effect merely on the basis of the presentation of that effect is called a purpose" (*CJ* 292). To put it differently, the only way that we can represent the parts as dependent upon the whole, is by appeal to the notion of a natural purpose, which represents the whole as containing the basis of its own possibility, so that the whole is conceived as the product of its own presentation. "It follows from this that the fact that we present [certain] products of nature as possible only in terms of a kind of causality that differs from the causality of the natural laws pertaining to matter, namely, the causality of purposes and final causes, is merely a consequence of the special character of our understanding"(*CJ* 292). In other words, when we try to represent the parts as the result of a natural purpose - we are no longer following the standard of our finite understanding, which must move from the part to the whole. Instead we "would be following the standard set by intuitive (archetypal) understanding"(*CJ* 292), and this would be a contradiction for the discursive, or finite type of understanding because the whole cannot be given as such. So, just as Spinoza dismisses final causes as "human fictions," which are nothing "more than a relation to our imagination"(Spinoza 442, 444), Kant can now dismiss final causality (e.g. "a kind of causality that differs from the causality of the natural laws pertaining to matter"[*CJ* 292]) as a necessary "consequence of the special character of our understanding" pertaining "only to the way our understanding is able to judge them"(*CJ* 292): "Therefore, this principle [of the causality in terms of final causes] does not pertain to [how] such things themselves are possible through this kind of production (not even if we consider them as phenomena), but pertains only to the way our understanding is able to judge them" (*CJ* 292).

This means that final causes are "necessary fictions," relative to the peculiarity of our understanding, which a finite and discursive understanding must provide in lieu of its

inability to grasp the complexity of mechanical causality of nature. In other words, because we cannot grasp the whole all at once, like Leibniz' God, we cannot conceive of the infinite complexity of efficient causes. Hence, we require the idea of a natural purpose to stop the gap of our failure to understand, and to put in place of our ignorance. In this respect, reflective judgements are perhaps not so different from the conventional construction's of Hobbes' *Leviathan*, where the artificial construct of the Sovereign power fills the infinite gulf between man's infinite need for security, his infinite remoteness from God and his infinite ignorance of the realm of natural fact.

In any event, Kant has clearly established that our idea of the whole as a product of nature's causality — i.e., our idea of final causality — does not establish "that it is impossible for such a body to be produced mechanically" (*CJ* 293). Thus, an intellect constructed differently than ours could in fact grasp the mechanical causality at work in nature which the finite character of our intellect conceals from our view.

The point is entirely Spinozistic. And yet this Spinozistic argument is simultaneously presented alongside and integrated with the key features of Leibniz's teleological metaphysics. Thus, Kant will argue that his appeal to the idea of an archetypal, or intuitive intellect, does not require that such an intellect is possible: "Rather, we must prove only that the contrast [between such an intellect and] our discursive understanding — an understanding which requires images (it is an *intellectus ectypus*) — and the contingency of its having this character lead us to that idea (of an *intellectus archetypus*), and we must prove that this idea does not involve a contradiction" (*CJ* 293). By thus arguing that the idea of an archetypal intellect is thinkable without thereby being necessary (in a way that recalls Leibniz's claim that the world is physically necessary without being metaphysically so in "On The Ultimate Origin of Things"), the appearance of Leibniz'

teleology is preserved as a kind of façade which conceals the Spinozistic claim that final causes are only relative to the special character of our intellect. This is to say that if Kant can demonstrate that the idea of an archetypal intellect does not involve a contradiction, then he can establish the possibility that an archetypal understanding, if it existed, could grasp the whole in terms of mechanical causes, and without attributing to it the idea of a purpose. In other words, he can then establish that the whole might be grasped according the dictates of Spinoza's rather than Leibniz' metaphysics. The difficulty is that the perspective of such an archetypal intellect is foreclosed to us, and we cannot proceed intuitively, as Spinoza claimed, from "an adequate knowledge of the essence of certain attributes of God, to the adequate knowledge of the formal essence of things" (Spinoza, *Ethics II*, Proposition 40, 478), because Kant has just demonstrated that it is impossible for our understanding to proceed from the part to the whole. Kant's solution to this difficulty is to adopt a position midway between the positions of Spinoza and Leibniz: final causes are indeed illusory (Spinoza), but they are illusions, which are *necessary* for any understanding constituted such as ours (Leibniz), because it is not possible for us to intuit the world the way an archetypal intellect does. This means that a critique of teleological judgment is possible, even though such judgments are in no way determinative of the objects they judge. Because of the special character of our understanding we are constrained to grasp both the causality of nature and organized beings in terms of final causes, and such a principle, though not constitutive of the objects it describes, is nevertheless, necessary, and thus, the proper object of a transcendental inquiry. Moreover, because it is the only way our understanding can talk about such things, it is even indispensable for us. The result of Kant's transcendental investigation, is that we come to recognize the necessity of such judgments, without inappropriately extending them to things in themselves (e.g., without

misunderstanding them to apply to things in themselves).

Having established the Spinozistic position that an archetypal understanding would be capable of thinking the whole in mechanical terms by presenting “such a unity in the combination of [a thing’s] manifold without also [thinking of] the idea of that unity as causing it, in other words, without [thinking of] the production as intentional”(CJ 293), Kant will now propose the Leibnizian alternative: “But this consequence [that an organized body cannot be produced mechanically] would in fact follow if we were entitled to regard material beings as things in themselves” (CJ 293). In other words, if material beings were not appearances for our understanding, then Leibniz’s Metaphysical account of life would be true, and a causal explanation other than the mechanical one would be required to explain the structure of organized beings. For on this view the unity of space would be the sole basis of nature’s products, and hence, what could not be explained as a combination of the manifold that appears in space, would require some other teleological principle of explanation. But after Kant’s Copernican Revolution in knowledge, space can no longer be grasped as a real basis of things-in-themselves (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B44), but only as the formal condition of their representation. This means that space is transcendently ideal, and hence, it is nothing but an appearance, which “merely resembles the basis we are seeking in as much as no part of space can be determined except in relation to the whole”(293). What this means is that neither the Spinozistic, nor the Leibnizian Metaphysics can genuinely claim to have attained this basis, *i.e.*, an insight into the basis of nature’s products. Leibniz does not reach it, because although he represents space as an imaginary mode of contemplation of things, and in this respect, appears to have anticipated Kant, nevertheless, his conception of Space is ultimately founded in the sufficiency of God’s infinite understanding (cf. Leibniz, *Philosophischen Schriften*, V, 136 /*New Essays*

on the Human Understanding, II.1, 149-150). This means that for Leibniz space has a real basis outside the subject, even if the subject does not adequately grasp it, and this is inconsistent with Kant's Copernican revolution, which regards space only as a form of intuition.

But Spinoza does not reach this basis, either, because the transcendental ideality of space means that finite consciousness cannot justly claim to proceed from an adequate knowledge of the structure of the attribute of extension, to "an adequate knowledge of the essence of things" (Spinoza, *Collected Works*, 478), as Spinoza claims in his account of intuition as the highest kind of knowledge. To put this bluntly, Spinozism will not work, because finite consciousness can only move from the part to the whole, and hence, it cannot possibly intuit the wholeness of the whole. This means that there can be no representation of that wholeness, except by representing it as an effect of its own presentation, i.e., as a purpose. Hence, for Kant final causes remain mere "human fictions" as Spinoza maintained, but they are nevertheless conceived as necessary for an understanding constituted such as ours. Thus, Kant wants to have it both ways: He wants to deny the objective validity of final causes, because it is possible that a non-finite intellectual intuition could think the substrate of the material world of appearances, and at the same time he wants to deny that this intellectual intuition is accessible to finite consciousness.

If we approach the problem in this way, we can begin to see how Schelling and Hegel were able to transform Kant's reflective teleological principle into a principle of determination. For all Schelling did was to transform Fichte's intellectual intuition into a supersensible basis of nature, such that nature could be regarded as an effect of its own presentation. But given his appropriation of Spinoza how could Schelling do this? How did

he read Spinoza so that this reversal of his critique of final causality was deemed permissible? The key is to grasp that he is not claiming to be able to cognize this supersensible basis of nature (for this we must wait for Hegel), but rather, he is simply claiming that such a basis exists in nature, and that we are its highest expression. Hence, when we intuit such a basis in philosophy and art, we necessarily treat it as if it realized an ultimate purpose, even if that purpose cannot be determinately given in concepts. In other words, Schelling gets around Spinoza's condemnation of final causes by radicalizing Kant's insistence on the difference between finite and intellectual intuition. Where Kant appealed solely to the possibility of such an infinite intellect, Schelling will claim that there actually is a consciousness at work in nature whose ends we can only intuit in accord with the limitations of our own understanding. Regarded as a thing in itself, the process of this intellectual intuition transcends all finite description, while regarded from the perspective of finite consciousness, its process appears to realize a purpose which can be intuited in philosophy and the fine arts. Thus, Spinoza's condemnation of final causes is rendered consistent with the notion of a purpose by ascribing the purpose to the finite character of human understanding.

This is the reason for the importance of art in Schelling's thought. It provides a way to utilize, and to some extent preserve the idea of a final causality, without running afoul of Spinoza's critique of final causes by claiming to explicitly grasp what that causality is. If we can only intuit the absolute indifference of the subject and the object, then we will never be required to state the ultimate purpose of that indifference in conceptual terms. Indeed, simply to state that it exists will be enough to discover Nature as the effect of its absolute causality. Thus Schelling's account of this intellectual intuition remains thoroughly Kantian, to the degree that he refrains from claiming any cognitive insight into what this

intuition actually is. All he does is to regard what Kant had raised as a possibility as if it were an actuality. Indeed, Kant almost invites such a reading: “But in fact it is at least possible to consider the material world as mere appearance, and to think something as [its] substrate, as thing in itself (which is not appearance), and to regard this thing in itself as based on a corresponding intellectual intuition (even though not ours). In that way there would be for nature, which includes us as well, a supersensible basis of its reality, though we could not cognize this basis”(CJ 293).

Where Kant argues that such an absolute consciousness of the substrate of the material world is possible, even if it is not available to us, Schelling simply argues that such an absolute consciousness is actual. But like Kant, Schelling is careful to avoid claiming any knowledge of such a substrate. At best it can be intuited in the fine arts. Thus, it is easy to see how Schelling could conceive himself as the true heir of Kant's critical project, for like Fichte all he is really doing is assuming the reality of something that Kant could neither assert nor deny.

This means that Schelling's Philosophy of Nature emerges out of a curious blend of Fichte's appropriation of Spinoza's notion of intellectual intuition with Kant's tempering of his critique of final causality. Thus, Schelling will appeal to Kant to explain the concept of nature which Fichte neglects. By transforming Fichte's notion of intellectual intuition into an intuition of the supersensible basis of nature (in a way that makes it more consistent with the Spinozistic origin of this principle), Schelling can use Kant's revival of teleology to claim an insight into this supersensible basis which would reconcile the empirical and the teleological. Indeed, at times he appears to be systematically following Kant's speculative suggestions, and transforming them in accord with his new interpretation of intellectual intuition. Where Kant speculates on the possibility that an intuitive understanding would

have access to a ground uniting teleology and mechanism, Schelling will claim to have attained an insight into that ground in as much as he claims to possess the intellectual intuition which Kant had denied to human cognition. One can easily see how Kant unwittingly prepared the way for this transformation: “But in fact it is at least possible to consider the material world as mere appearance and to think something as [its] substrate, as thing in itself (which is not appearance), and to regard this thing in itself as based on a corresponding intellectual intuition (even though not ours). In that way there would be for nature, which includes us as well, a supersensible basis of its reality, though we could not cognize that basis. Hence, we would consider in terms of mechanical laws whatever is necessary in nature as an object of sense; but the harmony and unity of the particular laws of nature and of the forms based on them are contingent in terms of mechanical laws, and [so] this harmony and unity, as objects of reason, we would at the same time consider in terms of teleological laws (as, indeed, we would consider the whole of nature as a system). So we would judge nature in terms of two kinds of principles, and the mechanical kind of explanation would not be excluded by the teleological as if they contradicted each other” (*CJ* 294). As Schelling believes he has access to this intellectual intuition, he believes he has access to the supersensible basis of nature which unites teleology and mechanism. Thus, he can claim to realize what Kant had foreseen only as a speculative possibility.

What is most important here for Kant is that the mechanical and the teleological not be regarded as mutually exclusive, for it remains possible that the supersensible substrate of nature might be grasped by a being with a superior intellect. But, although the two perspectives may be compatible, this does not mean that the mechanical could replace the teleological perspective. For our finite understanding, which is incapable of grasping the full complexity of mechanical causes, teleology remains indispensable if we are to conceive

of nature as a single whole. But Kant seems to regard teleology as most indispensable for accounting for organized beings, which (like Leibniz) he believes to be inexplicable through mechanical causes: “though we can try on it all the laws of mechanical production that we know or may yet discover, and though we may indeed hope to make good progress with such mechanical laws, yet we can never [account] for the possibility of such a product without appealing to a basis for its production that is wholly distinct from the mechanical one, namely, a causality through purposes” (*CJ* 294). Thus, “no human understanding (nor any finite reason similar to ours in quality, no matter how much it may surpass ours in degree) can hope to understand, in terms of nothing but mechanical causes, how so much as a mere blade of grass is produced” (*CJ* 294). The reason is that without an infinite understanding of every cause involved, judgment is forced to appeal to the teleological connection of causes and effects to explain things like design, function, etc. For even if we prescind from appealing to an ultimate creator outside of nature, we must still appeal to the idea of a natural purpose in order to account for the order that is realized within nature.

In a manner that shows his solution to the antinomy of teleological judgment to combine Leibniz’ metaphysics with Spinoza’s rejection of final causality, Kant ends section 77 by underscoring the tension between human limitation and the search for final causes: “As long as a sufficient reason [hinreichender Grund] for external appearances, that refers to purposes, cannot be found, but rather this reason, which also lies in nature, must yet only be sought in nature’s supersensible substrate, from which, however, all possible insight is cut off from us: so long is it absolutely impossible to obtain explanatory grounds for combinations in terms of purposes from nature itself, and it is necessary according to the character [Beschaffenheit] of the human cognitive power, to seek the supreme reason for such combinations in terms of purposes [dazu] in an original understanding, as cause of

the world” [translation mine *KdU* 396g/CJ 294].⁷ In other words, until nature herself reveals a sufficient reason that refers to purposes — or better, until our knowledge of nature is complete enough to reveal a natural purpose — we can only seek the reason for such a purpose in nature’s supersensible substrate. But as this supersensible substrate is by definition cut off from us, it will be impossible to ascribe a purpose to nature without seeking that purpose in an original understanding as cause of the world. This is to say that the idea of a divine purpose comes to substitute for the mechanical knowledge which we lack. Thus, in Kant as in Spinoza, the will of God, is a “sanctuary of ignorance.” What makes teleological judgement worthy of a transcendental inquiry, however, is that Kant’s investigation has discovered a necessary character to this ignorance in the “peculiarity” of our cognitive faculty.

If Kant’s critical philosophy illuminates the path of scientific inquiry by demonstrating its foundation without recourse to metaphysical speculation, then Schelling can be said to leap beyond the scientific discipline which would be necessary to discover the supersensible substrate of teleology and mechanism. By preparing the ground for Hegel’s claim to be able to think through this intuition by means of reason alone, Schelling’s appropriation of intellectual intuition short circuits Kant’s illumination of the limits of reason in a way that plunges science back into the darkness of metaphysics.

⁷The precise translation of this sentence leads to a rather awkward wording in English. A more graceful rendition would be as follows:

As long as a sufficient reason for external appearances cannot be found without delving into nature’s supersensible substrate, so long will it remain impossible to obtain explanatory grounds with respect to purposes from nature itself. Thus, it is necessary for the human cognitive power to seek the supreme reason for a purpose in an original understanding, as cause of the world. / Or again: as long as nature’s external appearances fail to exhibit a sufficient reason referring to purposes, and requires appeal to the idea of a supersensible substrate, it will remain impossible to obtain an explanation in terms of purposes from nature itself, and human cognition will have to seek the supreme ground for a purpose in the idea of an original understanding as cause of the world.

III. a. **The Reading of Spinoza in *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism***

Although it is not immediately evident because of the way its theme is disguised by a discussion of Spinoza, Schelling's *Dogmatism and Criticism* constitutes an extended meditation on the role of judgment in Kant's critical philosophy. In a manner that substantially repeats Kant's discussion of idealism and realism in sections §72 and §73 of *The Critique of Judgment*, Schelling tells us that the first *Critique* "is destined to deduce from the very essence of reason the very possibility of two exactly opposed systems; it is destined to establish a system of criticism (conceived as complete) or more precisely a system of idealism as well as in exact opposition to it, a system of dogmatism or of realism."¹

According to Schelling, "the *Critique of Pure Reason* has taught dogmatism how it can become dogmatism" (*DC* 169). Originally, Kant used dogmatism to refer to any system which proceeds without critique. Schelling is now calling this lack of critical procedure "dogmaticism" (i.e., a system "put up blindly without any preceding investigation of the cognitive faculty," *DC* 169). According to Fichte's definition,² dogmatism "holds that the not I is absolute" like Leibniz' metaphysics (*On the I as the*

¹Schelling, *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays by Schelling*, trans. and Commentary Fritz Marti (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1980) 169.

²Dogmatism is defined in the *Wissenschaftslehre* as any attempt to explain experience that "retains a thing in itself" [Fichte, *Wissenschaftslehre*, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: University Press, 1982) 8-9]. It is "the claim that one cannot explain the facts of consciousness without presupposing the existence of things in themselves" [Fichte, *Wissenschaftslehre Novo Methodo*, trans. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) 91/20].

Principle of Human Knowledge, 213). This means that dogmatism begins with what is opposed to consciousness, rather than with the critical principle of an original unity which precedes all such opposition. By this standard, Kant's system is dogmatic, in that it presupposes things in themselves as unconditional (*DC 169*, 170). Thus, Schelling is suggesting that Kant's *Critique* was insufficiently critical: "On this very point, as far as I can see, the Critique of pure reason cannot be freed at all from the reproach of inconsistency, provided its aim is to establish criticism alone" (*DC 169*). In order to discover the true principle of criticism, Schelling will correct Spinoza's account of intellectual intuition and thereby discover a principle which can overcome Kant's dogmatic distinction between appearances and things in themselves.

It is important, however, to understand that Schelling is not simply opposing criticism to dogmatism. Rather, he reads Kant's critical philosophy as having established "a complete system of criticism which presents "two systems of idealism and realism standing side by side"(169). Thus, Schelling sees himself as developing that portion of the critical philosophy which Kant had neglected. This is why he returns to Kant's treatment of the idealism of final causes in Spinoza, for in Spinoza he believes he has found a principle that will enable him to do for criticism what the first critique had already achieved for dogmatism.

In the sixth letter, Schelling tells us that Spinoza's real concern is not the "analytic propositions which he puts down as the basis of his system" but "the riddle of the world, the question of how the absolute could come out of itself and oppose to itself a world" (173-174). This according to Schelling is also the riddle of the critical philosopher whose main "question is not how analytical propositions are possible, but rather synthetic ones. For him, nothing is more intelligible than a philosophy which explains all from our very

essence, nothing more unintelligible than a philosophy which transcends ourselves" (174). By thus establishing a continuity between Spinoza and critical philosophy, Schelling can now appeal to Spinoza's notion of intellectual intuition to develop the critical side of Kant's critical philosophy in the way Kant had already developed its dogmatic side. This is evident from the following remarks: "The *Critique of Pure Reason* applies to all systems. Or, inasmuch as all other systems are only more or less faithful reproductions of the two main systems, it applies to both of them. Therefore it is the only work of its kind. Any essay proceeding beyond mere critique can only belong to one of the two systems" (170). As Schelling's preceding remarks denounce Kant for having "taught dogmatism to become dogmatism, it is clear that he sees himself as developing a critical rather than a dogmatic system. Thus, Schelling sees himself as remaining within the ambit of Kant's critical project, for he simply wants to do for criticism what he believes Kant has already done for dogmatism by developing the idea of the practical postulates.

On this reading, Spinoza is the true principle of criticism. "For him the absolute in ourselves is more intelligible than everything else. What is unintelligible is how we egress from the absolute in order to oppose something to ourselves that is radically different from us. The most intelligible is how we determine all, merely by the law of identity; the most enigmatical is how we can determine anything beyond this law" (174-175). By arguing that Spinoza's intuition of an absolute object is really an intuition of the absolute identity that underlies subjectivity, Schelling will transform Spinoza's dogmatism into the fundamental principle of criticism. Kant's third *Critique* had already suggested that Spinoza's critique of final causality was the fundamental principle of criticism by using it to correct Leibniz' teleological metaphysics. Schelling radicalizes this suggestion by transforming Spinoza's intellectual intuition into something subjective, such that it can be completely assimilated

into the critical philosophy and made consistent with its subjective point of departure, i.e., with Kant's copernican revolution in knowledge.

Because neither criticism nor dogmatism can explain how "the absolute could come out of itself and oppose to itself a world,"(173-174) the only possible solution is to bring the world into the self in accord with Fichte's postulation of an absolute moral subject. In other words, the only possible solution is a practical one, which does away with the question of the opposition between self and world the way Alexander dispatched the Gordian knot: "I must leave the realm of experience myself, that is, I must do away, for myself, with the bounds of the world of experience; I must cease to be a finite being" (175).³ With this practical postulate Schelling proceeds beyond "all bounds of knowledge to a region where I do not *find* firm ground, but must *produce* it myself in order to stand firmly upon it" (175). Because it is a production rather than a seeking, this is not a useless search of something new that reason cannot hope to find, but rather a practical necessity for "reason as such" (175).

Dogmatism and Criticism both meet in the problem of practice and can be properly distinguished there. The principle they had "so far presupposed was nothing but a *prolepsis*,⁴ upon which a verdict is to be given only at this point"(175). In other words,

³As I will argue in the discussion of *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* below, Schelling's use of the image of the Gordian knot appears stem from his reading of Leibniz who uses this image in "On Nature Itself (1698)" to argue that an immediate appeal to God's mandate that does not trace things to a non-imageable power of acting amounts to renouncing the role of the philosopher. It is "to cut through the Gordian knot with the sword" (Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften*, [Philosophical Essays 159]. Schelling is now employing this image in a more positive manner. But the reference suggests the possibility that the mere appeal to freedom, without the precise specification of its "non-imageable" power of acting, is equally unphilosophical, as Hegel will soon claim.

⁴*Prolepsis* is the answering of an objection before it has been put forward, an anticipation or the representation of something existing prior to its proper historical time, or the use of a descriptive word in anticipation of the act or circumstances that would make it applicable, as *dry* in *I want you to drain the lake*

dogmatism is a *prolepsis*, or an anticipation of something prior to its proper time, because it implicitly depends upon the practical postulation of God, while criticism is also *prolepsis* “upon which the verdict is to be given only at this point” because it ends by making the absolute an object yet to be realized through action. In each case the anticipated, but not yet realized absolute lies in the practical.

As both systems had put forth nothing but absolute assertions of which the other took no notice, neither system could follow the lead of the other. What is at issue here is not a matter of setting up the proper principles at the outset, and then deriving one’s system accordingly (this would be a merely circular argument), rather, “it is to be decided by our freedom whether they are valid or not”(176). So it is not our theoretical speculation which determines our freedom, but our freedom which determines theoretical speculation: “if we want to establish a system ... we cannot do it except by anticipation of a practical decision. We should not establish those principles unless our freedom had already decided about them; at the beginning of our knowledge they are nothing but proleptic assertions, or ... *original insuperable prejudices*” (176). So the dogmatic *prolepsis* of assuming a beginning which is groundless is replaced by the critical *prolepsis* of recognizing that our freedom has implicitly already decided about such a ground, and this ground can only be realized in action. This means that the synthesis constituted by our knowledge proceeds from a prior absolute unity, and it ends in an absolute thesis (165-66), just as our moral action arises from “an anticipation of the practical decision” and “demands the action by which the

dry. Thus, dogmatism is a *prolepsis*, because it presupposes the being of objects in advance of our cognition. Final causes are *prolepses*, because they represent something as real in advance of our ability to attain them. Criticism is also a *prolepsis* because it presupposes a not yet realized unity, viz., that the synthesis of our knowledge should end in an absolute thesis (cf. 165). Schelling’s use of this term appears to come from the Preface to Leibniz’ *New Essays on the Human Understanding*, where Leibniz describes how the Stoics referred to innate principles as “*prolepses*, c’est à dire des assumptions fondamentales, ou ce que on prend pour accordé par avance” (*Die Philosophische Schriften*, V, 42).

absolute is realized" (191). The problem is that the *Critique* cannot rise to the level of this unity, but can only prove the steps of every material synthesis by the validity of formal synthesis. In other words, it proves the validity of material synthesis, which is limited by intuition, through a formal synthesis which is "thinkable only under the condition of an unconditional thesis" (166). In such a logical synthesis, the subject "is compelled to rise (through pro-syllogisms) from conditional to unconditional judgments" (166). So the Critique explains material synthesis through formal synthesis, rather than deriving both the formal and the material synthesis from "a principle at the base of both steps" (166). This means it neither grasps the unity prior to any of its syntheses, nor the thesis at which its syntheses aim.

The seventh letter repeats the remark from the preceding discussion of Spinoza: "The main task of all philosophy consists of solving the problem of the existence of the world" (177). According to Jacobi, this is especially true of Spinoza, who "found that the notion of anything emerging within the non-finite posits something from nothing regardless of any support which images and words seem to furnish" (177). As a result, Spinoza rejected the transition from the nonfinite to the finite, and substituted instead "an immanent principle, an indwelling cause of the world, eternally immutable in itself, a cause which would be one and the same with all its effects" (177). Schelling cites this interpretation in support of the claim that Spinoza's solution to the transition from the nonfinite to the finite is the only possible solution for any philosophy. The reason, is that "no system can fill the gap between the nonfinite and the finite"(177). This is the result of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which sought to realize reason's transition from the nonfinite to the finite to bring unity into her cognition. "Reason wanted to find the middle term between the non-finite and the finite in order to connect both in the same unity of knowledge. While she cannot

possibly find that middle term, yet she does not on that account surrender her highest aspiration, unity of cognitions; it is now her will no longer to need that middle term. Her effort to realize that transition consequently becomes the absolute demand - there shall be no transition from the nonfinite to the finite" (177).

The middle term here refers to reflective judgment, which is a middle between the finite realm of objective knowledge and the non-finite realm of the supersensible world of the Cosmological Ideas. According to Kant, reason cannot find that middle term, but rather than give up reason's demand for the unity of cognitions, Kant preserves it by asserting that there is no transition from the finite to the infinite whatsoever. Thus, critical philosophy denies there is any transition at all in order to preserve the unity of cognition. If there can be no Spinozistic unity with the non-finite, then, thought will preserve its own unity by forbidding that transition all together. In other words, what reason really wants, is to attain this transition without a middle term, but this just leads her to transform her aspiration into an absolute demand to attain this transition without the middle term. This absolute demand is the demand of practical reason, which is at the same time expressed in a critical system which makes an absolute demand that there shall be no transition from the non-finite to the finite. But this means that Kant's philosophy is in contradiction with itself. Its practical side asserts the need for such a transition, while its theoretical part steadfastly denies that any such transition is possible. Hence, Schelling is suggesting that there is an undigested uncritical element in Kant, in as much his thought unites the "demand of blind dogmatism" which seeks to realize this transition, with "immanent" demand of criticism which denies that any such transition is possible. This is as much to call it a contradiction - and it would be a contradiction, were it not for the fact Schelling understands the critical philosophy as a canon applying to every philosophical system, whose destiny is to deduce

two opposed systems from the essence of reason (169-171).

But if Kant's philosophy recognizes the impossibility of moving from the non-finite to the finite, it does, however, make the transition from the finite to the non-finite. The connection is "precisely the refusal of the transition from the nonfinite to the finite which comes to be the connecting middle term of the two in cognition, as an aspiration." (178). Although it is not immediately evident given both his awkward phrasing and his unusual Jacobian language, Schelling is talking about the *Critique of Judgment*. He is using the terms "non-finite" and "finite" to refer to Kant's notion that judgment can bridge the great gulf between practical and theoretical reason. Indeed, it is as if Schelling needed to render this distinction in terms of his understanding of Spinoza in order to gain some critical distance before transforming the reflective judgment into a metaphysical principle; so the critical philosophy is quickly recapitulated in this new critical short-hand that permits him to quickly dispense with it.

Schelling's point is that reflective judgment is at once a refusal of the transition from the non-finite to the finite and an aspiration towards its realization. So if the critical philosophy "cannot make a transition from the non-finite to the finite, it will, nevertheless, claim to make a transition from the finite to the non-finite. What this means is that the finite has "a perpetual desire to lose itself in the nonfinite" (178) - a desire we can understand in terms of reason's drive for the absolute: "being unable to realize the unconditioned, [theoretical reason] therefore *demand*s the *act* through which it *ought* to be realized" (167).

Schelling's procedure is quite complex. Having just interpreted Kant in terms of Jacobi's comments on Spinoza, Schelling will now use Kant's account of practical philosophy to explain the fundamental impulse at work in Spinoza's *Ethics*. "Now only does light begin to dawn for us with regard to Spinoza's *Ethics*. It was not theoretical

necessity alone, it was not merely a consequence of *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that led him to the solution of the problem, the solution that there is *no* transition from the non-finite to the finite, no transitive, but only an indwelling cause of the world. It was to the practical dictum heeded by all philosophy that he owed that solution, except that Spinoza interpreted the dictum according to *his* system" (178). To understand what is at issue here it is important that we understand that for Schelling, Kant's critical philosophy articulates something that is true for all philosophical systems. This is why Schelling took up an exposition of the Kant in the preceding paragraphs, for Kant's critical philosophy is the canon for the dogmatic and the critical systems alike (169). Kant is normative for philosophy generally. Accordingly, Kant's practical philosophy is presented as the philosophical standard - or canon - against which Spinoza's interpretation of the practical dictum is to be read. This makes for a complex account, in as much as Spinoza is read through Kant, and then used to develop the critical side of Kant's philosophy.

Where Kant understands the injunction against the transition from the non-finite to the finite as requiring a transition from the finite to the non-finite, "Spinoza interpreted it according to his principle which let the finite differ from the non-finite only because of the limitations of the finite. According to his principle, everything in existence was merely a modification of the same infinite. Consequently there was no transition, no conflict, but only the demand that the finite strive to become identical with the infinite and to merge in the infinity of the absolute object"(178). In this way Spinoza tried to annihilate himself by giving himself over to the infinite. Indeed, his philosophy does away with the subject altogether. By doing away with "that independent causality of the ego by which it is ego" and in "demanding that the subject lose itself in the absolute, he had demanded implicitly the identity of the subjective with absolute causality"(179). As the subject was annihilated,

it is no longer the subject's causality, but rather, "a foreign causality in the subject" that realizes the practical demand. The subject as such cannot annihilate itself.

In the Eighth Letter, we learn that Spinoza was able to bear this principle through "a natural, unavoidable deception" (179). Referring to *Ethics* Book V, Proposition 30, Schelling argues that Spinoza confused the intellectual intuition of the absolute for his own self-intuition: "In so far as our mind knows itself and the body under the species of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God" (Curley, 610).

By correcting Spinoza's understanding of intellectual intuition, Schelling discovers this intuition at the foundation of subjectivity: "it is this intuition which first convinces us that anything *is*, strictly speaking, while everything else merely *appears*, and is only in so much as we transfer *being* to it. This intuition is distinguished from every sensuous intuition by the fact that it is produced by freedom alone, and that it is foreign and unknown to any whose freedom, overcome by the invading power of objects, is almost insufficient for the production of consciousness" (180). Schelling goes so far as to say that a complete aesthetics would show all empirical acts "only as imitations of that intellectual act" (180). What this means is that it is not experiences that are the original source of knowledge, but this intuition, which is the condition of possibility for our knowledge of objects of experience: "because every experience of objects depends on the experience of further objects, at core our knowledge must start from an immediate experience in the strictest sense, that is, from an experience produced by ourselves and independent of any causality.... This intellectual intuition takes place whenever I cease to be an object for myself, when — withdrawn into itself — the intuiting subject is identical with the intuited. In this moment of intuition, time and duration vanish for us; it is not *we* who are in time,

but time is *in us*; in fact it is not time but rather pure absolute eternity that is in ourselves. It is not we who are lost in the intuition of the objective world; it is the world that is lost in our intuition" (181).

While like Spinoza, Schelling will read this experience as a mode of the eternal, he will also emphasize its subjective status in a way that Spinoza does not. Thus, Schelling will argue that Spinoza "objectified" this intuition. Where Spinoza thought he had become identical with the absolute as an object outside of him (of which he was only a mode), Schelling believes the absolute has become identical with him. "In the latter case intuition was intuition of self, in the former case intuition of an absolute object. This latter was what Spinoza preferred. He believed himself identical with the absolute object, and lost in its nonfiniteness" (181). Schelling is correcting Spinoza's account of intellectual intuition by grasping it as an intuition of self rather than of an absolute object.

In this way Schelling will argue that Spinoza's proposed self-annihilation implicitly preserves the thought of his own self as the substratum of the annihilation. When he "intuited himself as merged in the absolute object, he still intuited himself; he could not conceive of himself as annihilated without thinking of himself at the same time as existing" (181). All *Schwärmerei* is traceable to such objectification of intellectual intuition (182). But if Spinoza's account is recast as an intellectual intuition of an absolute causality within the subject, the problem disappears, and his dogmatic metaphysics can be transformed into the fundamental principle underlying criticism as such. It becomes a non-thetic intuition of the absolute upon which every empirical synthesis is based.

On this view the conflict between happiness and morality is dissolved in intellectual intuition (183), which is at the same time the complete dissolution of self in absolute freedom (184). No consciousness of self is possible in this state. "An activity without any

object, an activity to which there is no resistance never returns into itself. Only through a return to one's self does consciousness arise. Only a restricted reality is an actuality for us" (184). This means that consciousness only arises with reflection "that is, a forced return to ourselves. But no return is thinkable without resistance, no reflection without object" (185). This means that the standard valuation of activity as life and passivity as death are inverted in Schelling's account of intuition, such that man is conceived as integrating the death of intuition into the life of his reflection on objects: "We designate as alive an activity intent upon objects alone and as dead an activity losing itself in itself. Man ought to be neither lifeless nor merely alive. His activity is necessarily intent upon objects, but with equal necessity it returns into itself. The latter distinguishes him from the merely living (animal) being, the former from the lifeless"(185). This integration of death into life is a pantheism of the highest order. It is Schelling's version of Spinoza's self-annihilation in the absolute. Rather than losing himself in the absolute object, Schelling will claim that the world of reflection - the life of its intentionality upon objects - is lost in the intellectual intuition which is the condition of its possibility. In this way, freedom emerges as a complexification - or a higher potency - of merely animate life.

This intuition, is thus both the most immediate and the closest to disappearance.⁵

"Should I maintain it *as* intuition I would cease to be /; I must grasp myself with might in

⁵In this respect this intuition is not unlike Heidegger's experience of the nothing in "What is Metaphysics?": "Without the original revelation of the nothing, no self-hood and no freedom" (*Basic Writings*, 106. Schelling also compares this intuition to nothingness: "For if nothing signifies what is absolutely not an object, then this nothing must certainly occur wherever a nonobject is supposed, nevertheless, to be intuited objectively, that is where all thought and understanding cease" (186). One can compare this to Heidegger's account of "the slipping away of beings as a whole" in anxiety (Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" in: *Basic Writings*, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977)105). Furthermore, one also finds the theme of "losing oneself among beings" (106) the way Schelling describes losing oneself amidst the world of objects. If Schelling transforms Spinoza's account of intellectual intuition into objective idealism, can we say that Heidegger transforms Schelling's intellectual intuition of the absolute into fundamental ontology?

order to save myself from the abyss of intuition. Still as long as intuition is intent upon object, that is, as long as it is sensuous intuition, there is no danger of losing oneself However, where sensuous intuition ceases, where everything vanishes, there is nothing but infinite expansion without return into self. Should I maintain intellectual intuition I would cease to live, I would go 'from time into eternity'" (185). Thus, the emergence from this intuitive state into the world of objects is described as a fall "from a state of bliss" (185). This means that Spinoza's dogmatism differs from "the dreams of the cabbalists, of the Brahmins, of the Chinese philosophers, and of the new mystics, in nothing but the external form. In principle they all agree" (186). The point is that Schelling's reversal of Spinoza's account of intellectual intuition transforms this dogmatic self-annihilation into the founding principle of criticism.

In accord with Schelling's conception of Kant's critical philosophy as the canon by which all systems are measured, the Ninth Letter tells us that every system reduces to either dogmatism or criticism. "If dogmatism demands that I vanish in the absolute object, then criticism must demand, on the contrary, that everything called object shall vanish in the intellectual intuition of myself.... These conclusions are inevitable as soon as we presuppose that both systems are intent upon the dissolution of that contrast between subject and object, upon absolute identity. I cannot do away with the subject, without at the same time doing away with the object, as such, and on the same account, with consciousness of self; and I cannot do away with the subject without at the same time doing away with the object as such, that is, with all its personality" (186).

This disappearance of the subject is inevitable "because all philosophy demands absolute thesis as the goal of all synthesis. Hence both systems necessarily strive for absolute identity" (187). Criticism strives for the absolute identity of the subject;

dogmatism for the identity of an absolute object. Criticism assimilates happiness to morality, while dogmatism tries to assimilate morality to happiness. For the dogmatist, striving for happiness is a mediate striving for the identity of my essence. For criticism, in contrast, moral action is an immediate striving “for the absolute identity of my essence” which is at the same time, a mediate striving for the “identity of the subjective and the objective in me, for bliss”(187). Both these systems only unite happiness and morality synthetically so long as they are on the path towards the goal of an absolute thesis. “If I should ever reach it, then the two lines one which the infinite progressus runs, morality and happiness, would meet in one point” and they would cease to be “two different principles. They would be united in one principle which must, therefore be higher than the principle either of absolute being or of absolute beatitude” (187). This is their “point of agreement” where “all controversy ceases” (187).

Schelling wants to show that the opposition between dogmatism and criticism is dissolved in a prior unity. As Kant’s critical philosophy only transformed dogmatism into consistent dogmatism, this unity can only be grasped by fully developing criticism. Thus, Schelling understands himself to be completing Kant’s critical project by grasping the fundamental point of agreement between the two systems: “The original opposition between the two principles of dogmatism and criticism has always been revealed in the particular systems of philosophy. But the point of agreement between the two fundamental systems has not always been grasped. Having grasped it in the result of our abstract investigation, we can now descend to those particular systems; they will confirm our result”(188).

Schelling demonstrates that both types of systems can be derived from this common point of agreement. The opposed moral systems of Stoicism and Epicureanism meet in the

goal of attaining absolute beatitude and contentment through independence from sensuous needs; similarly, the opposed theoretical systems of Idealism and realism “unite in the absolute, that is, must cease as opposite systems” (188). Thus, each passes into the other. Perfect realism becomes perfect idealism, and perfect idealism complete realism (188). One need only consider Leibniz for a moment to see this. God’s perfect intuition of objects is contrasted to the “confused” perception of the monad. Thus, God’s perspective would be a perfect realism. But this perfect realism is a perfect idealism from the human perspective. For such a view is no longer possible for human intuition; indeed, the very contrast with human perception demonstrates this. Thus, perfect realism makes the object into something ideal, or something accessible only from an ideal perspective in which the representation is identical with the object it represents. But this complete identity of the representation with what it represents is nothing other than a perfect idealism in which subject and object are identical. Thus the most perfect realism “in the deity by which it intuits the things in themselves is nothing else than the most perfect idealism, by which the deity intuits nothing but itself and its own reality”(188). In the same way, freedom and necessity are also united in the absolute. As unconditionally autonomous the absolute acts only according to the laws of its own being, but this is nothing other than “the inner necessity of its essence”(189).

In this way “it is confirmed throughout that all contesting principles are unified and all contradicting systems become identical as soon as one rises to the absolute”(189). As the same is true for criticism and dogmatism, if criticism is not to transform itself into dogmatism, “criticism must regard the ultimate goal merely as the object of an infinite task”(189). Once the absolute is “represented as realized... it becomes an object of knowledge and therewith ceases to be an object of *freedom*”(189).

This transformation of the goal of criticism into an infinite task transforms

Spinoza's concept of striving from the *Ethics*, into the practical fulfillment of Kantian criticism. If Spinoza's attempt to dissolve the individual into the absolute fails because he misunderstands the absolute as an object, then Schelling will put the absolute into the individual. But if the realization of this absolute is not to prevent the individual from realizing its freedom, the attainment of the absolute can only be an infinite task. Thus, rather than being an infinite striving to know oneself as a part of the absolute (which is in effect impossible, "because the absolute tolerates no subject beside it"), criticism becomes the infinite and perpetually deferred task of striving to know the absolute in oneself. Schelling sees this as a way of protecting philosophy from the "horrors of ecstasy [*Schwärmerei*]" (189)⁶, which would arise if philosophy represented the absolute as realized. So rather than realizing the identity of freedom and necessity, Schelling is proposing to postpone the realization of this identity to preserve our freedom. Indeed, Schelling believes it is impossible to know this identity cognitively because the intuition of the absolute is the condition of possibility of consciousness which is prior to it. At best it can be anticipated by the imagination, which can represent this goal as realized for the sake of the "realizing" faculty, or the faculty of desire (*i.e.*, moral faculty): "standing half way between the cognitive and the realizing faculty," imagination "takes a hand at the point where cognition ceases and imagination has not yet begun. The faculty of imagination, in order to represent the absolute as realizable, must now represent it as realized" (190). If this condition were ever brought into consciousness as a cognition, freedom would be destroyed. This is the mistake of dogmatism. It claims to realize the absolute, and thus lapses into enthusiasm (*Schwärmerei*).⁶

⁶Fritz Marti translates *Schwärmerei* variously as enthusiasm, fanaticism or even ecstasy depending on the context. "Swarming" is another possible translation.

Criticism, in contrast, has the same goal, but it does not claim to have realized it - not even in practical postulates - instead it sets its practical realization as a task. Rather than deriving its practical postulates from an idea of the attainment of its goal, criticism strives to realize its goal as something not yet attained: "philosophy inquires into the ultimate *aim* of our human vocation only in order to answer the much more urgent question as to our vocation itself. Only the immanent use which we make of the principle of the absolute in practical philosophy for the knowledge of our vocation gives us the right to proceed to the absolute"(190). By thus beginning with our vocation, rather than with the idea of its realization in the practical postulates, criticism "solves the conflict of theoretical philosophy by the practical demand that the absolute cease to be *object for me*. This demand I can only fulfill through an infinite striving toward the realization of the absolute in myself, only through unlimited activity"(192).

But as this idea of an infinite striving is a striving to realize an absolute causality in the subject, "criticism would deteriorate into Utopianism if it should represent this ultimate goal as attainable at all (even though as not yet attained). Therefore it makes a mere practical use of the idea for the determination of the moral being"(192). Thus, both dogmatism and criticism "make the absolute, which could not be an object of *knowledge*, an object of *action*." (191). The difference is that criticism stops with "a mere practical use of the idea," in relation to a possible infinite causality in the subject. whereas dogmatism appeals to the idea of a possible infinite objective causality.

On this account, the practical aim of criticism is to fight against the "objective power that threatens our freedom with annihilation"(192). Art has a vital role to play in this struggle, for if reason is not capable of making the absolute into an object of knowledge, Art becomes the only means of expressing our moral vocation, and hence the sole means of

preserving our freedom against the overwhelming power of objects.

The contradiction between fate and responsibility in greek tragedy is an outstanding example of this struggle between “human freedom and the power of the objective world in which the mortal must succumb *necessarily* if that power is absolutely, superior, if it is fate” (192). Greek tragedy shows “the *honor* due to freedom” because it punishes the hero “for succumbing because he did not succumb without a struggle”(193). Thus, tragedy’s portrayal of the hero who succumbs to fate is a recognition of human freedom which celebrates its struggle against the overwhelming power of fate even in the moment when fate triumphs. By “letting him atone for the crime committed by fate,” it shows the hero to be free even after the apparent loss of his freedom: “It was a *sublime* thought, to suffer punishment willingly even for an inevitable crime, and so to prove one’s freedom by the very loss of this freedom, and to go down with a declaration of free will”(193).

To realize human freedom, “it is the highest interest of philosophy to awaken reason from its slumber” (194). By this Schelling means reason must be awakened from its dogmatic slumber (as Kant said of Hume), into the wakefulness of true criticism, which renounces “‘either an objective intelligible world, or a subjective personality; either an absolute object, or an absolute subject, freedom of will.’ This antithesis once definitely established, the interest of reason demands that we watch with the utmost care that it be not obscured again by the sophistries of moral indolence, in a veil which would deceive humanity” (194).

Towards the close of the tenth letter we find several confirmations that Schelling identifies both Kant and Spinoza as dogmatists. Dogmatism, he tells us, is theoretically irrefutable, “because, on its own account, it leaves the theoretical realm in order to complete its system practically” (194). But it is “practically confutable, if one realizes in oneself an

absolutely opposite system” namely, criticism. But dogmatism “is still irrefutable for him who is able to realize it practically, for him who can bear the thought of working at his own annihilation, of doing away with all free causality in himself, and of being the modification of an object in whose infinity he will find, sooner or later, his own (moral) extinction”(194). What these remarks mean is that Kant’s philosophy which “leaves the theoretical realm to complete itself practically” is ultimately equatable with Spinoza’s dogmatism in that it seeks to annihilate the free causality of the self in the absolute object. It is the task of criticism to bring these results of dogmatism to the fore, “not to disguise them any longer in wheedling words, in the delusions of an indolent reason” but to expose them as distinctly, as obviously, as frankly as possible. In this alone lies the last hope for the deliverance of humanity”(195). Having long “carried all the fetters of superstition, she might after all, find in herself what she has sought in the objective world. She might thus return, from a boundless straying in an alien world, to her own, from a lack of self to selfhood, from vagrancy of reason [Schwärmerei] to the freedom of the will” (195).

Towards this end Schelling sums up the conclusions of this essay in a in a no-holds-barred indictment of Kant’s dogmatic failure to recognize that he could not preserve his moral autonomy in the face of the idea of an objective God: “How could you conceivably maintain your reason over against that highest reason which evidently could leave only the most absolute passivity for limited, finite reason. Or again, if you assume the idea of an objective God, how can you speak of *laws* brought forth by reason *from itself*, whereas autonomy can pertain only to an *absolutely* free being? In vain you imagine that you can save yourself by postulating that idea merely *practically*. Because you assume it merely *practically* it threatens your moral existence all the more certainly with extinction. You indict reason for not knowing anything of things in themselves, of objects of a

supersensuous world. Has it never occurred to you, ever so dimly, that it is not the weakness of your reason, but the absolute freedom in you which makes the intellectual world inaccessible to every *objective* power; that it is not the limitation of your knowledge but your unlimited freedom which has relegated the objects of cognition to the confines of mere appearances?"(195). Having thus reversed Kant's dogmatism, Schelling believes he has completed Kant's critical project. By developing the critical perspective which Kant had neglected, he has "advanced to the last great problem to which any philosophy can advance" (195) - the problem of conduct. Thus, "the ideas to which our speculation has risen, cease to be objects of an ideal occupation that tires our spirit all too soon; they become the law of our life, and as they themselves change into life and existence and become objects of experience, they free us forever of the painful enterprise of ascertaining their reality by way of speculation *a priori*"(196). By thus realizing these ideas through freedom, speculation *a priori* is transformed into the subjective realization of our moral destiny.

Schelling ends on a platonic note, recalling Socrates' condemnation of the foolish virtues of the many and the question of the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo*. "We shall not complain, but be glad finally to have reached the crossroad where the parting of our ways is unavoidable, glad to have penetrated the mystery of our spirit, by virtue of which the just becomes free by himself, while the unjust trembles by himself in fear of a justice which he did not find in himself and had to assign to another world, to the hands of an avenging judge" (196). With this assertion of freedom, Schelling is revealing the sacred mysteries of the philosophers: "Henceforth, the wise man will never have recourse to the mysteries wherein to hide his principles from profane eyes"(196). We should, therefore, not refrain from teaching "principles which are universally communicable" (196), even if

nature “has set bounds to this communicability, by reserving “for the worthy a philosophy which cannot be learned and recited like a litany” (196). Because the subject matter of this philosophy is freedom itself, it cannot be “feigned nor contained in dead words which secret enemies might pick up”(196). Instead, it is “a symbol for the union of free spirits, a symbol by which they all recognize each other, and one that they need not hide, since for them alone it is intelligible, whereas for others it will be an eternal riddle” (196). By transposing Spinoza’s intellectual intuition of an absolute object into an intuition of the absolute ground of freedom in the subject, it becomes the fundamental principle of a criticism which sets the realization of human freedom as its primary task.

III. b. **The Reading of Spinoza and Leibniz in *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature***

In the introduction to *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* there is a detailed account of Schelling's relation to Spinoza and Leibniz. Spinoza is praised, in contrast to "the greatest thinkers among the ancients," for being the first to have grasped that mind and matter are one.¹ "His system was the first bold outline of a creative imagination which conceived the finite immediately in the infinite"(15). Leibniz in contrast "went the opposite way," i.e., he conceived the infinite in the finite (16). In the subsequent analysis Schelling will "reestablish" Leibniz' philosophy by giving a Spinozistic interpretation to his conception that the infinite is in the finite. Thus, rather than regarding the infinite as something beyond the world, Leibniz' principle of sufficient reason will be regarded as an internal principle which forms a substantial unity with the finite. Instead of raising the finite to the level of the infinite, the infinite will be conceived as fully present in the finite. This blending of the two positions is, in effect, a reversal of Spinoza's understanding of absolute, for it is no longer intuited as an object outside the subject. Instead Schelling is proposing that it be regarded as an intuition of an original unity within the subject.

Schelling is particularly concerned "that the Kantian school should force its inventions upon him — alleging that he says things the precise opposite of everything he taught," for "there is nothing from which Leibniz could have been more remote than the speculative chimera of a world of "things-in- themselves" (16). Leibniz' true concern was to show that "all alterations, all change of perceptions and presentations within a mind, could proceed

¹Schelling, *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, trans. Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge: University Press, 1988) 15.

only from an inner principle" (16). As we can already anticipate, Schelling will claim to grasp this principle through intellectual intuition. This means that the Philosophy of Nature is the project of specifying this principle in our empirical intuition.

Kant's notion of things-in-themselves reduces the soul to the status of mere matter - "an optical glass." It explains how the soul is dependent upon external impressions, but it does not explain the activity by which the soul sees and actively raises the impression to consciousness. Further, the understanding makes problematic what was free of doubt for our intuition. Because it engages in an infinite analysis, the understanding forms the notion that what we know must proceed from an infinite synthesis. My intuition, however, is finite, hence, "the real seems to flee before me, or to vanish under my hand, and matter, the first foundation of all experience, becomes the most insubstantial thing we know" (17).

Schelling holds fast to the notion that there must be a link between our perception and things-in-themselves. If reality is so insubstantial that perception is just a dream, then it must be a shadow of a prior reality - or a recollection from a world that was previously actual (17). But if a higher being were creating this shadow play in me, then the only way to explain this would be that I had "received that shadow-show, merely as a limitation, or modification of its absolute productivity" (17). Notice that with these two alternatives for interpreting the limitations of my perception (i.e., recollection or modification of the divine substance) Schelling has just characterized the philosophies of Leibniz and Spinoza. Leibniz proposes that the appearance of the shadow-play in me is merely a limitation of my ability to perceive God's absolute productivity. Whereas Spinoza conceives my perception as a modification of that absolute productivity. Schelling wants to overcome Kant, by showing how the two views which form the foundation of his critical philosophy can be shown to support the idea of an intuition of the absolute causality in which subjectivity is

grounded.

Forces are not in matter as if they were something separate from matter which was implanted by a higher hand. Rather, matter itself is nothing but force (18). But as forces cannot be explained from matter, Newtonian physics is at an impasse, for there is no empirical explanation of the origin of forces through something outside yourself. A force separate from you makes no sense. Forces are only known to your feeling, but feeling gives you no objective concepts. And yet, we speak of forces as if they were objective. In Newton, the force of attraction is ranked as a physical cause — but as a physical ground of explanation “this is nothing more and nothing less than an occult quality” (18).² But even if this made sense, the empirical principles alone cannot explain the possibility of a world system, “for the ultimate knowledge from experience is this, that a universe exists; this proposition is the limit of experience itself. Or rather, that a universe exists is itself only an *idea*. Even less, therefore, can the universal equilibrium of world forces be anything that you could have concocted from experience. For you could not even extract this idea from experience for the individual system if it is everywhere idea; but it is transferred to the whole by analogical inferences” (18-19). The idea of a world is linked to the idea of a system. Thus the Newtonian empiricist does not recognize that the idea of the whole is implicitly prior to his or her experience. But this means that the empiricist cannot explain

²This criticism merely repeats Leibniz’ criticism of Newton’s ascription of force to matter in the Preface to the *Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement* (*Die Philosophischen Schriften*, V, 59). Leibniz’ use of this term may itself be drawn from Descartes’ *Regulae*, rule 9: “If I want to know how one and the same simple cause can give rise simultaneously to opposite effects, I shall not ... prattle about the moon’s warming things by its light and cooling them by means of some occult quality. Rather I shall observe a pair of scales, where a single weight raises on a scale and lowers the other instantaneously, and similar examples” (*The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, 403/34).

force from experience. Just as Leibniz had argued before him³, Schelling is claiming that forces must, rather, stem from ideas, which are “true in themselves” and must “for that reason be products of something, or must be grounded in something, which is itself absolute and independent of experience” (19). This idea (e.g., of force) extends beyond the realm of natural science into the realm of the Philosophy of Nature.

Newton, however, did not recognize this, for he continued to seek for “the effective cause of attraction” (19). Leibniz, in contrast, approached the problem from the opposite perspective. “Whereas Leibniz based the system of the spiritual world on the pre-established harmony, Newton found the system of a material world in the equilibrium of world forces” (19). What Schelling hopes to show is that “an all embracing mind will at some time find the midpoint round which the universe of our knowledge moves” so that the two accounts can “appear as one and the same, or merely as different aspects of one and the same totality”(19).

From the idea of this possible unity, Schelling goes “farther” to claim that we cannot appeal to a cause of sensation outside of us. As what is sensed has its basis only through our sensation, we cannot ascribe it to a cause outside. But if we suppose for a moment that these outer causes have an inner effect, then we discover that what takes place in our minds is “completely independent of the external impression”(20), even if the impression is not unknown to it. Thus, the empiricist account of consciousness, whether it be Locke’s secondary qualities, or Hobbes idea that all sense is fancy, or even Kant’s idea that objective knowledge is an appearance, is transformed into the basis for an argument that what appears to sensation has its origin in the mind. In other words, empiricism is used to

³Cf. Preface to the *New Essays for the Human Understanding* in: *Die Philosophischen Schriften*, V, 59.

support an idealist argument which discovers the condition of the possibility for objectivity in the data of experience, thereby transforming the appearance to consciousness into the principle of the constitution of the world as such, rather than finding the source of experience in the external object. "How then did the impression reach this region of your soul in which you feel wholly free and independent of impressions? However many intervening factors you insert between the effects of your nerves, brain, etc. , and the idea of an external thing, you only deceive yourself; for the transition from the body to the soul, according to your own submissions, cannot occur continuously, but only by a leap which you profess you would rather avoid"(20). In other words, if sensation is distorted, then there can be no transition from the outside to the inside. Such a transition could only occur by a leap. But this is precisely what empiricism tries to avoid by drawing all knowledge from experience. Hence, the inevitable distortion of sense experience is used as an argument to justify the idea of a subjective intuition of the absolute. Because there can be no transition without a leap, the only way to avoid such a leap is to posit knowledge as beginning with an absolute, rather than with a limited intuition.

Schelling uses this reasoning to dismiss the empiricist account of mechanical movement, of gravity, of matter, and of specific weight because all of these notions presuppose a leap from the external to the internal. In contrast to this Schelling is proposing to draw these laws from his intuition of an absolute productivity at the ground of consciousness. This is the essential task of the philosophy of Nature - to propose an idealist account which encompasses the empiricist account provided by natural science, and thereby give it a systematic foundation in just the same way that early modern metaphysics tried to discover a metaphysics that was consistent with the results of the newly emerging mathematical physics. Because it lacks systematic foundation, Newton's empiricist account

of nature anthropomorphizes nature “borrowing pictorial expressions which are taken from living natures” in the same way that Spinoza dismisses final causality as an anthropomorphism which is “the last refuge of ignorance” (21). The phrasing sounds like Spinoza’s, but the critique is actually drawn from the Preface to Leibniz’ *New Essays on the Human Understanding*.⁴

Thus, Schelling is appealing to Leibniz to argue that Newton’s attribution of force to matter fails to provide a systematic articulation of the relation between asserting them and the possible ground of their explanation. Newton’s account of force involves a leap. What Schelling is envisioning is the possibility of a systematic account of nature which does away with this leap by providing a complete articulation of the link between absolute intuition and the concepts employed in the empirical sciences. Having brought Spinoza’s intuition of the absolute into the subject, Schelling can envision the possibility of making that intuition into the ground of all possible explanation of nature (in accord with Leibniz’ teleology) in a way that would overcome the deficiencies of the categories employed by empirical science. Thus, the philosophy of nature is not so much an attempt to dismiss empirical science, as it is an attempt to provide it with a truly systematic foundation that can reconcile it with the latest philosophical development. Schelling proposes to provide such a foundation by interpreting Leibniz and Spinoza in accord with his subjectivization of the absolute.

Spinoza’s intellectual intuition is thus transformed into an intuition of the absolute in the self, and this absolute is henceforth conceived in accord with Leibniz’ account of sufficient reason as the ultimate principle of determination from which the laws of nature must be derived. The *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* of 1796 is thus merely an attempt to

⁴Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften*, V, 59.

suggest how these laws might be derived in a systematic way, rather than an attempt to complete such a systematic derivation. As Schelling states in the introduction, it is only the beginning, and not the execution of his plan for a Philosophy of Nature: “our present concern is not how we might present such a system once it exists, but how in general such a system could exist”(23).⁵

Schelling’s primary aim is to use the idea of such a Philosophy of Nature as a critical tool against all forms of empiricism which posit a “leap” between the object as it is apart from the conditions of my perception and the object as it appears in my perception. For what such accounts fail to explain is how the appearance of something external comes to have the inner quality of necessity. For example, when Newton tries to explain how two bodies can attract one another “independent of the relation of their masses, that is to say *independent* of the laws of *gravity*”(21), he says the “ground must depend upon the quality of a body”(21). But quality “has a legitimate sense only in relation to... sensation,” whereas the phenomena he is describing are supposedly objective facts. By thus misunderstanding quality as something external Newton fails to explain the connection between this “quality” and the real external motion outside of him. In other words, his empiricist account begs the question of how this “external movement” combines “with an inner quality” to yield an objectively necessary representation, which means that the force of attraction “is nothing more and nothing less than an occult quality”(18) arising from empiricism’s confusion of the imagination with the understanding. To speak in this way is to rely on the imagination “borrowing pictorial expressions, which are taken from living natures” in the same way that Spinoza argues that the idea of a final cause arises from

⁵Cf. Also *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, 4.

mistaking the imagination for the intellect.⁶ In other words, this is to appeal to an image which “you would be very hard put to convert ... into an intelligible concept”(21) and as such it is “a refuge of your ignorance”(21). Thus, Newton’s empiricist account of gravity is wholly imaginary, and will remain so until the Philosophy of Nature can systematically ground it in the subjective intuition of the absolute.

Schelling’s argument here is almost identical to the one Hume makes against rationalism in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Hume claims that there is no connection between sensory experience and the representation of necessity other than habit. Schelling, in effect, agrees with Hume that there is no representation of necessity in experience. Indeed, this is the reason for his critique of Newton’s use of the term quality in his account of gravity. But he draws the completely opposite conclusion than Hume does. If there is no necessity in experience, then this necessity is not simply the result of blind habit imposing itself on our experience of things outside of us, for this begs the question of the origin of the necessity it would explain. Rather, the necessity must be derived “from the nature of our mind, and so of the finite mind as such, and, in order that this succession may be genuinely objective, to have the things themselves arise and come into being in it” (27). What this means is that Schelling believes that the Philosophy of Nature can explain this necessity more successfully on idealist rather than empiricist grounds by linking it to an internal rather than an external (or sensory) intuition.

Consider the following remarks from Hume’s *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*:

⁶As I indicated above, this critique is drawn not from Spinoza, but from Leibniz’ *Nouveaux Essais sur L’Entendement* (*Die Philosophischen Schriften*, V, 59), which means that Leibniz already incorporated Spinoza’s critique of final causality, and further, that he saw his system of pre-established harmony as capable of recognizing a rigorously mechanistic account of nature with a teleological principles in a fashion that could overcome Spinoza’s critique.

It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles upon which the influence of these objects entirely depends.... But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and principles, we always presume that when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eaten, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connection between the sensible qualities and the secret powers.⁷

Schelling believes he has discovered the foundation of this connection in the intellectual intuition of the absolute, which will henceforth become the “medium” between our representations and the cause and effect relation. By thus proposing to demonstrate how the inner quality of necessity is linked to an intellectual intuition which does not appear in experience, he foresees the possibility of producing the chain of reasoning linking sensory appearance with cause and effect which Hume thought could never be found. “But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to reproduce that reasoning. The connection between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent upon those to produce it, who assert, that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matters of fact” (Hume 30). In relation to this Schelling thinks he possesses the key to unlock the riddle of the “secret powers” of nature (21) which lead us to unite sensory appearances with the quality of necessity.

Indeed, it is because Schelling and Hegel and Hegel after him believed that the philosophy of nature stands poised at the brink of a systematic explanation of this secret

⁷David Hume, *The Philosophical Works*, IV, ed. T.H. Greene and T.H. Grose (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1964) 31.

that they so often speak of nature in near mystical terms as a magical power, so that Hegel himself can describe the planting of a seed in the earth as “a mystical action, secret forces are in it, which still slumber, so that in truth it is still something other, than this, the manner in which it is there; the magician who gives this seed that I crush with my hand a wholly other meaning is nature, the concept — which is a rusty lamp, a powerful spirit; the kernel is the power which the earth called forth, that the earth’s force would serve it.”⁸

Rather than actually demonstrating how this intuition serves as the ground of such necessity, Schelling is only foreseeing the possibility of such a link. What this means is that the appearance that our empirical knowledge is outside us is something wholly imaginary. To be grounded in such a way that it can be transformed into “objective conceptions,” empirical knowledge must be systematically traced back to the ground of its necessity in the human mind. Thus “the question is not whether and how that assemblage of phenomena and the series of causes and effects, which we call the course of Nature, has become actual *outside us*, but how they have become actual *for us*, how that system and that assemblage of phenomena have found their way into our minds”(23). This means that Schelling is trying to move from mere fact of an appearance to consciousness to an explanation of whence it derives its necessity in consciousness.

The *Ideas for the Philosophy of Nature* merely presents a sketch of the possibility of such a systematic explanation, rather than an attempt to have worked it out in any detail. Indeed, when Schelling describes this link in the introduction he does not go much further than a few general remarks that suggest how Kant’s table of categories might be used to link the inner, qualitative experience of “matter and with it the forces of attraction and

⁸Hegel, *Naturphilosophie 1805, Gesammelte Werke*, Band VIII, Herausgegeben Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1976) 131, my translation.

repulsion, which are all distinguished from one another by qualities” into a systematic whole.⁹ So what is at issue is the derivation of the whole system of science from this inner experience of quality. Rather than deriving the qualitative from the quantitative, such that quality remains something “occult” and unexplained outside of us, as he accuses Newton of doing, Schelling is proposing to derive the quantitative from the qualitative, such that the qualitative becomes the ground of the explanation of quantity, instead of the other way around. As quality is “appropriate to the inner constitution of matter -*chemical* motion,” Schelling will proceed to sketch out the possibility of deriving both quantitative motion (gravity) and relative motion (mechanical motion) from it respectively: “for example, for chemical attraction between bodies to take place, one may say there must be matter, which extends them, which works against inertia - light and heat - also substances which mutually attract each other and so that there may be the greatest possible simplicity, one fundamental substance, which all others attract and these conditions of chemical processes... must be present everywhere.... This is more or less the way in which the theory of nature attains its completeness. But our present concern is not how we might present such a system once it exists, but how in general such a system could exist”(22-23).

The point of this derivation is really quite simple: To make knowledge objective it must be traced back to its necessity in the human mind, instead of merely depending upon *ad hoc* imaginary constructions like inner qualities of external matter, etc. Such categories can be used, but only if the entire empiricist approach to natural science is stood on its

⁹Schelling associates three possible motions with the mathematical and the dynamical categories and their relation (i.e., quantity, quality and relation): “1. *Quantitative* motion, which is proportional only to the quantity of matter - *gravity*. 2. *Qualitative* motion, which is appropriate to the inner constitution of matter - *chemical* motion; *Relative* motion, which is transmitted to bodies by influence from without (by impact) - *mechanical* motion” (22).

head.¹⁰ We must no longer consider “how an object completely devoid of quality could impart quality to another, this nobody understands and nobody can make intelligible”(21). In other words, we should not proceed from quantity to the idea of quality, rather, we should begin with an analysis of quality itself and show how such an analysis could eventually yield the objects of physics and their laws. As force is inseparable from matter, since “you cannot conceive matter at all without force” (18), to derive the object from the experience of its quality is also to derive its forces. Hence, “the necessity in our conception which we are absolutely compelled to think”(23) in objects derives from the conditions of the manner in which we receive them, rather than from things in themselves. “To explain this necessity is the major problem of all philosophy. The question is not whether this problem as such ought to exist, but how, once it exists, it must be solved” (23). Having accepted Hume’s objection that, there is no necessary connection between ideas exhibited on the order of sensory intuition, Schelling has radicalized it into a claim that the only possible source of this connection is in intellectual intuition. Hence, the task of the Philosophy of Nature becomes the task of portraying how the inner experience of quality is founded in a subjective intuition of the absolute - even if, like Hume, Schelling does not yet know the precise nature of this “medium” between intuition and necessity. The difference is that Schelling has posited it as something which remains to be discovered, whereas Hume believes that “no one will ever be able to discover any connecting proposition or intermediate step” between the two.¹¹

¹⁰Cf. Schelling’s comments on Kant’s system: “this system requires no refutation. To propound it is to overturn it from the bottom up. In fact, Humean skepticism is vastly superior, and not at all comparable to it”(Ideas 26). From Schelling’s perspective, Kant is just as much an empiricist as Newton, as he too, adheres to the axiom that “things affect us from without”(25).

¹¹Hume, *The Philosophical Works*, IV, 30

Common sense generally presumes that a necessary succession of ideas is subjectively necessary only because it is objectively necessary. But this simply means that the necessity of “this particular succession cannot be divorced from these particular phenomena” such that “both succession and phenomena are in mutual relation, both are mutually necessary in regard to each other” (*Ideas* 23). But this means that either “both arise together inseparably *outside* us. Or succession and phenomena both arise together and inseparably *within* us”(24). These are the only two ways that this succession can be “an actual succession of things, not merely an ideal sequence of our presentations one after another”(24). So Schelling is confronted with a choice between “the assertion of common human understanding” which assumes there is a succession outside us and “the attempt to derive the necessity of a succession from the *nature* of the human mind”(27).

The first alternative, the assertion “of the common human understanding, and even of philosophers formally opposed to Hume’s skepticism” (24), explains the necessity of the succession of things outside, but it fails to explain how this necessity is represented in us: “I understand how a succession (of ideas) takes place *within* me, but a succession which goes on in the things themselves, independent of the finite ideas is wholly unintelligible to me. For if we were to posit a Being who was not finite, and accordingly not bound to the succession of presentations, but who grasped everything, present and future, together in one intuition, for such a Being there would be no succession in the things external to him: it is therefore a succession as such, only under the condition of the finitude of the representation” (24). Schelling is appealing to the idea of an intuitive intellect from section §76 of the *Critique of Judgment*. By arguing that such an intellect would discover no succession in things external to him, Schelling is proposing that the idea of a succession in things in themselves is non-sensical. If an infinite being would have no such

insight into a necessity or succession outside of it, then neither would we, since the idea of our inability to cognize such a necessity in the things stems from a limitation of our intuition. In other words, as it is not our intellect, but the conditions of our intuition, which limit our understanding, the idea of things-in-themselves is simply a function of the weakness of our intuition — an imaginary fiction, and a “refuge of ignorance”— which we have imposed on phenomena that our sensory intuition has not adequately understood. Because reason can attain an intellectual intuition of the ground of these phenomena, we have the capacity to see beyond the limits of sensory intuition, and correct this error of the understanding. Thus, Schelling is in effect claiming that Spinoza’s critique of final causality applies only to the understanding, *but not to reason*, for intellectual intuition gives reason the capacity to see beyond the limits of the understanding, into the idea of a purposive ground of nature. This means that the Philosophy of Nature is conceived as the projected task of establishing a link between our experience of phenomena and this purposive ground made available to intuition. Thus, in the same way that criticism is conceived as a practical task, rather than an immediate realization of the absolute (DC 190-1), the philosophy of nature is conceived as a project of discovery, rather than as a finished system .

Up to the present, all philosophers “have unanimously declared that succession is something which cannot be conceived at all apart from the presentations of a finite mind” (24). This means that a necessary succession must “arise together with the things, and *vice versa*” (25). Again, for Schelling there are only two alternatives for explaining this. *Either* the necessity is in things independent of our ideas, in which case, objective necessity is a mere illusion, as there is no succession in the things themselves. *Or* “one adheres to the assertion that the very phenomena themselves, together with the succession, come to be,

and arise only in our ideas, and that only to that extent is the order in which they follow one another an objective order”(25).

The first system, which is, of course, Kant’s, is said to be “the most fantastical system that has ever existed.... For let us ask what things outside us and independent of these ideas must be”(25) apart from the conditions of their representation. If we attempt to answer this question we find the object to be without succession, cause and effect, space, time, or extension. Schelling believes such an idea of a thing-in-itself is a “non-sensical conglomeration.” In *Faith and Knowledge* Hegel called it a “formless lump”.

If we speak of them, we must have an idea of them, or else we speak as we should not. One has, indeed, an idea even of nothing; one thinks of it at least as the absolute void, as something purely formal, and so on. One might think that the idea of things in themselves were a similar notion. But the idea of nothing can, after all, still be made palpable through the schema of empty space. Things in themselves, however, are expressly excluded from space and time, for the latter belong to the peculiar form of representation of finite beings. So nothing is left but an idea which floats midway between something and nothing, i.e., which does not even have the virtue of being absolutely nothing. It is in fact scarcely credible that such a non-sensical conglomeration of things, which, bereft of all sensible characteristics, are nevertheless supposed to function as sensible things should ever have come into anybody’s head. (25-26)

But if the objective necessity we represent in particular succession of things is not in those things themselves, then “what is there left for me to understand? Clearly only *myself*. So all ideas of an external world would have to develop out of *me*, myself” (26). Thus, succession is not in things, but in their representation; it is in the subject. The two arise at the same time. In this way Kant “sets up a mind in opposition to things-in-themselves which contains in itself certain *a priori* forms” through which “formless objects require structure; the empty forms, content” (26). This explains the necessity in our representations, but it fails to explain “how it happens that things come to be represented at all, about that there is the deepest silence” (26).

Schelling finds Kant’s account of nature ridiculous: “this system requires no

refutation. To propound it is to overturn it from the bottom up" (26). He thinks it is inadequate because it fails to explain how the representation of what is outside me comes to be within me. Hume, is preferable, for he is, at least consistent with his principles to the extent that he assumes "that the *succession* of appearances is only in our ideas; but that we take just this succession as necessary he declares to be pure illusion"(26). Hume does not, however, "explain the source of this illusion" of necessity. He only tells us it arises from custom. But his explanation is, as Hume himself acknowledges, circular "for the very thing that was to be explained *was why things follow one another in this order*"(27)¹² and thus, to appeal the prior experience of some other order upon which they are based only begs the question of the origin of this order by construing it as something which is infinitely deferred to a prior representation. As Hume cannot successfully explain the objective necessity outside me, "nothing remains but the attempt to derive the necessity of a succession of presentations from the *nature* of our mind, and so of the finite mind as such, and in order that this succession may be genuinely *objective*, to have the things themselves, together with this sequence, arise and come into being in it"(27).

To explain how this necessity might arise from the human mind, Schelling turns to an analysis of the systems of Leibniz and Spinoza, as the only two systems "whose entire philosophy is nothing else but this attempt" (27). The ensuing analysis, shows how the reconciliation of these two systems becomes the foundation for demonstrating that what appears as external can have the inner quality of necessity inasmuch as it proceeds from an inner principle.

¹²Schelling is referring to the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* in Hume's *Philosophical Works*, IV, 31.

Spinoza

Schelling's account of Spinoza begins where the earlier *Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism* left off. Spinoza's intuition of an absolute object is described in terms of our ideal nature in a way that already approaches its transformation into a subjective intuition: "Spinoza it seems, was worried at a very early stage about the connection of our ideas with things outside us, and could not tolerate the separation which had been set up between them. He saw that ideal and real (thought and object) are most intimately united in our nature. That we have ideas of things outside us, that our ideas even reach out *beyond* the things, he could explain to himself only in terms of our *ideal nature*; but that these correspond to actual things he had to explain in terms of the *affections* and *determinations* of the ideal in us. There fore we could not become aware of the real, save in contrast to the ideal, or the ideal, save in contrast to the real" (27). In other words, Spinoza had to explain the correspondence of ideas and things by conceiving of the two as affections and determinations of the two attributes of the one substance which is accessible to us in intuition. This is what Schelling means when he says "he had to explain" this correspondence "in terms of the affections and determinations of the ideal within us" (27). This means that ideal and the real were revealed as originally linked, so that "concepts and things, or thought and extension, were for this reason one and the same for him, both were only modifications of one and the same ideal nature" (27).

What Spinoza failed to see was how this unity arose in us: "However, instead of descending into the depths of his self-consciousness and descrying the emergence thence of the two worlds in us - the ideal and the real— he passed himself by; instead of explaining from our nature how finite and infinite, originally united in us, proceed reciprocally from each other, he lost himself forthwith in the idea of an infinite outside us" (27). Thus,

Spinoza conceived the infinite succession of finite things as a modification of the infinite, with the result that “this endless succession is envisaged by me ... with necessity” (28). This means that for Spinoza there is no beginning of time anymore than a beginning in being, because his thoughts were also nothing other than a modification of the infinite. But, according to Schelling, this is only because he failed to see the necessity that his idea of this infinite succession arose from an original unity of thought and extension within consciousness itself. Thus, Schelling transposes Spinoza’s God inward into a subjective unity, just as Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason is transposed inward into a subjective purpose. Because Spinoza did not see this primordial unity as something in him, he was unable to explain how we become aware of this infinite substance. According to Schelling what he was really intuiting was a unity of thought and extension in himself, which he failed to grasp as such. This is why his system requires rethinking to grasp its truth: “For generally speaking, as it came from his hand, his system is the most unintelligible that ever existed. One must have taken this system into oneself, have put oneself in the place of his infinite substance in order to know that infinite and finite — do not *arise*, but — *exist* originally together and inseparably, not *outside us*, but *in us*, and that the nature of our mind and of our whole mental existence rests on just this original union. For we know immediately only our own essence, and only ourselves are intelligible to us” (28). So Schelling puts himself (or the transcendental ego) in the place of Spinoza’s infinite substance. The intuition of the absolute has to rest on a point of access from the finite, and this point of access is intellectual intuition: “How affections and determinations are and can exist in an Absolute external to me, I do not understand. But I do understand that even within me there could be nothing *infinite* unless there were at the same time a *finite*. For that necessary union of ideal and real, of the absolutely active with the absolutely passive

(which Spinoza displaced into an infinite Substance outside me) exists *within me* originally without my co-operation, and that is just what *my* nature consists in” (28).

Leibniz

Leibniz, in contrast, begins with the notion of such an internal principle, which is to say that in individuality thus conceived, there is an original union of the principle of sufficient reason with the principle of individuality: “there is an original union of what all philosophy separates, the positive and the negative, the active and the passive in our nature. How there can be *determinations* in an infinite external to us, Spinoza knew no way of making intelligible, and he sought in vain to avoid a transition from the infinite to the finite. This transition is absent only where finite and infinite are *originally* united, and this original union exists nowhere except in the essence of an individual nature. Leibniz, therefore, went over neither from the infinite to the finite, nor from the latter to the former, but both were made actual for him at the same time — as if through one and the same unfolding of our nature — through one and the same operation of the mind” (28).

Thus, Schelling finds Leibniz to have made the finite and the infinite actual at the same time. The difference — or the mistake — according to Schelling is that Leibniz failed to recognize that this actuality arose from an original unity within us, rather than from a transcendent unity, or a separate unifying principle: “That ideas in us *follow* one another is the necessary consequence of our finitude, but that this series is *endless* proves that they proceed from a being in whose nature finitude and infinity are united”(29). According to Schelling, we (rather than God) are the being who brings about this union. In this way the endless deferral of one representation to the one which precedes it found in Hume is stopped by the union of the finite and the infinite.

That this succession is necessary follows, in Leibniz's philosophy, from the fact that the things together with the ideas arise by virtue of the mere laws of our nature, according to an inner principle in us, as in a world of its own. What alone Leibniz held to be originally real and actual *in themselves* were *perceptual beings*; for in these alone was that *unification* original, out of which everything else that is called actual *develops* and *goes forth*. For everything which is actual outside us is infinite, and so not conceivable without a positive, which gives it reality and a negative which gives it limit. This unification of positive and negative activity, however, is nowhere *original* except in the nature of an individual. External things were not actual *in themselves*, but have only *become* actual through the mode of presentation of spiritual natures; but that from whose nature all existence first *emerges*, that is, the ideating being alone, would have had to be something which bears the source and origin of its existence in itself. (28)

In the same way he argued that Spinoza misunderstood his own intuition for the infinite Substance which united thought and being, Schelling is now arguing that Leibniz has mistaken this inner unity for a transcendent principle of determination: "If now the whole succession of ideas springs from the *nature* of the finite mind, so likewise the whole series of our experiences must be derivable from it. For that all beings like ourselves perceive the phenomena of the world in the same necessary serial order is conceivable solely and solely from our common nature. To explain this agreement of our nature, however, by a pre-established harmony is actually not to explain it. Because this word only says that such agreement occurs, but not how and why"(29). In other words, relying on God as the determining principle is no explanation at all.

Thus, Schelling is trying to argue that Leibniz' account of finite natures implicitly anticipates his notion of intellectual intuition: "It is, however, implicit in Leibniz' system itself that this agreement should follow from the *essence* of the finite natures as such. Because if this were not so, the mind would cease to be absolutely *self-explanatory* of its knowledge and cognition. Nevertheless, it would still have to seek the ground of its ideas *outside itself*" (29). In this way, Schelling completely dismisses the principle of sufficient reason as a transcendent ground by saying that it explains nothing because it makes the

world entirely contingent: "We should have reverted once again to the same point from which we began; the world and its order would be *contingent* for us, and the representation thereof would come to us only from without. But with that we are inevitably swept beyond the limits within which we understand ourselves" (29). In other words, if we are not to lapse into the Humean circle of scepticism which vainly tries to explain the necessity of judgments from their prior appearance, and thus to represent the necessity of our judgments as merely contingent habits, then we must seek to discover this necessity in ourselves. The pre-established harmony fails to explain the agreement of our nature with what happens outside it, "because it only says *that* an agreement occurs but not how and why" (29). If Leibniz says that this agreement must follow "from the *essence* of finite natures" (29), this can be true only if the mind is "absolutely *self-explanatory* of its knowledge and cognition"(29). In other words, even if the mind seeks the ground of its ideas outside itself, the pre-established harmony can only emerge from an internal principle, and this means that the subject must have access to the principle of its own determination: "Leibniz, therefore, could not have associated with the pre-established harmony the idea that one usually couples with it," namely, that ideas come into the mind from outside. "For he explicitly asserts that no mind could have *come to be*; that is, the concepts of cause and effect are altogether inapplicable to a mind. It is, therefore, absolutely self-explanatory of its being and knowing, and just because it exists at all, is also *what it is*, i.e., a being to whose *nature* this particular system of ideas of external things also belongs"(29-30). As "absolutely self-explanatory of its being and knowing," the mind has the function of grasping "the system of ideas of external things" which Leibniz had accorded only to God. With this argument Schelling has overturned Leibniz' dogmatism, and Leibniz has been brought into line with Schelling's own account of intellectual intuition.

This means that transcendental inquiry can hereafter proceed as a philosophy of nature which is nothing less than a genetic inquiry into the internal origin of our ideas. “Philosophy is accordingly nothing other than *the natural history of our mind*. From now on dogmatism is overturned from its foundations. We consider the system of our ideas not in its *being*, but in its *becoming*. The system of nature is at the same time the system of our mind, and only now, once the great synthesis has been accomplished, does our knowledge return to analysis (to *research* and *experiment*). But this system does not yet exist”(20). As he will remark at the close of this introduction to the *Ideas for the Philosophy of Nature*, nature should become visible mind, mind invisible nature (42). Thus, there is a turning inward at a higher level of complexity in which the exposition of nature as mind is transformed into the exposition of the mind’s natural history.

In accord with his remarks in the introduction that a philosophy of nature ought to deduce the possibility of nature, Schelling is claiming to be catching a glimpse of a work in progress — a work of production for which he sees the necessity but which he has not yet articulated as a system: “this system does not yet exist”(30). Hegel will claim to realize this system by claiming to have achieved the complete specification of the Idea in nature, while Schelling was still within the domain of Kant’s critical philosophy to the extent that he focussed on the conditions of the possibility of knowledge in intellectual intuition. Hegel, of course, will transform this intuition into determinate cognition, so that nature is completely specified, from the top down.

The organic shows the necessity of this system which Schelling is announcing in the *Ideas*, for, as Kant suggested, the “organic” refers to a different standard from mechanical causation by forever turning back into itself, such that its presentation becomes

the cause of its own production.¹³ Schelling takes this to mean that the organism truly produces itself.

Every organic product exists *for itself*; its being is dependent on no other being. But now the cause is never the *same as* the effect; only between different things is the relation of cause and effect possible. The organic, however, produces itself, arises *out of itself*; every single plant is the product only of an individual *of its own kind*, and so every single organism endlessly produces and reproduces *its own species*. Hence, no organization progresses *forward*, but is forever turning back always into *itself*. Accordingly, an organization as such is neither *cause* nor *effect* of anything outside it, and so is nothing that intrudes into the nexus of mechanism" (30).

In the organic the animating principle is inseparable from its essence. This means that the same thing would have to be regarded as both cause and effect, but this is impossible. As the organic is always turning back into itself, there can be no relation of cause and effect with respect to it, and thus, the organic process is thoroughly distinct from the mechanical. This also means that the organic shows itself to be *real*, in as much as it shows itself to be independent of my perception: "Every organic product carries the reason of its existence in *itself*, for it is cause and effect of itself. No single part could *arise* except in this whole, and the whole itself consists in the interaction of the parts. In every other object the parts are *arbitrary*, they exist only insofar as I *divide*. Only in organized beings are they real; they exist without my participation, because there is an objective relationship between them and the whole. Thus, a *concept* lies at the basis of every organization, for where there is a necessary relation of the part to the whole and the whole to the part, there is a *concept*" (31).

What Schelling here assumes as a *sollen* ("*Natur soll sichtbare Geist werden*") Hegel will claim to realize with his principle of life. But although Schelling has not cognized it yet, he can clearly see that this principle, or concept, is not separate from what it

¹³Cf. §77 of the *Critique of Judgment*.

organizes, rather “ it dwells in the organization itself, and can by no means be separated from it, it *organizes itself*, and is not simply, say, a work of art whose concept is to be found *outside* it in the understanding of the artist” (31). In other words, the organized being contains its purpose within it, and is inseparable from it, and this is what permits it to organize itself further. Indeed, the whole point of Schelling’s reading of Spinoza and Leibniz was to transpose the outside into something accessible to intellectual intuition so that organization could be regarded as equi-primordial with the concept which determines it. In other words, Schelling collapsed Leibniz’s distinction between the principle of animate life and its transcendent ground, by reading it through Spinoza, so that the principle and its ground become indistinguishable from extended substance: “Thus organization constructs itself out of organization. In the organic product, for this very reason, form and matter are inseparable.... Every organization is therefore a *whole*; its *unity lies in itself*; it does not depend on our choice whether we think of it as one or as many” (31).

This emphasis on organic unity is further articulated against the backdrop of Schelling’s appropriation of Hume, for the organic is said to be real only because it does not depend on knowledge of cause and effect, which, like Hume, Schelling believes to be wholly illusory: “Cause and effect is something evanescent, transitory, mere *appearance* (in the usual sense of the word). The organism, however, is not mere appearance, but is itself object, and indeed, object existing in itself” (31). Because Schelling has reversed Hume’s skepticism by claiming to discover the ground of the connection between cause and effect in intellectual intuition, he can now claim to understand the organism, because the organism exhibits the same structure as intellectual intuition: it reveals itself as its own cause, and hence, as real, because the grounding of necessity in intellectual intuition has in effect

obliterated the distinction “between experience and speculation” (30). As the middle term between what the organism already is and what it shall be, the organism is a whole which eludes description in terms of cause and effect, in the same way that intellectual intuition of the whole is the middle term which is the prior ground of every causal analysis. One might indeed accuse Schelling of having fallen into Hume’s circular reasoning here,¹⁴ inasmuch as he derives his knowledge of the reality of the organism from his presupposition of an intellectual intuition. The crucial difference, however, is that Schelling is basing his knowledge of the reality of the organism on intellectual intuition, rather than on experience. Schelling is exploring the idealistic alternative to Hume’s skepticism. If knowledge of necessity is not accessible through sensory intuition, as Hume maintains when he says that “the connection between these propositions is not intuitive” (Hume, 30), then it can only be discovered through intellectual intuition which discovers, or rather, is the “medium” between cause and effect. Because this intuition is an absolute ground of all knowledge, there is, henceforth, no “separation between experience and speculation,” as Hume alleges, which means that the project of elaborating the system of the Philosophy of Nature, as “the system of our mind” (Hume 30), can henceforth exhibit the organic as something real. The organic is real because it is a concept, and speculative concepts have been rendered indistinguishable from experience to the extent that both are appearances to consciousness — indeed, the organic is more real than any other external appearance, because it reveals itself to have the same structure as consciousness.

Thus, to regard the organic as its own product subsisting through itself (e.g., as the unity of concept and object) is to exhibit its reality in a way that merely empirical

¹⁴Cf. Hume 31: “To endeavor, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted which is the very point in question.”

knowledge cannot. "So if the purposiveness of the organic product is to be explained, the dogmatist finds himself completely deserted by his own system. Here it no longer avails to separate the concept and the object, form and matter, as it pleases us. For *here*, at least, both are originally and necessarily united, not in our idea, but in the object itself. I should like one of those who take playing with concepts for philosophy, and fantasies of things for real to venture with us into this field"(31). Thus, in some Anaxagorean fashion, what exists is regarded as coming from the infinite mixture which was present prior to generation. Thus, as Socrates remarks in his critique of mechanism in the *Phaedo*, Schelling claims that "the *origin* of an organism, as such, can no more be explained mechanically, than the origin of matter itself"(31).¹⁵

What is at issue here is an intuition of a conceptual unity prior to consciousness that becomes the ground from which the organism can be explained.

First of all you must concede that here the talk is of a *unity*, which is absolutely inexplicable in terms of *matter*, as such. For it is a unity of the *concept*, a unity that exists only in relation to an intuiting and reflecting being. For that there is absolute individuality in an organism, that its parts are possible only through the whole, and the whole is possible, not through assembling, but through the interaction of the parts, is a *judgment* and cannot be judged at all save only by a mind, which relates whole and part, form and matter, reciprocally to one another, and only through and in this relation does all purposiveness and attunement to the whole arise and come to be in the first place. What indeed, have these parts, which are but matter, in common with an *Idea*, which is originally alien to matter, and to which they are nevertheless attuned? Here no relation is possible except through a third thing, to whose ideas both, matter and concept, belong. Such a third thing, however, is only an intuiting and reflecting mind. So you have to admit that organization as such is conceivable only in relation to a *mind*. (31-32)

As organization is seen as possible only through a mind, Schelling does not hesitate

¹⁵*Phaedo*, 99c: "They imagine that they will someday find a more mighty and immortal and all sustaining Atlas that they do no think that anything is really bound and held together by goodness or moral obligation. For my part I should be delighted to learn about the workings of such a cause from anyone, but since I have been unable either to discover it myself or to learn about it from another..." The entire passage from 98a through 99d presents a critique of mechanism similar to the one that Schelling is presenting here. Like Schelling, Plato will discover the mind itself to be the ultimate ground of mechanical explanation.

to discover such a mind at the ground of organic nature. The mind is thus the sole possible ground of its own investigation. As for Socrates in the discussion of comparatives (the great and the small) which is taken up immediately after his criticism of Anaxagoras for failing to adhere to his principle that mind is the arranger of all things in the *Phaedo*,¹⁶ so also for Schelling there is no possibility of establishing a comparison “except through a third thing, to whose ideas both, matter, and concept belong”(32). And this third thing is the “intuiting and reflecting mind” which is the reflecting medium that makes the comparison.¹⁷ In a way, Schelling is implicitly attempting to unite Kant and Plato by arguing that in Plato the mind’s judgment brings about an “attunement” to the idea, in the same way that judgment brings about a harmony between the imagination and the understanding in aesthetic judgment. But rather than limiting that judgment to subjective feeling, Schelling is appealing to Plato’s objective idealism to transform that judgment back into the primordial principle underlying our investigation of reality. Just as Socrates argues that we must hypothesize that *Nous* is the ultimate ground of all things.¹⁸ Schelling is arguing that intellectual intuition is the ultimate ground of the explanation of nature. The difference is that Schelling is beginning with a subjective intuition of the ground of the possibility of objective nature, whereas Plato is hypothesizing the existence of such a ground as something separate from our experience. Apart from this means of access, however, the two views are quite close to one another.

¹⁶*Phaedo* 101a-b, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Hamilton and Cairns (Princeton: University Press, 1961).

¹⁷Cf. *Phaedo* 99d

¹⁸Cf. *Phaedo* 97c

In any event, Schelling seems to be suggesting that mechanism is incompatible with teleology in a way that Kant does not. His point is that their unity can only be reconciled in a single consciousness, for it is not possible to have a merely mechanical unity without at least implicitly thinking this unity as a purposive ground. This was the main thrust of his critique of Spinoza in *Dogmatism and Criticism*. "For since purposiveness is conceivable only in relation to a judging intellect, the question must be answered how the organic products arose independently *of me*, as if there were no relation at all between them and a judging intelligence, that is, as if there were no purpose in them anywhere. Hence, the first thing that you grant is this: Any conception of purpose can arise only in an intelligence, and only in relation to such an intelligence can anything be called purposive"(32). There is no mechanistic order, therefore, apart or separate from a purposive ground. Thus, Schelling thinks that Kant does not go far enough.

But to say the purposiveness of natural products is necessarily connected to a purposive ground, is not to say that this ground is in the control of the subjective will. The representation of this purpose is only necessary because the purpose comes from outside you:

For you can very easily distinguish what is arbitrary and what is necessary in the conjunction of your concepts. Whenever you conjoin things that are connected in a single aggregate, you act quite freely; the unity which you bestow on them you transfer to them simply from your thoughts; there is no reason residing in the *things themselves* which required you to think of them as one. But when you think of each plant as an individual, in which everything concurs together for one purpose, you must seek the reason for that *thing outside you*: you feel yourself constrained in your judgment; you must confess that the unity with which you think is not merely *logical* (in your thoughts), but *real* (actually outside you).(32)

Hence, we now have to explain how this idea arising in us is represented as something outside us. "It is now incumbent upon us to answer the question, how it happens that an idea, which obviously exists merely in you, and can have reality only in yourself, must be

actually intuited and represented by you, as itself outside you”(32).

Schelling rephrases the question as follows: “if it rests with your choice [*Willkuhr*] whether or not to impose the idea of purposiveness on things outside you, how does it come about that you impose this idea only on *certain* things, and not on *all*, that further, in this representing of purposeful products, you feel yourself in no way *free*, but absolutely constrained? You could give no other reason for either than that this purposive form just belong to certain *things* outside you, originally and without assistance from your choice” (33). Schelling is able to represent this idea as outside by appropriating Spinoza’s distinction between modes and attributes. If the form and matter of things cannot be separated, they can only have come into being simultaneously from a single infinite substance of which we are a mode. “In order to comprehend this union of concept and matter, you assume a higher divine intelligence, who designed his creations in ideal forms and brought forth Nature in accordance with these ideals” (33). We, in contrast, are beings in whom the concept *precedes* the act” and hence “the design the execution” who “*cannot produce*, but can only form or model, matter already there, can only stamp the impress of the understanding and purposiveness upon the matter from without. What he [the higher divine intelligence] produces is purposive, not *in itself*, but only in relation to the understanding of the artificer, not *originally* and *necessarily*, but only contingently”(33). In other words, our production is the result of mere understanding whereas the production of nature is the result of the activity of the actuality of the divine reason or *Nous*.

Is not the understanding a dead faculty? And has it any other use than to grasp and apprehend the actual when it is present? And, instead of creating the actual, does it not borrow its own reality from actuality itself? And is it not merely the slavishness of this faculty, its capacity for describing the outlines of the real, which sets up an accommodation between itself and the reality? But here the question is how the *actual* arises, and with it the ideal (the purposive), which is simply inseparable from it. Not that the things of nature, as such, are purposive, as every work of art is also purposive, but that this purposiveness is something which could not be imparted to

them at all from without, that they are purposive originally *through themselves* - this is what we want to see explained. (33-34)

Schelling's point is that purposiveness could only arise from a thorough-going unity of actual things with the purposive ideas which created them. But this still does not yet explain how we come to such an idea, for the question is not "how organic products, external to, and independent of me, have actually come to be," but rather: "how the *representation* of purposive products outside me got *into me*, and how, *although it pertains to things only in relation to my understanding*, I am nevertheless compelled to think of this purposiveness as *actually outside me* and necessary" (34).

To answer this question, Schelling will proceed to contrast Spinoza and Leibniz. If we regard nature as the work of an external creator, then no necessity can inhere in it, for the necessity we discover in it will only derive from our understanding. This is Spinoza's critique of final causality. If we assume that the creator possesses a concept of purpose, then he is subject to the laws of necessity, and thus "ceases to be a creator and becomes merely an artificer" (34). Making the creator finite deprives him of his creative power, making Him infinite transforms everything into a modification of the infinite. But this still does not explain "how the whole system of finite things, could have gotten into your consciousness, or how the unity of things, which can only be *ontological* in the Infinite Being, can have become *teleological* in your understanding" (34). The alternative is "to seek to explain this by the peculiar nature of the finite mind.... You could from now on, allow everything to arise and come to be simply in your mind. For if you also presuppose things *outside* and independent of you, which *in themselves* are purposive, you must nevertheless still explain how your *ideas* agree with these external things" (35). This alternative is Leibniz' system of pre-established harmony. But for this explanation to work, you "would have to assume a mind, analogous to your own, reigns in the very things

outside you" (35). For only in such a creative mind could "concept and actuality, ideal and real, so interpenetrate and unite that no separation is possible between them"(35). Thus, Leibniz thought that substantial form was the inherence of such a mind in the organized being (35).¹⁹

Schelling's treatment of this position echoes Kant's comments on hylozoism from section §73 of the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*. "This philosophy must accept therefore that there is a hierarchy of life in nature. Even in mere organized matter there is life, but a life of a more restricted kind. This idea is so old, and has hitherto persisted so constantly in the most varied forms, right up to the present day — (already in ancient times it was believed that the whole world was pervaded by an animating principle, called the world-soul, and the later period of Leibniz gave every plant its soul) — that one may very well surmise from the beginning that there must be some reason latent in the human mind itself for this natural belief" (35). Schelling's solution rehabilitates the *hylozoism* which both Kant and Leibniz had rejected,²⁰ and thus embraces a realistic rather than an idealistic conception of the purposiveness of nature. This means that Schelling's answer to the question of how we think of necessity as arising from objects outside of us, constitutes a reworking, if not a reversal, of Kant's reconciliation of Spinoza and Leibniz. Instead of

¹⁹Cf. "On Nature Itself" (1698): "the *communication of substances* has its source not in influx but in a concord proceeding from divine preformation: each substance, at the same time, that it follows the indwelling power and laws of its own nature, being accommodated to the others; and it is in this that the unity of soul and body consists"(Leibniz, *Philosophischen Schriften*, /*Philosophical Essays* 161). Or the following: "it is this same substantial principle which is called *soul*, in living beings, and *substantial form* in others; and so far as by its union with matter it constitutes a substance truly one, or *per se*, it forms what I call a *monad*"(162). Cf. also *Nouveaux Essais*, PS V, I.1, 64, and the Letter to Des Bosses, 5 February 1712, in: *Philosophical Essays*, 198.

²⁰Leibniz rejects hylozoism in "On Nature Itself": "I certainly agree that there is no such thing as a soul of the universe"*Philosophical Essays*, 156. Kant rejects it in *The Critique of Judgment* §65, §72, and §73.

merely correcting Leibniz's teleology through Spinoza's critique of final causality as Kant had done, Schelling will read Leibniz' pre-established harmony, which links subjective representations of necessity with the divine mind which is their sufficient ground, back into Spinoza. The result is the simultaneous collapse of both Spinoza's critique of final causality and Leibniz's distinction between the principle of sufficient reason and the world it determines. Henceforth, Spinoza's intellectual intuition does not just grasp God's unity, it grasps the purposiveness of natural products. In the same way, Leibniz' pre-established harmony allows us to grasp the purposiveness of natural products because we assume that a mind "analogous to your own reigns in the very things outside of you"(35). By collapsing the distinction between God and his creation, between purpose and its expression, what appears to consciousness is no longer regarded as a confused perception, but rather it is understood as a purpose, which we are capable of understanding because it possesses its determining principle in itself, even if that principle cannot yet be fully explicated. It is the task of the philosophy of nature to perform this explication, so that "nature should be visible mind, and mind visible spirit" (44). This means that the task of the philosophy of nature is nothing less than the project of the transformation of consciousness from a modification of the infinite into a complete articulation of the infinite in the finite.

Thus, Schelling's account of the organic beings involves an intertwining of these two views that unites the necessity of Spinoza's infinite substance with the contingency Leibniz' account of intuition in a way that constitutes a return to the idea of the world soul:

Necessity, because their very *existence* is *purposive*, not only their form (as in a work of art), *contingency*, because this purposiveness is nevertheless actual only for an intuiting and reflecting being. For that reason the human mind was early on lead to the idea of a *self-organizing* matter, and because organization is conceivable only in relation to a mind, to an original union of mind and matter in all things. It saw itself to seek the reason for these things, on the one hand, in nature herself,

and on the other, in a principle exalted above nature; and hence, it very soon fell into thinking of mind and Nature as one. Here for the first time there emerged from its sacred obscurity that ideal being in which the mind supposes concept and deed, design and execution, to be one. Here first a premonition came over man of his own nature, in which intuition and concept, form and object, ideal and real, are originally one and the same. (35)

This account of necessity is thoroughly in accord with Spinoza: “a thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence, or by reason of its cause.... But a thing is called contingent only by virtue of a defect in our knowledge” (*The Collected Works of Spinoza*, I, 106-7). Thus, trapped between a contingency which favors our intuition and a necessity we cannot cognize, our only recourse is to try to articulate our intuition of that ground with the creative imagination, which is to say that we have to think creatively through artistic and philosophical intuition: “pure intuition, or rather, creative imagination long since discovered the symbolic language which one has only to construe in order to discover that Nature speaks to us, the more intelligibly the less we think of her in a merely reflective way”(35). If we think Nature’s purposiveness as real, then we will be better able to intuit it. This is the sense of “*sollen*” in “Natur soll sichtbare Geist werden.”²¹ It is an injunction to think nature as a creative consciousness to better discover her invisible ground. Once we begin thinking in this non-reflective, intuitive way, we discover we are capable of grasping nature because we are linked to it: “So long as I myself am *identical* with Nature, I understand what a living nature is as well as I understand my own life; I apprehend how this universal life of Nature reveals itself in manifold forms, in progressive developments, in gradual approximations to freedom”(36).

Schelling unites in this way the relation between finite thinking and the attribute of thought in general with Leibniz’ idea of a pre-established harmony in which all of nature is

²¹Schelling, *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, Sämmtliche Werke*, Band II. I Abteilung. Herausgegeben K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-1861) 54.

conceived as animated by a single consciousness analogous to our own. Here, “we meet the absolute unification of Nature and Freedom in one and the same being. The living organism is to be a product of *Nature*, but in this natural product an ordering and coordinating *mind* is to rule. These two principles shall in no way be separated in it, but most intimately united. In intuition the two are not to be distinguishable at all; there must be neither before nor after, but absolute simultaneity and reciprocity between them”(36). In this way the human mind which grasps this unity is seen as an outgrowth of the absolute consciousness infused throughout the whole of nature. This is a perfect union of the thinking of Leibniz and Spinoza, for it is the condition of both: “As soon as philosophy removes this internal conjunction, two systems arise directly opposed to each other, because both entirely destroy all idea of life, which flees all the farther from them the nearer they think they approach it” (37).

In an argument that closely follows Socrates’ critique of Anaxagoras’ lapse into efficient causality in the *Phaedo*, Schelling dismisses all empirical accounts which would explain life from merely physical causes: “I am not speaking of that so-called philosophy of those who would hold that even thought, imagery and will spring up in us... through an actually artificial conjunction of muscles, fibres, membranes and ligaments which hold the body together, and fluid substances which flow through it and so on... not only is it a question of how these changes are caused, but also of what principle holds them together” (37). It is in the attempt to explain this principle of life that “nature oversteps the limits of inorganic chemistry” (37). Schelling posits the existence of a principle in the body which exempts it from all chemical laws. But this principle is not a “life-force” because forces can only be finite, and what is at issue here is something infinite: “no force is finite by *nature* except insofar as it is limited by one opposing it. Where we think of force (as in matter),

therefore, we must also presume a force *opposed* to it. Between opposing forces, however, we can only conceive a double relationship. Either they are in *relative* equilibrium ... then they are thought of as rest.... Or one thinks of them as in perpetual never settled conflict, where each in turn prevails and submits" (37). This means that there must be a primordially active principle beyond this conflict which keeps it going and maintains this alternation of passive and active forces. This principle is "higher than just *force*... which lies right outside the limits of empirical research into Nature" (37). But since "above and beyond nature ... nothing higher is acknowledged than mind"(38), we cannot speak of this principle as a force. The only alternative is to "take refuge in a completely antithetical system, in which mind and matter stand opposed to each other" (38). But rather than lapse into dualism by inquiring after the connection between the soul and the body, Schelling is proposing to explain "how the idea of such a connection has arisen in us"(38).

Like the Platonic theory of recollection, Schelling is arguing that the soul is the only possible source of what we know about the body: "at least this much is obvious, that if there is in me life and soul, the last as something distinct from the body, I can become aware of either only through immediate experience... I understand how an idea of my own being and life arises in me, because if I understand anything whatsoever, I must understand this"(39). Indeed, the entire system of pre-established harmony is implicit in the theory of recollection. If sensory things merely prompt us to recollect what we already knew, then there must be a harmony between our inner and outer experience. If *anamnesis* is, as Leibniz remarks, merely a mythical way of accounting for innate ideas,²² then there must be a sufficient ground of this harmony. This ground is the mind which arranges all things

²²*Philosophischen Schriften*, V, 46

at which Socrates refers to in the *Phaedo*.²³ If, as Schelling is proposing, we have an immediate intuition of this harmonizing ground, then there is no longer any need for a pre-established harmony, for the only possible source of what is outside, is already within us: "But how do I now come to transfer being, *life*, etc., to things outside me? For just as soon as this happens my immediate knowledge is converted into *mediate*. But now I maintain that there can be only an *immediate* knowledge of being and life, and that what *is* and *lives* only is and lives insofar as it first and foremost exists *for itself*, is aware of its life through being alive.... For life can as little be represented outside life as consciousness outside consciousness. So even an empirical conviction that something lies outside me is impossible"(39). The idea of life is thus the basis, or ground of everything that appears to consciousness as living, which means that I can be persuaded that anything corresponds to what is outside me only practically (39). As there can be no proof of the existence of life outside of the experience of life itself, the severe scepticism of Descartes' *Discourse* can only be overcome through practical conviction founded on the basis of one's own experience of life.

By merging Leibniz with Spinoza, Schelling has collapsed the pre-established harmony into a perfect idealism in which the appearance to consciousness is as absolute and severe as Cartesian skepticism. The goal of the Philosophy of Nature is to conceive the possibility of the ground of this union between the body and the soul in a higher principle which makes consciousness possible: "Here, clearly, there is something still higher, which freely and independently of the body, gives the body a soul, conceives body and soul together, and does not enter into this union — a higher principle, as it seems, in which body and soul are themselves again identical"(40). The recognition of this principle

²³Cf. *Phaedo* 97c

constitutes a leap across the abyss separating soul and body, mind and matter, mechanism and purposiveness, in as much as it recognizes that the only possible ground of the contents of consciousness is a transcendental principle which grounds the contents of consciousness in the idea of their union in a primordial activity which lies outside consciousness. "If we unite these two extremes, the idea arises in us of a purposiveness of the whole; nature becomes a circle which returns into itself, a self-enclosed system" (40). This idea of the absolute purposiveness of the whole remains within the domain of transcendental philosophy because it is "a necessary maxim of reflective reason" (41). And although Schelling has not yet transformed "this maxim into a constitutive law, we still follow it so steadfastly and so naïvely that we openly assume that Nature will, as it were, voluntarily come to meet our endeavor and discover an absolute purposiveness in her" (41). This means that we can "proceed with complete confidence in the agreement of Nature with the maxims of our reflective reason" to unite "special subordinate laws" under "general higher laws" by assuming apriori that phenomena are interconnected under some common principle (41). It is not until the announcement of the completion of his system in *Darstellung Meines Systems* in 1801 that Schelling will claim to have transformed this reflective maxim into a constitutive law for the complete specification of nature.²⁴ It is on the basis of this completed system that Hegel's 1803 Philosophy of Nature will envision life as the presence of the infinite in the finite such that Schelling's "higher principle ... in which body and soul are themselves again identical"(40) will be transformed into the infinite fluidity of organic life, such that organic life can be exhibited, not as a "secret force"(41) which lies "outside the limits of empirical research" (37), but as the vehicle by

²⁴Schelling, *Sämmtliche Werke*, Band IV. I. Abteilung. Herausgegeben K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-1861) 114.

which the concept carries out the complete specification of nature. What Schelling only foresees as a possibility in the *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* of 1797, Hegel will claim to have realized in 1803, by completely exhibiting Schelling's "higher principle" as the infinite fluidity of organic life. The difference is that whereas Schelling's system envisions this specification of nature as an absolute indifference of subject and object, Hegel will actually exhibit the principle of this indifference as organic life.

IV. The Organic in Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*

In what follows I will examine Schelling's account of the organic in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*. Although the *System* is not solely a philosophy of nature, its treatment of the organic in the second epoch of the history of self-consciousness presents some key themes that will appear in Hegel's philosophy of the organic. The most important of these themes is the idea that the self intuits itself as an organism in the production of organic nature, which constitutes the fundamental presupposition of Hegel's philosophy of the organic (if not of his philosophy of nature as a whole). To properly understand Hegel's point of departure in the philosophy of organic nature, we must descend into the intricacies of Schelling's Idealism and briefly review how it accounts for "the whole multiplicity of the objective world, its products and phenomena" (95)¹ by deducing them from the "absolute synthesis in the original act of self-consciousness"(43).

The *System of Transcendental Idealism* is an attempt to set forth idealism "in its full extent" by showing how "every part of philosophy" can be presented in "a progressive history of self-consciousness" (2) as it emerges from the intellectual intuition of the I, or Self. To achieve this, Schelling must show how both transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of nature are involved in a parallel development, such that "the same powers of intuition that reside in the self can also be exhibited up to a certain point in nature"(3)². The *System* consists of six parts. The first two are devoted to elaborating and deducing the concept of I, or Self, in Transcendental Idealism. The third, and by far the longest section of the work, addresses theoretical philosophy by showing how it emerges from the same principles as transcendental idealism in a series of three Epochs which constitute "a History

¹F.W.J. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), trans. Peter Heath, introduction, Michael Vater. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978) 95.

² Cf. also 91 which exemplifies this

of Self-consciousness.” The fourth part elaborates a system of practical philosophy according to the principles of transcendental idealism and ends with a philosophy of history. The fifth part treats the role of Teleology in Nature and Art, and the sixth part expounds a Philosophy of Art which completes the System of Transcendental Idealism by proposing that aesthetic intuition objectified in the work of genius exhibits the absolute identity of unconscious nature and conscious freedom. Although our concern is only to sketch out the place of the organic in this system, we must begin our exposition by examining Schelling’s account of theoretical philosophy as a whole.

Part three of the *System of Transcendental Idealism* undertakes the task of demonstrating how all the phenomena of theoretical philosophy can be shown to emerge from the absolute act of self-consciousness: “The self-consciousness we start from is *an absolute act*, and by this one act is posited not only the self with itself, with all its determinations, but also, as is sufficiently evident from the preceding observations, everything else as well that is posited as well for the self” (42). This means that part three must begin with a “deduction of the absolute synthesis contained in the act of self-consciousness,” after which it will proceed to a “deduction of the middle terms of this absolute synthesis,” which explains how this act can be mediated and made accessible to the transcendental philosopher. After establishing his method, Schelling then proceeds to show how the entirety of theoretical philosophy can be shown to evolve from the absolute synthesis of the original conflict of ideal and real activities in the act self-consciousness.³

³What is at issue is a portrayal of consciousness as an evolution from this absolute act, and not an evolution within this synthetic act itself. The evolution is only consequent to the portrayal. The deduction shows there is an absolute synthesis contained in the act of self-consciousness. All successive states of self-consciousness have evolved out of this synthesis. But for the transcendental philosopher to exhibit this synthesis, I must “interrupt this evolution and freely project myself back to its starting point” (48), through a “free imitation” of this absolute act, so that “there arises for me a new series, in which what was *necessary* in the first series, is now *free*” (49). Thus, “Philosophy as such is therefore nothing else but the free imitation, the free recapitulation of the original series of acts into which the one act of self-consciousness evolves” (49). In spite of this talk of evolution, it is important to recognize that Schelling does not understand this synthesis as evolving over time. Rather, he understands all successive states of consciousness to “evolve” from it in the sense that ordinary reflective consciousness flows from this

But to engage in such a deduction, this original act must be divided into a number of smaller acts, so that “we can, as it were, have *successively* presented to our eyes what is posited simultaneously and all at once in the absolute synthesis in which they are all incorporated” (42). The portrayal of the evolution of these acts is the history of self-consciousness. This history successively demonstrates how the self that the transcendental philosopher takes as his object is at the same time exhibited as subject, so that “consciousness of our object coincides with our own consciousness ... and the self itself has for us arrived at the point from which we started,” (42), viz., a grasp of itself as subject. This means that the history of self-consciousness begins by posting the unity of the ideal and the real in self-consciousness, and proceeds by dividing that unity up “into a number of individual acts”(42) in order to show how the self which is our object becomes capable of generating an intuition of itself as subject. Thus, the history of self-consciousness is essentially a reconstruction of the absolute synthetic act of self-consciousness in a series of three epochs which exhibit the successive emergence of matter, productive intuition, and the higher cognitive faculties out of the infinite activity of the intelligence.

Deduction of the Absolute Synthesis Contained in the Original Act of Self-consciousness

The deduction shows that the self of self-consciousness is an absolute synthesis of conscious and unconscious, or of subjective and objective acts. The deduction of the absolute synthesis contained in self-consciousness begins with what was proved in the General Deduction of idealism in part two, namely, that the boundary by which the self becomes an object to itself “must be at once both real and ideal”(40). But since this union

absolute synthesis. Thus, to say there is “an original evolution of the absolute synthesis” (49) is merely to say that consciousness has emerged out of it, but this does not mean that this synthesis has itself evolved over time. The potential for confusion arises more out of the contemporary resonances of the word than it does from Schelling’s imprecision about the status of the original synthesis.

of the ideal and real “is thinkable only in an absolute act,” of self-consciousness, this means that all limitation first emerges out of self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is originally ideal, but through it, the self arises as something real for us by becoming limited. But for the self to be conceived as limiting and limited at once, it must be “equivalent to an action in which there are two opposed activities” (43). Thus, the limit which gives rise to reflective consciousness is conceived as arising out of a prior action in which there are two opposed activities, one which is limiting, and for that very reason illimitable, and another which is limited. The limiting activity is the domain of subjectivity, while the limited is the realm of objectivity. Because this limitation introduces a division into consciousness, the act which produces it cannot be discerned, “just because it is the cause of all limitation” (44). Thus, the self is a synthesis of both the limiting and the limited activities, i.e., of the subject and the object, which can thus be regarded as emerging from a third activity compounded of both, whereby the self of self-consciousness is engendered (44).

This synthesis can be further defined as a conflict of opposing tendencies in the self, which is maintained by a “striving to be self-identical” and to preserve the contradiction “*through* the very effort to maintain and entertain it” (45). This means that the identity in self-consciousness is a mediated identity arising from the original conflict of opposing directions in the self. What this means is that Schelling’s transcendental inquiry is proposing that behind the mediated identity of Kant’s transcendental ego, there is a more primordial activity that is an infinite conflict, “wavering between opposing directions” (45), which can only be intuitable “not in a single action, but in an infinite series of actions. As self-consciousness unifies this one action, it must contain an infinity of actions, which is to say that it must be “an *absolute synthesis*, and if everything is posited for the self only through its own acting, a synthesis whereby everything is posited that is posited at all for the self” (46). This condensation of an infinity of actions into one is only possible if the

opposites contained in the self, namely the subject and the object are absolutely opposed to each other (46). It is this absolute opposition which provokes the absolute synthesis.

This deduction from absolute antithesis to absolute synthesis can be represented formally as the dialectical relation of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Thus, for both the subjective and the objective “to become real,” i.e., if they are to become objects to themselves, “they must, as it were, share out reality between them” (46). But this is only possible through a third activity of the self which unites them. This means that for the self to become conscious of itself it must blot out both the absolute reality and the absolute negation in an absolute synthesis that wavers between them.

In each of the succeeding epochs of the history of self-consciousness, this formal relation will become the mechanism by which the self is driven to progressively more and more complex acts of self-limitation in an effort to intuit itself as a subject.

For Schelling, the self’s intuition of itself in the organic arises directly out of a reconfiguration of Kant’s conception of the organic as that which is both cause and effect of itself in the third critique. In accord with his idealistic point of departure, which we have explained by examining his appropriation of Spinoza in the preceding sections, Schelling regards the organic as emerging out of the step-by-step production of nature which is structured in accord with the categories of relation, that emerge simultaneously with it and which are regarded as the basic categories out of which all others first arise (112). Beginning with the matter deduced in the first epoch (which becomes the new thesis resulting from the synthesis of the preceding stage of dialectical development), the second epoch in the History of Self-consciousness will show how these categories emerge through a series of three acts of limitation which culminate in the production of the organic. Thus, the second epoch accounts for the self’s production of individuated matter (which yields the categories of substance and accident), the genesis of the time series in finite consciousness (which gives rise to the categories of cause and effect), and the production of organic life,

(which gives rise to the category of reciprocity by uniting the two preceding acts of limitation through a third act which produces both the self's intuition of itself as a living being and its intuition of organic life in general. Having seen what we must explain, let us return to our analysis of how this account emerges out of the overall structure of Schelling's history.

Deduction of the Middle terms of the Absolute Synthesis

Thus far Schelling has only deduced that self-consciousness is an absolute synthesis. He has yet to explain in detail how this synthesis can be mediated and enter the consciousness of the transcendental philosopher. If "self-consciousness is the absolute act through which everything is posited for the self ... then the first question to arise is, what sort of act this may be, and whether it be voluntary or involuntary"(47). As prior to limitation it can be neither. "The action that is cause of a limitation, and can no longer be explained by any other, must be *absolutely* free. But absolute freedom is identical with absolute necessity" (47). Like Spinoza's God "it would have to be absolutely free, but this absolute freedom would simultaneously be absolute necessity, since in God we can think of no law or action that does not spring from the inner necessity of his nature. Such an act is the original act of self-consciousness; absolutely free since it is determined by nothing outside the self; absolutely necessary since it proceeds from the inner necessity of the nature of the self" (47). As in *Dogmatism and Criticism*, Schelling here transposes the object of Spinoza's intellectual intuition into the subject, in the same way as the *I as the Principle of all Philosophy* transformed the principle of pre-established harmony into something immanent which is determined only in the absolute I (*Of the I*, 126).

The philosopher only knows this act by inference. Discovering that I am generated for myself through such an act at every instant, I conclude "that only through such an act can I likewise have come into being in the first place"(47-8). From the fact that

consciousness of an objective world is implicit in every moment of my consciousness, I conclude that “something objective must already enter from the beginning into the synthesis of self-consciousness, and must again issue from the latter in its developed form” (48). But how do I know the content of this act? “Undoubtedly by the *free imitation*[*Freie Nachahmung*]” of it, “with which all philosophy begins. But how then does the philosopher know this secondary, arbitrary act to be identical with the original and absolutely free one? For if it is through self-consciousness that all limitation originates, and thus all time as well, this original act cannot itself occur in time; hence, of the rational being as such, one can no more say that it has begun to exist, than that it has existed for all time; the self as self is absolutely eternal, that is, outside time altogether”(48). Where the primary act is out of time, and constitutes it, the secondary act is within it. By reflection the self can, however, interrupt the steady passage from one presentation to the next that constitutes the temporal series. Such an “absolute interruption of the succession” is indeed the beginning of all philosophizing, “and from now on what was previously an involuntary succession becomes a voluntary one.”

But this free act still does not explain how the “act which has entered by irruption into the series of presentations is the same as that original act whereby the entire series begins”(48). Schelling’s answer is that to perceive that self arises through its own action is to perceive that nothing else can arise for me apart from what arises through the arbitrary action in the time series “save what comes about for me originally and beyond time” (48). In other words, the time series only arises for me from what is outside of all time; “the whole series of my presentations consists in nothing else but the evolution of that one synthesis. Hence, it is that at every moment I can come to be for myself, exactly as I come originally to be for myself. What I am, I am only through my own acting (for I am absolutely free); but through this act it is always just the self that arises for me, and thus I must conclude that it also comes about originally through the same act” (48). Thus, “if

philosophy's first construction is the imitation of an original, all its constructions will likewise be merely such imitations" (49). This means that "Philosophy as such is therefore nothing but the free imitation, the free recapitulation of the original series of acts into which the one act of self-consciousness evolves" (49). The first series which is imitated is real. The second which recapitulates it is ideal. The first is necessary; the second free.

By simulating this original experience in a free act we link together two experiences "the experience simulated, A, and the awareness of simulating it, B."⁴ This sets a limit to our experiences [*Begrenzung*] and establishes a temporal order [*Zeitreihe*] between them... Once this 'absolute synthesis' between A and B occurs, we can reflect on this unity" (Esposito, 106). But this free imitation of experience now appears as necessity, because the order of A and B can no longer be reversed: "The Self, once transposed into time consists in a steady passage from one representation to the next; yet it remains, after all, in its power to interrupt this series through reflection. The absolute interruption of the succession is the beginning of all philosophizing, and from now on, what was previously an involuntary succession becomes a voluntary one" (48). In other words, the transcendental philosopher knows that what first appeared to be determined is in fact the result of the free act of the I, or of self limiting itself. With this act, self-consciousness becomes a conflict [*Streit*] of absolutely opposed activities. "The one original going to the infinite, we will call real, objective, limitable, the other, the tendency to intuit itself in the former infinity is called the ideal, the subjective, unlimitable"(49/66-7, trans. mine)⁵.

The history of self-consciousness and indeed the remainder of the *System of Transcendental Idealism* charts the course by which self-consciousness' antagonism with itself is overcome, so that the freedom of the ideal and the necessity of the real can be

⁴Joseph L. Esposito, *Schelling's Idealism and the Philosophy of Nature* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1977) 106.

⁵F.W.J. Schelling, *Das System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992) 66-7.

shown to be reconciled in the work of Art. But before we can grasp how this conflict is resolved we must first examine how it develops in the three Epochs which constitute the history of Self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is a conflict between the two absolutely opposed activities represented by these two series, viz., between “the real, objective, limitable activity” which “originally reaches out into infinity,” and “the ideal, subjective, illimitable” tendency “to intuit oneself in that activity” (49). Although both activities are first posited as infinite, the limitation of the real activity by the ideal one gives us “a ground for positing the limitable activity as finite”(49). Thus, the first thing to be derived in the history of self-consciousness is how the ideal activity, which is first posited as illimitable because it limits the original activity (see preceding section, 43), can be limited. Thus, all construction in theoretical philosophy arises from this illimitability of the ideal activity (50), which though it is progressively restricted in the sequence of acts described in the history of self-consciousness, perpetually strives to intuit itself by extending itself beyond the limit of its acts. Because it is real, we can regard the original activity which is limited, free as to matter and yet restricted as to form. This means that the limitation of the originally illimitable activity which opposes it must be posited “unfree as to matter and free only as to form”(50). Thus, the task of theoretical philosophy is “to explain the ideality of the boundary (or how the limitation, originally existing only for free action becomes limitation for knowledge)” (41). In other words, theoretical philosophy explains how the free action of the intelligence unconsciously produces the content of its conscious knowledge through a series of limitations which it shows to be ideal (The task of practical philosophy, in contrast, is to show the reality of the boundary, or how a subjective limitation becomes objective).

The Three Epochs of the History of Self-consciousness

As a complete elaboration of this limitation is impossible (for “if it were ever to be completely accomplished, the whole structure of the objective world, and every determination of nature down to the infinitely small, would have to be revealed to us”[50]), philosophy “can enumerate only those actions which constitute Epochs as it were, in the history of self-consciousness, and establish them in their interrelations with one another” (50). The aim of theoretical philosophy therefore, is to show how the “one absolute synthesis is successively put together” (50) as a history of the epochs of self-consciousness. Thus, the three Epochs in this history merely constitute a rough sketch, or outline that permits Schelling to grasp what would otherwise be an infinite task.

It is important that we grasp the enormous scope of this enterprise. By explaining the ideality of the boundary of the real activity, Schelling is attempting to explain the entirety of theoretical philosophy as a series of limitations posited by the ideal activity. This means that “transcendental philosophy is nothing else than a constant raising of the self to a higher power; its whole method consists in leading the self from one level of self intuition to another, until it is posited with all the determinations that are contained in the free and conscious act of self-consciousness” (90). Thus, the epochs of the history of self-consciousness will show how (1) matter, (2) the organic world and even (3) the cognitive faculties themselves are to be “deduced” from the progressive limitation by the ideal activity (or the ideality of the boundary of the real activity) in a series of three Epochs. These deductions, are in fact all but indistinguishable from “constructions” (86) in as much as each merely exhibits, and thus imitates (48), the self’s primordial construction of its products from the original conflict of its opposed activities. The key to understanding the necessity of the succession of deductions within each Epoch is to recognize that the self is presented as only gradually emerging into the awareness that these are its own acts. Hence, for us, the transcendental philosophers, these constructions are deductions that freely

imitate the acts of the self, whereas for the self, they are as yet only unconscious productions. This means that to grasp the possibility of these productions we must learn to abandon “the common standpoint... which is the first condition of all understanding in philosophy. Anyone, *e.g.*, for whom in all the activity of the mind there is nowhere anything unconscious, and no region outside that of consciousness, will no more understand how the intelligence can forget itself in its products, than how the artist can be lost in his work. For him there is nothing other than the ordinary moral” — i.e., conscious — “bringing-forth, and nowhere any producing in which necessity is united with freedom” (75). This transcendental abandonment of the common standpoint will take the form of regarding these productions as emerging out of a series of ideal limitations (or of limitations by the self’s ideal activity), which proceed dialectically from thesis to antithesis to synthesis, and again to higher syntheses in three epochs “until what is posited for us in the self *qua* object is also posited in the self *qua* subject, that is, until for us the consciousness of our object coincides with our own consciousness” (42). Thus, the epochs of Schelling’s history are an attempt to overcome the fact that the total enumeration of the infinity of actions which comprises the absolute act “forms the content of an infinite task” (50). As a total enumeration of the acts which comprise this history is impossible, the system of transcendental idealism can only be completed when the system “is led back to its starting point” (232, cf. also page 1), the “original identity” of conscious and unconscious elements - *e.g.*, of nature and freedom - through the aesthetic intuition of the artist (231).

As we summarize each of these Epochs we must keep in mind the function of this history within the overall aim of the work. The goal is to exhibit the parallelism between “the dynamic and the transcendental” or between theoretical and transcendental philosophy in order to show the completeness of transcendental philosophy by showing how the system of knowledge “reverts back into its own principle” and to demonstrate “this *identity*” (12). If, in Hegel’s opinion, Schelling never makes this identity sufficiently

transparent to itself, he does, however, set the stage for Hegel's philosophy of nature (and his completion of Schelling's absolute idealism in the *Phenomenology*) by articulating a history of self-consciousness whose purpose is to link the genetic account of the origin of theoretical philosophy to the practical concerns of transcendental philosophy. This account can be said to prefigure the emergence of tripartite division of Hegel's philosophy at Jena into logic, nature and spirit, insofar as these divisions roughly correspond to the three epochs of Schelling's history of self-consciousness. The account also clearly influenced both the dialectical structure and method of the *Phenomenology*, which proceeds from consciousness to the emergence of self-consciousness out of life, to an account of the absolute knowing in which Schelling's absolute identity becomes fully transparent to itself as such.

Before we consider the history of self-consciousness, it will be useful to briefly summarize the overall structure of this history and the place of the organic within it, lest we get lost amidst the myriad of detailed arguments presented in Schelling's *System*. For Schelling, the self's intuition of itself in the organic arises directly out of a reconfiguration of Kant's conception of the organic as that which is both cause and effect of itself in the third critique. In accord with his idealistic point of departure, which we have explained in examining his appropriation of Spinoza in the preceding sections, Schelling regards the organic as emerging out of the production of nature which occurs in the original act of self-consciousness. Beginning with a deduction of the synthesis contained in this original act, Schelling will proceed to account for the variety of productions which arise in this act by outlining a history of self-consciousness. Because this history cannot possibly represent the infinity of acts contained in this absolute synthesis (50), it is represented in a sequence of three "major acts" or epochs, each of which portrays the self's productions—the mediating elements in that synthesis—as emerging out of a dialectical series of acts of limitation. This dialectical series of limitations is an attempt to represent the synchrony of

the absolute synthesis of the original act of self-consciousness in a diachronic account. Each epoch is structured as a series of three successive acts of limitation "proceeding from thesis to antithesis and from thence to synthesis"(47).⁶ As a result, the dialectical progression within each epoch essentially overlaps the one which precedes it, taking the preceding synthesis as the thesis of a subsequent higher series of limitations. Thus, the first epoch begins with the self's original sensation and ends with the emergence of matter through productive intuition. The second epoch begins with productive intuition elevated to the level of an intelligence and proceeds to the self's intuition of itself in the organic. With the organic, the circle of the self's productions comes to a close, and the necessity of productive intuition passes over into the free producing of conscious reflection (130).

The second Epoch explains how the intelligence, "whose production is... totally blind and unconscious" comes to intuit itself as intelligent (94), by coming to "tear itself free from its production and recognize itself" as productive (94). Here the move is from the self, become an intelligence in productive intuition, to an account of how it gradually becomes capable of intuiting itself in the external world of sensation and consciousness (i.e., "the whole multiplicity of the objective world, its products and phenomena"[95]) which appears to be independent of its own activity. This epoch ends with the deduction of the self as organism, and the emergence of free reflection as that which strives beyond every individual act of producing (130).

The problem in the second Epoch section is to explain "how the self, having once launched into production, should ever again emerge from it, since the condition of production, and the mechanism thereof, is constantly reinstated" (95). In other words, the

⁶The first epoch in which the self is only real is structured as a series of three successive limitations. The second epoch is more complex because here the self is both real and ideal at the same time, requiring that each of the three limiting acts of productive intuition be itself conceived as a complex of three acts "one simple, one compound, and a third which divides them from each other and relates them together"(96). The first act of the second epoch is a repetition of the last act of the first epoch, but raised to the level of an intelligence, which now seeks to intuit itself as productive by driving the ideal activity of the self's production back upon itself, so that it can transcend its product.

problem is to explain how the self's production of matter passes over into the self's intuition of itself in its own production. This problem is only resolved indirectly. After explaining how space and time, substance and accident, causality, and reciprocity are constructed on the model of Kant's categories (which proceed synthetically by combining the first two to yield the third), Schelling will describe how reciprocity leads to the self's intuition of itself in the organic, which is the last of the intelligence's productions, and the ground of the "free reflection" that will arise in the next epoch (131). The development in this section will be treated in detail in what follows.

The natural production described in the second epoch is structured in accord with the categories of relation which emerge simultaneously with nature and which are regarded as the basic categories out of which all others first arise (112). Beginning with the bare matter⁷ deduced in the first epoch (as the new thesis resulting from the synthesis of the preceding stage of dialectical development), the second epoch in the history of self-consciousness shows how these categories emerge through a series of three acts of limitation which culminate in the production of the organic. But whereas the first epoch dealt solely with self as real, so that its productions could be accounted for by simple limitations of the self's activity, in the second epoch the self is both real and ideal (131), in as much as it has been raised to the level of an intelligence when the bare matter that ended the preceding epoch once again becomes an activity of the self (94). This means that "we must renounce the idea that it should intuit itself as a simple activity" (95). Here the limitations can arise only as a result of the self's productive activity. Thus, we will have to

⁷The derivation of bare matter corresponds to Leibniz' account of "monads which are wholly bare" *Monadology* §24. As in Leibniz' account, Schelling's account of this bare matter is followed by a discussion of sensation and succession in §25 and §26, yielding a hierarchy of organic nature. The difference is that where Schelling ends this hierarchy with the self's intuition of itself in the organic, Leibniz ends it in the rational soul which grasps itself and God in §29. If we understand Schelling to be interpreting Leibniz in accord with his thesis that the entire universe is a production of the self, then Leibniz' account of the rational soul which knows God corresponds to Schelling's account of the intelligence's intuition of itself in organic life in as much as both entail a recognition of the sufficient principle of their origin.

distinguish the three limitations arising through the self's productions from the three intuitions, which are correlated to those limitations.⁸ Because what is at issue is productive intuition, rather than simple limitation, the first limitation arises in the self's production as the common boundary of the self and the thing in itself, and results in the self's intuition of itself as an object having sensation and consciousness. The second limitation arises from the internalization of this boundary by the ideal self, as time, which results, in turn, in the intuition of a succession of presentations. After showing how the causal series leads to the derivation of the categories of relation (substance and accident, cause and effect, co-existence or reciprocity), Schelling will introduce the third limitation as a limitation of this succession which is the condition of reciprocity. This limitation results in the self's intuition of itself as an organization (133).

What makes interpreting the structure of this epoch confusing is that Schelling claims that the three intuitions of this epoch are "none other than the basic categories of all knowledge, namely those of relation" (133), thereby making it unclear how these categories, which emerge only in the second restriction, or limitation, are to be understood as related to the first two limitations. In any event, the result of this account is that organic life is deemed significant, first, as the self's intuition of itself which brings the circle of its production to a close (130), and second, as the representation or symbol of the self-intuiting life animating the self (122).

Without going into further detail, the third epoch begins with the self's separation of itself from its products and proceeds to the absolute act of the will which is revealed as

⁸From the perspective of the summit of production achieved with the deduction of the organic at the end of this epoch, we can think of the structure of the second epoch as delineating three potencies of intuition, which lead to three acts of limitation or restriction, which result in three completed intuitions which are also the three categories of relation.

the condition by which the intelligence becomes an object to itself in a free act of reflection.⁹

As if this structure of these three epochs were not confusing enough, Schelling further distinguishes three *Potenzen* of the self's production within the production of the first two epochs: sensation, productive intuition and the organic. The major difficulty presented by his account of the *Potenzen* is the careless fashion in which they are introduced into what is already a quite cumbersome and obscure account of the structure of the limiting acts of intuition prevailing in each epoch. The *Potenzen* are first introduced in the middle of the second epoch, and their relation to the sequence of the limitations which result from each epoch is never defined with sufficient clarity. As a result, the reader is easily misled in the attempt to pin down the precise relationship between the various trinities of intuitions, limitations, and acts on the one hand, and the precise range of the three *Potenzen* on the other, with the result that the overall structure of the work remains

⁹As part two completed the synthetic acts of the self, part three proceeds to analyze how what has been derived is posited in the self (134). The problem of part three is to show how the self can become distinct from its products so that it can intuit itself in them by abstraction, "which appears as the first condition of reflection," by which it separates itself from what it has produced (134). The focus of part three is thus, the concept, and the deduction of the cognitive faculties as a whole. What is at issue is the explanation of what appears to consciousness. But Schelling's procedure undergoes a reversal. Up until now, he has proceeded by reconstructing the self's unconscious acts. In part three, however, the standpoint of reflection becomes identical with that of transcendental analysis. But since the acting of the intelligence and its objects are originally one (134), if the intelligence is to intuit itself in its products it must separate itself from them by abstraction. Thus, rather than showing how what appears to reflective consciousness is constructed by productive intuition, he will instead have to proceed in the reverse direction, to show how abstraction renders the structure of consciousness as something fixed which can only be explained through higher acts of reflection, or through a "transcendental abstraction" that shows the abstract categories of reflection to be grounded in productive intuition (144). Thus, Schelling will argue that the categories of reflection can themselves only be explained by higher conditions. By looking at the conditions of possibility of the judgment, we are led, by transcendental abstraction, to an original conception of the categories as types of intuition, which are not separated from the schematism (a separation which first occurs through transcendental abstraction). Thus, the task of this epoch in the Schellingian system is to show the objects of reflective consciousness to have arisen out of intuition by progressively seeking out the conditions of reflection through transcendental abstraction. From an absolute act of the intelligence, there arises a transcendental schematism for the production of an object, which is in turn the condition of the empirical judgment of that object. (These three limitations attained through transcendental abstraction correspond to the three acts of consciousness described in the preceding epochs). The result of this epoch is the emergence from reflection to the absolute act of the will in which the intelligence becomes an object to itself in the discussion of practical philosophy in Part IV.

shrouded in obscurity. No doubt Schelling's failure to lay out this structure with greater clarity is in no small measure a result of the very complexity of his transcendental attempt to exhibit a synchronic intuition diachronically as both intuition and product at the same time.

In any event, it is clear that the *Potenzen* designate three general levels of the power or potential for intuition which issue in the three intuitions of the second epoch. Thus, to every limitation produced in this epoch there corresponds an intuition which grasps it: 1) the original restrictedness which gives rise to the universe (115) and yields the intuition of sensation, which is the intuition of the category of substance and accident; 2) the secondary restrictedness that makes empirical consciousness appear to itself as bound to a particular moment of the time series (115) and yields the intuition of the succession of presentations (111,133), which is the intuition of the category of cause and effect; and 3) the third restrictedness in which the intelligence "must oppose itself to the succession in order to intuit itself therein" (121) as organic life, which is the intuition of the category of reciprocity. To preclude confusion about this structure it is important to keep in mind that these successive restrictions are simply the dialectical portrayal of a simultaneous production. Hence, when Schelling describes this first restrictedness as "in fact posited in the self in the first act of self-consciousness" he is not contradicting himself. Rather, he is merely unfolding this synthesis as a sequence of overlapping dialectical stages so that they can be exhibited to the reader. The constant regression, which links the current progression to a preceding stage is thus a function of the transcendental method we described above.

Like Leibniz' distinction between souls possessing sensation, memory and reason in the *Monadology*,¹⁰ from which they appear to be drawn, Schelling's *Potenzen* describe a series of levels of "presentative forces" (92) by which organic nature mirrors the universe as a whole. This notion of a hierarchy of presentative forces which reflect the whole is "a

¹⁰Cf. *Monadology* §25, §26, and §29.

principle underlying the idealism of Leibniz, which properly understood does not differ from that of transcendental idealism" (92).¹¹ By reinterpreting Leibniz in accord with his interpretation of Spinoza, so that the entire universe is a production of the self, rather than of God, Schelling transforms Leibniz' "presentative forces" which mirror the universe into presentative powers of self-intuition. The difference is that whereas for Leibniz this whole is something given, which must be reflected by the monad, for Schelling what is reflected is both reflection and product at the same time, and thus, the monad can only reflect the whole to the degree that its capacity to reflect has emerged out of the whole to stand over against it. This is why Schelling can say that "inanimate nature so-called is as such actually an immature intelligence"(6), for "nature's highest goal, to become wholly an object for herself, is only achieved through the last and highest order of reflection, which is none other than man ... or reason, whereby nature returns into itself, and by which it ... is identical with what we recognize in ourselves as the intelligent and the conscious" (6).

Having glimpsed something of both the structure of Schelling's account and how the organic fits into the overall structure of the History of self-consciousness, let us turn to a more detailed account of the first and second epochs.

The First Epoch

The first of these Epochs moves from the primordial conflict of the opposed real and ideal activities of the self 1) to an explanation of the primordial sensation in which the ideal self *intuits itself as limited* by a real activity which it does not recognize as its own (but as that of a not-self, 54), 2) to an account of how the self *intuits itself as sensing*, or becomes an object to itself as having sensation, when the opposition between the real and

¹¹On this reading the three epochs of the history of self-consciousness correspond to the three potencies of the second epoch, for the three epochs also constitute three levels of the presentative power of the self. The potencies are presentative powers of intuition emerging in production; the epochs are presentative powers of the self generally.

ideal activities is intuited in a third activity that is at once both ideal and real (67), and 3) to an account of the productive intuition by which the self produces its finite products. This intuition arises from a contradiction between the illimitable ideal and the restricted real activities (76). When the original limit is transferred into the ideal activity (73) and is fixated (75), the illimitable ideal activity is “placed under a constant compulsion to activity” in its attempt to “revert into its identity” (75). The theory of productive intuition proceeds from the opposition between these illimitable and restricted activities which are now opposed as the “self-in-itself” and the “thing-in-itself” (75), which Schelling reconceives as that which lies prior to the self’s production of individuated matter. The ensuing “deduction of productive intuition shows how this thing-in-itself comes to stand outside the illimitable intuitant self in a way that generates a third thing, a finite product that is composed of both and that is the finite appearance of this thing-in-itself. With this act of productive intuition, the self’s intuitant activity moves beyond the opposition between the self and the thing-in-itself and is elevated into an intelligence which is opposed to its product (78). The last part of this epoch provides a “deduction” of matter which accounts for the individuation of matter as an equilibrium of the opposed forces of the self (83,92).¹² After providing an

¹²This appears to follow the account of individuation through the good in the *Phaedo* (97d-98a), where Socrates envisions the possibility of explaining in detail the reason and logical necessity for everything that is. In accord with a critique of Platonism as an “improper idealism, a system which turns all knowledge into illusion... by positing external originals independent of our presentations”(73), Schelling is saying that these opposed forces are nothing outside the subject, “but emerge from an activity of the mind that is ideal and real at once” (73). Schelling’s account of matter as an equilibrium of forces clearly dismisses the Platonist conception of the forms as things laid up in a second world. Indeed, he says as much in the “*Timaeus* essay” of 1794. But perhaps Schelling’s account of matter could be read in conjunction with *Phaedo* 97d-98a, and another about the great and the small at 100e (after Socrates introduces his new method of enquiring into causation) to suggest that Plato’s account, which envisions the possibility of the complete determination of everything according to passion and action (98a) is working towards a similar account in which the individuation of matter is determined through a mental equilibrium. That Schelling did indeed read Plato in such an idealistic fashion is clear from the *Timaeus* essay. Perhaps his account here has arisen from applying similar canons of interpretation to the *Phaedo*, such that his account of the individuation of matter arises from an idealistic reconstruction of Plato’s account of the passive and active (98a) and the great and the small (96e and 100e). Not only are these comparatives relative to the mind making the comparison, but Socrates’ new method of causality can be read as a recipe for a transcendental account of how the world of reflection emerges out of *Nous* which causes all things, and arranges everything for the best (97c).

account of gravity as the “truly productive creative force”(85) which first completes the construction of matter, Schelling proposes that the three dimensions of matter (length, breadth and thickness) are associated in turn with Magnetism, Electricity and Chemical processes, while Galvanism is described as the process which unites this trinity of forces and transforms them into a real product. Because the construction of matter ends with the two activities (the opposing ideal and real activities of self-consciousness), which were previously “wholly separated and located in quite different spheres... posited in one and the same product,” (94), the first epoch closes (in accord with the dialectical method outlined above) with the self’s elevation to intelligence: “the activity of the thing becomes the activity of the self, which, by that very fact, is itself elevated to an intelligence” (94).

Because our concern is with Schelling’s understanding of the role of the organic, let us proceed to a more detailed treatment of the second epoch, in which the organic first emerges.

The Second Epoch

The second epoch begins with the hypothesis that the self can intuit itself as producing, and proceeds to show how this is possible. Because the two activities of the first epoch are united in a single product, this product “again also becomes an activity of the self which, by that very fact, is itself elevated to an intelligence” (94). But what ground is there in production that would drive this intelligence back upon itself so that it can recognize itself as productive, and intuit itself in its product? Or to put the question differently: How does the self, which is no longer a simple activity, generate an ideal activity by which it intuits itself as productive?

Production of the First Limitation: The Self’s Intuition of Itself as Having Sensation and Consciousness

In production we can distinguish the compound activity of production from the simple activity of its product. If the two are to be related to each other, then there must be a third ideal activity which relates them. To reveal this common boundary by which these two activities are related, Schelling distinguishes between the necessary and the contingent in production. The necessary is the condition of producing, while the contingent is the restricting of the restriction constituted by the thing-in-itself. In accord with the conclusions of the preceding epoch, we saw how the thing-in-itself formed a restriction of the productive activity of the self. To explain the contingency of this restriction requires the isolation of a boundary which is common to both the self and the thing-in-itself. The self is within this boundary, while beyond it, the self has transformed itself into a thing-in-itself. Thus "the intuition that oversteps the boundary therefore goes at the same time beyond the self as such, and to that extent appears as *outer* intuition. The simple intuitant activity remains within the self, and can to that extent be termed *inner* intuition" (97). This means that the boundary between the self and the thing-in-itself has become the boundary between inner and outer intuition. "Once remove it, and inner and outer intuition merge into one. Outer sense begins at the point where inner sense leaves off. What appears to us as the object of inner sense is merely the boundary point of inner sense, and hence, both of them, outer and inner, are in origin identical, for outer sense is merely inner sense subjected to a limit. Outer sense is necessarily also inner, though by contrast, inner sense is not necessarily also outer. All intuition is in principle intellectual, and hence, the objective world is merely the intellectual world appearing under restrictions" (97-98). Thus, "if the self is to intuit itself as producing, inner and outer sense must *firstly* part company therein, and *secondly* there must be a relation of each to the other.... for if outer sense is inner sense under limitation, we are obliged, in contrast, to posit inner sense as such, as originally illimitable. Inner sense is thus, nothing else but the illimitable tendency of the self, posited therein, from the very outset, to self-intuition" (98). Because outer sense is

composed of inner sense, "as the sole active and constructive principle therein" (98), inner sense is "nothing else but the illimitable tendency of the self, posited therein from the outset, to self intuition" (98). But "if the self is to recognize itself in outer intuition," it must relate it to the ideal activity of inner intuition, which we have just described.

The problem is that the self cannot yet recognize itself as intuitant through outer intuition, because it is nothing other than this ideal inner intuition in which relating and related are one and the same. This means that "the self cannot relate outer intuition to inner, *qua* inner, for it cannot in one and the same act relate outer intuition to itself, and in doing so, simultaneously reflect again upon itself as the ground of the relation. Thus, it could not relate outer intuition to inner, *qua* inner, for according to the presumption, it would itself be nothing else but inner intuition" (98-99). In other words, if it only recognizes outer intuition as a mode of inner intuition, the self would not yet be capable of recognizing itself as both outer and inner intuition at the same time. Like Spinoza's one substance, it would be both "producer and produced lapsed into one" (99), and would thus, not yet be capable of recognizing itself as subject, or as inner intuition, which formed the ground of this union. For the self to be capable of intuiting itself as both inner and outer, as both ideal and real at the same time, it must first attain the standpoint of an empirical consciousness, in which the outer intuition no longer appears as an act of the self, *i.e.*, it must reach a point where outer intuition is no longer "acknowledged as intuition at all.... in which there is no trace whatever of an outer intuition *qua* act"(99). In other words, it must attain a stage where inner intuition is limited by the object of outer sense. So there is a limitation of inner intuition by outer intuition *qua* an act. But this act no longer appears to inner intuition as a limitation of its own activity.

The link from this outer intuition, unaware of its ground, to the inner intuition which sustains it is Kant's thing-in-itself which "provided the first impulse which could carry philosophy beyond ordinary consciousness, and has at least shown that the ground of

the object that appears in consciousness cannot itself again lie in consciousness”(99). By showing inner sense as the illimitable tendency of the self, Schelling has shown it to be the same act which was immediately limited by its overstepping of the boundary, *i.e.*, he has shown it to be the same as the infinite act which ended the first epoch (76). The point is that once the self has been elevated to an intelligence, this act must recur at a higher stage. Thus, for the self to intuit itself as producing and relate outer intuition to inner *qua* inner, it can no longer do so through a simple act. It first requires a compound act of production, which divides into inner and outer intuition, and then it must relate the two to one another. Schelling's point is that the ground of consciousness cannot lie in a simple act. This is why he appeals to Kant's thing-in-itself. By reversing Kant's procedure, and showing that the condition of possibility of consciousness has itself emerged from a limitation of inner intuition, Schelling is proposing that we can grasp "this ground lying beyond consciousness," the thing-in-itself "as our own ideal activity, merely hypostatized into the thing in itself"(99). At this stage, however, Schelling is merely trying to demonstrate how the object first emerges as distinct from inner intuition, for the demonstration of how this production can become its own object (e.g., "how the self recognizes itself as producing"(100)) first requires the separation of producer and product. It is the task of the second epoch to show how this separation is the first in a series of acts of production which finally result in the self's intuition of itself in the organic.

Thus, the first act of limitation in this epoch is 1) the act of outer intuition, as that which divides the simple (e.g., the self as inner sense) and the compound (e.g., the compound act of productive intuition) from each other. What remains to be demonstrated is the act which relates them together and permits productive intuition to be recognized in contrast to inner intuition and to be related back to it in turn. This relating of the simple and the compound acts of the self will emerge through the second and third acts of self-limitation which arise in the self's production, which are 2) the restrictedness that makes

empirical consciousness appear to itself as bound to a particular moment of the time series, and 3) the third restriction in which the intelligence "must oppose itself to the succession in order to intuit itself therein" (121) as an organism.

Thus far Schelling has merely undertaken a general description of the conditions which must be met in order for the self to intuit itself as productive. The first of these is that inner and outer intuition be divided against each other in a compound act of production yielding "on the one side, the *sensory object* (separated from intuition as an act), and on the other, *inner sense*. Both together engender a self having sensation with consciousness" (100). This "act of outer intuition" can be understood as proceeding from the last act of the preceding epoch, which has now been raised to the level of an intelligence that seeks to intuit itself as productive. In other words, Schelling is describing the new series of restrictions that emerge when the self is raised to the level of an intelligence and begins to recognize itself as producing: "In the foregoing act, the self was a producer, but producer and product lapsed into one; the self and its product were one and the same. We now seek an act in which the self will recognize itself as producing" (99). Thus far, however, all he has shown is that inner intuition is opposed to the sensory object of outer sense. What remains is to show how the self is capable of intuiting itself in this compound act by relating it back to the simplicity of the self. To show this, Schelling must proceed to examine the transcendental conditions under which the self becomes an object to itself as having inner sense. The potential for confusion arises from the fact that this act is already patent to Schelling, the transcendental philosopher, in as much as he foresees the end of this epoch. The real work of this stage, however, will be to show how this intuition arises for the self out of its own products.

Production of the Second Limitation: the Self's Intuition of Itself as Productive through Succession

Having derived the self as an object having sensation and consciousness, or inner sense, Schelling must now examine the transcendental conditions under which such an object is possible. The self can distinguish itself as sensation with consciousness only “by opposing the object, as merely intuited, and thus without consciousness, to itself as the conscious” (100). Because the opposition between inner and outer sense engendered the boundary between them, the self can oppose itself to an object only by recognizing this boundary as a boundary. Thus the self is bounded by the passivity of the real and objective self, which is opposed to its ideal activity in the thing in itself, while the thing is bounded by “the passivity of the self ... which sets a limit to the activity of the thing” (101). Thus, “self and thing are so opposed, that what is passivity in the one is activity in the other” (101). This common boundary between them can be recognized as such “only if it is recognized as bounding the activity of the thing” (101). If this boundary is to be contingent to both the self and the thing, it must have a ground outside of both. But this ground cannot be sought in the self, for the self can know nothing about it, hence, “the ground of the limitation of the thing’s activity” must be sought “in something that now lies wholly outside consciousness, but yet intervenes in the present phase of consciousness” (101) and “contains the ground of its determinate limitation” (102). This ground appears as contingent to the self, but necessary to the transcendental philosopher. Thus, “if the self is to recognize the boundary between itself and the object as contingent, it must recognize this as conditioned by something that lies wholly outside the present phase” (102), of which it is unconscious. This means that the self can only reproduce this unknown origin ideally in an act which is not materially free, but only formally so. In other words, as stated above, I only know this act, which is outside of time, through a free imitation of it (47), which is formally free, because it is ideal, but which is materially necessary because “it contains the ground of the specific limitedness” (102) of the state of consciousness which is derived from it. “Hence the self here is in one and the same act at once formally free and formally

constrained" (102). If the self could revert to the original act from which this state of consciousness derived (i.e., A), it would feel itself to be free, but from the perspective of the present stage (i.e., B) it feels itself constrained, and that constraint is precisely what drives it back to A. Thus, "it feels itself driven back to a state of consciousness to which it cannot in fact, return. The common boundary of self and object, the ground of the second limitation, forms the boundary between the present stage and a past one. The feeling of being driven back to a stage that it cannot in reality return to is the feeling of the *present*. Thus at the first stage of its consciousness the self already finds itself trapped in a present. For it cannot oppose the object to itself without feeling itself restricted and committed, as it were, to a single point. This feeling is no other than that which we describe as self-awareness. All consciousness begins with it, and by it the self first posits itself over against the object" (103). In self-awareness the self becomes an object to itself as inner sense "through the fact that *time* arises for it" (103).

The results of this second restrictedness can be summarized as follows: the act of limitation is "the common boundary between the self and object, which is the ground of the second limitation" (103). This limitation arises for the self when it attempts to find a condition, lying wholly outside of consciousness, which limits both the activity of the self and the activity of the thing. The result of this limitation is self-awareness, in which the self becomes an object to itself as inner sense "through the fact that time arises for it"(103).

Whereas the first epoch saw the emergence of sensation ending with the self's elevation to an intelligence, the second epoch accounts for how this intelligence becomes aware of itself when "inner sense, that is, sensation combined with consciousness, becomes an object to itself" through the emergence of time and space as the intuitions in which inner and outer sense become objects to themselves respectively (103). From the correspondence of space and time to outer and inner sense, Schelling next shows how what is substantial in the object corresponds to outer sense while what is accidental rests entirely

on inner sense (105). Thus far Schelling has shown how space and time and substance and accident become distinguishable in the self for the transcendental philosopher. To show how they become distinguishable for the self, he will appeal to the causal relation “as the necessary condition under which alone the self can recognize the present object as object” (107). Without succession in the causal relation, “the intelligence would not only contain no manifold of presentations ... but even the present object would not be recognized as present either” (107).

The succession of the causal relation is the condition of the appearance of objects. For the idealist this means that “its ground lies, not in my free and conscious thinking, but in my unconscious act of producing. That the ground of this succession does not lie in us, means that we are not conscious of this succession before it takes place; its occurrence and the awareness thereof are one and the same” (108). Because both are absolutely inseparable, Kant’s description which attributes “succession to an act of the intelligence, while objects, by contrast, are held to arise independently thereof” is, according to Schelling, “completely illogical” (108). It is more reasonable to assume that “both, the succession no less than the objects, are equally independent of our presentations” (108), which is exactly what the idealistic account proposes when it suggests that both the succession and the objects arise in “my unconscious act of producing” (107). In other words, for the intelligence to grasp cause and effect in an involuntary succession of presentations, it must grasp one as the ground of the other, but this is not possible “unless both ... are opposed in one and the same act, and again related to each other” (109). This means that both cause and effect reciprocally determine each other, because both emerge from the same productive act.

With this reciprocity, Schelling also claims to have derived the concept of co-existence: “All simultaneity only occurs through an act of the intelligence, and coexistence is merely the condition of the primordial succession of our presentations... If this act of the

intelligence is reproduced ideally, that is, with consciousness, there arises for me thereby space, as the mere form of coexistence or simultaneity. In general, it is first through the category of reciprocity that space becomes the form of coexistence; under the category of substance it only emerges as the form of extensity. Thus space is nothing else but an act of the intelligence. We can define space as time suspended and time in contrast, as space in flux. In space regarded on its own account, everything is merely concurrent, just as in time, rendered objective, everything is sequential" (111). Thus, the emergence of the categories of relation for the self proceed from the derivation of the causal relation, which in turn reveals causation and space to be derived from the relation of reciprocity.

Having thus derived substance and accident, cause and effect and reciprocity, Schelling can claim to have provided a complete deduction of the categories:

The foregoing enquiries contain the complete deduction of the categories of relation, and, since there are initially no others but these, the deduction of all categories - for the philosopher, to be sure, not for the intelligence itself (for how the latter arrives at recognizing them as such can only be explained in the epoch that is to follow). If we examine the table of categories given by Kant, we find the first two in each group are always opposed to each other, and that the third is the union of them both. —The relation of substance and accident, for example, served to determine but a single object; through that of cause and effect a multiplicity of objects is determined; and through reciprocity these two are once again united into one object. —In the first relation something is posited as a unity, which is abolished again in the second, and recombined synthetically only in the third. Moreover the first two categories are ideal factors, and only the third that evolves from them is the real. (112)

What remains is to show how these categories of relation result from the productive acts by which the self seeks to intuit itself. Thus, the relation of substance and accident is the intuition of the present which results from the limitation in which the sensory object is opposed to outer sense. The relation of Cause and effect is the intuition of succession which results from the limitation that arises when the self attempts to find a condition outside of consciousness (*e.g.* time) which limits both the activity of both the self and the thing (103). Reciprocity is the intuition that results when the intelligence "opposes itself to succession to intuit itself therein" (121).

Having deduced the category of reciprocity, Schelling proceeds to explain how it makes possible the intuition of itself in the idea of nature. Because the idea of the individual object as substance and accident and the idea of the causal relation first emerge *for the self* only as a result of the category of reciprocity, there can be neither substance nor causality without a prior synthesis of nature as a whole: “the causal relationship itself cannot be recognized as such unless both the substances involved therein are again combined into one, and so this synthesis proceeds up to the idea of nature, wherein all substances are at last combined into one, which is in reciprocity only with itself” (112). Because the “original mechanism of presentation” is capable “only of a relative synthesis, but not the absolute one,” this “presentation of nature as the absolute totality, in which all oppositions are resolved and all succession of causes and effects is united into an absolute organism, is possible ... by means only of a *free* act of the intelligence, though this itself we do not as yet comprehend” (112-3). It is in an effort to comprehend this free act that Schelling will now embark on an account of the organic which portrays every object as “produced only as a part of an infinite whole” (113).

Production of the Third Limitation: The Self's Intuition of Itself as an Organism

Because succession “presupposes not just a multiplicity of substances, but a reciprocity, or a dynamic simultaneity of all substances” the consciousness that emerges at a single point in this succession “must already presuppose a totality of substances, and a universal reciprocity among substances, as conditions of a possible succession independent of itself” (114). In other words, the original restrictedness in which the universe arose for the self as an absolute synthesis of the original conflict of self-consciousness¹³ is not

¹³Cf. 43-47. This reference to the original act of self-consciousness as the first restrictedness may seem confusing. How can the first act of this epoch be equated with the original act of self-consciousness? If we recall that the first act of the second epoch begins a new dialectical progression in which all the preceding acts of the first epoch (and indeed the original act of self-consciousness itself) are condensed, then

directly accessible through “the particular ... or secondary restrictedness” of that act, which constitutes the self’s awareness of itself as a succession of presentations. This means that the secondary restrictedness of this “original mechanism of presentation” (112), i.e., the restrictedness of the first act of this epoch, which posits the sensory object as opposed to inner sense, by the second act, which limits the activity of the self and the object and thereby brings forth the time series, can “no longer be explained from self-consciousness and to that extent is therefore not explicable at all” (115). Hence, the problem is to explain how this secondary restrictedness, which grasps the world as an assemblage of parts in time, can emerge out of the “absolute synthesis” of the intelligence which is outside time (115). In other words, the problem is “to explain how the absolute intelligence is to be accounted for by an act of the absolute self, and how, in turn, by an act of the absolute intelligence we may explain the whole system of restrictedness which constitutes my individuality” (116).

Schelling’s answer is thoroughly Spinozistic in its refusal to separate the finite and the infinite intelligence. As the finite is merely a restrictedness of the infinite intelligence (posited in the original absolute synthesis of the act of self-consciousness), we must understand that finite restrictedness to be created through the same act as the absolute synthesis: “in one and the same act there arises at once for the intelligence both the universe and the particular point of evolution to which its consciousness is attached; or more briefly, there arises for the intelligence both the first and the second types of restriction, of which the latter appears incomprehensible only because it is posited along with the first, yet

the problem disappears. In other words, because the history portrays this simultaneous act as a series of successive epochs, the contradiction is only apparent. Thus, the first restrictedness of the original act of self-consciousness is at the same time the first act of the second epoch. If one does not grasp this condensation, one cannot follow Schelling’s reversion to a discussion of the original restrictedness by which the universe arises for the self in the original act of self-consciousness. Because productive intuition has already produced the material world, the whole of its production is now regarded as collapsed into this first restrictedness, which becomes the first thesis of the second epoch, which will now repeat the original restriction at a higher stage. The resulting structure is not as immediately apparent to the reader as it may have been to Schelling.

without being derivable therefrom in its determinacy" (115-6). *To understand this we must see that empirical consciousness does not posit the absolute synthesis, but rather, that the absolute synthesis posits empirical consciousness.*¹⁴ How is this possible? If there were only an absolute synthesis "there would indeed be a universe, but there would be no intelligence" (117). For an intelligence to exist, "it must be able to emerge from this synthesis, in order to engender it again with consciousness; but this is impossible, however, unless there enters into this first restrictedness, a second, or particular one, which can now no longer consist in the fact that the intelligence intuits a universe at large, but rather that it views the universe from this particular point" (117). In other words, for the intelligence to be an intelligence, and not to be closed up in the production of a material "universe at large," it must come to intuit its own productive activity, and this requires it to adopt a determinate standpoint outside of its own production. If the absolute intelligence is to be an intelligence for itself, a determinate intelligence must arise in which the absolute intelligence becomes conscious of itself within the limitations of its own temporal restriction (117).

This means that for every empirical consciousness time has both "already elapsed" and it "begins all over again"(118), when its beginning is posited through absolute freedom: "one can say that every intelligence, not for itself, to be sure, but objectively regarded, is an absolute beginning in time, an absolute point that is pitched and posited, as it were, into a timeless infinity, and from which all infinitude in time now first commences" (118). From this absolutely free beginning, the determinate intelligence can come to repeat the absolute synthesis of which it is only the limitation. Thus, the freedom of the determinate intelligence is its ability to represent itself as the ground of its own determinations by grasping itself as a limitation of an absolute intelligence. In this way "the

¹⁴As I stated in chapter one above: "you don't posit it; it posits you."

past *exists* only through the present, and so exists for everyone only through his own original restrictedness" (119). But once the determinate intelligence grasps itself as having its ground in an absolute intelligence, it also comes to recognize itself as determined by this prior act of producing, not in the sense that there was a "past-in-itself," but in the sense that its production always appears to it as linked to what has gone before: "In its present producing the intelligence is therefore never free, because it has been producing in the preceding moment. Through the first producing, the freedom of producing is, as it were, forfeited forever" (119). Thus, the self is at once both free and determined. It is free insofar as it is an absolute beginning in time, which freely imitates the absolute synthesis, and determined insofar as its present production is bound by what it produced in the preceding moment. It is only the absolutely free act of positing a beginning in time which permits the empirical intelligence to become something determinate in time by repeating its absolute synthesis. "Originally there exists for it only a present, and through its infinite striving, the present instant becomes an earnest of the future, but this infinitude is now no longer absolute, that is, timeless, but an empirical infinitude engendered through a succession of presentations. The intelligence strives, indeed, at every moment to exhibit the absolute synthesis; as Leibniz says, the soul brings forth at every moment the presentation of the universe. But since it is unable to do so through an absolute act, it attempts to show it forth through a successive progression in time" (119-120).

We can see here how Hegel will follow Schelling's reading of Leibniz but put it to a radically different use. When Schelling refers to Leibniz' monad as exhibiting the whole as an absolute act, he never dreams of transforming the monad into something which can consciously embrace the whole as an absolute subject which is capable of thinking it through consciously, as in Hegel's later conception of life. Rather, he merely refers to Leibniz's conception of the monad's ability to reflect the whole which is present only in a confused way (Cf. §60). Thus, the monad only grasps the whole confusedly because, on

Schelling's view, its representation of the whole is its own unconscious act. Hegel will transform this confused representation of the whole, which is merely unconscious, into the perfectly transparent knowledge of the determining principle of the whole, thereby completing a tendency that was implicit in Leibniz's thought, which accorded this privilege only to God. Even where Schelling cites Leibniz in support of his views, it is as if Hegel followed out the consequences of Schelling's reading of Leibniz to their ultimate extreme: if there is to be a passage from the finite to the infinite, and the monad is to intuit the whole in itself, then this intuition should be fully conscious.

The impetus for this view is already in Leibniz's conception of life, which Schelling's references neglect. His emphasis instead, is on the notion of the pre-established harmony, which regulates the continuity between conscious and unconscious and between finite and infinite acts. Schelling thus fails to grasp that the internalization of the principle of sufficient reason and the notion of a pre-established harmony imply the complete transformation of both Leibniz' metaphysics and his conception of life. In a way that goes far beyond Schelling's use of Leibniz, Hegel will transform Leibniz' conception of the living being as a machine which is also a machine in each one of its parts *ad infinitum* (§64), into a principle by which the whole is made present in every part. For if the absolutely synthetic act of self-consciousness is already the hidden ground of the conscious I, which the I can grasp through a free imitation, why should the I not be able to consciously grasp its own ground? If this act of the self is already the unconscious ground of a pre-established harmony between the subject's conscious and unconscious representations, then this ground must also be sufficient for explaining consciousness' relation to its unconscious ground, so that this ground is reconceived in accordance with Leibniz' principle of life as that which makes the whole present in every part. In other words, if the I or self is the sufficient ground of the harmony between our conscious and unconscious actions, then it must also be the sufficient ground of the principle of life so

that the divine analysis of the infinite complexity of the universe becomes completely transparent to the monad, which henceforth grasps the infinite fluidity of life of the self as the sole principle of its determination.

If this ground is sufficient, then it is rational, and it must be capable of being explained. If it can be explained, then the self as the principle of determination is no longer merely unconscious, but has become fully transparent to itself. It is as if Hegel's position at Jena merely followed out the implications of reading Leibniz' conception of life in terms of Schelling's appropriation of the notion of a pre-established harmony in order to transform an unconscious and confused grasp of the principle of determination of the whole into a fully self-transparent one, thereby moving firmly back towards a Cartesian conception of consciousness' transparency to itself.¹⁵ This ability to exhibit the whole is an unconscious, and therefore confused act of the monad. In an effort to explain the passage from finite to the non-finite consciousness, Hegel will transform this "passage" into a perfectly transparent grasp of the infinite by the finite. In Hegel, empirical infinitude and absolute infinitude meet in the infinite mediating fluidity of organic life.

With this account of how the intelligence has been displaced into succession Schelling has for his part "deduced a self-intuition of the intelligence from within succession, by way, that is, of reciprocity" (121). What remains, however, is to show how this reciprocal intuition of the intelligence from within succession becomes an absolute intuition (and not merely a relative one) of the whole succession of presentations. In other words, what remains is to show how the intelligence's intuition of itself strives towards an absolute synthesis of the succession of presentations that will yield a perfect intuition of its self as productive. But as it is impossible to grasp how this reciprocity can become intelligible as a "whole succession of presentations.... we see ourselves driven into a third

¹⁵Michael Vater, introduction to Schelling's *The System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978) xxviii.

phase of limitation” in which the intelligence “must oppose itself to the succession in order to intuit itself therein” (121). The product of this third phase of limitation is organic life. By rendering the succession as something finite, which nevertheless contains “an infinite succession within this limitation” (121), the organic enables the intelligence to intuit the absolute synthesis in it, because it is “at once both finite and infinite; finite because it never oversteps a certain limit; infinite, because it constantly reverts back into itself” (121). By restricting and turning the infinite succession of the second phase of limitation back in upon itself, the organic becomes the finite representation, or symbol, of the absolute synthesis contained in the self’s original act. The organic thus enables the intelligence to intuit the absolute synthesis of the succession of representations because it is “at once both cause and effect of itself; cause, insofar as it produces; effect, insofar as it is the produced” (122). This reciprocity exhibited by organic life shows it to be the external expression of the organic life of intelligence which “has framed to itself outwardly from within everything that is external for it” (122). Thus, Schelling’s “deduction” of the organic is nothing else than the exhibition of the organic as the condition under which the self is capable of intuiting its own productive life, i.e., of intuiting itself as an object which has life. What is at issue is a series of intuitions by which the intelligence is gradually capable of intuiting itself with increasing degrees of accuracy. The foregoing derivations were simply “an hypothesis” entertained in order to seek the conditions of the self’s intuition of itself (95). The deduction amounts to a demonstration that this hypothesis is indeed correct.

The Deduction of the Organic

The “deduction of the organic” answers four questions: “1. Why is an organic nature necessary at all? 2. Why is a graduated sequence in organic nature necessary? 3. Why is there a difference between living and non-living organization? 4. What is the basic

character of organization?"(122). Because these questions bear directly on Hegel's account of the organic we will consider each in turn.

The first question is answered by what is stated above. The organic is necessary for the intelligence to intuit itself in "its productive transition from cause to effect, or in the succession of its presentations in so far as this returns into itself" (122). The intelligence does this by representing this succession as outwardly permanent, static and fixed, but inwardly in "a continuous flux" insofar as that succession constantly reverts back into itself. As the intelligence is "at once both cause and effect of itself," so the succession must be objectified to it as an organization which is both cause and effect of itself, if it is to intuit itself as productive.

The second question can only be answered through a more complex reference to Schelling's appropriation of Spinoza and Leibniz, for what is at issue is a striving to represent the whole. Schelling's account of this striving unites Leibniz' notion that every monad goes confusedly to the whole with Spinoza's account of the *conatus*. For what strives here is not the monad, but the intelligence itself, which "strives, indeed, at every moment to exhibit; as Leibniz says, the soul brings forth at every moment the presentation of the universe"(120). This striving is a striving to represent its own nature to itself through the production of the organic. Because the intelligence is itself a continual striving towards self-organization, it produces a graduated sequence of organization to bring forth in succession what it cannot depict simultaneously in an absolute synthesis. This evolution is organization, which is "nothing else but a diminished, and as it were, condensed picture of the universe" (123). As in Spinoza, this striving is essentially that of the intelligence itself. Just as Spinoza conceives thought and extension as two attributes of the one substance, so Schelling will conceive organization and succession as two products of the productive intelligence: "In proportion therefore as the succession proceeds, organization, too, will achieve a greater extension, and depict within itself a larger portion of the universe. The

law of this sequence is that the law of organization constantly enlarges its scope as the intelligence constantly extends it... the limit of the one is the limit of the other" (123).

As in Leibniz's account of distinct orders of Entelechies,¹⁶ Schelling articulates a series of levels of organic life which reflect the universe with varying degrees of adequacy: "the deeper we descend into organic nature, the narrower becomes the world which organization depicts within itself, and the smaller the portion of the universe that condenses into organization. The vegetable kingdom is assuredly the narrowest... Broader already, although still very restricted is the sphere of changes exhibited among the lowest orders of the animal kingdom, in that, for example, the noblest senses, those of sight and hearing, still lie dormant... If we move upward in the scale of organization we find that the senses gradually develop in that order in which by means of them, the world of organization is enlarged"(123-4). This series of levels are the *Potenzen* which are first introduced in the text which follows this passage.

The answer to the third question is that the self-reverting character of organic life and its inner principle of activity is necessary if the intelligence is to intuit itself therein. "Hence the intelligence must intuit itself not merely *qua* organization as such, but as living organization" (124). According to this deduction, then, there "can be no distinction between living and non-living organizations in nature itself. Since the intelligence is to intuit itself as active in the successions throughout the whole of organic nature, every organization must also possess life in the wider sense of the word, that is, must have an inner principle of motion within itself"(124-5).¹⁷ The question about the distinction

¹⁶In the *Monadology* Leibniz identifies three distinct orders of monads in the monadology: 1) monads, or entelechies, which possess simple perception (§19), animals, or souls, which possess sensation, and thus have perception and memory (§19), and rational souls (§82). Each of these orders reflects the universe to a different degree.

¹⁷Cf. Schelling's "*Timaeus*" manuscript where soul is defined as anything which bears its principle of motion in itself. F.W.J. Schelling. "*Timaeus*." 1794, *Schellingiana Band 4*, hrsg. Walter E. Ehrhardt (Stuttgart Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994) 30.

between living and non-living organization, thus, reduces to the previous question about the graduated sequence in organic nature: "Precisely as the intelligence, by means of the succession, constantly tries to depict the absolute synthesis, so likewise, will all organic nature appear as struggling towards universal organism and at war against inorganic nature. The bounds of the succession in the presentations, will be the bounds of organization" (125). Although there "must be an absolute boundary to the intuiting of the intelligence ... if the intelligence intuits the evolution of the universe, so far as this falls within its intuition, in terms of an organization, it will intuit this latter as identical with its own self. Hence, the intelligence will appear to itself, not merely *qua* organic as such, but as standing at the summit of organization" (125). The result then, of the third limitation of this epoch, is that "the intelligence must appear to itself as an organic individual" (125). This means that the difference between living and non-living organization is a necessary one if the intelligence to fully intuit itself as an organic individual.

The answer to the fourth question about the basic character of organization is that it is both cause and effect of itself. But as we saw earlier, the notion of cause and effect is grounded on the reciprocity of all substances (108), which yields the idea of an absolute organization. "Organization is thus the higher power [*Potenz*] of the category of reciprocity, which, viewed universally, leads to the concept of nature or universal organization, in relation to which all individual organizations are themselves accidents. The basic character of all organization is therefore that it be in reciprocity with itself, at once both producer and product, and this concept is the principle of the whole theory of organic nature, whence all further determinations of organization can be derived *a priori*." (126).

It is from the perspective of the organic as "the summit of all production" that Schelling distinguishes three orders, or *Potenzen*, of intuition: 1) the simple intuition of stuff [*Stoff*], which is posited in nature through sensation, 2) the intuition of matter which is posited in nature through productive intuition, and 3) the third which is designated

through the organic. These three *Potenzen* are to be understood in accord with the graduated sequence of organic nature as the three levels of intuition by which the intelligence comes to intuit itself. They designate the three phases of the self's emerging awareness of itself in the productive intuition of the second epoch. Thus, in spite of the fact that the first epoch ended with the production of matter, this production has nothing to do with the second *Potenz* described here, because in the first epoch the self has not yet intuited itself in this production. What is at issue in this later sequence is much rather the manner in which the self intuits and becomes aware of itself through the three restrictions, or limitations of the second epoch. The point is that even though matter is present for the transcendental philosopher in the first epoch, it does not emerge as an object for the self, until the self begins to intuit itself in its own productions in the second epoch. Although they all depict the universe in general (123), they are potencies of the self's intuition which gradually comes to recognize itself as an organization in the explanation of how the intelligence comes to intuit itself in its product in the second epoch.

These Potenzen are not, however, to be confused with the stages of production which constitute the three epochs of the history of self-consciousness. Thus, from the first restrictedness there arises original sensation, which is the first potency of the self's intuition of itself. From the second restrictedness there arises succession, which is the second potency, by which the self intuits itself in the world of matter that it has constructed through productive intuition. From the third restriction there arises the self's intuition of itself in the organic, when the self opposes itself to succession to intuit itself therein as a living being. This is the third, and highest potency of the self's intuition of itself in its production. These three *Potenzen* culminate in the concept of nature as the concept of a universal organization. With the intuition of the organic, the intelligence appears to itself as a "living organization" (125) which "stands at the summit of all organization" (125) insofar as it now intuits the evolution of the universe "as identical with its own self" (125).

These three *Potenzen* correspond to the three forces of general physics isolated at the end of the first epoch. These forces are magnetism, electricity and chemical force. If these three forces are themselves raised to a higher power they yield the three categories of organic physics, which are sensibility, irritability and the formative urge. Galvanism, which is the general expression for the transformation into a product by this trinity of forces (89), is the link between the universal forces of nature and the three categories of organic physics (126).

But all this only accounts for the self's intuition of itself as life in general. In an effort to account for the basic character of all particular instances of life, Schelling defines life as "a sequence, reverting into itself, fixated and sustained by an inner principle" (126). In accord with his definition of the soul in the essay on the *Timaeus* manuscript of 1794, where the soul is defined as the inner principle of motion,¹⁸ this inner principle is conceived as the continuity of internal motions: "Just as intellectual life ... is sustained only by the continuity of presentations" so organic life "is sustained only by the continuity of internal motions" (127). Similarly, where the intelligence struggles to achieve consciousness in the succession of its presentations, so life is "engaged in a constant struggle against the course of nature, or in an endeavor to uphold its identity against the latter" (127).

Having deduced the possibility of organic nature, Schelling now considers how the scale of organizations culminates in an organization which is identical with the intelligence. Thus, one result of this deduction is that the organism which the intelligence recognizes as identical with itself "will at every moment be the perfect expression of its inner nature" (127). But where the organism does not yet express that inner nature, the intelligence will not yet recognize itself as identical with itself. What Schelling is working towards is the

¹⁸Schelling, "*Timaeus*," 1794, 30.

idea that the scale of organization must eventually yield an organization in which the intelligence recognizes itself. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that this organization is man, but this is not what Schelling has in view. We must recall that what is at issue are various potencies of intelligence's self-intuition. It is not man himself who is the organization through which the intelligence recognizes itself, but rather it is through the organic generally as the highest potency of intuition, that the intelligence will come to recognize itself as an organization. As of yet human intelligence as such plays no active role in the self's intuition of itself. Schelling's point is merely that to the extent that a perfect intuition has not yet been attained by the intelligence, all that can be achieved is an intuition of the intelligence as organism.¹⁹ To illustrate his meaning Schelling offers the example of a man born blind: "If we wish to speak transcendently, the man born blind, for example, certainly has a presentation of light for an observer outside him, since all that is required for this is the power of internal intuition, it being merely that this presentation does not become an object for him; although, from a transcendental viewpoint, this presentation really does not exist in him, since nothing exists for the self which it does not itself intuit therein" (127). Like the blind man, the intelligence can form an idea of the transcendent as such, but it cannot form any positive notion of what it has not yet intuited. In other words, although the intelligence might possibly, like the blind man, form a transcendent idea of a perfect self intuition, at this stage, the best the human intelligence can do is to fill that intention with the intuition of itself as an organism. As "the organism is the condition under which alone the intelligence can distinguish itself, as substance or subject of the succession, from the succession itself, or under which alone this succession can be something independent of the intelligence," intelligence will thus appear to itself as an organism. In other words, representing the intelligence as an organism is the transcendental condition of possibility for

¹⁹ As the "intelligence is absorbed in its organism, which it intuits as wholly identical with itself," it "once more fails to attain an intuition of itself" (129).

the intelligence to represent itself to itself. The transcendent possibility of a more complete intuition of the self remains to be addressed in the third epoch of part three, and in the system of practical philosophy in part four which makes the realization of such an intuition into an infinite practical task.

It is worth recalling how this image resembles the example by which Hobbes explains his account of natural religion in chapter 12 of *Leviathan*: “For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive and assure himself there is somewhat there, which men call *fire* and is the cause of the heat such as they have that see it; so also, by the visible things of this world and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of him in his mind”(Hobbes 92-93). In chapter three above we saw how Hobbes’ claim that the blind man could feel the warmth of the fire involved a crude anticipation of the antinomy of teleological judgment. By appealing to a similar example, Schelling is simply traversing the same ground as Kant by arguing that a reflective judgment dependent upon the limits of our intuition - in this case our “blindness”- must be put in place of a wholly transcendent claim to know the presentation of light for some sighted observer. The difference is that this is no reflective judgment on the part of a merely sensory intuition, but rather, a reflective judgment only on the part of the intelligence, or the I, which has not yet come to a full intuition of itself. Thus, Schelling is proposing that empiricism - and this clearly includes Kant as well - fails to recognize that it is not the organism (and hence, the limits of sensory intuition) which is the condition of the presentation to consciousness, but rather, the self-intuition of the intelligence which is the condition of the presentation to the organism. This means that it is not the presentation which is conditioned by the limits of the organism, but simply our conscious awareness of the presentation, because we remain unaware of the

intelligence's unconscious production. If empiricism could learn to restrict itself to our conscious awareness of its presentations "no objection could be made to it" (127).

As we saw above, this is precisely the problem with Hobbes' natural proof for the existence of God. By claiming an access to the transcendent apart from our intuition, Hobbes fails to recognize the limits of conscious awareness, and surreptitiously claims access to a wholly transcendent ground. Were he to restrict his empirical claim to his actual conscious experience, his empiricism would be beyond Schelling's reproach.

Schelling's point is that as the organism "is itself but a mode of intuition on the part of the intelligence, everything in the latter must necessarily become an object to it immediately in the organism" (128). Thus, the organism necessarily becomes the external representation of the intelligence, with the result that the mental comes to appear to be dependent upon the material, rather than the other way around. The true relationship between the mind and body is thus to be understood as the perfect self-intuition of the intelligence in the organism that constitutes our body; the perfect "transparency of the organism for the spirit" (128). This means that illness is understood as a disruption of this harmony or transparency of the body to the spirit. We are thus capable of feeling "ourselves to be ill only because of the absolute identity of the organism with ourselves" (128). The process of illness that we feel, in contrast, is simply the result of the natural laws of the intelligence, because the self's production is restricted there. So just as for Spinoza "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" so here, a change in the organism brings about a change in intuition, since the organism is nothing other than the intelligence's intuition of itself. This explains why illness is linked to sexual reproduction in Schelling's 1799 *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* and in the Jena Philosophy of Nature.²⁰ When the organism is no

²⁰Cf. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol.VI: 261, 244, 247 and Vol.VIII: 121, 122, 143,175,178.

longer the perfect expression of the idea, or the intelligence, it is in effect, ill, because the intelligence can no longer perfectly intuit itself therein. *Qua* specified individual, the organism is in a sense ill, because the intelligence cannot perfectly intuit itself in it. Only the species provides the basis for the self's perfect self intuition of itself.

In a manner that recalls Plato's notion of *anamnesis*, Schelling goes so far as to say that birth is simply an appearance to consciousness which is ultimately traceable to the fact that our organic condition is only an appearance: "To this dependence, not of the mental itself, but of the consciousness of the mental upon the physical, there belongs also the waxing and the waning of the intellectual powers along with the organic, and even the necessity of appearing to ourselves of having been born. I, as this particular individual, did not exist at all before I intuited myself as this, nor shall I be this same person, once the intuition ceases. Since, by the laws of nature, there is necessarily a time at which the organism, as a fabric gradually destroying itself through its own energies, must cease to reflect the external world, the absolute loss of identity between organism and intelligence, which in sickness is only partial, namely death, is thus a natural event itself falling within the original series of the intelligence's presentations" (128). Thus, individual birth and death — though not specification in general — are dissolved "within the original series of the intelligence's presentations" (128). This means that they are empirically real, because we are not fully conscious of the blind activities of the intelligence's productive activity. To the transcendental philosopher, however, they are transcendently ideal, because the transcendental philosopher, through the absolutely free act of self-positing, is capable of deducing "the original series of the intelligence's presentations" (128).

What is true of this blind activity of production will also be true of its free activity as well, and thus, a free movement will correspond to every voluntary succession of presentations in its organism. But this movement is not simply the obverse of a change in the intelligence conditioned by a change in the organism. For in the latter case (the change

in the intelligence conditioned by a change in the organism), what is at issue is an unconscious identity, while in the case of free movement, we are dealing with a conscious, and thus mediated identity. The feeling of illness, for example, arises from an unconscious identity and thus, the organism is not free to change what it perceives. But in free activity, the intelligence becomes distinct from its organism via reflection. This means that there is no causal relation between presentations in the organism via reflection and the intelligence. Indeed, such a causal relation is inconceivable, "since the two are not really opposed but only ideally so" (129). Thus, the only way to explain the activity of the intelligence is to posit a harmony between its free activity and its unconscious intuitions. Unlike Leibniz's pre-established harmony, however, this harmony is not erected to explain the relation between the individual and the organism, or the soul and the body, by reconciling them in God's dual legislation in the kingdoms of nature and grace. Rather, the aim of this pre-established harmony is to reconcile the free and unconscious activities of the intelligence by positing their identity in the absolute I, or self.

Schelling's version of the pre-established harmony unites both Leibnizian and Spinozistic elements. In accord with Kant's subjectivization of reason, it transposes Leibniz's pre-established harmony inward and unites it with Schelling's peculiar reversal of Spinoza's notion of intellectual intuition in *On the I* and *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*. In this way, this harmony becomes much more a harmony between two aspects (the conscious and unconscious) of a single intelligence than a harmony between two distinct realms of creation. In any case, this harmony is plagued by the same difficulty as Leibniz' version, namely, that it verges on a fatalism in which I am only free to discover what is determined in advance. As Michael Vater puts it, "There is no sense of freedom other than that self-determination whereby I know (and determine the existence of) a world; there is no efficacious altering of reality other than my bringing it forth as a series of presentations and cognizing it" (Vater, xxx), just as in Leibniz there is

no altering of God's knowledge of the whole harmonious arrangement of the discordant elements in human history. The result is that "the self, which is will and act, is nothing other than an *act of knowing*... More than that, knowing is its only conscious form of being; its originative (and central) activity can be intuited only as a past, as the objectivity of a thoroughly determined world... This is a thoroughly deterministic reading of the human situation" (xxx-i). The result is that this pre-established harmony of nature and freedom brings about the complete subjection of all freedom to the absolute identity of nature and freedom in the I, such that the I is free only in its unconscious production of nature, while remaining thoroughly bound in its conscious cognition of its own products.

In any event, this pre-established harmony between unconscious and conscious producing activities "is needed to explain a passage from the intelligence into the external world" i.e., a passage from the free reflective activity of the intelligence (which will be addressed in the third epoch, and in the system of practical philosophy in part four) to the external world that appears to it in its involuntary presentations. Thus, even though the conscious and unconscious productions of the intelligence are united in that they are products of the self, the articulation of this pre-established harmony is necessary to ensure their agreement. For inasmuch as the I is not immediately aware of its unconscious presentations, which are only deduced and reconstructed through a free imitation of the self's primordial activity, there is no guarantee that these conscious and unconscious activities will not be completely dissociated from one another. Indeed, without the idea of this pre-established harmony between the self's conscious and unconscious acts there is no guarantee that the self's free and conscious reflection and its unconscious productions will be the activities of one and the same self.

By drawing the whole world of intelligence together into the organism, the circle of the intelligence's production is now closed. This means that the act whereby consciousness is posited in the organism falls outside the sphere of producing. This is as much as to say

that consciousness can only arise when it breaks free of the self's unconscious production - when those productions are complete. Because "the positing of every derived product in the intelligence's own consciousness could be explained only through a constant reflecting of the intelligence upon what it produced" (130), that is, because the production of the intelligence continually strived beyond each of its individual acts, we come to recognize that the sphere of those acts is itself already a part of reflection. But once producing is at an end, the intelligence cannot return to production by any new act of reflection. This means that its subsequent acts of reflection will be free rather than unconscious and necessary, as was the reflection which drove each act of production to the succeeding stage. Thus, the next stage, to be deduced in the third epoch, is free reflection emerging out of the third restrictedness which gave rise to organic life. This means that the organic is the point of transition from the I's unconscious production to the conscious and free reflection which will emerge out of it in the third epoch.

As the middle term between the involuntary appearance of nature and the voluntary and free reflection of the intelligence which emerges out of it, the organic occupies a unique position in Schelling's System. With the emergence of life, the intelligence becomes aware of itself as a living ground capable of sustaining the harmony between its conscious and unconscious production. Considered from the transcendental perspective, it is difficult to see why this harmony is required at all, for it seems indistinguishable from the transcendental backdrop of the self out of which it emerges. If the I is the ground of the self's conscious and unconscious production, then the very unity of their common ground will be sufficient to harmonize them. Considered from the perspective of empirical consciousness, however, this harmony is required because it would otherwise be impossible to establish a causal relation between the unconscious and conscious acts of the self. This suggests that the pre-established harmony is primarily a rhetorical device which Schelling uses to distinguish his system from that of Leibniz. Where Leibniz harmonizes

the body and the soul through God's legislation, Schelling is concerned with harmonizing the transcendental and the empirical perspectives by showing them to emerge as the common products of a single living being. In accordance with Kant's subjectivization of reason, Schelling has internalized the principle of sufficient reason and transformed it into the principle of life, which grasps itself as its own ground, and is thereby rendered capable of harmonizing its conscious and unconscious products.

A Recapitulation of the Argument of the Second Epoch

The three potencies described above from the perspective of the organic as "the summit of all production"(126) above, can be linked with each of the three limitations as follows: 1) the first restrictedness leads to the self's original sensation of an object in outer sense, resulting in an intuition of itself as having sensation and consciousness, 2) the second restrictedness results in the emergence of time as an absolute limit, which gives rise to the self's intuition of itself as a succession of presentations, 3) the third restrictedness results in the self's intuition of itself as organization.

In the first restrictedness of this epoch, the limit has gone over into the object. Whereas in the first epoch the self is only real, it can appear as a limitation of its own activity or as the thing-in-itself, now the self is both real and ideal. This means it cannot just be limited by the original boundary, for the boundary has passed over into the object, which is the common product of the self and the thing-in-itself. This means in turn that the self can only feel its limitation through production (131). In the second restrictedness of this epoch, the self's producing moves this common boundary of the self and the thing-in-itself inward, so that what is a boundary for the real self, or the object, can also emerge as a boundary for the ideal self, or inner sense.

Here the original boundary has gone over into its products in a way that limits both its ideal and real activities. The result is that this second limitation "must appear to the self

as at once dependent on, and independent of, its activity" (132). In other words, as a present boundary "it is independent of the self"(132), while in so far as this boundary has arisen out of the self it has "its ground in a past act of the self" (132). This means that this restrictedness appears as a limitation of the present, such that "time arises for it as an absolute limit, whereby it becomes an object to itself as having sensation and consciousness, that is, as inner sense" (132). This intuition of the present is the first intuition of this epoch.

But "this inner sense cannot become an object to itself as inner sense without outer sense simultaneously becoming an object to it" (132). Thus, "as an immediate result ... of the bounding of the ideal activity in production, inner sense becomes an object to the self through time in its independence of space, and outer sense an object through space in its independence through time" (132). As space and time again become objects for the self, this constitutes the second intuition of this epoch, which is the succession of presentations. This results in the complete positing of the second restrictedness.

The third intuition arises when the succession of the causal relation again becomes an object to the self through reciprocity. Thus, the progression of these three intuitions advances through the categories of relation from substance and accident, to cause and effect, to reciprocity. These categories are said to be "the basic categories of all knowledge" (133). In the first intuition, the self intuits itself through substance and accident as the present sensation of "mere stuff," in the second intuition it intuits itself through causality as succession, and in the third, the self intuits itself through reciprocity as organization, which is at once both cause and effect of itself. This intuition is the highest point of production, and the condition of a new form of restrictedness, compelling a transition to a new series of acts.

HEGEL'S JENA PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 1803/4 "THE ORGANIC"
Gesamtausgabe Vol. 6 (pp.173 - 265)

Translation Conventions

This translation is based on volume VI of the edition of Hegel's collected works (*Hegel Gesammelte Werke*) edited by Klaus Düsing and Heinz Kimmerle and published by Felix Meiner Verlag in 1975. I have attempted to make the translation as precise as possible while still remaining readable in English. Although there are many places where the same thing could be phrased more felicitously through the choice of a different word, I have strived to translate Hegel's terminology as consistently as possible, preserving as much of Hegel's phrasing and punctuation as possible. Occasionally, however, I have supplemented missing verbs, conjunctions, commas and definite articles to render the sentence in acceptable English. Wherever I have interpolated more than an article or a missing verb I have indicated the addition with a translator's note. Where the English rendering is questionable, I have cited the original German in a footnote. All such notes are to be distinguished from Hegel's own footnotes (and the translator's comments) by the fact that they are in German.

Thus there are three types of footnotes:

- 1) Hegel's own notes, which are usually prefaced by "*in the margin:*" or "*in the upper margin:*" in italics. Any of Hegel's further additions to these marginal comments are indicated by brackets "[...]" within the note itself.
- 2) Translator's notes clarifying the choice of a word or the translation or meaning of a particular passage. Such notes are always prefaced by "*Translator's note:*" or "*Tr. note:*" in italics.
- 3) Notes citing select German words or passages. These notes simply present the original German at the bottom of the page without any additional punctuation. Wherever I have made any additional comments, I have cited the German within quotation marks and placed my comments in a "*Translator's note.*"

To facilitate the use of the translation I have matched the pagination to that of the *Gesammelte Werke*, Volume VI, which is the German edition upon which it is based.

THE TRANSITION FROM THE PHYSICAL TO THE ORGANIC

This translation begins midway through section A) of Fragment 10. "Wir sind mit dieser Idee der Erde..." where Hegel begins the discussion of organic life as such. This first section is entitled "A) the phsyical idea of body," which runs from pages 111 through 208 and incorporates the transition to from the physical to the organic. I have begun translating on 173 where the page heading shifts from "Physik" to "Das Organische."

[173]

Fragment 10

In the a) *immediate earthly body* the principle of individuality is only properly posited as absolute singularity, as numerically one, as a principle of individuality; the latter one is an absolute one of the moments, of the totality of the elements which are of an ideal nature¹ *to their accidents*, the immediately earthly body is the absolute negation
 5 of their *independence*, but they are actual within it, however, as accidents. b) *The former unity*, and *the latter*, its *totality*, are simply mixed into each other,² *indifferently*, but not *opposed* to each other; the *negative unity* and *the totality of the elements* do not *step into the different* relation within the immediately earthly body. c) But the earth is not absolute singularity, rather it is also universality, and the elements which

¹*Translator's note:* following Petry's translation of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature from the *Encyclopedia*, "ideell" is translated "of in an ideal nature"; "ideal" is translated simply as "ideal." Reelle is similarly translated as "of a real nature" while "real" is translated as "real."

²ineinander

[174] are of an ideal nature in the earth, are also at the same time universality and each is a totality as we have cognized them, the element's ideality in the earth is simultaneously the positive universal, such that they reflect themselves into themselves in the universal element and posit themselves as a totality of moments. But the singular
 5 body is opposed to the universality of the earth and in that they are of an ideal nature in the singular body, the latter, their ideality, is not their reflection into themselves as a totality; they are only as moments, only universal *as abstractions* of the latter *negative unity* which is only *of an ideal nature* to its inner totality.¹ The *sense of color of the singular body* is for that reason only *an abstract sense*;² not existing within the singular
 10 body as color³— truly it would be the totality of all colors — but as *a determinate color*; in the same way the singular body's universal *being* as matter, the universal matter and the being opposed to its universal being as gravity, does not itself exist as universal gravity, and inasmuch as the universal in the particular could only exist as a system of the singular gravities, it could exist only *as a singular particularized specific weight*.⁴
 15 The other moments of the inner totality of the elements fall outside [of the body.] b The process or its living moments is the *transcending* of the singular body over the latter its singularity; a) the element *is here itself* as universal as the undifferentiation of its moments;

¹sie sind nur als Momente dieser ihrer innern Totalität nur *ideelle negative Einheit*, nur allgemeine als *Abstractionen*.

²nur ein abstracter

³als Farbe an ihm nicht existirend

⁴ebenso *sein allgemeines Seyn* als Materie die allgemeine Materie und ihm entgegengesetztseyn, als Schwere, ist nicht selbst das allgemeine Schwere, und *da das allgemeine* im besondern nur als System der einzelnen Schweren seyn könnte, nur als eine *einzelne besondere spezifische Schwere*.

[175] it is however in this living moment only the dissolved singularity; the destructive relation of the determinacies to each other, and the latter moment has the consisting of the undifferentiation of the singularity outside itself.¹ But the latter moment is essentially related to this undifferentiation of itself, to the consisting of the product; and
 5 the being of the singularity of the element comes out of the being of the opposites, and passes over into singularity, just as the opposites are essentially related to the being of the singularity of the element; and the singularity of the element is in the same way essentially related to their being-sublated, and related to it in such a way² that the element becomes universal as something determinate; the absolutely essential is, such
 10 that *the self-identical fluidity of one tone* of one specific gravity, of one color of *one moment in the neutrality*, of the living moments all at once, would be a *sublating of this One*, and at the same time would be a being of the plurality of the elements or would be a being³ such that *the element* as universal would at the same time be *in absolute singularity*. So that the independence of the elements would at once be in the form of
 15 particularity of the ideality which would not be independence; and in the latter its singularization, immediately become universal of its own accord.⁴

¹Und dieses Moment hat ausser sich das Bestehen die Indifferenz der Einzelheit

² und die Einzelheit des Elements ist ebenso wesentlich auf ihr aufgehobenseyn bezogen, und darauf dass die *Selbstgleiche Flüssigkeit Eines Tons* Einer spezifischen Schwere ...sey.

³Tr. Note: "would be a being" is interpolated to provide a clearer context for the final clause of the sentence.

⁴und in dieser seiner Vereinzelung unmittelbar selbst, allgemein werde

[176]

a) in the singular [body] only a moment of the element is posited; this singularity confounds itself with the opposed moments; in this manner the element is as universal in so far as the unity of its moments is posited b) in the same way the cycle of the inter-
 5 meshing elements in the living moments of the process is posited. But α) every universality of the element is only a negative universality, the living moment of the chemical process is only the sublation of the existence of its moments, in the same way the cycle of the elements in the chemical is only the being-sublated of the drive to separate which their independence has immediately in itself;¹ or the latter moment is
 10 essentially related to the doubled undifferentiation of the elements $\alpha\alpha$) as autonomous elements² in their process against each other and $\beta\beta$) as a totality of their moments in itself. But both are essentially related to each other;³ this relation of the latter being-one⁴ [is] the implicit of the chemical process and the latter is the organic.⁵

15 The numerical one of the earthly body has α) all [elements] *in itself*

¹lebenso ist der Kraislauff der Elemente im chemischen nur das Aufgehobenseyn ihrer Selbständigkeit hat unmittelbar in sich den Trieb auseinanderzugehen

²Tr. note: selbständiger. The word "elements" is interpolated.

³Tr. note: "Aber beydes ist wesentlich aufeinander bezogen" which could also be translated as "but either is essentially related to the other."

⁴diese Beziehung diss Einsseyn

⁵Und diß das organische

[177] *as ideal natures, as actuals, indifferently against each other*, which do not conflict with themselves, their opposing processes are completely stilled;¹ and thereupon, however, their conflict, their struggle and the cycle of their reciprocal sublating out of the latter singular earthly body. β) At the same time the elements have their reflection in
 5 themselves in the earth, and they are as universal themselves each in itself a totality of being; within the absolute singular body, however, this earth is not as a universal wherein the elements are as a totality, rather the absolutely singular body is something particularized and the elements are not posited within the single body in their totality, the numerically one² is only a moment, a color within them. But α) the former
 10 indifferent being of the elements against each other is absolutely a differentiation against each other; just as the former singular inner determinacy of the elements is essentially, in the same way, only in the universality within which the indifferent being³ exists — and the elements are essentially A) the latter totality of the elements towards the outside in which they are [in] the cycle [of the] absolute process,⁴ A) and at the same time they
 15 are the latter its universal motionless totality of an ideal nature in itself,⁵ and and are both essentially, they are essentially the being-one of both. The latter *essential* is that to which the earth must proceed,⁶ in order to be what it is;

¹Ihr Proceß gegeneinander ist völlig beruhigt

²Tr. note: "es" which refers to the "numerically one" at the beginning of the paragraph; it could possibly also refer to the "being" in β .

³es

⁴A) diese Totalität derselben nach aussen in der sie [in] dem Kraislauffe [des] absoluten Processus sind A) und zugleich...

⁵ihre allgemeine ruhige ideelle Totalität in sich

⁶fortgehen muß

[178] so that *the singular* would be a totality of the elements differently opposed to each other; and at the same time such that they would be a singularization of their inner existence which would immediately be a universality; the chemical process has both only as separated moments, in the living moment is the former being-one of all elements and the being-mixed together of their existence; in the products of their totality. The organic, however, is the being-one of both. The nature of the organic goes forth from this;¹

α) *The organic is above all² the absolute singularity* of the earth, the numerical one, and the *being-positing of an ideal nature* of the earth within the latter;³ it is, however, not at the same time the static *being of an ideal nature of the earth* within the numerically one;⁴ in this *static being-one*, only the *singularization of the elements* is itself in the moments of their reality; the static being one exists as process as being-sublated of this singularization of the moments; or so that they are, as universal, b) as such they step over against their existence as singularized; and the numerically one's being as universal is not of a formal ideal nature⁵ the *organic one*, and the numerically one is the latter universality of the elements which is absolutely one with the negative unity; they are here as universals of an ideal nature;⁶ but the latter the numerically one's ideality is

¹Es geht hieraus die Natur des organischen hervor

²vors erste

³und ideell gesetzteyn derselben an ihm

⁴das ruhige ideellseyn derselben in ihm

⁵*Translator's note:* following Petry's translation of "ideell" and "reell" I am translating "formell" as "of a formal nature;" hence, "ihr Seyn al allgemeiner nicht formell ideeller" is rendered as "its being as universal not of a formal ideal nature."

⁶als ideelle allgemeine

[179] conditioned through its reality, and its cycle in the negative unity of the the organic stands over against its absolute cycle as the independent opposition of different things against each other.¹ As these independent elements² reflect themselves of their own accord³ in the organic unity, they become of an ideal nature, and singular but
 5 likewise absolutely universal and indeed, universal of an ideal nature and universal of a real nature. In this way the numerically one's absolute cycle passes over into the cycle of organic unity, and back into the former, and the organic is the cycle of these two cycles.

10 a) the elements stand opposed to the organic in the movement; they stand opposed to it in their absolute independence⁴ as a solar system in that they are only different from one another through the absolute concept of time which is of a wholly ideal nature; and the elements are opposed to it as the free real absolute concept is opposed to it through fire; as the absolute concept the organic is essentially the sublation of the
 15 elements in that they lose every form of independence, in its negation of the elements their actual independence, which is purely as different, is necessary for the organic⁵

b) In this positive relation of the organic unity to the independent elements [the elements] perfect the cycle of the organic unity's ideal process in the movement, and
 20 they perfect the cycle of the real process in the absolutely chemical process in itself, and the organic is something strongly⁶ posited in this universality, and itself belongs to this process; which rings in it again, with which it, and all of its periods, rises and sets.⁷

¹als selbständiger gegeneinander differenter gegenüber

²Tr. note: "selbständiger." The word elements is interpolated.

³reflectiren sie sich

⁴Selbständigkeit

⁵Tr. note: This paragraph proved unusually difficult to translate: "a) die Elemente stehen dem organischen in der Bewegung entgegen; in ihrer absoluten Selbständigkeit als System der Sonne in dem sie nur durch den ganz ideellen der absoluten Begriff der Zeit gegen einander different sind; und dieselbe als durch das Feuer den freyen realen absoluten Begriff; es ist als der absolute Begriff indem si jede Form der Selbständigkeit verlieren wesentlich das Aufheben derselben, in seinem Negieren derselben ist ihre wirkliche rein als differente Selbständigkeit für das organische Notwendig." There are a variety of problems here. The most difficult is the lack of a verb in the second clause. Its dependence on the first requires the repetition of the verb in translation. Compounding this difficulty is the repetition of "dieselbe" (in the third and fourth clauses), which refers to die Elemente mentioned in the first clause. Finally there is the problem of the reference of "es" at the beginning of the fourth clause, which refers to the organic.

⁶Tr. note: "schwer" in the sense of "heavily," or "richly" posited.

⁷Tr. note: In keeping with the metaphor of the solar system in the preceding paragraph, Hegel is implying that the organic is the center around which the activity of the chemical process revolves. Thus, the organic, resounds again in the chemical process, and is determinative of both it and its periods. It is the sun around which it rises and sets.

[180]

c) at the same time, however, the singularity of the organic steps out of this space in that it swims out of it; its being in this process is the universal element of its existence, in which the process¹, however, withdraws itself into itself. Just as the organic²
 5 traverses the periphery of this cycling process, in the same way it is the static center of the latter, and comports itself to it as a point through *its* radii, through its singularization the latter become torn out of their independence and out of *the continuity* of their connection, out of their self-identical being for themselves, and are only an infinite multitude of points, of singularities.

c) the latter is the first moment of the organic individual against the elements, such that the being for itself of the elements as heavenly bodies and the *continuity of the organic individual's cycle*, the intermeshing of the element's necessity in the organic individual, reduces itself and the elements become singularized in themselves. This
 15 singularization is the reflection into itself of the elements out of their self-identical fluidity and their differentiation from each other; a singularization wherein they themselves break themselves into themselves,³ and succeed in attaining their totality in itself; they exist as this totality only in the whole of the earth. They exist within the singular bodies only in the singularization of a moment, only in one of its tones, one of
 20 its colors, it must in the same way

¹er

²es

³worin sie sich in sich selbst brechen

[181] necessarily become sublated in its singularization, as the static subsisting of gravity in its totality, they must be posited as universals of an ideal nature, as the negatively universal, *i.e.*, as whole, but as sublated, and they must be posited as this sublated whole; that is they must become *thoughts*.

- d. The organic is the existence of the latter system of elements, as in a unity in which they are these ideal natures, in such a manner that the elements are themselves differently opposed to each other therein, as they are according to their essence; the organic's ideal consisting as accidents is simultaneously opposed to itself as a living
- 10 process of the latter.¹ But the unity of the accidents is the unity of the organic, is the process itself, is as one unity, and the organic is for itself, it is its absolute cycle gathered into one; the moved in the organic are not the latter elements themselves, they are of an ideal nature; what moves itself, rather, is the organic one itself, this one is the existing organic one; the moments of its movement are themselves each the organic
- 15 one, only posited in the form of elements of an ideal nature; it differentiates itself into moments each of whose self is the organic nature of the organic one; the elements which are penetrated

¹*Tr. note:* "derselben," or "of the same" which refers to "die Existenz" in the first clause. The word "derselben" occurs in the next sentence as well, where I have also translated it as "existence."

[182] through this one have become inseparably mixed; and the separation which comes back out of it again is a system of organic members, the element itself is an organic moment;¹ the organic in its moments is the element, the element is the form of the organic's differentiation of its moments from each other.²

The organic therefore is this simple unity of elements, or the absolute substance; in the free elements this *independence*³ is form, they appear as various independent parts⁴ of various substances, in the organic the reverse is the case, the substantiality is the essence, and the *essence* of its determinacy is the mere form of its merely
 25 different relation, which different relation, or different being-one, is simultaneously absolutely one with the former positive universality of substantiality.⁵

The latter substance, within which the elements are only the form of differentiation, stands a) opposed to the system of elements in which they are in part
 30 an independence as the world-body, in part different independent parts⁶ in the process of the elements, which are held apart from each other in their slow cycle, both are the same image of totality; the cycle of the wheel of the periphery is as it were on the side of the elements as such; the side of the idea of the organic is as the absolutely quick movement

¹Tr. note: "das organische selbst ein organisches Moment," which could also be translated as "the element itself is one organic moment."

²Tr. note: "Das organische ist in seinen Momenten es selbst, die Form seiner Differenz gegen einander seiner Momente ist das Element." An alternate translation of the first clause is: "the organic is itself in its moments."

³*Selbständigkeit*

⁴*Selbständigkeiten*

⁵Tr. note: The entire sentence reads: "Das organische ist also diese einfache Einheit der Elemente, oder die absolute Substanz; an den freyen Elementen ist diese *Selbständigkeit* Form, sie erscheinen als mehrere Selbständigkeiten mehrere Substanzen, umgekehrt am organischen ist die Substantialität das Wesen, und ihr Wesen ihre Bestimmtheit ist blosse form bloss differente Beziehung welche differente Beziehung, differentes Einsseyn zugleich absolutes Eins ist, mit jener positiven Allgemeinheit Substantialität." Hegel's point is that the essence of the organic is not a unity of autonomous parts, but rather a "different being-one" that is the "mere form of its merely different relation" of unity which is, at the same time, absolutely one with the universality of its substantiality. In other words, the essence of the determinacy of the organic is only form, only different relation, which is at the same time absolutely one with the various autonomies of the various autonomous parts of the free elements which are in it. It is thus a different relation, a different being one than the composite unity of its various elements and their parts. This means that the form of its independent elements does not determine the substantiality of the organic, but much rather that *organic* substantiality is determined by the mere form of organic relation. Thus, contrary to appearances, organic substantiality is not determined by its component parts, rather the parts are determined by the formal relation that constitutes organic substantiality. This means that in the organic the essence which determines substantiality is form - "the mere form of its merely different relation," to itself (e.g., its constant circulation into itself) rather than the various autonomous parts of its component elements.

⁶*Selbständigkeiten*

[183] of the latter periphery, through which they appear as stationary and as a *general* tone, and neither one¹ is to be distinguished. The absolute universal unity of both, which appears as the middle between them in so far as they are considered [as] juxtaposed, is precisely the latter, so that *they* both are forms of the movement of this
 5 same totality; they are according to their contents, according to their essence, but in view of the form, they are also opposed, and this side of their being-one or middle is the *absolute form*, the infinity which in precisely this way is the latter *opposition* as it is immediately the ideality of the absolute sublation of this opposition. Both sides of the middle are themselves split on the two sides as the form of their appearance; the
 10 elements appear as the universally *existing*,² independent, eternal against the singularity of the organic individual which they outlast in being, those which in *being destroyed* are imperishable, as opposed to the latter. But the other side of *the middle*, *the infinity* is on the side of the organic individual; the infinity is *the individuality itself*, which is that which reverses the former relationship of the being of the
 15 elements, which absolutely particularizes the universality of the elements, the reflection of the latter, which makes them into single points, and raises itself through this to the absolute;

¹keins

²seyende

[184] in as much as that universal of the elements is only the *existing*¹ *undifferentiated* inert universality; the universality of the organic individual, however, the negative ideal universality in which they *likewise are*, in which they indifferently consist, but as sublated as of an ideal nature, as moments of the form. The organic has
 5 taken the soul out of the elements for itself, and it is the flame of life and the universal of infinity. What heretofore was our reflection, that the moments of the totality are essentially a relation in infinity which is one, this exists in *the organic*.

e. In this manner the organic is itself the cycle as an absolute one, and is the
 10 organic's *being* as absolute one, such that it makes itself into an absolute one, so that it idealizes the elements, so that their system is independent towards the latter,² only as a negative unity. But in this manner the same contradiction of the process is itself posited in the absolute one, such that it is as absolute singular and simple and as a totality of organic moments. The idea of the organic is the absolute universality of
 15 being-one,³ both of the absolutely simple being-one of the organic and of the organic as a totality and at the same time the it⁴ collapses into itself and the idea exists in the doubling of the organic individuality. The idea, in which the infinity of the absolute concept is at the same time more simple, must itself become infinite *of its own accord*,

¹seyende

² *Tr. note:* as absolute one the organic idealizes the elements so that their system is independent towards this absolute one. The result is that there are two cycles, that of organic unity which idealizes, and that of the elements which are idealized by it, and yet preserve their autonomy over and against it.

³Allgemeinheit Einsseyn

⁴*Tr. note:* e.g., the idea.

[185] it must, of its own accord, posit itself as one, which is absolutely opposed to it, for its self¹ it must [itself] posit the latter sublating of the opposition as other than what it is, and so that this other is itself; and only is,² in this diremption and in the sublating of the latter. *The idea* of organic *individuality* is *species*, universality; it is
 5 infinitely an other to itself, and in this being other, it itself *exists* in the separation of the sexes, of which each is the whole idea, but which relating itself to itself as to something external and sublating this opposition, intuitively itself [in the] being other as itself. Between the two stands *the middle in both of its sides* of positive and negative universality; the *feminine* appears as the positive universal the passive *relating* itself
 10 *to itself*,³ which is *receptive* to form;⁴ the *masculine*, however, is the negative side of the middle, as the active aspect of the form.⁵ The *idea* itself is their absolute unity; the idea only exists as infinitely being another than itself,⁶ as individuality. The individual is the idea and it exists only as idea, therefore the contradiction of being this idea is in the individual; and at the same time only a being other than this idea,
 15 the individual is absolute drive; it is only in as much as it is the *sublating* of this determinacy; this being-other. In the latter sublating of the being-other and of the *contact* of both sexes, then, there thus *exists* only the idea; the *individuals*, which only are as the latter so that they

¹für sich selbst

²seyen

³Sich auf *sichselbstbeziehenden*

⁴*Translator's note:* The word "receptive" translates *empfangen*, which means both to receive and to conceive or become pregnant. Hence, *die Form empfangende* means both what is receptive to form, and what conceives through this receptivity.

⁵*Tr. note:* "das thatige der Form." The word "aspect" is interpolated to clarify the sense in English. Hegel's point is that the form itself is to be regarded as an activity which is masculine.

⁶die Idee existiert nur als unendlich als sich selbst ein anderes seyend.

[186] are drives, idea and itself relating itself to itself as to another, cease to be; the *produced* is the *existing idea*, which has taken on being the idea precisely because of those *standing opposite* its essence, and only leaves singularity and with this, only independence as form, not as essence, and makes them into elements, the *offspring* and the latter having become singularities, or the independent elements fall
 5 *indifferently* apart. But the idea is essentially *only as infinity* relating in itself as relating itself to another, and in its existence it is infinite individuality; it immediately begins its tension against the elements, and the whole cycle is absolutely turned back into itself; or it has no beginning and no end, and is the same eternal cycle.

f. If we reflect *on this cycle of* the organic then we see that the organic is the unity *of two processes which form one circle*. The one is the cycle in which the independent elements become ideal, and out of these, become absolutely independent elements in precisely this way, in that their ideality of negative universality is immediately also
 15 positive universality,¹ the cycle of self-preservation; of the being-positing of the elementary processes in the organic is the other of the cycle of the species; the realized idea. The organic, which has thus sublated the external differentiation opposed to the process of the elements in that the organic

¹ Indem ihre Idealität negative Allgemeinheit unmittelbar auch positive Allgemeinheit ist

[187] posits this process in itself, becomes sex, it posits the external differentiation in in itself, and collapses within itself into different organic individuals; and thus sublates the latter differentiation, and returns to the first. The organic itself intuitively its being-other there as the totality of the inorganic process, unconscious that it is itself
 5 the latter totality; the organic becomes this other-being as well, such that the latter other becomes the organic itself, or such that its being-other is the same organic essence, and this differentiation inverts itself again into the first. Both immediately mesh with each other.¹ The being-sublated, of the differentiation against the inorganic process becomes a differentiation of the sexes and the being sublated of the latter is
 10 the former first differentiation.

From this we see that the organic individuality is now² the absolute unity of the doubled movement in itself, and which relates itself to another; and the essence of the earth is fully realized in the organic; or the earth comes to itself in it, and bears itself
 15 forth³ out of it to this absolute unity of the doubled movement. The two movements are, as shown, an absolutely distinguishable cycle, the idea, the *species* is the *sun* of the individual, around which the self preserving motion itself untwists into the motion relating to the individual.

¹ Beide greiffen unmittelbar in einander

² hiemit

³ gebiert sich

[188] and in that on the one side this *movement* of the individual around the species relates itself to the idea, on the other side it relates itself to an inorganic nature. It is the middle, the *infinity* of the being-outside-itself¹ is implicitly outside of itself according to two² sides; its is the earth which moves [itself] around the sun; just as a
 5 moon moves itself around it, and in their being, sun and moon hold themselves apart from themselves but in such a way that the active force opposed to the moon only comes from the sun; so the organic [which] preserves itself against the power of the species, which makes it perish, just as it preserves itself against that of inorganic nature, and moves itself around its axis for itself of its own accord, is itself preserved
 10 in itself.³ But this movement of the organic individual in itself is the consumption of organic nature and would be in accord with it, in that the individual would have the species in itself; and thus the universal is the absolute middle, which moves itself in itself, around which the individuality which is always becoming other, moves itself in the periphery. The preservation process of the individual as its movement around
 15 itself, however, alone has the power of the species, the idea,

¹ausersichseyn

²Tr. note: written as an arabic numeral.

³Tr. Note: As the earth is between sun and moon, so the organic is between the species and inorganic nature. As the sun is the force that regulates the movement of the earth, and hence the force by which the earth holds the moon in its orbit, so the species is the force which regulates the movement of the organic being, and hence, it too is the force by which the organic holds the inorganic within its sway. Because this force is always exist as something individualized, the species, or universal, is the absolute middle of this process which moves the individual. Thus, the individual which particularizes the species is the absolute middle and unity between inorganic nature and the organic idea. This means that the individual is essentially inorganic nature determined by the idea.

[189] and in the process of preservation the species exists as living organism in the organic individual; and *the individual* exists as the *absolute middle* and *unity* between the totality as inorganic nature and the organic idea so that the latter is the shape, the activity of the organic idea; but the idea posits itself as active against the individual
 5 just as absolutely. The inorganic nature is that which becomes species in the sex, and carries the victory of this over the individual.¹

The absolute unity, as we have recognized it as the essence of the organic, is the *absolute life-force*; an absolutely universal that for the sake of its unity and simplicity,
 10 *[can]not be grasped out of another*. It² is *ungraspable* as this simple, it is *the absolute ether*; as this self-identical *it has all opposition* in itself; and *nothing is opposed* to it, *i.e.*, it is not to be grasped out of another; it is universal as the absolute concept itself. Precisely because of this it is not the abstract simplicity, the latter is only the multiple in relation to something opposed to it, and becomes grasped out of
 15 it; but the former absolute unity as non-abstract unity but a living unity is immediately infinite; the latter is the absolute unity of opposites, of the idea and of the individuality of the totality in the form of unity and of

¹Es ist die unorganische Natur die im Geschlechte zur Gattung wird, und über das Individuum den Sieg davon trägt.

²Tr. Note: "es" which refers to the "absolute unity," which is "something absolutely universal," hence, "es," although neuter, actually refers to the feminine "absolute Einheit." Because the reference is thus indirect, I have translated "es" as "it" throughout this paragraph.

[190] infinity. *The simplicity* of life is for this reason neither the result of factors, nor of what the result would be, nor just as little is it something secret uncognizable; the simplicity of life is infinite *in its simplicity*, it is the idea of the former absolute taking up of the infinity into the simple itself; in which immediately absolute *particularity* is
 5 posited that is immediately absolutely universal, and this absolutely universal is likewise immediately an absolute particular; Life¹ is therefore because it is inconceivable, i.e., not cognizable out of another, at the same time absolutely cognizable; in that the indicated unity is, life is the existing cognition itself; the cognition cognizes itself not through another, but through itself, and we recognize the
 10 organic in that we recognize that it is that unity or the existing cognition. In so far as the former absolute unity of the organic is considered in relation as a particular, so it immediately passes over into the universal as the universal which is opposed to a particular, and vice-versa, but the latter transition is only in the manner of contemplation; the organic is, implicitly this transitional being-one, which just as
 15 absolutely dirempts [itself], as it remains one in its diremption. It is formally the same simple being-in-one² as the particular in space; which immediately as the latter singular is just as absolutely fluidly universal out of itself, in its singularity it is immediately space only in the universal, or the simplicity of thought, which as determinate is just as immediately of an ideal nature universal; only that in the

¹*Tr. note:* Whereas the subject of the previous sentence was the "simplicity of life" it is now merely "life."

²*inEinsseyn*

[191] inert formal undifferentiation of space, which is not simultaneously time, the particular is still something spatially detached from its universality; as in formal thinking what is thought is still a particular determinacy; in the organic as such in contrast, the particularity is absolute particularity or sublated within itself as
 5 particularity, it is infinite particularity.¹

The latter moment of the relationship of the organic to the particular element is the true idea of excitability.

10 The latter organic *fluidity* or *simplicity* is that which thwarts all conceiving of organic functions according to their essentials, so that they are organic, from mechanical or chemical *grounds*; the latter single thing, which is brought into the atmosphere of organic function, immediately ceases to be this singular, it becomes, like the singular in space, infected, destroyed by the organic unity as this particularity.
 15 The organic functions can only be conceived within themselves, [from] within their unity. They have no external relationship, they only cut themselves off from each other; in themselves they are locked² in *organic simplicity*. What happens to the inorganic when it is pulled by the organic into its circle, is not a *separating of it*, so that it takes *some of it* from out of itself, and parts with the rest; and that the way it
 20 becomes in the organic is already itself recognizable in the *inorganic*; the action³ of the organic is an absolute infection. All the representations fall away, for example, that the plant decomposes the carbonic acid of the atmosphere

¹oder an ihr selbst als Besonderheit aufgehoben, unendliche Besonderheit ist

²geschlossen

³Wirkung

[192] which is not in the atmosphere anyway, retains the carbon for itself, and gives oxygen gas back from itself when its is exposed to light, — whereby, the pure fact itself, that the plants give oxygen gas rests on badly made experiments — or that in the same way oxygen gas is destroyed in *breathing*; and the venous blood should
5 become transformed into arterial blood through this oxidation; likewise the grasping of nutrition, so that it would be a mixing of organic juices and a drawing out of the nourishing material; through dissolution, precipitation, coagulation, etc. All these representations contain only an external mechanical or chemical action, in whose products there would be nothing else that were not as such already present in advance
10 in the inorganic which comes into [the] atmosphere of the organic. The organic infection is one and the same essentially changing action for the inorganic, as is active in the animal, for example, in animal warmth in general, though not as a determinate chemical action. The general form of this infection is also empirically demonstrated in the most determinate way; there has been, for example, food brought
15 into the stomach of animals which is placed in closed tubes, the stomach walls were then cut out, and the food was discovered to be spoiled; in the same way, small pieces of meat have been wrapped in little packages of linen and placed them in the abdominal cavity, or under the skin on mere muscular flesh, and they are changed just as they are in the stomach.

[193]

The essential in the product of organic function, that which belongs to it is not a superficial activity of the breaking apart of the inorganic or of the mixing of that which appears on its side, with inorganic which is offered to it, rather the latter is
 5 essentially changed, infected, and elevated in its universality.

From this universal idea of the organic we pass over to the existence of the organic.

10 *The simple existence* of the organic is the *plant*; the two moments of the organic are the organic as species, and the organic as individuality, idea, species and individuality do not step apart from each other; the *individual* as the cycle of its processes in the moments of the latter is always the whole, the species; the articulation¹ within the individual itself, only steps into an external superficial or
 15 sequential² differentiation, and the process of the species, the decomposition of the idea is formal in the same way. The individual is to a certain extent to be called imperishable; in that the individual is itself always the species, and its *articulation* is at the same time the preservation of the species, or it does not perish in the processes of the species, it does not split itself into opposed sexes,³ rather the process of the
 20 individual articulates itself in itself, in as much as it posits itself as universal, and vice-versa in as much as the individual is subsumed under the idea, and the two movements coincide; the processes self articulation is immediately the decomposition into the individuals of the species,⁴ the individual as such exists as *a plurality of*

¹gegliederung

²aufeinanderfolgende

³Tr. note: "entgegengesetzte des Geschlechtes," which literally translates as "the opposites of sex"

⁴sein sich gliedern is unmittelbar sein Zerfallen in die Individuen der Gattung

[194] individuals; the idea, the species is as it were too weak to be able to be able to let itself decompose into opposed individuals, and to trust itself to sexual differentiation .

- 5 We consider the plant in its simple course of life. The plant as expressing the first potency of the organic process, is absolute organic unity and in that it raises itself against the inorganic world, as against that within which the plant raises itself as other than it is itself, it makes itself into the totality of the process, and sublates the process existing as other than it is itself, the plant can only portray the totality as it is in its
10 moments, as an implicit succession, in as much as it always remains one; not as different things opposing each other, in the immediate at the same time, for with this the plant would cease to be the formal self-same of the organic within itself; in its organic articulation the plant remains the same, and in this it is a formal differentiation a duplication of itself. Even less can the plant pass over into this
15 genuine diversity¹ of individuals, in as much as the idea becomes infinite [and] splits itself as such; (the idea as such ceases to exist in this dispersion;) the idea exists in the process of the species, but not as a numerical one, rather in the multiplicity of such a one, in the multiplicity of individualities and the plant is one such individuality; the process of the species as such more self-detaching, is only abstract from

¹*Tr. note:* to distinguish “verschieden” and “unterschied” from Hegel’s many permutations of the word “different”, “differenz”, etc. I have translated “verschieden” as “various,” and “unterscheidene” as “distinct.”

[195] the side of its differentiation as the latter, as individuality itself, whose differentiation does not become actual in individuals remains under the determinacy of this individuality and does not step forth as opposed individuals, or [is] itself a moment of the totality of the individual, instead of that of the species-process and
 5 subsumes the individual under itself in the power of universality.

The organic course of life in the form of the latter simplicity, or as plant, results by this means in the following way.

10 ¹The *plant* which exists solely in the simplicity of the idea is the seed, the whole plant in itself; as organic in general it relates itself to itself as another; it falls into the fertilized earth. The fertilized seed, *i.e.*, the *seed* relating itself to itself as another, turns itself against elemental nature, to subjugate it beneath itself, to make itself into the center of its cycle, and to be its cycle in itself; the seed's first universal
 15 *fertilization* or the relation to the inorganic is, in general, to itself as an other, such that the latter inorganic nature falls into the seed itself as the *universal*, so that the seed now is as universal through the inorganic nature, it consequently divides itself in itself,

¹Upper left at the beginnng of the page as parenthetical numeration: o)

[196] opposes itself in itself to an inorganic nature; and in that the seed is at the same time the *universal* it surrounds the latter inorganic nature, at the same time the skin, which contains this point of individuality and that which is becoming inorganic nature for it, consumes it in the infinity of its nature; the seed at first consumes itself, it has
 5 an albumen and consumes its albumen; as the idea of organic nature; it is the one of its organic being, and of inorganic nature. In this self-enclosed life it becomes itself that which it consumes, as a whole it first makes itself into another which it itself is, but immediately as *THE LATTER WHOLE* it is something directed towards the outside;¹ this tension directed outward goes apart in the same way into one directed
 10 inward;² as the organic one, the living fire of the plant divides itself against the air and the earth, and consumes the middle, the water, into itself; it roots in the ground and strives into the air. In the latter water process gravity decomposes into opposed specific gravities; the one side presses into the earth, the other into absolute lightness in the air; the latter straight-lined, simple oppositional movement, insofar as it only
 15 relates itself to the shape, relates the indifferent being—one of fluidity, and the unity in the differentiation, but it divides the line and widens it into more lines, and comes to the surface of the leaf just as in the whole differentiating which the bodily form gives itself in the formation of various branches; the differentiation in the unity, the cohesion

¹ein nach aussen gerichtetes

²geht ebenso in eine nach innen auseinander

[197] is thus immersed into the fluidity, the differentiation only is as an external shape, and *the water is* to this extent *stale*, and rises up merely mechanically through the ducts and filaments as through a capillary system; the combustible is immersed in the water.¹ This development is the development of the merely fluid shape [and] is as
 5 such, not an inwardly unfolding tension of organic articulation; the plant which sustains itself therein *as unity of the cycle*, can only preserve itself as this organic one in *the form* of the seed; and interrupts the line which draws it everywhere with such *resumptions* into unity; or productions of the *seed*; in the roots, as in the line of the stem, it entangles itself;² every nodule is a seed, and every unfolding of a nodule is a
 10 new plant; every nodule is perfectly closed in itself through a harder partition as the wood, is cut away from what is left over, and divides itself against the stalk as it did before against the roots as a whole; each is a new individual. The unfolding is a repetition of the plant; the leaf is the whole plant, as is the branch, and the line of wood fibers, just as the wood reverses the *cylindrical*

¹Die Differenz in der Einheit die Kohäsion ist so in die Flüssigkeit versenkt, sie ist nur als äussere Gestalt, und das Wasser ist insofern fade und steigt bloss mechanisch, durch die Röhren der Fasern, als durch ein Haargefässsystem auf; das brennbare ist in das Wasser versenkt.

²*Tr. note:* "verknotet sie sich," e.g., it ties itself into knots, or forms nodules; it nodulates.

[198] *surface of the bark*, and the pure surface of the leaf, they are abstractions which relate themselves to the mere shape, abstractions in which the plant simplifies itself completely towards what is inner, and externally has this highest stepping forth into form.

In the *unfolding* of the shape no inner differentiation is posited; that which has come to be within it is thus a pure extending crystallization, and the latter which has come to be within it is also an indifferent, an absolutely having become something mortified¹ in its having come to be; the most powerful drive in the plant is to
 10 inwardly mortify this single facet² of the shape within itself; and the living process is at the same time the superficial, transitory within the plant. But as the plant indifferently preserves itself in its further formation, so the opposition *between rooting and branching out into the air*, this unfolding of the shape against the *unity* of the plant, tenses itself at the same time. *This unity of this tension is the coming to life*
 15 *of the principle of fire* which steps out opposite the preceding shape. The line of the roots steps forth in opposition to the width of the leaf, and synthetic opposition of both is in the stem; in the latter there is nothing other than simple wood fibers, which have tubular interstices between them, in which the plant water ascends;³ the horizontal line of the leaves stays this progress; and precisely in this way the
 20 horizontal leaves in

¹ein erstorbenes

²einfache

³n die Höhe steigt

[199] the stem impede the rising of the organic waters. This impediment is the activity of the air enlivened by the light of the fire which was posited in the leaf, against the earth which is active through the same fire in the pure length of the roots; and the activity of differentiating the water of the leaves can indeed be none other
 5 than the attempt to neutralize this fire,¹ to displace it within the organic unity of saltiness; just as in contrast the earth in the root, which is active against this fire, tries to bring the combustible, the brittle, closer to the dusty, the cohesionless. Plants which remain, as it were, within the power of the roots, represent to us this floury² cohesionless, in itself undifferentiated earth³ which does not come to acid or salt. The
 10 physics of plants has not yet determinately known how to portray this pure opposition; the universal is the tensed water, which is under the rule of the air and earth, which are tensed against each other around the leaf and root, in which tension the unity of the principle of fire steps forth as the unity of this tension; and as before [the] formal progression of the line itself interrupted the shaping of the plant through
 15 the nodules, so now the ideal unity interrupts the principle of fire the former self shaping progression of the whole, and the becoming universal, the species interrupts life, and the plant ceases to grow. The synthetic color of the green of the leaves returns to the simple color of yellow, of the light of the individuality which until now brought the universal of the individual's inorganic nature beneath itself, as it is
 20 immediately color; and the principle of fire goes *together* in a developed *nodule*, in which it realizes its absolute inner division,

¹und die das Wassert differentierende Thätigkeit des Blatts kann wohl keine andre seyn als der Versuch es zu neutralisieren, es inner halb der organischen Einheit in salzigkeit zu versetzen; so wie dagegen die gegen es thätige Erde in der Wurzel es dem brennbaren, spröden, dem staubigten kohäsionlosen näher zu bringen sucht (*Tr. note*: "Es" refers to the fire which is active in the roots in the preceding clause).

²mehligte

³*Tr. note*: The word "earth" is interpolated. The entire sentence reads: "Pflanzen die gleichsam innerhalb der Macht der Wurzel bleiben, representieren uns diss mehligte, kohäsionlose in sich differente das nichte zur Säure oder Salzigkeit kommt." To render this in acceptable English it is necessary to interpolate the substantive "earth." Plants which remain within the power of the roots have not yet transformed the earth into acid or salt. It remains, rather, floury and cohesionless.

[200] as it were, as a solar system; this nodule divides itself from within outward, as the most beautiful differentiation of the shape, surrounds itself with *leaves*, which are preferably yellow, and in higher purity are white, and in which every *woody*¹ *line* and *frame*² is mingled in one; and no fibers are distinguishable as in common leaves; the
 5 nodules divide *themselves* into the different *opposition* of male and female, an opposition which is only formal and does not make itself the whole individual plant;³ because of this there are no male and female plants, the distinction between masculine and feminine is only a distinction of parts of the same plant, not the formation of two individuals; and the **monocists** and the **diocists** are only distinguished in these, their
 10 parts, and perhaps there are not even true diocists in that according to Blumenbach in most flowers⁴ one encounters not only the beginning of the male sex, but even male and female parts; with the latter division the ovary⁵ swims in the *combustible, in oil*, and the nectars are the sexless formations of this oil. The division of the oil in sexes *throws the ovaries* back together in the same way, the unfertilized middle comes to
 15 itself in its previous contact; it is *seed*, a gemma, which

¹*Tr. note:* or *ligneous*. The German word is "*holzige*."

²*Gerippe*

³einen Gegensatz, der nur formal ist, und nicht als ganzes Pflanzen Individuum sich macht.

⁴Blüthen

⁵*Tr. note:* In German, the word for ovary "*Fruchtknoten*" also means "seed vessel," or "fertile nodule."

[201] is become gemma out of the whole plant, and out of ideality; not a formal repetition, but one which divides itself in the opposition and has found itself out of this opposition.

5 *The Principle of fire which is thus borne out of this opposition*¹ had at first only inhibited the water process of the departing shape, which is opposed in earth and sky, *then it formed itself for itself*,² and posited *the former over and against itself*; but in such a way that this development of the sexes within the plant, which itself has the species within it, stands still, and this division only is as a moment of the fire
10 principle portraying itself in its ideal moments;³ this universal remains, but the whole universality of the plant is now opposed to the former shape, only as a universal in *the form of air, as the smell of the flower* portrays. But the unity of the plant which is thus born out of it *now turns* against the water process, realizes the smell in it, and gives it a real differentiation; the unity of the plant makes *something neutral, a salt*, out of the
15 ideal tension and undifferentiation of the vegetable water; and the unripe fruit which is argol salt⁴ turns into a nobler salt of sugar; until the unripe fruit has finally taken the latter neutrality completely back into the organic simplicity, and *becomes indissoluble*, and [is] as the *winey*⁵ of every fruit in that fire and water have absolutely organically united themselves. The

¹Tr. note: "*Das so ausgebohrne Feuerprincip.*" Because this refers to the "opposition" discussed in the last line of the preceding paragraph, I have translated it as "The principle of fire which is born out of this opposition," thus, "of this opposition" is interpolated.

²*dann sich für sich ausgebildet*

³aber so dass diese Entwicklung der Geschlechter innerhalb der Pflanze selbst stehen bleibt, die selbst Gattung, diese Entzweyung nur als ein Moment des sich in seinen ideellen Momenten darstellenden Feuerprincips an sich hat.

⁴Tr. note: "Weinsteinsalz, "which is cream of tartar, or potassium bitartrate in its crude form. It is often found in grape juice, and which forms a reddish or whitish crust-like deposit in wine casks. Hence, its German name.

⁵Tr. note: *weinigte*, which can be translated either as "winey, "or perhaps also as "potassiate." I have chosen "winey" because Hegel is emphasizing the connection between fermentation and organic life.

[202] individual plant, however, cannot drink this wine itself, the latter only offers this wine to nobler natures than the inorganic nature which is prepared for them; the plant would become an animal if this absolute unity of fire and water in the fruit were to go back into it itself, and its shape, which is only an external articulation, it would
 5 fall apart in an inner articulation; the former fruits into which they pass over remain only the abstractions of this unity, in which fire immediately posits a strong differentiation in water which becomes an inner articulation, which because of this likewise remains unity in the fluid universality; they fall away from the shape, which is not capable of taking them on, and the plant is again sunk back into the seed, its
 10 first stage, the process of mere shaping; as the plant is the process returned back in itself in the fruit, so in the seed it is the process returned back into itself as the shape;¹ in the seed itself it attains an inner articulation; so that the plant in itself is itself its infinite world; and decomposes into the opposite in itself; which [it] otherwise has outside of it; but as the plant has reached this stage, the seed ceases belonging to the
 15 individual plant and its processes, and the beginning life of the seed is the latter sublating of the seeds inwardness; of the seed's being opposed in itself, and in precisely this way the seed is directed against the element; in that the element is just as little an uninterrupted stream for the seed, in that the element makes an opposition, against which the element only preserves itself [through]

¹ Wie sie in der Frucht der Process in sich zurückgekehrt ist, so ist sie im Saamen als Gestalt

[203] reproduction.¹ The elements are within the plant according to the way the plant is; because the plant does not become within itself the unity of itself and inorganic nature, it is not itself absolutely taken back out of the process of the shape;² thus the plant also only has four senses: the simple one of the shape, that of fire in so far as it is realized in the earth; that of smell and of taste, it lacks the fifth, the sense of voice or of hearing; this absolute taking back into itself of infinity into itself is the being-sublated of organic nature as something external; the former senses, which it has step forth, therefore, only in the cycle; α) they are not absolutely simultaneous and likewise each as such lacks the nature of the voice itself, *i.e.*, they are only its determinate senses, in each the sense is lacking as sense, as an absolutely universal in its determinacy which implicitly infinite, remains universal in its particularity; the elements have only become senses in them as they come into the power of organic unity of the organic cycle, and not by themselves, the way in which in a mineral only one of the determinacies of its existence, for example, is a single determinate color, or in so far as they are themselves again determinate as simple, thus the organic unity³ has a free raised existence of formal universality; as color, the fire exists in the leaf as the synthetic green color, which passes over *out of the plant* itself into the yellow and out of the blue green into the pure green and then into yellow, the gravity is a striving towards lightness and a manifold

¹Indem es ebensowenig ist für ihn im ununterbrochenen Strom, ein Entgegensetzung macht, gegen das es sich nur [durch] Vervielfältigung erhält.

²Weil sie sich nicht an ihr selbst zur Einheit ihrer selbst und der unorganischen Natur wird sich nicht aus dem Prozesse der Gestalt absolut zuruknimmt

³sie

[204] of specific gravities, but it does [not] come so far as a contingent movement;¹ the warmth is a simultaneous multitude of specific gravities, not a constant sublation of them; the smell is only one of these as in the individuality which is raised out of the formal unity of the air, but it exists as such more freely than in a mineral where it
 5 must be frequently excited by rubbing or breathing on it, or above all only in the process, or it is itself a process - like smoking acid.² The neutral sense of taste does not exist as a salt and what is different from it,³ but rather as an organically subdued saltiness and it ceases to be neutral, and it has the nature of the combustible in it.

10 As the elements in the plant are not universally and in themselves absolutely particularized, so in the same way their shape is not particularized in itself, rather, it is in its articulation so like itself that, as is well known, *the gemmae grow into the leaves of trees*, so that when the plant is turned over and *its roots* are in the air, its branches can be stuck into the ground, and even as branches they grow⁴ as roots, such that the
 15 bark, even *without gemmae*, lets itself be grafted onto another tree, and shows the sprouting⁵ of the plant from which it is taken. For the sake of this simplicity, it does not particularly have to preserve itself as species. The *organic articulation* is thus, at the same time, no *individualization* of

¹aber sie kommt [nicht] bis zur zufälligen Bewegung

²Rauchende Säure

³die differenten der selben

⁴vegetieren

⁵Knospentreiben

[205] these members; the plant no more has to sublate itself as a single individual than it has to resume its articulation as the stepping apart of diverse entities.¹ The *propagation* ²through *roots* is almost more universal in the plant realm than propagation by seeds; (*seed propagation* is a luxury of nature in which it only
 5 intimates its higher differentiation in sexes;) in *cryptogamic plants*³ generally the genitals are believed to be infinitely small, as is the case with seeds and with a number of plants; but it has been shown with the palm, which bears the breadfruit that it indeed produces seeds, but none which is *capable of germinating*.⁴

The organic articulation is a succession of the elements which have become
 10 organic. But both the shape, and the process of the elements relate themselves completely to each other; both must occur in each other; the articulation of shape must in itself be an organically differentiated articulation, and the fruit of the plant, the fluid being one of the process of fire and water must only pour itself out, through what is mortified, as an external differentiating of wood possessing length, and the
 15 fixed must be fluid, and the fluid must have the implicit differentiation which is born out of it through fixity.⁵

This organic unity and complete organization is *the animal*; its

¹so wenig die Pflanze sich als einzelnes Individuum aufzuheben hat, so wenig hat sie auch ihre *Gliederung* als ein Auseinandertreten verschiedener.

²*Fortpflanzen*

³*Translator's note*: e.g., plants which bear no flowers but propagate by means of spores like algae, mosses and ferns.

⁴aber keine *Triebfähige Saamen* hervorbringe

⁵*At the bottom margin*: the simple lengthening of the plant is the propagation of the same.

[206] shape is absolutely organically articulated in itself, and is the opposite of the simple in the being in one¹ of the shape and of the organic process and of the different being in one; they step apart from each other in another way than in the plant; the simple Being In One² of the shape and of the organic process is itself an absolute
 5 organic process of the *process of the individual*; and in the differentiated being in one of the latter, the differentiated are themselves organic individuals and the simple being in one is their idea, they are in the process of the species. As individuals the universal of the species is subsumptive of the inorganic nature beneath it — as in the process of the species, it is reversed, and the individual vanishes into the universal.³

Through the fact that every moment of the organic process is itself taken up in the simplicity of the shape it is something universal, and in this universality it exists in the entirety of its dividedness; the relation to inorganic nature is not present at hand for the plant; it is not for itself what is opposed to it. This separation is first present at
 15 hand for the self existing infinity of the animal individual in itself; such that the division is in its universality, and it comes just as in the being-other of the organic individual, to be itself an opposition in the external to which it relates itself;⁴ it is ideal universality abstraction; it cuts itself off from the organic individual, and it exists as opposed to itself; the external becomes something reflected,⁵ existing for
 20 itself and manifold, and comes to the animal as the latter manifold; there the plant exists⁶ in an uninterrupted stream with its inorganic nature and the animal is likewise an uninterrupted stream in itself. The animal *senses*; the being-excited is a singularity within the latter; the animal immediately distinguishes itself from this singularity as universal; the latter singular immediately

¹in einsseyn

²In Einsseyn

³Als Individuen das allgemeine der Gattung, die unorganische Nature unter sich subsumierend — als im Prozesse der Gattung umgekehrt im Allgemeinen vergehend.

⁴und es kommt ebenso in das Andersseyn des Organischen Individuums, in das äussere worauf es sich bezieht, selbst ein gegensatz.

⁵in reflectiertes

⁶ist

[207] becomes something universally of an ideal nature; the sensation is a singular, or it is posited in its being as a being-sublated.

In the process of the individual the latter immediately sublates inorganic nature, in
 5 the process of the species the individual becomes sublated; through the reversal of the
 relationship the whole portrays itself; the unity of both, the reflection of the
 relationship's¹ being one is the *theoretical, ideal process*. In the same way the middle
 of sensation steps between the immediacy of the being one of the individual plant and
 of the species; the being of the species² of the animal is in the latter as desire and as
 10 its proper sensation; it senses itself and the other of its sex or *IT consists* in its being-
 other just as the other does; its being sublated in the species itself consists as desire,
 as not being sublated; precisely in this way as the not being sublated of the other, as
 intuition.

15 In this neutrality the element has become the proper sense;³ it is universal, ideal,
 and particularized therein; Where the blue is here color; the sensed is blue, it is not
 just this determination of the blue, for which nothing else is, rather it is posited as
 different, and with this at the same time as that which is sublated, as color in general;
 the sensation is in it itself, ideal destruction of the isolated external,

¹ihres

²Gattungseyn

³Sinne

[208] the not yet being destroyed of the latter, *desire*; and precisely the subsisting of the therein, proper sensation, intuition.¹

5 This ideality of the immediate being-sublated of singularity or of the simple relation of the opposites to each other [is] sensation as a system of the absolute character of the animal which forms itself for itself,

10 A. PROCESS OF ORGANIC SHAPING, OR OF THE INDIVIDUAL WHICH FORMS ITSELF TO TOTALITY

α) *Shape* in general is in its principle first singularity in general, and singularity related to the earth in the universal element of singularity; through the animal character of sensation this simple universality of the singular becomes [related to] the earth; *gravity* is interrupted and the singular steps over against the element of singularity at the same time;

¹und eben darin bestehen desselben, eigentliche Empfindung Anschauung

[209] the earth becomes a *formal universal* against the absolute simplicity of the singular; the singular *itself particularizes* the latter earth, it sublates the intuiting
 15 within which the individual body is immersed and in which it is thus a universal singular; the earth rises to the universality of being, in which the particular consists, the singular, however, is the negative universal of time against the earth, in this way the animal has *free*¹ movement;² it establishes itself³ as living time against the indifferently consisting earth, and it passes over into the earth whcih it itself has
 20 particularized.

¹ willkürliche

²Translator's note: The earth is universal being. The animal now stands opposed to it as the negative universal of time, which possesses free movement. As Hegel will remark in the next sentence, this means that the animal is the particularization of living time which is opposed to the universality of the indifferently living earth.

³ erweist sich

[210]

TOWARDS THE ORGANIC AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT

11.

B) THUS UNIVERSALLY SEPARATED FROM THE EARTH ...

b) Thus universally separated from the earth as the organic unity the animal is the universal mixing of all elements, the absolutely having flowed into one, a *gelatine*, in
 10 which nothing is distinguished; it is the sprout of life in the universal mixing,¹ it is
 penetrated by the absolute concept; but the absolute unity of the *gelatine* holds itself
 absolutely and inseparably together against the tension, which is brought into its
 fluidity through the absolute concept; the fluid is the absolute communicating of that,
 which according to its nature, as a being outside itself, is the positive universal in
 15 which the absolute concept realizes itself and has its simplicity existing in its absolute
 opposition; the absolute concept as absolutely one with this fluidity, the organic has
 inorganic nature just as absolutely in itself as it has it outside of itself. The plant
 cannot endure this fluidity in itself;

¹ in ihr

[211] in the seed the plant is such a being-one of the inner and the outer world, of the shape and of the fluid, of the universal and the absolute concept; the plant feeds, at first, on itself, it *consumes* its fluidity and thereby takes with it the possibility of all inner organization and the universally fluid is its external element; the fluid animal in contrast is as absolutely infinite in the latter its absolute being in itself, in the latter its fluidity absolutely outside itself, it swims in the universal element as its own inward element of animality. For the plant, the universal element of fluidity falls outside of the latter; the gelatine of the animal [is] the latter universal element as existing in the animal itself; it is like the plant which is raised in the universal element and its nourishment is an unparticularized stream, but this unparticularized stream of nourishment is in itself. Lower animal natures, which do not thus [belong] to the specialized elements of the earth, but rather to the formal universal external elements of air and water, are closer to plants therein; they are thus born in eggs like the plants; they swim as shaped in the universal external elements of water and air, and hence they are more capable, merely in the egg, of ascending to this nature of a world which is closed in itself which has the universal fluidity absolutely in the world's self;

[212] which the absolute animal in its formation¹ itself perfectly is.

γ. According to [one] side this *gellatine* is itself first this universal connection of the animal with the external elements; and it necessarily particularizes the latter
 5 therein, so that the animal altogether interrupts this stream of the elements through out its fluidity to all sides of its being, in that it leaves this gelatine as skin which remains the relation with the universal elements of water and air, it rises at the same time to the production of one of the latter opposed inner fluidities,² and through the mouth it itself posits the elements in a *particularizing* connection with the animal,
 10 wherein the latter particularizes the the elements³ and places itself thereby in the relation of a nourishing which is opposed to the former relation to the air and water in which the plant remains, in the relation of a nourishing which itself organically particularized has received the nature of the fiery principle in itself. The *skin* is the residue of the lower stages out of which the animal originates, the animal's
 15 belongingness to the whole of the elements as an external, and [the skin] maintains precisely the latter⁴ constantly, and takes no part in the particularization, the skin is the seat of fluidity, of the shape of the air and water process; the absolute form of fluidity in which the animal dissolves its nourishment; the universal connection, the element of animal organization.

¹ ausgebildetseyn

² einer dieser entgegengesetzten innern Flüssigkeit

³ dasselbe

⁴ Tr. note: e.g., the latter belongingness to the elements.

[213]

δ. The particularization of the connection with the element or the external
 production of it, so that the animal stands in relation with the particularized organic
 against *the element*, is in this way precisely an absolute particularization within *the*
 5 *gelatine itself*, and the absolute concept of the animal separates itself into the fixed as
 opposed to the fluid skin, of which the fixed has the opposition in it and cuts itself in
 itself in the absolutely brittle continuity of bone-formation; the one side of the
 opposition, (as radiating cores which have the character of the combustible, of the
 absolutely brittle, whose essence is the point which goes out of itself;¹) and in the
 10 other side of the opposition, *the neutral*, the externally decomposing, in the
 antagonism of the (flexor and tensor) muscles.

ε. The *bone*, as the side of brittleness proceeds from cores, out of as it were, a
 multiplication of the point of unity in the fluidity; in as much as it is in the organic,
 15 the bone itself becomes a system, and it represents² the shape of totality in the
 determinacy of its inflexibility; and it necessarily turns itself back into the opposed
 out of such originary determinacy in this organic formation; the point of the core
 radiates forth out of itself,³ passes over

¹ der aus sich ausgeht

²representirt

³strahlt aus sich heraus

[214] into the formation of the bodily line, and from there into the whole reversal to the bodily of the cylinder-form over into the spherical surrounding.¹ The single bone-core which becomes length rounds itself off towards the outside and particularized as complete length, it articulates itself into a manifold of such bone-lines;² the
 5 extremities are as such immediately adjusted to³ the *particularization* of the elementary earth and are themselves most particularized, and closest to the singulars of the core-form.⁴ The bones, out of the inversion of cores, have length within, and roundness without, they turn back [on themselves] as dorsal vertebrae; to the
 10 *unlocked* cavity open to the outside, and to the majority of remaining radiations, broken up but remaining core; within the chest the longer bones join together, and strive to portray a bodily envaulting,⁵ which the skull formation reaches in a more perfect way; they fall together inwardly, become planes, and from the concentration of *ossis spenoidei*⁶ at the same time the midpoint of the cranium itself arches⁷ this plane into the skull.

¹ kugligten Umschliessen

² Knochenlinien

³ auf... gerichtet

⁴ Kernform

⁵ Umwölbung

⁶ *translators note:* Hegel is referring to the sphenoidal (or wedge-shaped) compound bone, or bones, at the base of the skull (approximately under the temple).

⁷ wölbt

[215]

ζ. As within the organic gelatine, the bone system forms itself as a side of the
 brittleness, and similarly on the other side *the muscular system*, as the seat of the
 disintegrating¹ separation or the *neutrality*, but of the dissolved neutrality, — for the
 5 universality of the animal is the absolute actuality *of all possibility*; the muscular
 system² has the actual separation in its unity and must hold together the actually
 separate in its universality as neutral. The muscle first has this opposition within itself
 in general, in the contractility; in as much as when stimulated by something external
 the muscle contracts and then distends again; but it has the latter opposition which is
 10 here only an accidental condition, as *actual* in the doubling of *extending* and
 contracting muscles, the tensor and flexor muscles. The whole formation of the
 muscular system will again also exhibit the taking back of the opposition into one, it
 [takes itself] back in that the muscle shrinks into bands in its *width*,³ and in the
 mucilaginous sacs of the joints its difference preserves the fluidity.⁴

η. The latter inwardly formed system of shape in general, which decomposes into
 itself against externality is the *system of irritability*; the bone formation

¹aus einanderfallenden

²es

³in dem er in die Breite geht, in den Bändern zusammen

⁴und in den Schleimbeuteln der Gelenke erhält ihre Differenz sich die Flüssigkeit

[216] is the sensitive¹ side of the latter, the latter insofar as it relates itself to itself, and holds together the muscle-formation as the latter fixedness, or as the relating of itself to itself of the irritable system of the irritable; both within the enclosing skin; the system of irritability² itself however swims in itself in the universal *fluidity* of the enclosing in skin,³ of the lymphatic system, which has likewise become inner,

δ. The latter first inner system of shaping which differentiates itself into muscles and bones, and inner skin, is organic unification, the immediate simple system of the individual, its shaping is the organic unity in which [the individual] opposes an inorganic nature to itself and articulates itself in itself, as a totality of the system. The process of this inner shaping against the inorganic nature and the shaping itself fall together; in so far as the individual consumes the inorganic nature, it grows in its shape; or the former consumption is its production. The determinate form, as it consumes the inorganic nature, and is itself nourished on it, is such that through its inorganic nature it has particularized the latter against its universality, and so sublated its universality in itself, such that the individual does not transform [its universality] into particular animal moments, but into animal fluidity in general. The means of nourishment

¹sensible

²es

³Verhütung

[217] becomes the Lymph,¹ through which, as we can generally name it here, the organic infection transforms itself into lymph; (and as in arthropods²) and *other* animals, also larvae of insects which remain at this stage of shaping, the reproduction is not yet animal), this animal lymph is the *universal* reproduction of animal fluidity; 5 the latter is just as much a product of the animal in general as it is the universal of the animal, the fluidity, the gelatine, from which we have begun and which has now become here; the latter having become is the fluidity in which bones and muscles differentiate themselves, what joins them together in precisely this way; and that they use for their production, which they consume as that in which the absolutely organic 10 grows, that destroys inorganic nature, pulls it apart and holds it together;³ accordingly an inner cycle is posited,⁴ which transforms the animal fluidity into the differentiation of bones and muscles, is held together by the fluidity in the cycle's juxtaposition,⁵ and enlivened by this differentiation, the fluidity transforms the external into itself. The self-enclosed cycle of the enlivenedness meshes with⁶ nature, which passes into 15 the line of time as particularized, interrupts the necessity of its connection and destroys the particularity of nature again in the animal, in that it transforms the animal [into] the particularity's opposite in animal fluidity. The latter transformation in the tube which receives, the *task of assimilation*

¹*Translator's note:* a clear watery, often yellowish liquid circulating in the lymphatic system, or the clear liquid given off by inflamed body tissues.

²Schaltieren

³das sie vernichtet auseinander und zusammenhält

⁴*Tr. note:* "es ist somit ein innerer Kreislauf gesetzt," which could perhaps also be translated as "the latter having become is, accordingly, posited as an inner cycle"

⁵auseinanderseyen

⁶greift...ein

[218] can take no other course in its determinacy, than that the particularized inorganic which is at first sublated in its external shape, is mechanically made smaller, and then its inside worn down¹ through animal warmth and becomes fluidity in general which is then enlivened² by the animalized and the animal fire principle, 5 through which the particularized organic³ at last steps *wholly* into the animal identity. The universal substance of nourishment⁴ must be the last of the preceding potency which will be raised up⁵ to the following level and from the latter actually drawn over into the following potency.⁶

¹zernichtet

²belebt

³es

⁴Stoff der Ernährung

⁵sich emporgehoben

⁶*Translator's note:* e.g., from the preceding Potency it is drawn over into the the animal which is the next level

[219]

12.

ø. THE SHAPING OF THE ANIMAL ...

ø. The *shaping* of the animal, as it has been considered as a being, is likewise
 5 absolutely *a process*, a *producing which moves* itself against organic nature; and a
process in its self; the shaping is the cycle such that the organic one itself *tenses*
against inorganic nature which is the active against the latter, sublates inorganic
 nature, and with it, the shaping's opposition *and itself as* active, and *sinks the being-*
one of both into the nature of its *universality*, *becomes inward* in this process¹, and
 10 active against the universal as the being one's own of *its universality*,² differentiates
 the latter in the same way, so that the different the organic one itself, just as before it
 differentiated them *in themselves as a whole*, and *an external to itself*; the latter inner
 differentiation is precisely the growth into bones and muscles; and the *perfected*
differentiation, the being-sublated of the universal is once again the *having become of*
 15 *the whole into an active, singular* against *a universal*, which is an external, as
 inorganic nature.

α) the whole's³ relation to the inorganic nature is the relation to the latter as a
 universal, air and water, the skin, process, the relation to *particularization* and
 particularized nature is opposed to the latter process; the means of nourishment of the
 20 latter inorganic nature⁴ is opposed to the former process⁵ and is necessarily the last of
 the previous Potency, its highest intensification,⁶ in that the previous potency has
 raised itself up⁷ to the border of the animal, the complete undifferentiation of the air
 and water processes; the vinous fruit grown spirituous;⁸ this final product of the fruit
 falls in the plants beyond the opposition of the air and water processes themselves;
 25 the process of

¹ herein

² und gegen das Allgemeine als seine eignes seine Allgemeinheit thätig

³ seine

⁴ Tr. note: "der letzteren," inorganic nature is interpolated because the relationship between former and latter is unclear in the translation of the preceding sentence.

⁵ Tr. note: "jenem," or the process. Again, "process" is interpolated because the relationship between former and latter is unclear in the preceding sentence.

⁶ Steigerung

⁷ erhoben

⁸ Translator's note: e.g., the vinous fermented fruit. The German reads: die weinartig, geistig gewordene Frucht.

[220] the animal posits them in one; and itself produces *the latter's inner element, the animal lymph*; the gelatine, as that from which we proceed, is something which has grown from the animal itself. *The absolute of the transition of the means of nourishment* into animality is the simple infection of the the latter through *animal*
 5 *unity*. The consumption may be dissolved once more into so many successive changes of the means of nourishment into animality, that the absolute transition our of the consumption's determinacy remains in the animal. The gradualness of the change should likewise make such a transition more comprehensible, in that between the extremes there is thrust a quantity of of mediating members, the larger the better, *so*
 10 *that each of the extremes* is at first *posited* as present in the other in an *invisible and infinitely small way*, out of which it now steps forth, and does not first become, but rather was already *actual but latent* therein. But one extreme may be regarded in the other as still so *attenuated*, that it remains its extreme, and it remains always this same separation and the same necessity of the transition into the absolutely opposed,
 15 which is in infinity in the absolute concept. Thus insofar as it is opposed to the living animality, the means of nourishment becomes transformed only through the dominion¹ of the infinity in the animal; the *transition* is simple, immediate. The activity of the animal organism is not a *merely formal one* of the change of the mixing-relationship,² *etc.*, rather it is an essential change of the matter; for *as matter*
 20 the means of nourishment is itself nothing other than an organized determinacy; it is not the absolute matter of the means of nourishment, which the aether is, rather the means of nourishment becomes sublated as this determinacy; or it becomes posited as that of an ideal nature which it implicitly is. *The transformed activity* of the organism is *admittedly* [more] or less formal and indeed most formal when warm blood is
 25 drunk, or is decanted out of one man or animal into the veins of the other; but it is not yet digested by doing this, that is, not yet innerly *differentiated* again in the systems of the organism. The external immediate transformation of the means of nourishment presupposes an approach of the the latter to the organization

¹Gewalt

²Vermischungverhältnisses

[221] of the animal; or presupposes that the latter itself be an *organic particular*. Through the skin the animal stands, like the plant, in connection with the universal unparticularized organism, and is in process with the latter; but what in general is supposed to stay in living combination with the organism, must implicitly be
 5 something resolved;¹ and from the mineral realm only the salty, calcareous and sulphurous has an effect on the organism, the *metal* remains standing, as it were, in the *fluidity of the lymph*, and strengthens only its dominion over the whole organism. Thus are medicines distinguished from means of nourishment generally, in that they only fall into the universally fluid, and adhere there, and cannot become dissolved in
 10 the latter.

The activity of the organism towards its means of nourishment is externally therefore the animal infection of the means of nourishment in general, and transformation of it into animal fluidity. This simple essence of the process is
 15 *however, as a process at the same time itself distinguished into MOMENTS*; as made inner² not as if these moments were only excretions, *etc.*, of the nourishing material; rather, the universal of all alike is the transformation; the latter simple element³ of the transformation as such has its moments. *The task of assimilation* can take no other course than that the foodstuff first become sublated in its external shape, it
 20 experiences a mechanical dissolution, then dissolved through animal warmth in its specific inner nature, a moment of the chemical thus comes into the animal, is pulled into the animal neutrality, and then enlivened by the animal fire principle, both the foodstuff's saltiness and its fiery nature are posited in one absolutely, and thus steps into the identity of animal fluidity.

The latter particularization of the task of assimilation does not, however, belong any longer to the shaping, to the production as such; the task of assimilation is a meshing of the inner organism in the external; and the alleged moments are first real⁴ in the higher organism

¹*Next to this in the margin:* more resolved differentiation [aufgeschlossener Differenz]

²erinnert

³dieses einfache der Verwandlung

⁴real

[222]; the immediate external organism does not have the latter *inner articulation* of the fluidity of the lymph; the latter's inner articulation as a unity is precisely the reflection in the organism itself of its *going back into itself*; ¹ the organism only goes back into itself in as much as it makes itself into shape; or the fluidity having become
 5 animal is particularized in the articulation of the shape, and the becoming animal of fluidity is itself immediately this transition.

As such a transition the organism's activity of production is the immediate positing in one of the *form of animal* fluidity as the latter, as something particular ized from the nourishment belonging to the fire process, is posited in one with the air and
 10 water processes.² The opposition of this process is the *particularization* of the latter's activity and this particularization thus immediately has the character of something external; the latter one of drinking, of air and water processes and of eating composes the produced animal fluidity; through whose production the animal's³ tension against the external [is] sublated, and it has been posited in itself as one. This middle which
 15 the animal has become, is as such a simple animal fluidity, as a whole *the animal is this simple itself; its inner infinity is collapsed into it, one*; ⁴ the animal is immersed in digestion and sleep; a perfect activity against the means of nourishment, *in the perfection of which, however, even the active has consumed itself*. This enlivened falling into each other goes asunder in an inner tension; the animal fluidity becomes
 20 divided, not analyzed in this separation; out of which it arose, but rather, the animal fluidity remains inseparably one, and itself becomes the differentiation whose every side is the latter animal fluidity, it becomes *bone* and *muscle*; and the latter opposition which comes to be *in animals* comes to be its activity or the this, that it⁵ has the universally fluid outside of it, and *the desire* is again awakened in the animal.⁶
 25 The immediate with which the animal touches the means of nourishment is itself the fluidity which through the differentiation of itself, is enlivened and become active.

¹ist eben die Reflexion des Organismus in sich selbst des in sich zurückgehens

²Seine als eines solchen Tätigkeit der Production ist das unmittelbare in eins setzen der Form der animalischen Flüssigkeit wie sie als eine besondere, dem Feuerprocesse angehörige Nahrung, mit dem Luft und Wasserprocesse in eins zu setzen

³seine

⁴*Translator's note:* e.g., it is collapsed in it as one.

⁵Oder diß, daß es die allgemeine flüssige ausser sich hat

⁶*Translator's note:* Hegel is talking about the desire for food as the animals desire to attain the universally fluid which it lacks by consuming other animals outside of it.

[223]

13.

1. THIS ORGANIZATION WHICH WE HAVE RECOGNIZED ...

1. This organization which we have recognized, is the one¹ of the shape and its
 5 nourishment, the process is turned back on itself; in that the one of the organic
 fluidity particularizes the organic gelatine from an inorganic nature, sublates this in
 itself, and makes it into its fluidity, and out of this fluidity differentiates itself in
 muscles and bones through which even this fluidity is first the enlivened organic
 fluidity which in itself is the universal and absolute concept; as that in which the
 10 differentiation of shaping simultaneously is as fluid; and first as such can particularize
 and sublate nature.

But this cycle is a pure cycle of shape, the organic is not *for itself* of its own
 accord² therein; the animal does not exist³ as the absolute inhibition and interruption
 15 of its shaping;⁴ or [similarly] it does not exist⁵ as a *sentient* organism; that the
 organism should be the latter, the cycle of production must itself become something
 external or intuit this cycle as singular. The inorganic world must become this
 external organism itself for the animal;⁶ the animal must turn back into itself as
 species. This higher organism exists therefore as turned back in on itself

¹ Eins

² für sich selbst

³ ist nicht

⁴ Translator's note: it is not a static thing, but a process of circulation which is not yet complete.

⁵ ist

⁶ The inorganic world must for the same <e.g., the animal> become this external organism itself .

[224], as universal, and the organic whole itself grows as the unity of this outer and this inner only up to the animal self-relating organism that is truly enclosed in itself; and in that the organism's inorganic nature falls in the organism itself. In that the animal takes its externally related organism back in itself, it is thus α) this organic

5 system, that relates itself to its producing shaping organism as a simple active organism and comes here from the latter; but it realizes its absolute universality only thus in that the organic system β) likewise absolutely takes itself together, [it] fully isolates itself, becomes an absolutely universal system, and as an absolutely universal it falls asunder in the relation to the opposite, in two universal systems it comes in

10 the two arms out of the former middle system; once α) as the organic individual is the species for itself, as the organic individual's *individuality* remains as universal;¹ then β) as the the organic individual sublates its individuality into universality; the former as the synthesis of the universal and the particular as the disintegrating relation; the system of the animal senses

¹*Above the line:* Determinacy

[225] the latter as the absolute universality, the existence¹ of the *species*, as sex within which the individual is destroyed.

χ. The immediately self relating from the *system coming from outside*², or the rebirth of the first as the latter is penetrated through the self-same fluidity, is the
 5 *transformation* of the inflexible bones into the fluidity of the nerves; and of the different muscles in the venous system and α) the immediate *being one of both*; their absolute touching is the infinite middle, in which they are immediately one β) the positive middle in which they realize themselves, which separates them and holds them apart,³ the fluidity in which they posit their differentiation against each other
 10 and reciprocally produce each other.

We consider α) what both moments of the external self-shaping organism themselves become in this reflection in the element of universality; doubled relation to the external organism within the latter itself; and the being other of the organism's
 15 self, as intuiting its own organism, and thus an inner being, *i.e.*, to be the reflected external organism; for which this first organism of the shaping is inorganic nature.

In this way what the inorganic world has in itself is first absolutely animal organism, not merely as fluidity, rather as fluidity articulated in itself and as a part of
 20 itself.

λ. *The bone* itself as self-enclosed fluidly, in that it only belongs to the pure shape, unfolds itself as dorsal vertebrae and skull, and in that it is itself

¹Existenz

²Das unmittelbar aus dem *äusseren kommende System* sich darauf beziehend

³die sie trennende auseinanderhaltene positive Mitte, in der sie sich realisieren

[226] reflected in itself as this rigid totality, [the bone] raises itself into the form of *universality*, and it steps out of its universal, *absolutely fluid side*, and its marrow *becomes nerve*; as the absolute becoming one of the brittle and of the fluidity of the absolute universality of everything particular, the bone becomes what absolutely
 5 communicates the universal, or the sentient;¹ just as on the other side likewise the *active universal* which particularizes the sentient;² inorganic nature first becomes particularized through [the] nerve, and whether the animal recognizes itself as particular, or it recognizes itself suffering, thus the nerve is the absolute activity of particularization as such; *as universal activity* that posits the particular³ the activity⁴
 10 appears as choice,⁵ chance, the nerve is the seat of free movement, as it is that of sensations. The nerve relates itself in both respects to the external self-shaping organism. As the universally fluid, in which the destructive activity of the external organism is inhibited, becomes posited of an ideal nature; that which is to be sublated through the nerve, that consists in the universally fluid positive element, is itself
 15 posited in the nerve's having become-sublated, the nerve is *sentient*; in the same way the nerve reflects the external organism towards the outside; it posits the universal element, the universal of inorganic nature as a particular; and through this the activities of the external organism against inorganic nature appear as choice.

¹er wird als absolutes Einswerden des Spröden und der Flüssigkeit absolute Allgemeinheit alles
 besonders, zu dem was absolut, das besondere mittheilt oder das empfindende

²es

³Als *Thätigkeit* Allgemeines das Besonderes setzt

⁴sie

⁵als *Thätigkeit* Allgemeines das Besonderes setzt erscheint sie als Willkuhr

[227]

The nerve's relation to the external organism is both passive and active insofar as the latter generally relates itself to something external; the nerve comports itself in the organism, therefore not to the bones as such, but rather to the side of the opposite, to
 5 the muscles as living unity against the passive death of the bones, the nerve realizes the inner differentiation of its being-fluid in the muscles which are opposed in themselves.¹ The nerve is the absolute universal, the *undecomposable* fluidity, in which the particular as such is posited, and in which it is absolutely sublated, becomes forgotten, fades away; because of this the nerve has nothing more to do with
 10 the reproduction of the muscles; it is a not to be *differentiated fluidity*.

The nerve relates itself to the reproduction of the external organism. As the nerve's previous relation was the enlivened differentiating sentient and moving, a relation to the different muscles, so this is the side of the undifferentiation of its
 15 relation, and in the latter the nerve is not the latter unity in the choice, rather, it is itself immersed in this unity, and it runs in the latter for that reason not as a quantity of threads as it relates itself to the muscles, but rather without a different form, an abstract expression of *indecomponible* fluidity; in the *fluidity* the nerve is as

¹in dem in sich selbst entgegengesetzten Muskel

[228] a multitude of nodules, an uninterrupted communication; subsumed under the fluidity instead of subsuming the latter; the nerve's absolute in itself different unity becomes a multitude of cores, which often become cartilaginous or bony cores; the *sympathetic nerve* is not to be seen [as] a nerve going out from the brain, but rather as
 5 such a quantity of nodules, which only lightly anastomose¹ with the brain nerves, and in which the spinal cord makes the transition to the reproductive brain, whose plexus² is not a merely inner forced connectedness of nerve fibers, but rather a core become completely simple.

10 μ. The *muscular system*, that turns back into itself through the absolute fluidity, preserves the form of undifferentiation, it becomes the venous system, and the external differentiation of the muscle, in part as contractility, in part as a doubling of the tensor and flexor muscles, becomes a unity in the subsisting of the opposition, a unity of the absolute cycle which turns back into itself through persistent opposition.³
 15 In the *heart*, the *muscle* comes to its own absolute life of contraction and expansion, it is absolutely without nerves, without sensation, without positive universality, but rather absolute infinity in itself, absolutely self-opposed movement coming out of itself. The changing absolute movement in the fixed heart muscle itself becomes fluid in the blood, and in this fluidity,

¹Translator's note: to form a cross connection between separate parts of a branching system.

²Translator's note: a plexus is an arrangement of blood vessels, lymphatic vessels, nerves, etc.

³ eine durch bestehende Entgegensetzung in sich zurückkehrende Einheit absoluter Kreislauf

[229] in this universality the movement becomes a simultaneity of the opposed movement or an absolute circulation¹ of the blood.

v. As the nerve is the existing sensation² as the absolute concept in the form of
 5 universality ; immediately communicating the particularization, immediately positing
 the latter as of an ideal nature; the resolved brittleness of the bones which, however,
 in principle remains their simplicity, is thus the blood system of the absolute concept
 in the form of the differentiation of the muscles collected into one, but so that the
 nerve precisely remains in the principle of subsisting differentiation. The nerve
 10 comports itself to the differentiation of the external organism, to the muscle; the
 blood comports itself in the opposite way to the side of the organism's self-reflecting
 fluidity in the blood,³ to the produced and producing fluidity. And the blood as the
 side of the differentiation of the inner system makes the absolute connection (the
 point of infinity) of the outer and [inner] systems; the blood exists as the enlivening
 15 of the external fluidity; *i.e.*, as the living activity of the latter according to the two
 sides, such that the the latter⁴ feeds the bones and muscles, in that the absolute
 opposition realizes itself in its sides, in such a way that they once again revert back⁵
 into fluidity;

20 The blood is only for itself of its own accord in the heart; in the blood's opposed
 cycle, it is completely different towards the outside; as fluidity which produces itself
 in the process, and exhibits itself as the universal of the organism, the latter thus
 consumes the different sides of the shaped organism as it consumes the different
 inorganic nature, the organism itself becomes this inorganic nature; the fluidity
 25 consumes the muscle; and on the opposed side it differentiates itself in the latter, and
 feeds the latter; the blood⁶

¹Kraislauff

²Empfindung

³seiner in ihm sich reflectierenden Flüssigkeit

⁴*Tr. note:* "sie," *e.g.*, the external fluidity

⁵zurückfallen

⁶es

[230] suckles all fluidity of the parts itself, and the immediate fluidity of the food¹ in itself, and on the other side it likewise consumes itself in them. The circulation of the blood is a more universal, more real circulation² of the whole shaped organism; it is the active absolute concept which its liveliness has in the whole organism, and which
 5 is in the organism in the absolutely opposed way; the lymph of the production is the middle of the organism in which inorganic nature changes over into the animal, within which the inner differentiation of the organism thus precisely posits itself, as that in which the inner difference sublates itself; in the lymph as such this inner double movement does not exist, it is only the moment of the middle as the
 10 undifferentiation to which all struggle and activity of the organism comports itself; to subdue the lymph's undifferentiation and to potentiate the lymph in nerve and blood, or bones and muscles, [or] to absolutely revert into the lymph out of its differentiation; as the lymph is active against the organism and through this becomes active outward. The latter opposed movement of the lymph, of the passivity, and of
 15 the activity of the lymph, is real in the blood; the movement³ is the same, in so far as it is enlivened and enlivening, the lymph as such remains the indifferent fluidity in which the organic vacillates⁴ between the organic and the inorganic, the immediate transition to the product, and the producing out of the inorganic product.

¹NährungsFlüssigkeit

²ein allgemeiner realer

³sie

⁴schwankt

[231]

The blood as it gives itself as consumed in its opposition in the same way, is the enlivened lymph, which becomes different organic parts, and which equally well¹ pulls them back into the undifferentiation of the lymph, is in this way itself fluid in its
 5 two opposed functions, universally and everywhere diffused in the organism, and the latter's two opposed functions accompany it immediately, they do not step forth as these opposites; they must, however, also exist as such and step forth in their own opposed systems, which the blood itself forms. This doubled opposed activity of the blood appears as its own system,² in that the circulation roots itself according to two
 10 sides in the air, and in the earth; α) against the element of the air the circulation breathes out and in; what the reproduction; of the earth and of the water wins away³ for the organism, the blood consumes on the one side in the organism in general for the pure differentiation, on the other side it consumes as in a point of unity in the lungs, the oedema.⁴ As the consumption of the lymph in the universal organism is a
 15 real differentiation, so the consumption is the opposite in the lung, as it were, in a way that is of an ideal nature;⁵ out of the predominant parts of the consumed venous blood, the animal blood becomes transformed in the lungs and arteries into different enlivening blood; and what was heretofore universally said of the lymph becoming different through the blood, has its reality in the lungs wherein it becomes

¹ebensowohl

²tritt als eignes System auf

³abgewinnt

⁴*Translator's note:* Oedema, also edema - is an abnormal accumulation of watery fluid in the tissues or cavities of the body, often causing visible swelling; dropsy.

⁵auf einer ideelle Weise

[232] dissolved and broken down¹ blood, which can immediately become different organic parts. As on this side the circulating blood itself becomes different blood in the air,² so the blood roots itself on the other side in the blood's³ earth, its inner differentiation becomes more compressed, and in the portal vein system produces
 5 blood for itself as the combustible side of the lymph of the gall which is active in the external organism; and it thus gives the most powerful moment of the consumption a means of nourishment through the lymph, which for itself of its own accord attains in the glands an inert inner system from the universal enlivening through the blood; and preserves itself in the in and exhaling vessels in general as the indifferent fluidity of
 10 all parts; particularly, however, in the production of the side opposed to the gall, the inner moment of the consumption of the means of nourishment, which constitutes the active moment coming from within of the neutral side.

o The blood system splits reproduction into all parts in this way, on one side
 15 differentiating the fluidity in the lungs, in order to become organic parts, and on the other enlivening the fluidity to activity against the means of nourishment in the liver; maintaining the fluidity in the universal as indifferent animal lymph.

π. Thus related to the self shaping organism and realizing its inner life,

¹aufgeschlossenes

²sich an der Luft zu differentem Blute wird

³seine

[233], the latter animal nerve and muscle system *finally frees itself* from this connection to the external. The individual is perfected in the reciprocal action of the two organisms, the latter must itself become universal; and the inner organism which does not exist as more universal in its relation to the external organism must
 5 implicitly exist as freer, more universal. The inner organism in that it relates itself to the external organism as nerve is a) generally sentient; not reflected into itself; not the sensation articulated in itself. Insofar as the inner organism relates itself to the external organism *AS BLOOD*, it is the movement of the self–sublating and self–producing individuality; this *movement* is just as little still the sublating of
 10 individuality as a whole reflected in itself for itself *of its own accord* and the production *of the latter again as a whole*; the former sublating and producing again¹ is purely *isolated*, is not a *universal motion* taken back into itself constituting itself for itself.² Both relations of the inner organism must become universal constituting themselves for themselves;³ the ideal movement of sensation in that the singular itself
 15 immediately becomes another; and the real movement of individuality, in which the whole individuality itself becomes another. In the former ideal movement individuality is the universal in which singularity is for the individual, which is sublating and posited as something sublating for the individual; and this positing of singularity as something

¹ WiederErzeugen

² für sich sich constituierende

³ für sich sich constituierende

[234] sublated; or the consisting itself of what is sublated is as totality, as sensation organizing itself in itself.¹ In the other movement, in the reverse way, the individuality of a singular becomes sublated, and posited as what is sublated or it is the process of the species as such. These two opposed forms of universality
 5 immediately connect to each other; in that in the first the individual is universal, and the singular subsumes under the latter, the individual is universal, or in that it is sensation it is universal, and in the latter universality it sublates itself as individual, it becomes the species. From the *side of the external* there likewise appears this absolute transition to the opposed; that which is singular for sensation becomes
 10 posited as something sublated of an ideal nature; as the latter identity of the singularity and the universality of being in its being-sublated the individual² becomes the organic itself; and for the sentient animal its *whole sensation becomes something external*; the individual is itself as sentient, or the ideality of sensation, that to which it comports itself, it itself transforms the sentient immediately into sexual difference.³
 15 In that as *sentient* the individual is the species, it is both, the infinity of the *BEING* of the individual as species, or so that *THE INDIVIDUAL* is sensation, and the external is a sensed singular and in the same way the reverse, so that the individual is the singular and the universal is the sensation of an external for the latter.⁴

20 p. In this process of sensation or the *theoretical process*, the nerve

¹sich in sich selbst organisierende Empfindung

²es

³wandelt sich dem empfindenden unmittelbar in Geschlechtsdifferenz um

⁴In dem es als *empfindend* Gattung ist, ist beydes, die Unendlichkeit des *SEYNS* des Individuums als Gattung, oder daß *ES* die Empfindung ist, und das äussere ein empfundnes einzelnes und umgekehrt ebenso, daß es das Einzelne und das allgemeine die empfindung ein äusseres für dasselbe ist

[235] becomes the ruling, as in the inner organism, which is different from the external, in that the blood is the side of differentiation,¹ and the absolute concept preserves its perfect formation, thus now the nerve exists² as the universally communicating, the subsuming under itself of the absolute concept. The nerve gathers
 5 together its expansion into the different system in the brain and unifies its totality, as well as sensation as such, as sentient therein, as free movement and spreads [itself] out, for the articulated sensation which is itself reflected into itself, into its own sensory-nerves, against the universal motor-nerves.³

10 In that the nerve becomes the ruling of the latter organism; thus the nerve sublates the particularization which is posited in the organism of the real process in the muscle [and] bone,⁴ [gathers the particularization⁵] together into the simplicity of the *skin*; and in that the nerve articulates the universal of sensation the simplicity of the skin grows into *SENSE*; the latter is *✱ sensing* in general, ideal *fluidity* and relates itself as
 15 such to *shape* in general; and [the latter] is the sensed element of earth.

For the earth, however, or for the shape as such, the movement of its ideality falls outside of it, and the feeling as universal sensing relates itself to the universal being for itself of the shaped; the moments are the self-sameness with itself⁶ in the
 20 particularization which comports itself to them, gravity, and *gravity* of the single body reciprocally,⁷ in the determinate particularization of the single body, and the universal

¹ der different auf den äussern ist die Seite der Differenz das Blut

² ist

³ als der willkürlichen Bewegung und breitet [sich] für die sich in sich reflectirende gegliederte Empfindung in eignen Sinnesnerven, gegen die allgemeinen Bewegungsnerven aus

⁴ in diesem

⁵ sie

⁶ sichselbstgleichheit

⁷ gegeneinander

[236] fluid sublating of the latter, *warmth* and *cold*. As the latter sense is universal for the universal shape, this universal sense is likewise a sense of the whole *shape* of the animal. Whereupon¹ as universal sense the sense² is at the same time sense in every particular sense; the other senses make the the universal sensing³ into thinking,⁴ such
 5 that the senses are the latter universal sense in their particularization. But the senses' universal sensing is also related to the particularity of their sensing, the universal sensing is different from the latter, and sublates the latter as something particular; 2. the universal feeling which thus comports itself to the shaped matter, or as the universal feeling is the tone in the fluidity expandend in all directions, stands over
 10 and against universal feeling's opposite, the existence⁵ of the tone, as the tone's simple, pure existence remains an abstraction;⁶ as the tone is wholly free of this being-immersed; and is the *entire ideal nature* of the shape, the abstraction of the line, plane and point; and the latter as related to time, in the movement, and likewise to the entire spaceless and timeless being-simple of the tone. The *face* has nothing [to
 15 do] with the bodily as such, with its pure ideality, *i.e.*, as *outer* shape of movement and color, and with the absolute concept in its abstraction as time, which relates itself to space. In the face the animal is pressed to the last abstraction of nature possible for it. The face is light and space, line and plane for the animal; and movement, but the face remains time itself as such, in that [otherwise]

¹Alsdenn

²er

³es

⁴*Tr. note:* "Sinnen," "is both the plural of "Sinne," or "sense" and the gerund form of the verb "sinnen," which means to think .

⁵Existenz

⁶Dem allgemeinen Gefühl das sich so auf die gestaltete Materie bezieht, oder wie es der Ton in die Flüssigkeit nach allen Dimensionen verbreitet ist, steht sein Gegentheil der Existenz des Tones gegenüber wie er als seine einfache, rein, eine Abstraction bleibt

[237] time would be something externally intuited for the animal, time is the higher side, the face would be infinity as such, which the animal intuited, or it would become representative.¹

5 1. The disintegrating² real and ideal side of the shape, which belong in their moments to feeling and face, collapsing into one³ organized in their being-one; and related to the air as these organizations or individualities of the earth and its particularity in these universal elements of the air itself as exhibiting something completely simple;⁴ becomes the sense of the combustible, of the simplified
10 individualities; *Smell* comports itself to the particularized earth as something *simple* in its organization, color is only the abstraction of *simplicity*, as *tone*, the *principle* of organization, not the organization's individualization as simple, which its developed *differentiation* consumes in itself as fire, and which portrays its totality as this simplicity.

15

 7. the sense for the neutral, the smell which unlocks itself in it⁵ and the element of water which steps out of its neutrality, is *taste*, which takes the abstraction of the potassiate⁶ and the [acidic] together into the undifferentiation of the salty, and opposes the sweet to the salty, and as the synthesis of both forms the bitter;
20 furthermore, in that the differentiations of these tastes,

¹Tr. note: as the personal pronoun "es" can refer to either "das Gesicht," or "das Thier," this is passage is extraordinarily difficult to translate. I can do no better than to cite the whole passage in the original: "Das *Gesicht* hat es mit nichts körperlichem als solchem, mit seiner reinen Idealität d.i. als *äusserer* Gestalt, und mit dem absoluten Begriffe in seiner Abstraction als Zeit, die sich auf Raum bezieht, der Bewegung und Farbe [zu tun]. Im Gesicht ist das Thier bis zur letzten ihm möglichen Abstraction der Natur gedrungen. Es ist Licht und Raum, Linie und Fläche für dasselbe; und Bewegung; aber es bleibt die Zeit selbst als solche, indem ihm [sonst] die Zeit ein äusserliches angeschauten würde, die Zeit ist die höhere Seite, es wäre die Unendlichkeit als solche, die es anschaut, oder es würde vorstellend."

²auseinanderfallende

³in eins zusammenfallend

⁴ein ganz einfaches darstellend

⁵den sich in ihm selbst aufschliessenden Geruch

⁶kalischen

[238] having passed through the organic, which is itself more or less undifferentiated, fall together with the smells, and are only formally distinguished as senses, so that smell takes on the latter¹ as indifferent, whereas taste destroys it.

- 5 7. The universal sense, the feeling, which universally implicitly falls asunder in the indifferent senses of feeling and face,² and divides itself into [the] different senses of smell and taste, the universal in the particular, must, as absolute negative universality, posit itself, as absolutely sublating the latter particularity and itself as withdrawing out of it [as] something universal, pure simple positing; every sense as
10 such is a sense through the fact that it is a feeling of universal sense, which sublates its particularity in the universal of sensing,³ the latter negative side of sense must exist as such; step out over and against the positive universal sense of feeling; the *sense of tone* as one such feeling is *the latter simple* infinity which the animal opposes to the latter simple infinity to all particularity of the senses, so that the animal
15 is universal sense, and raises its singularity as such into the air in the voice, and undimmed and unbroken, makes its singularity universal and absolutely communicates it; just as in hearing the animal receives precisely this communication. *The tone of continuity* of the earthly body is only noise and ringing,⁴ *noise* insofar as the tone expresses only the immediate external, forced continuity of the friction,⁵ and
20 *ringing* insofar as the tone expresses its inner continuity as pre-eminently metal;⁶ but for both, the sound⁷ itself is only excited when externally struck, they are a mechanical reverberation⁸ of the body in itself

¹Tr. note: e.g., the sense of smell indifferently takes on the smell it senses because it does not destroy what it smells the way that the sense of taste destroys what it tastes.

²Der allgemeine Sinn, das Gefühl, das allgemein in ihm selbst in die indifferenten Sinne Gefühl und Gesicht auseinanderfällt

³Empfindens

⁴Gerausch und Klang

⁵Reibung

⁶wie vorzüglich das Metall

⁷Klang

⁸Erhallen

[239] as a simple unity, they are not the sense, which expresses the absolute being for itself of movement as an absolute simple, and likewise is indifferent against the as being-for-itself and as simple appearing movement. The voice as the active hearing, the hearing as the receiving voice are that wherein the sensation of the individual
 5 takes itself back into itself, and constitutes itself as absolutely universal.

σ. in this *theoretical process* the individual makes its individuality into the universal, it posits itself as universal, or the species is in the form of individuality, and what thus posits itself as universal is the articulated sensation in itself of the system of
 10 the totality of sensations, which as universal sensation in sight, makes them formally and universally of an ideal nature;¹ makes them in taste and smell into the sides of combustibility and neutrality of the simply posited, and resolved infinity, and in hearing and voice posits itself [as] simple self-moving infinity in itself.

15 In that in the voice the singular absolutely returns into itself, the individual expresses itself as absolutely universal thus the latter is its reversion² of the individual's whole individuality, its immediately becoming other of its own accord as this whole; its simple voice fractures itself,³ and the individual steps into sexual difference. In the voice species and individual, universality and infinity fall into one,

¹die als allgemeine Empfindung im Sehen, sie formal allgemein ideell macht

²*Translators note:* Zurückgehen. "Abatement" is another possible translation. This word is difficult to translate for he is playing on its opposing senses. What is at issue is both a cancellation or abatement, as well as a falling back, or a reversion, or even a withdrawal.

³bricht sich

[240] and in this absolutely reflected unity of Individuality, the individual is itself become an external as a complete individual; sensation has turned back into itself of its own accord, and is a sensation of itself or the latter is decomposed into itself; and this whole that sensation is has doubled itself, and is different from itself in this doubling. The final perfection of the organic is that it collapses individual and species into one, as it does in the plant; but the multiplication of individuals is not an indifferent plurality, but rather a different one.

[241]

14.

THE IDEAL PROCESS OR THE PROCESS OF SENSATION ...

5 the ideal process or the process of sensation forms itself for itself in the same way, as the latter is in *the two processes* of the animal, the process of the individual and the process of the species and likewise the process holds them apart as it determines them, as it is in them, as it steps into opposition with them¹ in differentiation, in that it *rules the animal*, lets the animal grow entirely into sensation, is sickness.²

In general the ideal process or the process of sensation³ determines α) the process of individuality; the nourishing; αα sensation steps as a middle term between the practical immediacy of inorganic nature's becoming-sublated by organic nature, which inhibits the latter becoming-sublated;⁴ and the organic becomes posited as
 15 something of an ideal nature which is destructive,⁵ just like the inorganic. The organic which thus stays itself in the destroying, subsists in its tension, and thus as the organic is simultaneously this tension as organically inorganic, or such that what is to be destroyed is in the organic but as something still subsisting; the organic is desire; the latter is sensation as something universal and the animal is the latter universal; in
 20 itself the animal is both, the animal as active organic and the inorganic which is to be destroyed; it is nothing as an external; but rather the latter separation is in *the animal itself*; it is α) the *destructive*, and the *destroyed* itself is something other than the animal; β) but this entire relationship of *this separated* relation falls into the latter, the animal is the universal

¹Next to this in the margin: indifferent system blood of the animal

²Next to this in the margin: sickness makes the transition to reason

³α

⁴Next to this in the margin: a subsisting

⁵als ein vernichtendes ideell gesetzt

[242], as desire itself it is the relation of tension.¹ BB. *the opposed, the inorganic*, is determined through sensation in the same manner; stayed in the immediacy of being destroyed, for the animal the opposed² becomes the universal of something opposed, it is a particular. For the sensation of the animal α) the element is opposed and
 5 something particularized³ in itself;⁴ the element preserves its universal existence in the animal;⁵ for the animal the life-stream is something absolutely broken up, the animal articulates the stream into itself,⁶ the animal's destroying of the inorganic is a succession to the isolating [of the] inorganic.

γγ. in the animal, on the other side, the latter, its desire, is a singular, just as the
 10 stilling of desire in enjoyment, and the succession therein, as well as the destruction inhibiting intuition, are likewise singular;⁷ sensations and enjoyments which disappear in the animal, and are singular in their being, *i.e.*, posited as universal; as posited only as sublated. In the animal the absolute autonomy, the heaviness of the earth, is first become the absolute other of itself; become the abstraction of existing
 15 time. In the organic in general, in the plant there exists a being collapsed into each other of the two movements, the one [which] relates itself to itself and the one which relates itself to another; and in their indifferenciation, in that they [become] one, is the movement in general; in the animal this movement begins to be of an ideal nature towards itself, and to dissect itself in the moments of the movement's concept; this
 20 movement exists in the animal as time;⁸ it is something particular for the animal,⁹ the point of reflection, which sublates itself again in its being, and the animal is this sublating and flowing into itself determinate point, which remains the same with itself in its flowing into itself. In man time itself becomes the particular sublated, and the latter point¹⁰ becomes absolutely existing space.

25 *Β as sensation determines the process* of individuality, in the same way the latter

¹es ist das allgemeine, als Begierde selbst die Beziehung der Spannung

²es

³ein besonderes

⁴*Next to this in the margin:* an other, as that which is to be destroyed

⁵das Element erhält in ihm seine allgemeine Existenz

⁶für das Thier ist der Lebensstrom ein absolute gebrochener, es gliedert ihn, in ihm selbst, sein Vernichten des unorganischen ist eine Succession auf das vereinzeln [des] unorganischen.

⁷am Thier auf der anderen Seite, ist diese seine Begierde, so wie die Stille der derselben der Genuss, und die Succession darin, so wie das die Vernichtung hemmende Anschauung, ebenso ein einzelnes

⁸*Next to this in the margin:* does not become master of time

⁹Es ist für das Thier ein besonderes

¹⁰er

[243] determines the character of the process of the species; sensation is itself generally the latter, such that the organic individual is implicitly the species; by this means then the process of the species is generally a decomposition into two individuals.¹ But for sensation as such the individuality is itself as universal, and for
 5 the individual its becoming-sublated likewise comes in the species under the potency of sensation; sensation becomes in precisely this way a middle between the immediacy of the individual's becoming sublated in the species; a middle which falls in the individual itself; the relationship has at first generally the universal form of desire; so that the individual's being sublated is inhibited² and the latter's being and
 10 its being sublated are simultaneously in the individual and held apart. But by portraying the individual's being to itself as species as the satisfied desire that it has become the species, it exhibits its being as species as other than it is; in the realization of the offspring³ the animal has itself become species, and, in the species its being-destroyed inhibits itself of its own accord and sets itself over and against the species
 15 which has thus become. The latter, so that for the animal the species becomes something external in the offspring, so that the animal distinguishes itself from the species, this becoming external of universality is the highest form of reasonableness⁴ of which the animal is capable; the animal is related therein to the species itself as to a singular. In that [the animal⁵] relates itself to the species not as to a singular but
 20 rather as to a universal and, in relation to singularity, [as] divided in itself, in that the animal lives in herds, and communally searches for food, just as it lives communally; the animal has the portrayal of a higher relation to the species, but this universal is here nothing more than a multitude of singulars; the latter universal is not a universal simple as such;⁶ with the latter, so that the universal as such exists with the immediate
 25 becoming-transformed of singularity in simple universality, the organic steps over into reason.

γ. This middle, which inhibits the immediate collapse into one of the opposition, and which holds both together in the opposition as juxtaposed, is sensation as the latter is the universal

¹ein Zerfallen an zwey Individuen

²*Next to this on the border*: Gives a subsistence

³im erkennen des Kinds

⁴Vernunftigkeit

⁵es

⁶sie ist nicht ein allgemeines einfaches als solches

[244] of the process of the species and of individuality, thus it is also for [itself], and develops itself as its own system, as system of senses, a universal system, that relates itself to sexual difference, over and against the moment of the organic system; the system remains thus in the animal a system as a moment of the whole,¹ that remains
 5 under the rule of the numerical one, or as time; the system does not fall together with what is species to the animal and is as a system existing for itself, one which is indifferent to the animal process, which does not rule the species,² dissolving into itself of its own accord;³ in that the system raises the animal thereto within itself, such that its universal fixes itself against its differentiation, that its universal is for itself,
 10 and does not fall together with its differentiation, thus the sickness is posited in which the animal wants to go beyond itself; in that the animal can organize the universal for itself, unrelated to the animal process, or as the animal strives to fix⁴ the non-universal of animal life, it goes over into its death.

¹ Es bleibt so am Thiere, ein System als Moment des Ganzen

² nicht sie beherrschendes

³ in sich selbst auflösendes

⁴ *Tr. note:* fixieren; one might also translate this as "establish"

[245] Fragment 15

15.

The Organism Has Thus ...

- 15 τ. the organism has thus perfected itself in this way, such that out of the process of shaping¹ it withdraws itself into the inner organism; which is itself something different that is related to the external;²

For the external organism the individuality is generally outside of itself, and the organism's inorganic nature which is opposed to the former is an other than itself.

- 20 The external organism becomes to itself a more inner organism;³The external organism posits its inorganic nature as itself, in that the external organism produces its universal animal undifferentiation⁴ the animal fluidity. In this becoming one of itself,⁵ the external organism becomes an inner system to itself; it reflects itself as an organism in itself, and its reflection in itself is the articulation of the inner system.
- 25 The latter middle system, liberates itself from this relation and⁶ makes itself into a theoretical universal process in the system of the senses; sensation realizes [itself] in the plurality of the senses and turns back into itself in the voice, and the individual becomes this absolute turning back of its voice as a whole that sentiently is in an other.⁷ The latter whole, its object, its inorganic nature to which it relates itself, which
- 30 it consumes, is animalized inorganic nature; the lymph

¹Gestaltungsprozesse

²der selbst ein differenter auf den äusseren bezogener ist

³Der äussere Organismus wird sich ein innerer

⁴Tr. note: Indifferenz, following Petry.

⁵in diesem sich Einswerden

⁶Translator's note: the conjunction "and" is added for clarity.

⁷Die empfindung realisirt [sich] in der Vielheit der Sinne und kehrt in der Stimme in sich selbst zurück, und das Individuum wird dieses absolute Zurückkehren seiner als eines Ganzen das empfindende, in ein andres.

[246] of reproduction, the fluidity in which the individual¹ realizes itself in which it articulates itself, differentiating [itself] in itself.² With this fluidity the inward system lies in conflict and posits the cohesion of its differentiation, in universal theoretical nourishment, particularization of the lymph in all moments of the animal system. In
 5 that the lymph becomes the fluidity of every particular organ, it has [become], like the senses, the ideal universal to the real universal in the particular. In that the fluid in the higher nervous system frees itself from this real being in the particular, and becomes absolutely universal, in that the particular is only as something sublated, the fluid³ is a theoretical system.

10 The whole organism which has thus articulated itself, and is this trinity of systems, is thus absolutely one *undivided becoming*, and each of its organic parts is itself this trinity of systems.

 v. As a system of sense⁴ the theoretical process is *the becoming universal of the individual* as such a sense; the individual⁵ is sentient; sensation is indifferent to the
 15 proper animality of *the process of shaping* and is *indifferent* to the relation of the intermediate system; as it were only an accompanying, indifferent⁶ function of the universal *being-one*; which is the enlivening of the process, but does not actively interfere with such a being one, but rather disappears and is immersed in the latter; the nerve is in the being-one only as the nervous-brain of the abdomen

¹es

²[sich] in sich differentiierend

³es

⁴System der Sinne

⁵es

⁶gleichgültige

[247], not as the sensing communicating *brain*. The theoretical system as *sex relationship* is reflected just as little in itself; the latter¹ is only the relation of the individual to an other; the species is the middle which does not step to the fore, which would relate itself to the individual as such. But the absolute essence of the animal individual is species idea, to be universal; and this side according to which the absolute essence of the animal individual² is universal communicative nerve, is opposed as such to its individuality, the absolute essence of the animal individual³ is an other than its animal process; in which the universal is only that which does not step to the fore, only in the singular. The organism essentially has its life in being this movement; which potentiates⁴ itself out of the undifferentiation of fluidity into the differentiation of the organism's moments; and preserves the organism's different movement in the fluidity. The latter immediacy of the transition, so that this middle is not opposed to its sides, is the essence of the animal organism. In that the undifferentiation of fluidity separates itself from the absolute becoming differentiated, and opposes itself to the latter, thus is sickness posited in the organism. Sickness is essentially the latter becoming for itself of the positive universal of the organism over against its infinity over against the negative universality;⁵ the fluidity ceases to be the immediate *indifferent middle*; to be the immediate opposite of itself. In that the *distinction* between the external and internal organism, as we have recognized the former as differentiating itself in bone and muscle and the latter as organism differentiating itself in nerve and blood, the latter is not thus to be understood as if bones and muscles were separated from muscle and nerve, rather *every organic part* is the whole of the

¹Tr. note: e.g., the theoretical system

²es

³es

⁴potenziert

⁵Die Krankheit ist wesentlich dieses für sich werden des positiven Allgemeinen des Organismus gegen seine Unendlichkeit gegen die negative Allgemeinheit

[248] organism itself, and bone is within the latter itself also muscle and nerve and blood; the muscle, blood, and nerve, and the nerve in the same manner; the *distinguished moments* are themselves again moments in each single part; each part is precisely in this way immediately inner and outer organism the fluid that
 5 differentiates itself into the organism, and a falling back into the the fluid; in the organism's articulation a positing of itself at the cost of the fluid and a sublation of itself, the organism's becoming fluid is the enlivening differentiation and the differentiation to be sublated; each relates itself in the same way towards the two sides of the fluidity as the middle. The latter are the inner organism for the fluidity;
 10 for the inner enlivened organism the fluidity is that which is to be sublated, that within which the organism obtains its differentiation as nerve and blood; and consumes the latter in the organism's process; the latter is *the closing together* of the chain, that is always applied to the members themselves; and in that they are alive at the same time, they connect as active. As the fluidity is here the passive middle, so
 15 the same members are also external organism for the fluidity; the latter is

[249] the enlivened the active [middle], directed towards its inorganic particularity, and expending the latter in the undifferentiation of the animal fluidity. The latter its activity is alone the differentiation of tension, which the fluidity maintains as comporting itself to the inner organism; the fire insofar as it appears in the latter.

5 With the power, which the fluidity maintains against the inner organism, *i.e.*, to remain something indifferent, is not to be potentiated in its differentiation; the power¹ of the fluidity against the external organism as external is immediately lost in the latter's particularizing self-fixating organism; for the former power subsists in the fact that the fluidity² does not remain as indifferent fluidity as such, but rather, so that the

10 organism's fire is at the same time negatively powerful with respect to the differentiation in the fluidity;³ as positively universal and the absolute concept of the liveliness to be the immediate opposite of the concept's *self*, they fall asunder.

In that now the fluidity as universal middle ceases to be different according to the latter two sides to become the opposite of itself; In that the latter constitutes itself for

15 itself, or in that the sensation falls in the animal organism, and as its fluidity is for itself, thus *sickness* is present in the organism. The latter fluidity becoming-for-itself⁴ is likewise incapable of having the fluidity's⁵ passive function; of being potentiated in the articulation of the inner organism, as active against the the latter as something particularized; and of indifferentiating it as external to the organism which becomes

20 its product.

¹Macht

²*Tr. Note:* "sie" which could also refer to "the power" earlier in the sentence.

³sondern das sein Feuer zu gleich in ihr die Differenz negativ mächtig ist

⁴fürsichwerdende

⁵ihre

[250]

In that the fluidity fixes itself in this way it is likewise incapable of either receiving the liveliness of the principle of fire into itself, and becoming active, or of moderating the isolated systems which are arising for themselves¹ in their isolated activity and
 5 turning them back into the universality of undifferentiation. The universal living principle of all the parts that no longer falls together with the fluid middle, is errant, as it were, all around it,² the latter falls in the nerve or the blood, and leaps over from one to the other, in that the universal living principle now has its seat in the one, the latter has raised the one side at the same time to an entirely inner system, the other,
 10 however, it has made into fluidity, but precisely herein it preserves the change between the two; such that the latter which now was the fluid passes over into activity precisely through its relation to the other, and now is the active.

The *pure process of the fever* is this appearance of the self positing separation of the life principle in the organism, and the fluidity and the reproduction of the unity of
 15 the latter.³ The process of the fever exhibits in the organism itself the absolute differentiating activity of the organism, as outside of fluidity the absolute differentiating activity⁴ makes the non-fluid articulation itself into fluidity, and in that the latter is thus the activity's product, the process of the fever posits the *inertia* of the fluidity as subdued, and just because of this it also makes the latter absolutely passive,
 20 *i.e.*, capable of articulating itself in itself into the particularized members. The fever which [as principle of fire] in the healthy condition is posited as one, appears here in

¹ die für sich werdenden vereinzelteten Systeme

² irrt gleichsam umher

³ *Translator's note:* e.g., the separation of the life principle

⁴ sie

[251] a succession. The fever precedes a universal enervation¹ of all functions; the entire system of the organism falls into fluidity, which fixes itself for itself, α) the principle [as] the enlivening absolute differentiation does not fall in the fluidity, the latter is inactive, unenlivened, and *every enlivening is without the positive indifferent*
 5 *unity*, the enlivening falls² in a single part, β) [the fluidity³ is] likewise resisting its becoming different, unenlivened for the nourishment, absolutely passive. The enlivening activity which is not in the universal fluidity of the organism, which is not undifferentiated unity, falls in the member of the fluidity as the the self-fluid, universally communicating moment of the enlivening opposition; in the nerve, which
 10 in this way *implicitly preserves the appearance of the blood, and muscle*, contracts and expands, shivers within itself,⁴ and likewise does not hold the muscle in the unity of sensation, the nerve sets the muscle free for itself and makes it quiver in an alternating expansion and contraction;⁵ in the skin as the undifferentiation of the nerves and the muscles there appears now in the same way only the isolated
 15 *enlivening* of the nerves and the skin⁶ senses cold, in that the nerve principle, the absolute fluid communicating, the nerve principle in itself different in the drive to shaping, is sick to the point of rigidity.⁷

This sthenia⁸ of the Nervous principle has immediately reduced the blood system to indifferent fluidity,

¹Erschlaffung

²es geräth in einen einzelnen Theil

³sie

⁴in sich schaudert

⁵ihn für sich freylässt ihn in einer abwechselnden Ausdehnung und Zusammenziehung zittern macht

⁶Tr. note: the subject "the skin" is interpolated.

⁷empfindet Kälte, indem das absolut flüssige mittheilende das Nervenprincip in sich different im Triebe zur Gestaltung, zur Starrheit krank ist.

⁸Translator's note: a condition of bodily strength or vitality.

[252] in that the former in itself is the entire living being;¹ but in that the different principle has fallen into the nervous system, it has itself become that which is truly the movement of the blood; in that the differentiating enlivening thus falls in the blood, it does not have a principle which is opposed to it, and the sthenia of the nervous system goes over into a sthenia of the blood; for the blood is itself this
 5 differently moved side of the organism insofar as otherwise active, as the blood² now also has the *absolute undifferentiation* of its movement in it itself, the whole side of the living process inasmuch as³ in the healthy condition the one side belongs to the absolutely indifferent fluidity of the nerve; and the animal lymph, the
 10 undifferentiation of both is the third. The organism which is now merely blood, becomes itself *indifferent fluidity* therein, or the blood appears as that as which the blood is posited and a sweat, a skin rash, or erupting skin disease, as well as evacuations of all kinds, portray the fluidity, which is only an undifferentiation produced in the living moments of the organism, *as an undifferentiation of the the*
 15 *latter*; and at the same time is secreted *as a product* not being for itself but rather as originating out of it; the sleep, which follows thereafter, strongly creates, as it were, *the having become one* of the functions, or it

¹in dem jenes in sich selbst das ganze lebendige ist

²es

³da [conjunction]

[253] is *the feeling of the latter*. But this fluidity does not fall at once as sweat, *etc.*, as product entirely outside of the organism, but rather in the skin, as rash, *etc.*, thus nerve and blood have only produced the one side of the organic relation; namely, they have sublated the latter's opposition against the fluidity; and they have become fluid; 5 but the other side, so that *the fluidity* likewise should again be sublated, and differentiated in the relation, is still not posited; and in the opposed fever makes itself [into] the opposite process of articulation, the self-dissolving lymph. The fluidity has portrayed the two sides of its being, one after the other, its activity in which nerve and blood become fluidity; and its passivity; so that the fluidity returns again into this 10 differentiation of articulation.

The latter *such that the inner moments* of the organism themselves become fluidity through the blood, consumption, the organism lays waste to itself;¹ in the latter self-organizing consumption the former fluidity inhibits itself, between the 15 blood and the becoming fluid so that the latter is not the universal fluidity,² or so that it always only comes to the product; the sweats and evacuations are then generally weakening; the produced fluidity must fall with the activity itself in the fluidity in the skin.

¹ Daß daß *die innern Momente* des Organismus durch das Blut sich selbst zur Flüssigkeit werden

² In diesem sich organisierenden Zehren hemmt sich jenes flüssigwerden, zwischen ihm und dem daß daß nicht die allgemeine Flüssigkeit ist

[254] and thus likewise attain to undifferentiation, to equilibrium against the self-isolating nerve and blood-activity; the produced fluidity¹ must be the undifferentiation of the nerve and blood, or absolutely bind these together; otherwise its enlivening falls out of the enlivening of the nerve and blood differentiation, the
 5 fluidity² is not at the same time the retarding of the latter.³

φ. This is the essential theory of disease. From this universal process of disease all of its infinite manifold forms must be grasped; the fever is, as it were, the theory of the latter; and the determinate forms of disease are posited therein so that every organic moment is itself the whole organism, and the living principle falls into the
 10 fever,⁴ and *can* itself *remain* therein; and⁵ comports itself against the remainder as the not fluid; the latter however, becomes the fever's fluid fluid, or in relation to disease, thus the fluid does not have its pure course of passage through all systems that ends with the universal indifferenciation; and it remains for a moment the *fixed*,⁶ such that
 15 no trace of the fever is present in the other system according to the transition of activity, the disease is in this manner, epilepsy and what belongs here; Thus, this moment remains fixed, so that it does not run through the remaining systems, so that it only portrays a formal fever that rules the absolute *sthenia* of the nervous system, thus the latter moment⁷ is nerve-fever.

¹ sie

² sie

³Tr. note: e.g., the fluidity is not the retarding of the enlivening of the nerve and blood differentiation.

⁴Tr. note: "es" which might also refer to "every organic moment"

⁵Tr. note: "and" is interpolated

⁶So Z.B. bleibt das Moment des Schauderns das Moment, in welchem die absolute Bewegung in das Nervenprincip fällt absolut so das fixe

⁷es

[255] The activity thus inhibits itself so that the blood reduces itself through its activity to an indifferent fluidity, generally the internal system withal, so that it always only becomes the product, without the latter becoming indifferent of this fluidity again becoming dissolved backwards into a becoming potentiated, consequently the particularized do not again become products, thus the organism consumes itself in hectic fever generally.¹ The external and internal organism, that is to say the becoming potentiated of the fluidity to articulation and the becoming sublated of the articulation in the universal fluidity fall [together], thus the fluidity becomes an entirely fixed, undecomposable² fluidity, just like a fluidity that its not produced. The becoming potentiated of the fluidity³ becomes nerve, and indeed, nerve as the system of the reproductive brain, and with this the higher system can divide itself in its ideality, [not] to come into the free function of the senses, in this way *hypochondria* is present; which if the latter fixes itself more on the side of the reproductive blood system, becomes melancholy.

15 Because the particular diseases are, as it were, impure fever, we see that fever generally is the disease having become alive.

¹so zehrt sich der Organismus in Zehrfieber überhaupt auf

²indecomponible

³Sie

[256]; and in nerve, fainting, epilepsy, in the blood, angina,¹ gangrene² become hypochondria in that the inner, ideal organism falls into the lower one of reproduction; the transition to health, however, is necessarily the fever, and one can see why *the older doctors* especially regarded it as the absolutely beneficial effort of
 5 nature towards healing.

χ. *This is not the place* to compare present and formerly in fashion theories of this view of illness, or to defend them by stating contrary views; I note only so much; that the organism like the disease and like all objects of cognition in general, can just as well be regarded purely formally as *purely materially*. The *Humoral pathology* is at
 10 last debased to the entirely *material* dead point of view, which related itself to the organism generally as to something in itself undifferently manifoldly separated, and *something specific*;³ which considered every single system as being-diseased existing-for-itself,⁴ and likewise reacted to the organism⁵ as if the single systems, like the portraying itself as active as opposed to the inactive appearing of the fluidity,
 15 completely fell apart, and were not essentially against each other, and the fluid as it appears as the pure product of the fluid members, [were] only to be removed in the same way, not through

¹ Braüne

² Braüne

³ als auf ein in sich indifferentes vielfaches geteiltes, und spezifisches bezog

⁴ fürsichseyend

⁵ ihn

[257] the enlivening of the whole as well as [becoming] enlivened itself, except that the different organic parts of the whole must be nourished for themselves on the latter which is acted upon without acting on the enlivening¹ of the organism itself.

The formal view treats the organism and disease as a whole, absolutely
 5 interconnected, whose parts simply have their being in the whole; it reacts against the organism, likewise as a whole. But the formal view remains formal; und *instead* of a whole of systems, and being a living process of the latter, the whole² is a whole in general; whose movement is not recognized as a movement of this living organism, but on the contrary remains a formal, merely logical construction. The *capacity for*
 10 *action*,³ *the excitability*,⁴ *excitation*,⁵ and *stimulation*⁶ are formal, merely logical relations, whose reality is not exhibited like they are in animal organisms. *Where* the concrete of the animal organism should become something for this formalism, then the latter becomes, instead of the older⁷ abstractions of the consisting: the *molécules*, the small parts, the elements of the microscope; to the chemical abstractions of the
 15 elements of the crucible and the retort⁸ to the well known *acid, etc., substances*.⁹ The opposition between fluid and infinite which fixes itself in disease, the abnormal disturbance of a formal nature of the equilibrium of stimulation and the capacity for action.

¹Lebendigkeit

²es

³Wirkungsvermögen

⁴Erregbarkeit

⁵Erregung

⁶Reitze

⁷ehemaligen

⁸*Tr. note:* e.g., an alembic used in chemistry

⁹Stoffen

[258] The formal view, which does not admit the articulation of the organism, comes, therefore, immediately into a predicament if it henceforth should recognize the disturbances in its manifoldness and as a system. It cannot come further than to the superficial non-cognitive distinctions of the more or less of excitement and grasp
 5 disease as the abstraction of the *sthenia* and *asthenia*; and if the formal view wants to recognize this more or less itself as a distinct relationship from the relationship of stimuli and capacity for action, thus it falls into the contradiction previously warned against, such that it lets the one rise and the other fall, since both simply only have meaning for each other; they are no stimulation for the capacity for action, as insofar
 10 as the latter is active, and in the reverse way both remain absolutely in equilibrium, the distinction can only be an increase or a decrease of both equals at once, which is no cognizing.¹ Essentially through the latter dynamic view, the organism is raised into the absolute concept to a whole which has become organically different in itself, the merely indifferent and material of the *organism has disappeared*,² according to
 15 which the physical activity of the organism is more an external mechanical activity than a living activity, and the seat of a disease in a determinate matter

¹so kommt sie in den sonst gerügten Widerspruch, da B sie das eine steigen und das andre fallen läßt, da beyde schlechthin nur Bedeutung für einander haben; keine Reize für das Wirkungsvermögen sind, als insofern die B thätig ist, und umgekehrt beyde absolut im Gleichgewichte bleiben, und der Unterschied nur eine Vergrößerung oder Verminderung der beyden Gleichen zugleich seyn kann, was kein erkennen ist.

²das bloss materiale des *Organismus* ist verschwunden, nach welchem

[259] is itself a principally mechanical and singular hindrance, and an external reaction against it is possible. But neither must the dynamic view remain the pure opposite of the material, in a way that means the same thing as formalism, but rather it must likewise articulate the organism into itself which the dynamic view has simply
 5 made, and recognize the formally grasped distinctions in the organism and its diseases as a system of the organism not as an abstraction of the nerve and muscle fibers, or even of the nitrogen or other substances,¹ and as the living movements of these systems against each other; the dynamic view must essentially realize its concepts, and recognize the disease in the same way, according to which, what in the
 10 determinately existing² organism is a moment of the organism, fixes itself, goes towards³ raising itself to the whole and posits itself in activity against the entire remaining organism, and thus, in that the disease reacts to the whole organism, the disease is simultaneously posited towards the organism, as the organism is now posited in a determinacy.⁴

15 ψ. With the disease the animal oversteps the boundaries of its nature; but the disease of the animal is the becoming of spirit; *in the disease the universal of the fluidity* has itself been isolated; what the disease there enlivens simply from the infinite concept of the differentiation of the system, and only as one, is absolutely not its universality and life, and can only end in death;⁵ in that the life principle consumes
 20 itself in the opposition just as well as the disease. The whole organism tries to become the theoretical process of the being-for itself of the universal;⁶

¹oder gar der Stik u.s.f. Stoffe

²daseyendes

³darauf geht

⁴und so in dem sie auf den Ganzen Organismus reagirt zugleich auf ihn, wie er jetzt in einer Bestimmtheit gesetzt ist

⁵was, da die schlechthin von dem unendlichen Begriffe der Differenz des Systems belebt, und absolut nur als eins nicht ihre allgemeinheit und leben ist, nur mit dem Tode enden kann.

⁶Der ganze Organismus versucht zum theoreischen Prozesse zum für sichseyn des Allgemeinen zu werden

[260] But the absolute concept exists only as the organic articulation of the animal and the concept itself cannot raise itself out of this in the former self isolating universality, and absolutely one with it, thus become simple itself. The idea of the organic is that the universal and the totality be one, the plant expresses this idea. But
 5 insofar as the plant, in its being other, remains itself, it ceases to be individuality; the animal is the beginning becoming-one of the infinity of the absolute singularity and simplicity, in that it is sensation; or in that it has the being other of itself in its singularity in its simplicity, it senses itself. But this universality is not free for itself, it is immersed into singularity, only present to singularity.¹ *In its sensation* the sentient
 10 is a singular, another than the sentient is itself; but the latter does not have this other-being

¹nur die Einzelheit Gegenwärtig

[261] within the sentient itself, but outside of it; the animal is time, which passes within it, and in which its sensations themselves pass by as singular; the universality is only in the *form of necessity* the infinity only the hidden unity of its oppositions; the singular of sensation is designated for the animal as something of an ideal nature,
 5 a negative; the singular is as something sublated; but the singulr does not have its ideality within the singular itself, but its ideality only is as the other side of the opposition; the universal is only a transition to others; this being-sublated of the singular through the opposed, through the other of itself, is composed of two opposites, it is two activities, two sensations.¹

10 The animal's sensation as an organic whole *of organic articulation* is likewise a transition, from the inner into the outer organism, and in that the animal intuits its sensation, as the latter whole that the animal is; the animal's totality as the other sex, and as *what is produced by the latter*; thus the latter is likewise simply posited for the animal under the form of singularity; and it relates itself to the other sex only through
 15 desire, thereupon to sublate the singularity; not in an intuition in which the singularity is immediately sublated within itself;² and its *becoming* an offspring, as a sublated intuited singularity, is precisely because of this, itself again another singularity; a multiplying of the individual, it is not itself having become totality as a singular, but rather as this having become it is another; In the sickness there is the incipient
 20 liberation of singularity, that which distinguishes the individual from itself, and the positing of the transition as one existing simple. But the individual is only universality as simplicity, as the individual raises itself out of the indifferent fluidity, it is not at the same time the absolute concept which passes over into this simplicity,

¹ d.ß Aufgehobenseyn des einzelnen durch das entgegengesetzte durch das andre seiner selbst, sind zwey entgegengesetzte sind zwey Thätigkeiten zwey Empfindungen.

²In welchem die Einzelheit unmittelbar an ihr selbst aufgehoben ist

[262] but which only consists in the opposition of the inner and outer organism, and only has has a relation to the singular within itself.

But the absolute essence of the animal is the absolute being—one of the universal
 5 and infinite so that the absolute concept in its oppositions like fire is absolutely
 simple, and the being of the opposition, the positive universality, has its nourishment
 absolutely in itself; so that thus for the sensation of the organic the sensed singular is
 immediately within itself a universal that is other than its singularity; then first does
 the organic sense itself as organically alive. Thus generally in this way, such that the
 10 other is as the organic itself, and expresses and is the absolute essence of the organic,
 so that the *sensed* blue immediately ceases being this blue, and the opposite of its self,
 the remaining colors opposed to it, the unity of everything remaining which is
 opposed to it in its potency such that it immediately becomes *color*, the latter raises
 the sensation beyond itself; it goes over into *consciousness*, and the animal becomes
 15 rational. The disease, as the being for itself of the fluid against the singularity, of the
 sensing against the infinity of the opposition, takes the latter infinity of the
 opposition¹ up into itself; the infinity becomes a simple consisting of the singularity
 in the animal's being destroyed, in its having sublated the unity of the universal and
 the infinite;² the fixed universality of the disease only destroys the infinity of the
 20 opposition; and passes over into death, the universality

¹ diese

² sie wird ein einfaches Bestehen der Einzelheit in sich die Einheit des allgemeinen und der Unendlichkeit aufgehoben, Vernichtet seyn

[263] of the spirit makes the opposition consist, in that the universality has sublated the opposition within itself, the opposite of the absolute concept which steps forth within the animal as sensation, is implicitly universal in itself;¹ the absolute essence of the animal raises itself out of its immersion in the consisting; it becomes species and is implicitly universal.² The *ideality* of sensation consisted therein that the singular posited in sensation, was posited as something possible, but in addition to which the other was possible, here it is possible within itself, the existing³ possibility as such. The *ideality of the species* subsisted in the fact that the individual intuited itself as itself in another,⁴ but in the sublation of the latter, its being other disappeared; and another individual becomes; as the sensation disappeared into the being of the being other of the sensation's individuality and becomes another sensation; here the becoming-other of the individual is its being; or the becoming-other is the universal in which the being-sublated of the singularity itself is; and the animal is now the absolute trinity of organisms: of the external organism, of the internal organism relating itself to the former,⁵ and of the absolutely inner *free* organism. The latter⁶ as the absolute universality of the former⁷ determines the function of the first in the same way,⁸ and presses its character upon them, as the inner free organism for itself is opposed to them and is the absolute recapitulation⁹ of the latter¹⁰ in itself. The inner free organism is as the absolutely universally communicating, the absolutely fluid;¹¹ the middle of the outer and inner organism; but likewise the absolutely encompassing, the positive unity as the inner free organism is the absolute unity of the inner, which is the essential unity of the latter.¹²

¹ das entgegengesetzte der absolute Begriff der als Empfindung hervortritt an ihm an sich selbst allgemein ist

² wird Gattung, an sich allgemein

³ existierende

⁴ in einem anderen als sich selbst sich anschaute

⁵ Tr. note: e.g. to the internal organism

⁶ Tr. note: e.g., the absolutely free inner organism

⁷ Tr. note: e.g., of the internal one which relates itself to the first.

⁸ Tr. note: In other words, the free organism as the absolute universality of the internal organism which relates itself to the external organism, determines the function of the first, or the external organism, in the same way (e.g., because it is the absolute universality of the internal organism it determines the function of the two preceding organisms in this trinity), and imposes its character upon them.

⁹ Resumption

¹⁰ Tr. note: derselben, e.g., the first two organisms above. In other words, for itself the absolute inner free organism is opposed to the first two organisms in the trinity of organisms (the external organism and the internal organism which relates itself to it) inasmuch as it is itself their absolute recapitulation. It is opposed to them by the very fact that it recapitulates them.

¹¹ Er ist als das absolute allgemeine das absolut flüssige, mittheilende

¹² Tr. note: e.g., of the external and inner organism

[264]

The *external organism which shapes the individual* and reproduces raises itself thereby to the point¹ that its singularity immediately becomes absolute universality so that what the individual does for itself, becomes immediately an action for the whole species; for² the inner organism the sensation becomes within itself a sensation of the whole species, an activity of the latter; and likewise the being and doing of the whole species becomes the being and doing of the individual; the animal self-interest is immediately unselfish;³ and the lack of self interest, the sublation of the singularity of the individual, is immediately in the interest of the individual, *i.e.*, in the interest of the being of the [individual] as one of the species;⁴ the being for itself of the individual, its self producing and shaping becomes an *empty deception*; the individual⁵ is, in that it intends to produce itself of its own accord, a product of the whole, and it produces the whole. This stepping of the essence of the animal out of singularity [is] in the same way immediately the absolute return, the absolute becoming inward, of nature into itself. The absolute [is] likewise the being in itself⁶ of the aether, of the absolutely simple matter, as being-outside-of-itself.⁷ The aether as absolutely pure undifferentiation self-identical with itself has as this determinacy the infinity, the ideality, outside of itself in the absolute autonomy of the members of the opposition, of the heavenly bodies; this undifferentiation of the aether against the existing infinity passed [over] into the earth into the differentiation of the heavenly bodies against each other and the heavenly bodies became elements existing for themselves,⁸ but absolutely different to each other in their being for themselves; their being-for-themselves collapsed⁹ into the absolute numerical singularity of the earth; they became

¹ dazu

² Tr. note: "for" is interpolated

³ der animalische Eigennutz ist unmittelbar Uneigennützig

⁴ und die Uneigennützigkeit das Aufheben der Einzelheit des Individuums unmittelbar Nutzen des Individuums, d.i., das Seyn des [Individuums] als eines solchen.

⁵ es

⁶ in sich seyn

⁷ aussersichseyn

⁸ für sich seyende

⁹ stürzte...zusammen

[265] idealities; they became the unity of universality and of infinity. This unity only is as an absolutely moving itself in itself as infinite,¹ and as absolutely simple in its movement, or as the absolute return of the aether through the absolute concept of infinity in itself. *In the spirit nature exists as that which is nature's essence.*

5

III. Philosophy of Spirit

III. In the spirit, the absolutely simple aether through the infinity of the earth through out is returned into itself; the latter being one of the absolute simplicity of the ether and of the infinity exists in the earth in general; the latter being one is spread into the universal fluidity but in its spreading it fixes itself as singularity.

10 [The rest of this transition to Spirit is on pages 266 and 267. The philosophy of Spirit runs from 268 -308]

¹ Diese Einheit ist nur, als eine als unendlich sich absolut in sich bewegende

HEGEL'S JENA PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 1805/6 "THE ORGANIC"

Gesammelte Werke Vol. 8 (pp.108-184)

Translation Conventions

This translation is based on volume VIII of the edition of Hegel's collected works (*Hegel Gesammelte Werke*) edited by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Johann Heinrich Trede and published by Felix Meiner Verlag in 1976. I have attempted to make the translation as precise as possible while still remaining readable in English. Although there are many places where the same thing could be phrased more felicitously through the choice of a different word, I have strived to translate Hegel's terminology as consistently as possible, preserving as much of Hegel's phrasing and punctuation as possible. Occasionally, however, I have supplemented missing verbs, conjunctions, commas and definite articles to render the sentence in acceptable English. Wherever I have interpolated more than an article or a missing verb I have indicated the addition with a translator's note. Where the English rendering is questionable, I have cited the original German in a footnote. All such notes are to be distinguished from Hegel's own footnotes (and the translator's comments) by the fact that they are in German.

Thus there are three types of footnotes:

- 1) Hegel's own notes, which are usually prefaced by "*in the margin:*" or "*in the upper margin:*" in italics. Any of Hegel's further additions to these marginal comments are indicated by brackets "[...]" within the note itself.
- 2) Translator's notes clarifying the choice of a word or the translation or meaning of a particular passage. Such notes are always prefaced by "*Translator's note:*" or "*Tr. note:*" in italics.
- 3) Notes citing select German words or passages. These notes simply present the original German at the bottom of the page without any additional punctuation. Wherever I have made any additional comments, I have cited the German within quotation marks and placed my comments in a "*Translator's note.*"

To facilitate the use of the translation I have matched the pagination to that of the *Gesammelte Werke*, Volume VI, which is the German edition upon which it is based.

[108]

III.

The Organic¹

The universal presence and actuality, which is light, has penetrated all moments of
 5 the physical body; it is *alive*; not yet ensouled. It is a *universal* self; that is not yet the
 latter single self; — still space, the universal organic. The existing² implicitly and for
 itself,³ the simple substance of all its moments, and precisely because of this, these
 moments subsist of an independent implicit-being⁴ that subsists therein by subsuming
 itself. They are actual, they are free parts which are purposive, which alone are
 10 determinable through the concept of the whole, or remain in the concept; wherein the
 form and substance are simply no longer separated — *the single bodies are actual
 subjects*, but they do *not* have the *form in them perfectly*, rather, *one part of the
 moments of the form*⁵ falls outside of them. The

¹In the margin: Reflection on the foregoing; α) repetition of the *mechanical* and *chemical* in the physical — the *reflected* movement of *being and of the self* in the element — *implicitly*

β) how is the physical-chemical gone back into shape — in that the process itself has placed simple *solidity* on the sides, and sublated the *neutral*, and in the same way [has] made the solid into the neutral

γ) it is the *substance* of the foregoing process, it *carries* the latter in general, *it is implicit there*, as the single organs are implicit in a subject

physical independence dissolved

²seyende

³an und für sich

⁴Ansichseyn

⁵derselben

[109] organic is already *implicitly* what it actually is. It is the movement of its *becoming*. But what the result is, is also the foregoing.¹ Until now, the latter is our cognition. Physical body is *implicitly*, unity of gravity and warmth; the latter is what it becomes and precisely this becoming is its actuality itself. — That which it is *implicitly*,
 5 is itself likewise a *becoming*, that lies behind, beyond its actuality; or they are its *properties*, its universal sublated moments, whose subject it is. It is the syllogism, within which its universality returns through determinateness into singularity, and the latter likewise into universality; so that it² is the unity of both extremes.—*The movement from universality to singularity was the becoming of the physical body*, as
 10 light-penetrated crystal; the other, the movement from singularity to universality, is its *change into the organic*.³ The former⁴ is in it such that the parts, *i.e.*, moments, produce the whole; for the parts are the universal; it is its inorganic nature. *It excites* the physical body,⁵ that is, it does not work upon it such that it would be passive, rather inorganic nature is much more the passive, the other, however, the active, but not as
 15 pure negative comportment, rather, inorganic nature even sublates itself in the body. It effects nothing in another if this other is not itself already *implicitly* this effect. Excitation is, therefore, not a stimulus of a formal nature, whereupon⁶ the organic would react in its own way, a mere impetus;⁷ rather it is substance, which in itself goes over into the organic, becomes the latter. There are two substances, each the same
 20 *implicitness*⁸ as the other; that is to say, one substance; but two actuals,⁹ and because of this the former transition is of a formal nature; the organic is the self, the power, the unity of its self and its negative; it has power over the same only as this unity, and the relation makes *actual* what is *implicit*;— the transition is thus of a formal nature insofar as both are the same being; but it is not of a formal nature, as if the other remained
 25 something foreign and only excited, something foreign that did not enter through its substance into the organic, and retained a proper substance for itself.

The inorganic returns into itself, is one *self*, precisely in the organic; this singularity however is itself universal even in that; its self-preservation is this self-sublation of the universal; through this is singularity, which, however, goes over into division, into
 30 reality, and is thus itself a sublated singular; - the

¹Vorhergehende

²Tr. note: *e.g.*, singularity

³Werden zum Organischen

⁴Tr. note: *e.g.*, the movement from universality to singularity

⁵Tr. note: *e.g.*, the physical body

⁶wo als denn

⁷Anstoss

⁸Ansich

⁹Wirkliche

[110] leaves, *etc.*, bring forth the tree, it however, brings forth the latter, its parts; they make something that already *is*; because they have a relation to it, as sublated; and the tree likewise brings forth only itself; its doing¹ is reflected in itself. The beginning is the same as what the end is.

- 5 The latter universal life, the earth, thus has living parts, which are elements, its universal, its inorganic nature; they are² as free independent things, sun, comet and moon, but in their truth separated, the element of the air, as atmosphere, of water as sea, of fire, however, as the fertilized, dissolved earth, as fertilizing sun. The life of the earth is the atmospheric and sea-process within which it produces these, each is a
10 proper life for itself, and likewise only constitute it. Here the *chemical* has lost its absolute meaning; it is only a moment, it is reflected in independence, it becomes bound under the subject, and held fast as dead; each is related to the other as free subject through its substance itself.

- 15 The *shaping* of the organic earth contains the ways of the determinate being of its organic life. - As the latter it is the living fertilized earth, which the efficacious sun contains in it as earthly fire, and life in general. The shaping's first *determinate* life, however, is the *atmosphere*. As pure movement, as substance of an ideal nature, the shaping has the life of the heavenly sphere within it; its changes are connected with the heavenly movement; but it materializes the latter in its elements. It is the dissolved
20 purely tensed³ earth, the relation between gravity and warmth. It runs through the period of the year, of the month, and of the day in the same way; and expresses them as changes of warmth and gravity. These periodic changes thus step apart again, such that where the turning of the axis is predominant, the period of the day predominates beneath the equator - daily changes of the barometer reading,⁴ daily ebb and flood - in
25 the year however, this relation does not step apart from itself, in contrast with us, where the daily ebb and flood are little noticed and all time of change is connected more with the moon.⁵

¹Thun

²es sind

³gespannt

⁴Barometerstand

⁵Und alle zeit der Veränderung mit dem Monde mehr zusammenhängt

[111]

Gravity is inner gravity, elasticity, as pressure but essentially change of *specific* gravity; movement waves¹ of the latter, which are connected to changes in temperature, but such that this change has the opposed meaning, of being in common and light-
 5 temperature; the former eliminated² warmth, the latter freely coming up through the light.³ The latter is generally clarity of the air, the pure elasticity of the same, higher barometer reading; while the former belongs to the shaping, and is there if the elastic in rain goes over into snow.⁴

These abstract moments go back into themselves precisely in the air; the heavenly
 10 movement materializes [itself] in them, and likewise, *on the other side*, sea and earth mesh with it and it evaporates itself in them; a processless immediate transition; The air individualizes both in it, partly into the universal atmospheric process, within which precisely its highest independence and the sublation of the water and the earth becomes — in odors — its own release, the transition into water, — partly into the fleeting
 15 comets, meteors — partly in earths which it produces, atmospherules⁵—partly in poisonous winds, miasmas for the animal body — partly honeydew and mildew; animal and vegetable airs.⁶

The neutral earth, however, the *sea* is thus precisely the movement of the ebb and flood, a movement composed of the movement of sun and moon—like the external
 20 form of the earth. As the air itself as universal element takes its tension⁷ out of the earth, so the sea takes its neutrality; the earth steams out against the air as the sea, but against the sea it is crystal, which secretes the excessive water from it in springs which gather themselves into rivers. But this is abstract neutrality, sweet water, the sea is the physical neutrality. The crystal of the earth goes over into the latter. The origin of
 25 springs externally represented as a seeping through

¹wogen

²ausgeschiedene

³jene ausgeschiedne Wärme, diese frey durchs Licht hinzutretende

⁴In the margin: it repeats or is the constant actuality of the absolute process

⁵atmosphärlilien

⁶In the margin: Bitterness of the bitumen* otherwise attributed Gr.807.

*Next to this:magnesia

⁷Spannung

[112] is a mechanical and purely superficial representation — as are volcanic and hot springs according the other side.¹

Everywhere we see regions—especially sandstone strata which always secrete dampness. — The sea itself is this higher liveliness than the air; subject of bitterness,
 5 and neutrality and dissolution; a living process which is always on the point² of breaking out into life because it contains all of the moments of the latter; the point of the subject, the neutrality, and the dissolution of the former in the latter. It thus breaks readily into phosphorescent light—a superficial life, that that collects itself together into the simple unity, but also reflected into itself in the same way in perfect unity—a sea of
 10 light,³ which subsists of sheer living points—tiny creatures, which immediately die, and cease to light up, if they are taken out of it—the growing of the water into gellatine—as the sea is also only a filling of infusoria.

The proper life of the earth, however, is determined therein,⁴ that it is the *universal*, i.e., the *immediate* individual. The immediate individual is the permanent structure⁵ of
 15 the earth which does not yet have its life as soul; but rather exists⁶ as universal life—life in the element of *being*. It is the inorganic earth —which lays out its parts as unensouled external form like a rigid body and its articulation into parts. Its separation into water and land, and firm land and islands, and the figuration and crystallization of these, in valleys and mountain ranges - belongs to the pure *mechanical shaping* — in
 20 this it can well be said that the earth *would be* in one place *more contracted* and in another *more expanded* - but nothing is said by this; — also the outline of the landscape and mountains can be related to *magnetic* axes, northwest to southeast; but magnetism as linear direction is in general a purely formal moment whose power is already suppressed in the globe, and still more so in the subject. To grasp the whole shaping

¹In the lower margin: lung is their evaporation, secretion-vessels; so their liver is the latter heating of themselves within themselves.

²auf dem Sprunge

³lichtmeer

⁴In the margin: The self is as the *diversity* of the shape; —static *interpretation*, moment of the independence of all parts.

⁵feste Gebäude

⁶ist

- [113] the fixed bearing ought to be taken together—not so much in comparison with the sea as with its currents, the expression of the free movement of the earth in itself.—In general the external formation striving for determination against the globe¹ goes to the pyramidal,—within that striving thus a ground, a breadth, which points off towards the other side; collapse to the south—But the restless turning stream hollows out this figure everywhere from west to east, drives and presses² the fixed as it were towards the east and swells it out towards the eastern side,—like a taut bow—and bulging to the west and rounded off.³ In general, however, the land is *torn into two parts*, into *old* and *new* world, of which the latter portrays the unformed division in general; a northern and southern part in the manner of the *magnet*; Naturalness, remains retarded childlike nature⁴ — the other, however, is the more perfected division into three parts—one, the *solid metal*, the *blunt spirit which does not enter into consciousness*⁵—the other, the dissipation, the middle *wildly bearing itself out of itself*, the *formless production*;—the third, however, the *consciousness*, which is the reasonable *part of the earth*.⁶
- 15 *History fell to earth earlier*; now however it has come to rest. A life, that fermenting in itself, has time in it, — the

¹kugel

²treibt drückt

³In the margin: virginal earth is found here, *paradise of man* - abundant vegetation tiger, jaguar all lions, crocodile caimans, *larger birds*, butterflies, weaker animals, *men*.

⁴Natürlichkeit, Bleibt zurück kinische Nature

⁵In the margin: origination, becoming wild devastation of humankind

⁶In the margin: universal *character* of the shape — does the earth have a *history*? What is *history*?

*Time** falls in men opposite the irrational.

*Next to this: form of *succession* next to the simultaneous.

[114] earth spirit, which has not yet come to opposition; *the movement and the dreams* of a *sleeper*,¹ until it is awakened and attains its consciousness in man, and thus steps before itself as static shaping.— *Mere occurrence*, — the successive stratification makes entirely nothing comprehensible, or much rather leaves aside the necessity, the
 5 comprehending entirely; dissolution in water, or fire, completely singular sides, which do not express the organic fermentation.— Likewise to grasp them as an oxydization–deoxydization process of a carbon and nitrogen series, is something completely superficial.²

The physical formation of the earth is thus made, so that its *superfice* breaks out in
 10 *organic cepters*,³ in points of totality, which unify the whole in themselves,⁴ and from there on let it fall into decay, and singulars born out of it portray the whole; unlocking itself, the former contraction passes over into the throwing apart of the moments. The latter centers are a kind of kernel,⁵ which portray the whole their its shells and rinds, and passing through the kernels throughout they themselves pass into the universal
 15 ground as the element of the whole.

The *kernel* and *root* of these formations is nothing simple,⁶ but rather the *developed* totality of formation; the existence of the organic unity, as it can be in this universal individuality; *i.e.*, not in the form of the simple self, but rather, in the form of the totality, which contains the moments cut off from one another in itself. This kernel is
 20 *granite*; it consists, as is well known, of silica,⁷ the absolute earth of the brittle punctuality—of the mica, of the plane, which develops itself to the opposite of the self-unlocking punctuality of the the moment of combustibility, that contains the germ of all abstraction, finally of the *feldspar*,

¹ eines Schlafenden

²—Ebenso sie als Oxydations—Desoxydationsproceß zu begreifen, Kohlenstoff-Stickstoffreihe ist etwas ganz oberflächliches

³*In the margin*: as in *single plants*

⁴*In the margin*: Inside and underneath is nothing,—nothing that is *not* on the ground

⁵Kernen

⁶*In the margin*: Not a simple self; momentsunfolded within it itself; point—plane—whole.

⁷kiesel

[115] the indicated yet undeveloped neutrality of lime.¹ The latter is the simple *earthly triunity*, which develops itself according to its different sides - and indeed determined in both directions of the process, such that at one time² this whole has the differences in it as its form, and remains the same, only differently modified, according to the content,—at an other, the differences penetrate the substance and they become simple abstractions—the former is the shaping, as it appears here—the latter is the distinction, in which, however, all meaning of the chemical is lost, and is precisely the shaping of the simple physical body.

The granite rocks have gneiss,³ syenite,⁴ in which the mica⁵ becomes clay, becomes hornblende, micaceous schist⁶ and the like deposited around it, nothing but simple modifications, the micaceous schist, however, becomes color especially in porphyry, — the border of this absolute rock⁷ — the mica goes over into colored metal and clay — the graywacke formation⁸ — mica in the metallic — generally a fine massing of the constituent parts of granite — porphyry, feldspar, silica and clay. — The closest change of form is the schist formation⁹ — that which became simple, and the sublated neutrality; iron- and especially sulphurous compound expresses the combustible bound together; but in the pure trap formation,¹⁰ and especially the basalt form the combustible has become pure—volcanic origin has the latter truth, so that it belongs to the principle of fire, but is just as little originated through water as through fire.—On the other side the whole passes into the *salt*-form; the salty earth, the combustible more unlocked to bitterness;¹¹ serpentine¹² and the like, that irregularly emerges here and there — The latter combustible

¹des Kalchs

²In the margin: α) external formation

β) consumation of the existing moments of the totality, — and pure excretion of the same as abstraction β) collapse into indifferent existence, deposited land; just as good as the first, the ground and soil.

³Gneus

⁴Sienit

⁵Glimmer

⁶Glimmerschiefer

⁷Gebirge

⁸Tr. Note: e.g., large gray sandstone.

⁹Schieferformation

¹⁰Tr. Note: Trap formation is a formation of any of several kinds of dark grain igneous rock

¹¹Tr. Note: N.b., "Bittererde" is magnesia; "Bitterkalk" is magnesium limestone.

¹²Tr. Note: e.g., ophites

[116] form then stands in opposition to the calcareous¹ in general; the neutral, which however as penetrated from metallity has qualitative unity within it, and hence is completely penetrated by organic formation.

5 These main formations pass over into so-called stratified and deposited rock, where in their separation these moments almost exhibit the entire dissolved totality as pure earths; in the sandstone deposits, the source of springs,²— clay-loam deposits— bituminous coal seams, peat deposits, bituminous shale,³ rock-salt deposits and finally calcium and gypsum deposits —

10 But in that the granite and what belongs to it pulls itself together into abstraction, the self-separating ores likewise open themselves up against it — in part especially early in iron, and gold deposits, and principally in veins and (copper) seams⁴ — everywhere interspersed through whole masses of rock. A flowing in of materials is mechanical and without thought — just like oxygen, *etc.*

α)⁵ The *veins*, clusters,⁶ *etc.*, are predominantly these containers of the pure self-separating earth, — minerals, crystals — represented as fissures, through drying out, so that the dissolved pulp⁷ of metals *etc.*, has run into it — most conceivably — then healed over. In truth, however, they are not just this mechanical summary — but a physical one — the parts of the totality, which simplify themselves, sublate the developed determinate being,⁸ and therefore now drive it out in even abstracter form.

20 The course of the veins is most often opposed to the direction of the rock, — planes of fracture⁹ as it were, but not only the spatial form,¹⁰ but physical significance.¹¹

β) In the study of geology on the one hand the point is to first see the universal masses, concept of the elements,¹²—where a small distinction is found, a new

¹*Tr. Note:* or "calciferous"

²wassers

³Schiefer

⁴Flötzen

⁵*In the margin:* organic grasping

⁶Nester

⁷Brey

⁸Daseyn

⁹Bruchflächen

¹⁰Raumgestalt

¹¹*In the margin:* TREBRA'S observation, that veins occur in the soft slopes.

¹²Momente

[117] species, a new kind is made out of it;— thoughtless enumeration. — In nature, the most important thing is to follow the transitions in the strata; nature binds itself to this order only in a general way; and produces this order in manifold variation,¹ within which the fundamental features nevertheless remain. Whereupon, however, in that
 5 nature deposits them as parts in an indifferent *proximity to each other*,² it indicates the necessity through transition of the different parts³ into each other;⁴ but not only through mere gradualness of the diminishing,⁵ but even distinguishing according to the concept steps forward for the mere intuition of the diversity of kind. Nature designates these transitions as a mixture of the qualitative and quantitative, or shows, that the manner
 10 according to which one may be different from the other— in one rock, globules,⁶ clusters,⁷ middlepoints of the other begin to form themselves — which in part are mixed in, in part also form themselves as externally cut off in each. — Home of this is predominantly shown [in] transitions, the breaking out of the one in the other — philosophic point of view —

15 γ) ⁸Organic structures. They belong especially to the clay shale,⁹ and lime deposits, in part dispersed as isolated animal and plant forms. But above all they belong to whole huge masses formed through and through organically — lime-shale masses¹⁰ — likewise bituminous coal strata within which one very frequently recognizes the definite form of a tree — so that indeed so much— if the Breccia where to be added to it —
 20 organically structured is present — as what is otherwise structured¹¹ — here they are not single dispersed plants or animals in a mass rather through and through they are everywhere nearly structured in the same way, as a calcite crystal shattered in all its points¹² is rhomboidal¹³—so one is in the other,—not entirely so inwardly as the rhomboid of calcite.— Here, of course, one is immediately ready to grant the prior
 25 existence of an organic world, which perished in water. But whence then the latter? It has arisen from the earth,

¹abwechselung

²Tr. Note: "*Nebeneinander*," which could also be translated as "collaterality.". The word "being" is interpolated to make the English intelligible.

³Tr. Note: "differenten." Parts is interpolated.

⁴In the margin: *home* completely detached

⁵Abnehmens

⁶Kugeln

⁷Nester

⁸In the margin: organic formation begins

⁹Tr. Note: "*Tonschiefer*" which can also be translated as agrillaceous shale.

¹⁰Kalkschiefer Massen

¹¹—als anderes—

¹²Tr. Note: An other translation may be: "as a chalk crystal smashed to bits is rhomboidal."

¹³Als ein Kalkkrystall in allen Punkten zerschlagen rhoboidisch ist

[118] not historically, but arises out of it as always before, and has its substance therein. — Those organic forms are present there where strata pass over into each other, especially where they are more singular, and do not constitute the entire mass. The *border* where the elements¹ are posited in one which processless nature lets fall
 5 apart, is principally the seat of organic structures, of petrifications; and such structures which have neither the form of animals nor of plants, but transcend the crystal form are plays and attempts at organic formation. In the *shaley*² and *calcareous* the inorganic especially unlocks itself;³ for the former in that it forms itself⁴ into the sulfurous out of its earthy side, part however preserves the metallic principle in it; it sublates its fixed
 10 subjectivity of its own accord. Its punctuality, unlocked through the bitumen, which having differentiation in general in it,⁵ receives the continuity in the metallity⁶—unity [of the] absolute subject and predicate, — is infinite — and comes into a fluctuation between the organic and the inorganic.— Likewise for the *calcareous*⁷ — it is the neutral — it has the moment of actuality, of the subsisting in its sides, and the simple
 15 metalness steps [forward],⁸ through the *simplicity* of their continuity, as the qualitative unity, which obliterates the indifference of both sides, a unity which has sides of the neutral, a neutral which has unity, — exhibits the transition to the organic; on the one hand the fissure⁹ stays in the dead neutrality, on the other it stays in the dead abstraction and simplicity.— These *organic forms* are not to be regarded¹⁰ as if they
 20 *once had actually lived* and then had died, for singulars are not the issue, — but they are born dead, — just as little as the bone fibers, veins or nerves existed and then were hardened, so little did the former forms first actually live and then die; it is the organic *plastic* nature which exhibits the organic in the element of immediate being — and thus produces it, crystallizes it through and through as dead shape — the way the artist

¹Momente

²Schiefrigen

³In the margin: unity of abstract moments

⁴herausbildet

⁵In the margin: penetrating itself—

⁶empfängt an der Metallität die continuität

⁷Tr. Note: e.g., the inorganic unlocks itself for the calcareous in the same way.

⁸Tr. Note: "tritt...[auf]" which could also be translated as "appears."

⁹Tr. Note: "Sprung" or fissure, which is the fissure through which the pulp of molten metal flows mentioned in α) above.

¹⁰In the margin: single to be sure — framed boat

[119] portrays human and other formations in stone — or on the flat canvas — he does not kill men, and dry them out, penetrate them with stone, or press them into stone¹ — he can do this as well, he casts models, but rather, through tools he produces forms, according to his idea, which portray life, and not living forms themselves; — but the
 5 immediate nature — *i.e.*, the concept is not present at hand as the represented, and the thing as the representing over and against it, which is fashioned by it; it is not the form of consciousness, but immediately in the element of being, and undetachable from this. The concept has the material there for its work, where the moments of the organic are present at hand in their totality; the point is not a universal life of nature; that nature is
 10 everywhere alive; but the point is the essence of life; it is to be grasped, to be interpreted in the moments of its actuality or totality; and the latter are to be exhibited.

What is missing in this portrayal of the organic, of the immediately organic in general, is that [the] concept is immediately inner purpose, is element of indifference;² its moments, its physical actualities, are not reflected into themselves, are not the
 15 former indifferent one stepping over against it. The universal, the purpose, however, expanding itself within the moments, returns back into itself, its indifference is the one-sided moment, that collects itself in negativity, and is an individual. The substance separates itself not only into diverse substances, but into absolutely opposed ones, and such of which each is the totality reflected into itself; indifferently against the other, one
 20 according to the essence, and not only the latter but whose reality itself is this being one, this negativity, *i.e.*, the *determinate being* of which is the process within itself.³

*Life*⁴ is essentially this perfect fluid penetration of all parts of the latter, α) *parts*, *i.e.*, such which are indifferent against the whole; they are no chemical abstractions; rather they are substantially its own whole life — and a life of the parts, which
 25 restlessly dissolves itself in itself, and only brings forth the whole

¹In the margin: *Not this mediation*

²Gleichgültigkeit

³Tr. note: "deren Daseyn der Proceß an ihm selbst ist" which could also be translated as "the *determinate being* of which is implicitly the process in itself."

⁴In the margin: the aether which actually is

[120]. — *The whole* is the universal substance, the ground, as it is the resulting totality; — and the whole is the latter as *actuality*; it is the One which in its freedom contains the parts bound together in itself; the One divides itself in the parts, gives them its universal life, and holds them in itself as their negative, as their force;¹ the latter is
 5 thus posited such that the parts have their independent life with them, which however is the sublation of their separateness and the becoming of the universal. The latter is the cycle² the movement in single actualities; the not constructed, not absolutely indifferent for each other.

This universal cycle is closer to the totality of three cycles, unity of the universality
 10 and of actuality; the two cycles of their opposition, and the cycle of the reflection of them in itself.

α) The universal is something *determinately existing*,³ and the organic One is the power over this negative of itself, this external, and consumes it; it is only something sublated β; the organic is thus the actual, that maintains itself, and runs through the
 15 process within itself; it is itself its universal, that divides itself into its parts, which produce the whole, sublate themselves γ) this actual which is brought forth is the species, it is the power against the singular; — the process of the species; it sublates *the latter* singular, brings another forth, that is the actuality of the species, and precisely for this reason is division against inorganic nature, to which the species sinks down.⁴

20 The organic process divides itself into two universal extremes, inorganic nature and species, [it] is the middle; α) with each immediate one it is αα itself species ββ) inorganic nature β) mediation with every one through [the] other αα) through the species with the inorganic⁵—the actual

¹als ihr negatives als ihre kraft in sich

²Krais

³daseyendes

⁴Sie hebt dieses Einzelne auf, bringt ein andres hervor, das die Wirklichkeit der Gattung ist, eben daher Entzweyung ist gegen die Unorganische Natur, zu der die Gattung herabsinkt. *Tr. Note:* "herabsinkt" might also be translated as "debased." The point is that the species is division against organic nature because it both brings another forth in reproduction and sinks back into inorganic nature in the death of the individual.

⁵In the margin: nourishment

[121] is the power over the latter, because it is the absolutely universal. $\beta\beta$) through the inorganic with the species, sex relationship.

I. The organic is immediately unity of singularity and of universality, is immediately organic species; it is excluding One, it excludes the universal from itself,—the species
 5 forsaken by the power of negativity, by life — or the organic posits itself as its inorganic — The species is the absolute universal, that sets itself over and against the abstract universal; precisely because of this it has also set free the moment of singularity, which is the negative relating against the inorganic. — In the syllogism of the merely organically alive, the species as universal does not at all step forth as its own
 10 free actuality.

II.¹ Here the species stands on the side of the organic — which is the conclusion of the syllogism,² so that the species is immediately unified with the inorganic.— the individual consumes itself; the non-exclusive diremption; relation of the organic to itself; sublates its own anorganicity,³ it nourishes itself out of itself, it articulates

¹*In the margin:* [There is a drawing appearing to represent the three circulatory processes discussed on page 120.]

²Schlußsatz

³anorganität

[122] itself in itself, it dirempts its universality in its differences. The course of the process is in itself.

III. The conclusion of the syllogism¹ is relation of the two sides, which are the whole organic — or diremption of this whole into opposed, independent sexes, sublation of the singular, and the having become of the species, but as a singular actuality,² which begins the cycle again.

I.³ Form of the species; abstract consideration. The organic One is the immediate unity of the individual and of the species — α) this universality is properly the unactual⁴ species in which $\alpha\alpha$) the classification⁵ of the species into kinds falls, $\beta\beta$) partly the superiority of individuality in general, of the earth, partly the singularity which frees itself from it, ⁶—quantitative difference, passivity.

β)⁷ In its actuality however, as it is within itself, the species is the stepping apart of the organic and its inorganic nature; the former is the form of the singularity, the latter the form of the universality; both are abstractions — the substance is the same, as it has determined itself as kind— the determinacy remains universality, it belongs in the element, in the principle.⁸ The stepping apart of the organic and its inorganic is nothing for the organic, that the stepping apart is not itself. — It is the latter, the organic one, taken back in the reflexion, so that the latter's world is implicit,⁹ its world is only as something sublated, the stepping apart is the positing and carrying of its world.— But to take the latter activity alone ¹⁰would be just as one-sided. The earth makes the

¹Schlußsatz

²aber als einzelnes Wirkliches

³In the margin: I) abstract relationship of singularity

⁴unwirkliche

⁵eintheilen

⁶In the margin: Organism a manifold complication of manifold processes - precise distinguishing - they do not fall out of unity, each itself goes back to it.

⁷In the margin: form of actuality, organic

A) immediately the moments are abstract existents, or indifferent division into organic and inorganic nature

⁸Gehört ins element, Princip

⁹Es ist in der Reflexion diß zur"ngenommen, daß seine Welt an sich ist

¹⁰Tr. note: e.g., the activity of stepping apart

[123] sun, *and the earth's* elements, like every organic as the latter universally organic, but likewise it is *implicitly* both.¹

The latter being—posited is the being—sublated of the inorganic; the being-sublated is not *implicit*; the organic is the self; but the former is first of all for the latter as implicit,² as the indifferent determinate being of both— it passes over into a tensed determinate being,³ into the form of the being-for-itself, which is proper for the organic. γ) the former immediate *being of the organic* as species is likewise something purely mediated α) through the inorganic, — the former immediate being of the organic is only this opposition against itself through the latter being other, as abstract universality, it is that of the species released from individuality β) through the organic as *singular*, the immediate being of the organic is procreation through its like; *generatio univoca* — because the former, the abstract universality, is also life within itself, it passes through itself into the organic; — in general the determinate being of the organic is the self-isolating,⁴ contracting action⁵ of the whole earth, the reflection of the universal in itself. But the abstract universality is likewise the stilled being—reflected in itself, and the more noble plants and animals are this fortified being—reflected in itself, that does not shoot up out of the earth like mushrooms, — gellatine without individuality or lichen,⁶ which is only organic life at all in its bare articulation into parts. In its *determinate being* abstract universality only comes to *universal* reflection, and here its immediate becoming ceases. The reflected in itself now stands fixed for itself, and proceeding through its own cycle, and is a proper determinate being,⁷ which remains opposed to the former⁸ determinate being which comes to universal reflection, and adheres to its negative being, denies its origin, and exhibits its becoming for itself.

δ) The relationship to the inorganic is the immediate and the mediated; α) in the former the organic is the immediate power, the immediate fusion⁹ as it were of the inorganic to organic fluidity. This is the ground of every relation of the two to each other, precisely this absolute unity of substance, through which the inorganic is so plainly transparent, un-objective of an ideal nature as space and time, for the organic, — notwithstanding the independence, the indifference

¹Die Erde macht die Sonne, und ihre Elemente, wie jedes Organische als diß allgemein Organische aber ebenso an sich beydes.

²Tr.note: e.g., the organic is first of all for the self as *implicit*

³Daseyn

⁴Tr. Note: "sich Vereinzelnde" could also be translated as "self-singularizing".

⁵Thun

⁶Flechte

⁷ist ein eignes Dasein

⁸In the margin: B. The species is *mechanical usurpation power*; force the individuality. (Tr. note: "mechanische Bemächtigung Macht ist die Gattung; Gewalt die Individualität." One might also translated "Gewalt" as "violence". I have chosen force, because in the sequel Hegel will elaborate on this theme by speaking of the "force" ("Krafft") by which the individual realizes the potential of the species.)

⁹Schmelzen

[124] of both. This unity of substance is the immediate transition, the immediate transformation; is actual here. — The latter is the immediate transition upon which all chemistry, all mechanics founders, and finds its limits, the grasping¹ out of such present at hand substances² that already has external equality, or negative relation. α) either is perfectly free in its existence against the other — Bread has no relation within
 5 itself to the body or the chylous,³ blood is something else; chemistry exhibits something similar in both, something close to egg-white material and the like — acid water, etc., substance; or precisely in this way in the plant substances which it exhibits in water⁴ — only both are purely something else at the same time — the wood, blood,
 10 flesh — as these substances, or water, or as the just mentioned plants; it does not remain the same thing — the pursuit of the same, the continuation of the same completely ceases; the *determinately existing* substance completely disappears. — Geometry is the exhibition of the same — or two fluidities, compound one salt⁵ — and evaporated water; would chemically dissolve the salt, and thus obtain the former
 15 substances again; the salt is grasped, not become something else in it, the substances become the latter. — But in the organic the latter becoming other of existing⁶ substances, the being is only something sublated, in the self, the spiritual, negative substance of the matterless;⁷ it does not come therefore at all into view according to its determinate being, but according to its concept — According to the latter it is the same
 20 [as] what it is as the organic — and in the organic it is only as it is in its concept; in the concept, its being precisely goes to ground^{8,9}

The latter¹⁰ portrays organic assimilation; organic assimilation is an *infection* of the inorganic, the latter's being, its substance becomes changed, and indeed immediately, its being is simple transition because the concept is the latter. The foodstuff that steps
 25 into

¹Tr. Note: "begreifen," which could also be translated as "conceiving."

²Das Begreifen aus solchem vorhandendenen

³Tr. Note: Chylous is a milky fluid consisting of lymph and emulsified fat extracted from chyme, or partially digested food.

⁴In the margin: when they are no longer the latter α) the organic makes them into such abstractions like chemistry* β) but these chemical substances are not in the same way the true being for the organic - blood and the latter taken again as chemical substances, in this manner they are other to it.

*Daneben: the fire is acid, etc.

⁵Oder zwey Flüssigkeiten, Verbindung ein Salz

⁶seyenden

⁷Das Seyn ist nur aufgehobenes, im Selbst, geistiges, negatives Stoff Materienloses;

⁸Tr. Note: In German to go to the ground ("zugrundegehen") means to perish, but it also implies going back to its ground in the sense of returning to the fundamental reasons or grounds for its being, which is what Hegel's philosophy of nature is attempting to portray. Hence, in spite of its awkwardness, I have tried to leave the translation as close to the original as possible.

⁹In the margin: unfortunately the spiritual bond is missing

¹⁰In the margin: C digestion α) immediate digestion

[125] the sphere of organic life is plunged in this fluidity —¹and by itself this dissolved fluidity; like a thing becomes a fragrance, something dissolved, a simple atmosphere; in the same way a simple organic fluidity becomes there, within which then no more of it or of its constituent parts can be discovered. This transition must similarly portray itself
 5 as a process, ²and unfold the articulation of its oppositions; but the ground is, such that the organic immediately pulls the inorganic into its organic matter, — it is the universal, the species — the simple self, and the latter is the self's power. — If the organic as *purposive* brings the inorganic gradually to identity with it throughout the single moments, then these wide-ranging institutions of digestion are likewise superfluous; it is
 10 the course of the organic in itself which happens for its own sake, in order to be movement, actuality — its fundamental relation, however, is this simple touching, within which the other is at once immediately changed. Assimilation has been portrayed by the physiologists as the latter infection, in as much as they, for example, have enclosed feed in tubes and placed them in the stomachs of animals, where thus saliva,
 15 pancreatic juice of the stomach, and the Gall could not work on them; the feed was digested just as well as if it had been in the stomach; — in addition, they even cut out the stomach wall, so that, as it were, only the pure direction was present; the it went equally well in both places.³ — The attempt was made to put small pieces of flesh into the abdominal cavity instead of in the stomach, also not in the intestines — also merely
 20 under skin simply on the bare flesh of the muscles; they were just as much changed as if they had been in the stomach — A well known experience is

¹*In the margin:* The chemical *determinately existing* difference is unnecessary; because the organic is this power.

²*In the upper margin:* Mysticism, concept is actual *supersensible world*

³es ging gleich gut von Statten

[126] also, in the choking of fieldfare,¹ if they are quite lean, that they become quite fat in the space of a few hours,² — a transformation³ in which without *further secretion there occurs* a passage through *the isolated moments of the process of assimilation*. — This is the organic fluidity which remains the same as itself, its fire-essence, within
 5 which everything immediately returns to its concept — eating and drinking makes inorganic things into what they implicitly are, in truth,⁴ it is the consciousnessless grasping of the latter, — they become the sublated therefore, because they are [it] implicitly.⁵

II. The latter immediate transition is likewise the developed process — the former is the reflection of itself into itself of the inorganic,⁶ the becoming the organic itself in
 10 general. The latter universal, however, has to actualize itself within itself — it gives itself its own *feeling of self*⁷ — precisely through movement — *becoming for itself*. The feeling of self is *transferred*⁸ into itself; the *organic* has its *inorganic nature* within

¹Tr. Note: e.g., trapped, or shot, birds. The German is "Krametsvögelfang."

²durch ein Nebel in Zeit von einigen Stunden

³In the margin: β) mediated digestion

⁴Essen und trinken macht die unorganische Dinge zu was sie an sich, in Wahrheit sind

⁵an sich

⁶In the margin: [There is a drawing of Hegel's apparently representing this reflection of itself into itself - which appears to be a portion of the drawing on p. 121, followed by this note:] the immediate species implicitly enters into the *process*— has become actual.

⁷In the margin: Element becoming digestion for itself — the communal is immediately the species — is actual.

B) * I consumption of its nature as inorganic: I its shaping out of itself.

II *Being-for-itself*; Night of its *being-for-itself* — pure ** *Negativity* - the *SATED* individual that has slept.

III The result is *sense*;- the individual has sublated its *being for others*; *theoretical essence of its inorganic nature*

*Next to this: it proceeds in its innards

**Next to this: SLEEP; reversal ,being is bored out of it into reflected being in itself. Sense

⁸verlegt

[127] *itself; it consumes itself*; it is¹ turned against itself as this immediate universal, as the latter **ORGANIC** species;² *it is itself the organic*. The latter is its individualizing process. It steps over against itself in itself,³ as it previously did against the external; the other has stepped under the concept. Insofar as the singular is already posited in advance, so here the singular concludes a syllogism through the species,— joining its
 5 universality with the particularized universal;⁴ the latter is the one extreme, which being taken up into the absolute species, becomes absolute particularity, singularity. The latter is the particular bearing out of the moment of individuality, the becoming of individuality, which already entered into the process as determinately existing^{5,6}
 10 Nothing comes out other than what already is. The digestive process of itself — and the articulation, the shaping of the moments, members become consumed, and likewise produced — the universal unrest, what remains is the soul, the simple —⁷ In it the individual comes through *the species* to the *tearing itself apart* from it; the⁸ process in the species makes the soul precisely into a one, which has negativity within it, and thus
 15 is opposed to the species as universal; Henceforth the element is the species, as at first the essence was the species.

¹In the margin: II.

²In the margin: A consumption of its nature as inorganic α) it consumes itself, is $\alpha\alpha$) its inorganic nature $\beta\beta$) its organic nature

³Tr. note: or "as itself."

⁴so schliesst sich hier das einzelne durch die Gattung, — seine Allgemeinheit, mit dem besondern Allgemeinen zusammen

⁵sevend

⁶In the margin: B) *Determinate being* β) brings forth itself as *doubled* α) *determinacy for others*; inorganic is its *being for others* as the senses reflected into themselves β) *its shape implicit being** γ) senses are its process in itself

*seine Gestalt an sich seyn

⁷In the margin: positive and negative meaning at the same time; the the former the individual, the latter division of the species.

⁸In the margin: C) Its process as *species*; for what it consumes is the *inorganic nature* which it itself is, i.e., species

[128]

III.¹ The result is that the singular has detached itself from the species;² this independent singular is for that reason related to such a one, that is equal to it as species. The species has divided itself in independent singulars; as before the individual
 5 was the middle, and the sides were the universal extreme; so [now] the species is the element. As each is this whole each is to itself, an object outside of it. — In the first process representation, recognition of an other, — in the second being for itself; in the third *the unity of both*; the other and it itself; ³it is the true actualization of the concept; it is the complete independence of both, within which each at the same time knows itself
 10 in the other as it knows itself; it is the relation become purely of an ideal nature, so that each is of an ideal nature to itself, a universal in itself; the pure non-objectivity is established in the self as such.

The organic begins with singularity, and raises itself to to the species; this process is in the same way immediately the opposite; the simple species climbs down to
 15 singularity; the perfection of the individuals into the species through their sublation is likewise the becoming of the immediate singularity of the offspring.

I.

Vegetable Organism.

The plant is the immediate organic individuality, within which the species

¹*In the margin: III* sublates itself as species, the latter is its downfall, process of the species;** pure changing into the inorganic. Parents pass away.*

^{*}*Next to this: III directed towards itself as species; division thus in the whole*

^{**}*Next to this: locked together through the inorganic immediate being one; they change into being.*

²*Daß aus der Gattung das einzelne sich abgesondert hat*

³*In the margin: immediate unity - unity is inorganic nature; they are no longer separated through indifference, through any being for itself, or through any immediate implicit being of the individual.*

[129] predominates, and the reflection is not of an individual nature, what is *of an individual nature* does not return to itself as such, but is another, there is no *self-feeling*. The latter character has its whole process.

α) The latter vegetable organism is the first earth, which exists¹ as subject. The earth as organism in general thus posits itself opposite itself, is one, such that the others are perfectly independent — Sun, moon and comet — are the first subject, but as its elements. As the former return into themselves, they are physical elements
 30 through this return; the vegetable organism is their subject; the reversed becoming of the latter; previously the physical elements were a transition into unity which immediately posits the independent bodies; now they are in the subject only as sublated things, only as elements.²

35 The plant has these universal elements for its inorganic nature; it is the species of an individual nature;³ [as] opposed to itself the plant is likewise the latter not individual nature; and it is the process of the latter elements of light, water and air; — the light does not affect the plant as fire; the plant is no *warmth*, because the light is composed of *independent* elements, actually dissolved in the plant, which are their
 40 own self⁴ — so that in their free determinate being the elements would have the nature of the self within the light — But rather immediately stepping out of the subject they step forth only as elements. — Also the earth is not for the elements for this reason; it does not posit the elements; it is still immediately one with them.

45 This universal vegetable organism has the determinacy within it immediately as singularity; it is singular thing — the natural species immediately falls away in this form, — the singulars remain an excluded mass indifferent to one another, which do not proceed out of their substance as a common being.⁵ — These singular subjects are now within themselves the process of the latter elements; as the shaping of a subject;
 50 the light as singular thing, which transforms air into water and water into air,

¹ ist

² ist sie im Subjecte als aufgehobene nur Elemente.

³Tr. note: "die individuelle Gattung," which might also be translated as the "individualized species."

⁴Tr. note: "denn es sind selbstständige, die eignes Selbst sind, in ihr wirklich aufgelöst" Either: "the light is composed of *independent* elements, actually dissolved in the plant, which are their own self" Or possibly: "there are *independent* elements, really dissolved in the plant, which are their own self"

⁵Gemeinwesen

[130] — a process in which the light even excludes this not-unlocked solidity¹ as a moment.

α)²The first relationship to inorganic nature is α) the former the dividing of the
 5 concept, the other the sublating; the latter movement against the external is the
 unmediated — the immediate flowing together; for the plant no singularity is there by
 itself, through which it is separated from the others, and can only be joined back
 together with them through a middle, rather it is the inner, the force of the earth alone,
 through which they are one. The elements are themselves the object, *i.e.*, the simple
 10 essence, the relation is thus likewise immediate. The earth is only the latter universal
 force. — The plant thus steps forth as a simple immediate unity of the self and the
 species — as a kernel of seed.³

β) The latter thus is as an *indifferent* thing, for the sake of the immediacy of its
 15 individuality; it falls in the earth; the earth itself is only the universal force for the
 kernel of seed, the latter draws no sustenance from it as earth, it feeds itself only
 through air and water. Earth does not decrease in its weight, plants planted in sulfur
 glass⁴ thrive equally well; a good earth only has the meaning of being this unlocked
 organic force or possibility; — like a good head merely means the possibility⁵ — it is
 20 the real possibility⁶ — light, air and water are likewise the possibility of the plant; but
 not as substance, which implicitly is already what the plant is, an *implicitness*⁷ that is
 not the abstract implicitness of thought — like implicitly the absolute, is merely
 empty thinking; on the contrary, it is the essence, but the essence of the plant, the
force of the latter. — Stone considered *implicitly* in the absolute is life, plant, man;⁸
 25 but it is not the *force* of the stone; *i.e.*, the *determinate* simple *immediate* possibility.

¹Unaufgeschlossene Gediegenheit

²*In the margin:* The process is the simple — in the earth planting, growing, rooting, stem and
 branch and leaves blooms and the production of seeds; the matter which one cannot see with one's bare eyes
 is not contained in the microscope — the true determinate being is open, it is to be grounded in itself.

³Saamenkorn

⁴Schwefel Glas

⁵*Tr. Note:* *e.g.* To have a good head means the possibility to be the unlocked spiritual force.

⁶*Tr. Note:* *e.g.*, the real possibility of unlocking this spiritual force.

⁷ein Ansich

⁸Stein an sich im Absoluten betrachtet Leben, Pflanze, Mensch

[131] The seed therefore, so that it is essentially force, is in the earth, the essential force is not the seed's inorganic nature, its objective element, but rather force; — the seed comports itself negatively against the force according to the concept, it sublates the latter, so that the concept is earth, so that it realizes itself; but the latter is not the
 5 object of the indifferent determinate being, as against its inorganic nature. That the seed is laid in the ground means it is force. The determinately existing is the mere determinate being of the ideal spatial relation¹ — this unity of space is force; otherwise nothing would occur as spatial change.² The meaning of space here is thus life. This sheltering³ in the earth is therefore a *mystical magical* action — as the child
 10 is not just this helpless human form which does not announce itself as reason, but is *implicitly* the force of reason; something completely other than the latter⁴ that cannot speak, and can do nothing rational, and baptism is precisely this solemn recognition by the companions of the spiritual realm, — so the letting fall of the kernel of seed in the earth is this mystical action, secret forces are in it, which still slumber, so that in
 15 truth it is still something other, than this, *the manner in which it is there*; the magician, who gives this kernel that I crush with my hand a wholly other meaning is the *concept*, the concept of nature — which is a rusty lamp a powerful spirit; the kernel is the power, which called the earth forth, that the earth's force would serve it.⁵

The development of the sprout⁶ is *at first* mere growth, mere increase; it is already
 20 in itself the entire plant; it is the tree, etc., in miniature; the parts already perfectly formed, only an enlargement, a formal repetition, a hardening. For what should grow,⁷ is already; or growth⁸ is the latter merely superficial movement. It is however just as much the qualitative articulation and shaping, the essential process.

As relatedness of the vegetable individual towards the *outside*, the latter process⁹ is
 25 an immediate streaming in; *the stream of the outside's inorganic elements*

¹Raumbeziehung

²Raumveränderung

³Bergen

⁴e.g., the child which cannot speak is something other than a fully developed reason

⁵Tr. note: e.g., that the earth's force would serve the kernel. In other words, what is at issue is a realization of the force of the concept. The kernel of seed is the power of the concept which calls forth the earth to serve it. This suggests that the transition from logic to philosophy of nature occurs through a similar realization of the force of the concept. Thus, for the concept to fully emerge and recognize itself as such, nature is required to serve it, so that it might realize itself. Thus, the concept is the ground of nature, rather than nature being the ground of the concept. Hence, there can be no evolutionary account in the modern sense of the word according to Hegel, not because he is opposed to the idea of a development, but rather, because he is opposed to the idea of a chance or random development. The concept must be present from the outset, and his entire project is an effort to show how the concept's determination of nature and spirit culminates in the moment of recognition which grasps it; i.e., it is an effort to measure the concept's pre-history from the present apex of its development. Thus, rather than measuring the present by the past, as does evolution, Hegel is measuring the past by the eternal present of the concept in its fullest actualization in human reason.

⁶Keim

⁷werden

⁸Werden

⁹Tr. note: the word process is interpolated for clarification.

[132] *is not articulated, not isolated, for the vegetable individual, not physical* qualities; not outward, against which the plant would comport itself according to a mechanical movement, and itself a singular, take possession of¹ these singulars by itself. Rather as it is the first organic process, not an individuality, but rather
 5 singularity in general, its relatedness is thus immediate; not mediated through an external movement.

The² first relationship grasps the division in organic and inorganic, and mechanical — immediate (here mechanical has the sense of being implicit³) return
 10 [into] the organic unity. But the former streaming in, although immediate touching, is just as much process;⁴ quiet process of the elements, whose subject, fire, is the plant, elements which do not come to the self, which do not come to flash within themselves.⁵ α) the element of this process is *light*, the quiet unity of both sides, the substance, the self, through which the organic and the inorganic is one. The light is
 15 therefore active, exciting, because this plant as organic self is itself the latter light. — For the sake of the independence of both, the light must be determinately *there*⁶ for the plant, and its determinate being in the singular is contingent for it; — the change of light and darkness is necessary. — The plant thus strives against the light like the lonely person seeks out others, it wrests itself up out of the earth, towards it; — in
 20 closed vault cellars, where there is a crack — potatoes send forth tendrils

¹ Bemächtigen

² *In the margin:* [Another of Hegel's drawings]. This conclusion is there — the shaping is its becoming, bringing forth through itself α) [next to this : another drawing] root, stem and leaf — leaf is b singularity as process. c) is living wood

³ des ansichseyend

⁴ *In the margin:* The first is water absorption, water process.

⁵ ruhiger Process der Elemente, deren Subject, Feuer, die Pflanze ist, die nicht zum Selbst, zum Blitz an ihnen kommen

⁶ *Tr. note:* This translation of "da seyn" is chosen to preserve continuity with the translation of "Daseyn" as "determinate being" following Petry.

[133] as if they knew the way, not in a straight line, but according to the angles of the wall towards the light — Through this unity of the opposed inner and outer self the pure process is in general. Thus the plant comports itself to the air, to the tensed physical elements, so that it kills their tension, and so that in itself it changes itself
 5 into water, and the reverse, so that it changes water into air; it is α) an inhaling and exhaling; an inhaling of air, which becomes organic water; further, there is no great change, something sweet, acidic organic water, but penetrated by life, individualized, in a way that escapes¹ the hands of chemistry — a spiritual bond. — it would draw the carbonic acid² out of the air, preserve the carbon for itself, but release the oxygen
 10 for itself; — merely hypothetical explanation. It is already completely superficial in itself to regard the vegetable process as the *de-oxydizing*, the *Oxydizing* as the combustion of the animal, so that the latter would express the first; What this supposedly philosophic view is grounded upon are experiments in which plants, placed under water and exposed to light, give off oxygen — as if this were not just as
 15 well a process with the water, as if therein lay the proof that they give it off from themselves in the free air, where its process is not hindered, and did not much rather decompose³ the air and take the oxygen gas into itself,⁴ and only give it off under water, and under the air-pump,⁵ but take it into themselves in their true process.⁶ — It does not arrive at this *chemical* determinate being at all; rather the negative is the
 20 force of the plant; *envelopped*, hidden in the indifferent freedom of life;⁷ if it came to chemical processes as such, then

¹entflieht

²kohlensäure

³zersetzen

⁴und das Sauerstoffgas sich nehmen

⁵Luftpumpe

⁶*In the margin:* Red and green, a painter which only has these colors, the former for historical pieces, the latter for landscape peices.

⁷*In the margin:* universal — like a sensible human being comports himself to the solid universal. —

[134] organic life would be extinguished; — the organic is no longer the *determinately existing* abstraction, or differentiation.

The¹ plant is thus the doubled process α) it transforms air into water; — here
 5 every chemical perspective fails to help explain the transition from nitrogen into
 hydrogen, for both are the plant's unchangeable materials;² — The mediation occurs
 through the oxygen gas as that which is negative to itself. But with this the process is
 not finished³ — it goes back into carbon, back into the subjective, actually chemical
 — similarly β) turned the other way around the plant dissolves the latter which is
 10 punctual, in water and air through the opposed path.

But both processes are closed up in life; they have stepped back, the abstract
implicit, thus they are not real; rather air and water and vegetable earth are moments
 of the same; — it separates itself into the doubled α)⁴ lung process air and water
 15 going back into the *solid*, β) and the solid evaporated into itself. Both begin
 everywhere $\alpha\alpha$) in the external *air*, it goes back through water to the solid $\beta\beta$)⁵
 external water, which becomes absorbed goes in the air, and air as the abstract —
 standing for the chemical element, passes over into the organic $\gamma\gamma$) in the *solid*, in the
 earth it goes back into water and

¹*In the margin:* Becoming [*Next to this:* neutrality shaping] water, water process — division of this neutralization.

²*In the margin:* universal process. Sublation of the positing of humidity.

³*In the margin:* β) Return out of neutrality to self — the shaping transforms itself in the process into the self which is present at hand —

⁴*In the margin:* Process of the individual — directed towards itself; it is for itself; it must therefore take everything out of itself

⁵*In the margin:* α) distinguishing of the moment, what they are in themselves is determined through the moments of inorganic nature, which the plant now has in itself

[135] air. — the *external* goes back into inwardness, and this back to *externality*. —
The plant maintains the atmosphere in humidity, and likewise it absorbs the water of
 the latter; everything negative is likewise positive.

5 In the plant itself this process is its shaping, which contains the three moments α)
 that they become the solid, the self, the wooden — β) that they become the
 water-filled — neutral — γ) that they become the airy, purely ideal process.

α)¹ *The process of lignification*² and the *process of growth* are opposed as
 qualitative and quantitative;³ the former the becoming the solid simply dead self, the
 10 latter going out of its self — is connected especially with light; humid, cloudy
 atmosphere promotes growth — in shade the plants are larger, but pale and weak; —
 in the light stronger, adhering more to the core, riper,⁴ more lignified. β) *The*
water-process is composed of the inert determinate being and growth generally; — at
 the same time the transition of the first into division, dissolution cleansing and
 15 evaporation of individuality; the air process is finally this evaporated [individuality],
 aetherization of the former inert dead independence; the other extreme, in which the
 selfly⁵ water divides itself — in the static singularity and in the enfolded universality,
 in the determinate being of the species.

The latter⁶ whole is α) *implicit* — being, static shape generally, $\alpha\alpha$) the force which
 20 has not been unlocked, the pure self that precisely for the sake of its immediate
 simplicity

¹*In the margin:* α) expression of the moments, wood—fibers, water—cells, air—tubes β) growth, shaping as the becoming of the existing, quantitative change — the last of these processes is the process itself, the leaf γ) that shaping is through this a becoming of the sublated (β) it expresses the water γ) the air) — γ) the whole has become through this unity. This whole is gemma another individual, like the first; this produced steps out over against its becoming. It is the whole itself, like the wood and root are only the abstract self.

²Verholzungsprozess

³*In the margin:* wood is root — water, the stem, airduct is the leaf

⁴kernhafter reifer

⁵in welches sich das selbstige Wasser entzweyt.

⁶*In the margin:* root

[136] sinks back into the inorganic; it is the *wood-fibers* generally — regarded chemically it is carbon; abstract subject; — but according to its concept it is the bare force in general, force as such;¹ which in the earth is its simple seed, remaining dark;² the root which is pure wood, without bark and pith; — **ℵ**) *Combustibility as the*
 5 *possibility* of fire, of the subject, mere possibility it is itself no warmth, it is not species in such a way that it would be the unity of two itself, the dissolution of singular shapes; — it proceeds for this reason often to sulphurousness — in some roots it itself produces completely formed sulphur — **β** likewise in the earthiness — it produces rotted roots — peat-mould process³ — also in the stems it produces unmistakably⁴
 10 produced earth, decomposition in dead punctuality out of its continuity. **¶**) it just as easily produces decomposition in stone;⁵ the rooting is such a curvature and extinguishing of the plane and line of such an entangling,⁶ such that the sublatung of the former is a solid continuity, which is on the verge [of becoming] entirely inorganic — without the *distinctions* of shape, (fibers) of chemical (combustibility) of
 15 punctuality (earth) — and to return to rock, as frequently occurs — petrified trees; powder ash⁷ a form of scilica in the bamboo tube in the nodules, for these are themselves new root nodules —

β The *root*, the wood, taking its length together in *the curved entangling*,⁸ the force which remains in itself discloses itself; in the evolved moment of the shape —
 20 **α**) simple *skin*, external pure unity of all moments, the lymph, the universal encompassing, **β**) the bark, the celled tissue, whose cells are full of water — occasionally one finds fine crystals in it in microscopic observations; **γ**) wood fibers themselves again in spiral form — the solid middle — which **δ**) passes over to the limit on the other side, air-utricles, like the

¹In the margin: hangs in the balance between all moments

²der in der Erde, seinem einfachen, finstern bleibende Saamen

³Dammerde Torfprocess

⁴Förmliche

⁵Tr. note: "ebenso leicht in Stein" the construction is such that the pronoun and verb "it... produces" are implicit from the preceding clauses.

⁶Verknötung

⁷Tabascher

⁸die Rundung Verknötung

[137] bark, water cells; — this stalk stem is lacking in monocotyledons, which pass immediately from the root into the *leaf*.

The *foliage* is finally the pure process, lichen¹ and bark of the stem, but the freed
 5 activity, the limit of the motionless *shaping*, the beginning of the pure process as
 process; the living light process, which passes over into fire process, into the
 dissolution of its shape, and produces the latter as being for others. The plant *is* in this
 manner; but its being is a *tension* of its *rooting*, its force *existing-in-itself*,² against its
actuality; its diremption is the extreme of being-out-of-itself, of the dissolution of
 10 the sublated *singularity* in the leaf; — *Process* as such against the subsistence of
 singularity.

In this shape the universal sphere within which the plant remains can be observed
 in its essence;³ namely, something simple, which in its articulation⁴ does not come
 15 out of the simplicity of its universal substance; therefore, each part is the force of the
 whole plant, and each can represent it. — inverting the roots of tree, with the boughs
 planted in the earth, it sprouts, the roots become perfect branches — bark sprouts in
 the same way — and the branches revert to roots; but foliage, the free process,⁵ no
 longer has this solidity within [itself],⁶ that it could come to subsisting.—⁷

b)⁸ With the stepping forth of the proper *process* of the self the shaping is
 inhibited

¹Lunge

²ihrer insichseyended Krafft

³In the margin: In the opposed processes of individuality the species is present — entirely through
 this opposition

⁴Articulation

⁵In the margin: This self does not come to an appropriate cycle in itself.

⁶Tr. note: "an [sich]" which is normally translated "implicit" has here been translated as "within
 [itself]" in an attempt to account for the parentheses in the original.

⁷das es zum Bestehen kommen könnte

⁸In the margin: b) the result is the unity as process — it turns back into being — inhibition,
 reflexion in itself, leafprocess reconstruction of wood — produces roots, takes back the absorption of light,
 — like the first absorption of water, shaping was process directed against itself.

[138] — The light already inhibited the stepping forth of the proper process of the self as *shaping*; but as a whole the stepping forth is the light's own whole actual;¹ it is the light's own fire; it is the taking itself back into itself — the being—outside—of—itsself is precisely the actuality of this process.² Its actuality — as
 5 the shape is its *being*, so it is the being for others of this process, but it is a reflected being for others, in the manner of its *senses*; and *being for itself*, but as something simple. — The process of shaping, is negativity of the immediate simplicity of the subject — of seed, and wood — it is division of the shape, — sublation of the former negativity as the latter division of the shape— it is *reproducing*³ in general⁴ —
 10 shaping, production of another self — gemmation, reproduction of bulbs⁵ — multiplication, within which multiples become a whole, as this single shape was enlarged previously. The latter represents the place of senses⁶ — that it is reflected into itself in its *determinate being*, in its form, here means that the shaping of its determinate being is everywhere a whole individual^{7,8} itself something existing; it is
 15 not a universal individual in its determinate being, or reflected into itself as such, such that the objective were a singular for it, and it is the unity of this singularity. The individual as a self is thus *there* as a self, in such a way that

¹aber als Ganzes ist es sein eignes ganzes *wirkliches*

²*In the margin:* It has become the entire result α) posited opposite its becoming β) whole in itself; αα) gemma ββ) flower γγ) fruit. This whole is the process, which the whole plant has as its parts.

³*Vervielfältigung*

⁴*In the margin:* A. meaning of the whole is α) being reflected in itself — self—feeling. Being in itself in its being for others; meaning. Plant does not comes back to itself as individual.

⁵zwiebel

⁶*In the margin:* gemmules generally, Stolons* bulbs break into two — ready as leaf — gemma —

**Tr. note:* e.g., a shoot that bends to the ground or that grows horizontally above the ground and produces roots and shoots at the nodes

⁷sein Daseyn Gestalten ist allenthaben ganzes Individuum

⁸*In the margin:* The singularity, the process is itself still object; — unity of to singularities; plant only earth, force.

[139] it is not the unity of itself and the universal inorganic nature, — but rather it is the unity of itself, and a foreign singularity, *i.e.*, one [, which] is really reflected in itself for itself — But the inorganic nature is not itself such a singularized object in itself in the plant, but rather it is more immediately, or it is no object. Its being reflected is not itself, therefore, the *unity of two singulars*, rather the latter fall apart in it. Inorganic nature comes presumably to this reflection, to be this singular and another singular, but expressed from one side the negative unity of both is missing — the unity is the shape-whole¹ of the plant; the resting shape, not the negative shape — from the other side it does not even come to genuine free objectivity in it, and this other singular is only *a PART of the latter, and a plant like it*. — *It can produce itself in its shaping* only in this way, or preserve the parts of the shape in the organic unity such that it makes the latter into a determinately existing whole — it cannot produce the latter as particular systems— the singular moments as living express life in an other determinacy, in an other element.

In this way² inorganic nature's immediate being reflected into itself, *its implicit being and being for itself* is made;³ — but the latter essential movement — the determinately existing whole⁴ is the unity of the shape, the unity of the *implicit-being*⁵ and of the *being-for-itself* of the process; the determinately existing whole⁶ is the process of the independent, *self identical, whole* individual — the relating of that, which only fell apart as existing unity in the first immediately reflected unity; the relation of the individual to itself as independent individual. But the plant has no force to do this; *the determinately existing whole*⁷ *is the production process, which is only a representation of the sex relationship*; — indeed in dioecious plants⁸ the separated masculine and feminine individuality, is each furnished with its own plant, but this plant is not penetrated by this character, rather it is only a superficial summit.⁹

The opposition of masculinity and femininity comes to be in the doubled way

¹Gestalt Ganzes

²In the margin: B. flower

³ihr an und für sich seyn beschaffen

⁴es

⁵Ansichseyns

⁶es

⁷es

⁸Diocisten

⁹Spitze

[140] two processes are posited α)¹ *the implicitly existing plant*,² *which comports itself negatively against inorganic nature, the species, which is as singularity* — and β) the plant *which, reflected into itself, is universal in its being turned outwards*; the former is the singular actual self, the latter the possibility of singularity, of activity; 5 the immediate actual unity of the species and singularity and for this reason the passive, receiving and bearing of the universal womb. They represent the two first processes against each other;³ the one is the negative which has its essence outside of itself and is directed towards it, as towards something to be sublated — the other is itself the latter essence reflected into itself, it is no longer the inorganic nature. Both 10 processes are themselves the whole, only in opposed determination. Thus both *find* them opposite themselves.⁴ But their determinate being has become through the process itself and that is indeed through the latter.⁵ *The self digesting shaping has born itself out of itself into a process reflected in itself*⁶ — as a process it is the divided within itself, and as the reflected into itself its sides are the whole individuals. 15 The water process of the leaf divides its neutrality into lignification as roots as simple sprouts, individuals⁷ — and into *the process of the air, marrow*.⁸ — In this element the plant now produces itself as a whole which is dirempted into *sexes*, or much rather it is dirempted into sexual parts. ⁹

20 **Becoming a sex has the sense that the individual plant**

¹In the margin: α) implicit being

²die an sich seyende Pflanze

³Sie stellen die beyden ersten Processe gegen einander vor

⁴In the margin: β) Having become

⁵Tr. note: "durch den letzteren" which could also be translated "through the latter process."

⁶Das sich verdauende Gestalten hat sich zum in sich reflectierten Processe herausgeboren

⁷In the margin: Marrow, this dead universality — like wood a dead self.

⁸Tr. Note: the German word, "mark" means both "marrow" and "pith."

⁹In the margin: α) Bridal beds [Brautbette] — whole $\alpha\alpha$) calyx * - skin — universal encompassing $\beta\beta$) leaf bark — refined, colored, the neutral color of the leaf cleanly characterized — moment of its proper actuality being for itself —

*Tr. Note: e.g. the sepals of a flower considered as a group

[141] would be another to itself as individual; that it would become actual its self as *light*; for the pure self is the light, the selfhood,¹ in order that it would become as objective present, the absolute for *sight*.² — the light does not become that, but rather the sense of sight remains only light, the color within it, not the light reborn in the mid-night of sleep, in the darkness, of the pure I, not as a seeing — not the latter *spiritualized* light, which selfhood is; the pure *existing* negativity.— The latter rebirth contains the moment of the transformation of the water as reflection into individuals, gemma, stolons, — the simple unity of these individuals is only there, as belonging to the plant, as its simple pure continuity, metallity, or *color*. The bark and leaf which are the self of the process, still in their undividedness — *green*; this synthetic color of blue and yellow is sublated with the neutrality of the water and divided into blue and yellow; appearance of the present green is yellow, and has a bluish appearance, and the yellow later passes over into *red*; ³ — Fire colors — cornfield gold, corn flowers (blue), poppy (red).

This light process is the shape of the flower. It is the shape raised up into the light in the self — the manifold of the leaves pulls itself together into a single point (as in the bud⁴ a single point for each) and the latter bud is the developed whole in its pure parts — the flower-calyx⁵ is the leaf which has shrunk into the skin — the leaf extinguishes its woodiness and its separated water cells and gathers itself in a cleaner color around the *yeast*^{6,7} This is the abstract in-itself of the plant; the seed is the abstract actual implicit, — the *fertilized*, the yeast

¹Selbstigkeit

²daß es zum absoluten zum Sehen würde

³*In the margin:* Many kinds run through all these colors — artistic gardening to pursue them through all these colors and their mixing. If the wild flower is red, it is difficult to turn it into blue — if a plant does not bloom — it easily colors its leaves, and also paints its pistil as well;

⁴*Tr. note:* “Knospe” which is elsewhere translated as “gemma.” “Knospen” is translated as “gemination.”

⁵Kelch

⁶Germen

⁷*In the margin:* yeast is this purer gemma

[142] however does not yet have the possibility of being actual within it,¹ it is still possibility in general. The yeast is for another, and the latter, its being for another, is the *pistil*. The other for which it is; the latter is the *wood-fiber*,² for the other is the *determinatcy* of the *simple* self. The latter comports itself against itself; the other, for which it is, is a part, a particular actual thing; — to which the plant is added here, such that the singular is for it, but α) a *part* of it, β) not as a whole; — it is the active, *the leaf*, the process, which makes itself into a material, into *pollen*, the *active marrow*; — marrow is the abstraction of the *airy*, the elastic, which is tensed in itself; here the tension comes into determinate being *as activity*; the organic= chemical moment, as pistil³ on its side;⁴ an external activity, a working of something determinately existing on something determinately existing;⁵ and one such that is the inorganic nature of the determinately existing⁶ — it does not help there — as in production generally not to investigate what is in the unfertilized yeast, and what comes to it through fertilization; the change eludes the rough hands of chemistry, which kills what is alive, and only comes to see what is dead, not the living. The fertilization of of the plant only consists in the fact that that it sets up the moments of the abstraction in this separated⁷ determinate being,⁸ and posits them again as one through touching.⁹ This movement as a movement between *abstract*, different, spiritualized, but *actual*, i.e., *determinately existing*, things,¹⁰ because they are abstract, is the plant's *realization*, which it exhibits within itself.¹¹

¹In the margin: different moments

²In the margin: Wood—fiber and leaf, marrow, pollen; but combustible, active, enlivened like leaf, only more watery

³In the margin: acid, base

⁴seinerseits

⁵eines daseyenden auf ein daseyendes

⁶eine Wirken eines daseyenden auf ein daseyenden; und ein solches das seine unorganische Natur ist.

⁷getrenntem

⁸In the margin: the same materials, quantitative distinction, — unfortunately the spiritual bond is lacking; first becoming — the reason of course present at hand — relating to the dead

⁹Und sie durch die Berührung wieder in eins setzt

¹⁰d.h. daseyenden

¹¹In the margin: odor — aereated plant in the spiritual, immaterial for other being, marrow.

[143]

The latter exhibiting has generally been seen as the sexual process since Linneaus; only, that if it were the latter, it would not only need parts of the plant as its moments, but whole plants. The monoecious and Dioecious plants are indeed separated sexes, and constitute the main proof of fertilization; but the diverse individuals cannot be
 5 regarded as diverse sexes, because they are not immersed in the *principle* of their opposition; because the principle does not entirely penetrate them, it is not a *universal* moment, is not the principle of the whole individual, but rather a *cut off part of the latter*, and both only relate themselves *to each other* according to this part. The proper
 10 *sex* must have whole individuals as its opposites, whose determinacy is completely reflected into themselves, and spreads itself out over the whole.

It is properly for this reason that the sex relationship is just as much or much rather to be regarded as *a digestive process*.¹ For the digestion is the latter process, which has such independent things as its sides, which indeed have their own
 15 *determinate being* within them, but not to be the perfect reflection, the whole in itself;² They are only *viscera*, not individuals, the parts of the corolla are such viscera. — Or digestion and production are the same here. They are the *same*, the digestion brings the *individual* itself forth— inorganic nature —³ but in the plant it is another individual that becomes here — as in the immediate digestion of growth,
 20 precisely the latter is an entangling.

The⁴ product, the plant become perfect is then the *fruit*. It is the *seed*, a gemma, which is not immediately, but rather through the developed process; the former is only the formal repetition of the whole. As *seed* the seed has no advantage over the
 25 gemma, insofar as only a new whole should be produced

¹*In the margin:* In insects male and female are of very diverse habitus.

²Denn die Verdauung ist dieser Proceß, der zu seinen Seiten solche selbständige hat, die zwar eigenes Daseyn aber nicht die vollkommene Reflexion, Ganze in sich zu seyn, an ihnen haben

³*In the margin:* Production of something superfluous for propagation — luxury oil of the nectars

⁴*In the margin:* Seed freely dissolves itself, comes into movement, but only of the dropping

[144]; — many plants do not even come to produce¹ seeds.² — The latter is however the *digested* plant — and *fruit*, which itself precisely exhibits itself out of itself as its own organic nature and as having been produced through it. as its own organic nature out of its self Seed and fruit are the proper sexes, which the plant succeeds in
 5 attaining;³ in the parts of the flower there are only different things⁴ (sexual parts) which do not have their own whole; seed and fruit, are this whole but without differentiation; they have the whole within them, and the rotting⁵ of fruit is the process of becoming of inorganic nature as *such*; the account, according to the inner meaning, not so that inorganic nature would only be what is rotted by this seed —
 10 other plants are no fruit. — The seminal ground⁶ swells up; the *leaf*, (the seed capsule) whose process has now materialized itself. The plant brings the seed capsule as far as this digestion, it presents itself to higher organisms,⁷ in order to be enjoyed; this is its *determination*; the plant is a subordinated organism; the idea of the latter is not perfected in the plant; rather the organism is a determinate being to be consumed
 15 — it is so hard to do⁸ in contrast to the economic uses, it is not at all contingent; it is *common*, because the plant is something common. Considered within itself, the plant as it is in the absolute, is precisely to be one such a determinate being to be consumed in its perfection, to sublate that, which is inorganic nature for another.⁹

¹Viele kommen gar nicht zu Saamen

²*In the margin:* separated individual [*next to this:* inorganic] its own being—in—itsself; for the gemma — the tree its being in itself.—

³zu welchen die Pflanze gelangt

⁴differente

⁵*In the margin:* Fruit the inorganic nature as being for other reflected into itself.

⁶saamenboden

⁷*Tr. note:* “sie bietet sich als höhere Organismen dar” which might also be translated as “it presents itself as higher organisms” or “by way of higher organisms.” The following context suggests that the fruit offers itself *to* higher organisms.

⁸*Tr. Note:* “Es ist so Spröde zu thun gegen den ökonomischen Nutzen”. e.g., this process by which the seed is a being to be consumed is so brittle, hard (Spröde) or difficult to describe in contrast to the economic uses, for it is not at all contingent.

⁹*In the margin:* taste of the plant — digested inorganic nature, developed subsistence

[145] (It remains to see, how the latter inorganic nature¹ which is reconstructed by the plant is nature. α) the light is *color* within inorganic nature,² as being for others; — its own light — flowers of a yellow color shine forth very readily — but the light is not only thus color, property; but the organic itself has subjugated the color to a *thing*,
 5 or raised what is only *being for others* and does not have its own actuality, to a physical determinate being, — it is already *thing* as metal, everything of the inorganic which is colored is metallic. In that chemistry shows the plant in its dead parts, it exhibits a *colored-material*³ — in animals iron in the blood, the physical abstraction; plants do not contain this purity in their concept.)

The inorganic nature is likewise, as a form of air for others, the sense of smell — its whole nature has evaporated into the air, in an atmosphere, aerial determinate being; — as in color as color, so smell as smell;⁴ — it *smells*, — in fruit, the latter⁵ is separable as thing, as *aetherial oil*. — It is likewise the *salty*, the *neutral* — pointed
 15 crystals in the leaves, still less digested water.⁶ Mainly in fruit which is still unripe, it is saline, predominantly as tartar salt,⁷ an unripe salt, which taking its neutrality together, pulls itself together into the *combustible* salt of sugar, and becomes winey fluidity. Here the *plant* now first shows itself as the concept, which materializes the principle of light, made into a fire-essence⁸ — it contains not only a quantity of
 20 combustible, resined parts⁹ — which keep the flame when lit; — rather it is itself the movement of the fire in itself; it passes over into *fermentation*, but the warmth, which it implicitly gives itself from itself¹⁰ is its destruction — the life course *of the dead*. The animal process, which is higher than it is as a plant is its demise. — sugar — wine, vinegar fermentation (acid still outside) rotting, putrefaction, unbinding of the
 25 dead materials; — forsaken by the self, they become dead material.

¹Tr. note: e.g., the inorganic nature.

²das licht ist an ihr Farbe

³Färbestoff

⁴Tr. Note: e.g., as light is color in it, so air is smell in it

⁵Tr. note: e.g., the latter inorganic nature.

⁶In the margin: Taste

⁷Weinsteinsalz

⁸Feuerwesen

⁹In the margin: Warmth

¹⁰welche sie an ihr selbst, aus sich sich gibt

[146]

The plant has thus produced two organic beings¹ in the fruit²— seed and fruit as such; which however are indifferent and fall apart; the force which bears the seed becomes the *earth*, — the fruit is not its maternal body. The plant's fruit has the
 5 doubled principle within it, of the sugary winey and of the flowery, the *viscous*³ —, of the drinkable and the edible — the former of the *spiritual*, the latter of the *bodily*, the former of the *selfly*⁴ — the latter of the *consisting*.⁵ The neutrality of the watery has become fiery;⁶ — *the latter spirituality is the highest selfhood*⁷ to which the self brings the plant;⁸ the latter spirituality does not become *the plant's* blood, but rather
 10 *the plant's death first contributes to it* — intoxicating drinks place man back into this consciousness, universal self-feeling. Animals consume the still unfermented.

The latter⁹ nature of the plant in nature is present at hand in more or less complete ways. α) Palms, Monocotyledons do not bring forth¹⁰ to any actual stem — not to a
 15 finished leaf, they are always this involuted gemma which breaks out, but is never flat, but which never becomes finished; hence *musa paradisiaca*

¹Wesen

²*In the margin:* Gravity [*Next to this:* Feeling] and warmth

³klebrichten

⁴*Tr. note:* "selbstigen" which might also be translated "the selfly"

⁵bestehenden

⁶*In the margin:* Organism is the totality of the various placements of the same simple moments — pure form

⁷Selbstigkeit

⁸*diese Geistigkeit ist die höchste Selbstigkeit, zu der es die Pflanze bringt*

⁹*In the margin:* The single plant, the kind means nothing, points to another — a weak, not of an individual form, unperfected genus [Geschlecht].—

¹⁰bringen es

[147] thus do not become fertile¹ seeds; their roots and whole stem is marrow. The stem is a continued root — it has *no gemmules*, *no branches*, but always only new roots, which die off, and bind themselves together through wood fibers.² — The *digested* fruit falls in the root — turnips, potatoes, etc. — in the stalk, sugarcane —
 5 more perfect plants more purely exclude this moment. — Other plants, like *Cactus*³ remain succulent in the leaf which resists the light; it only comes to needles — instead of wood, and ramification; the overpowering⁴ light does not let it come to the innerness of the wood; the leaf does not die off, but sprouts forth new leaves.⁵

[II.]

Animal Process

In its fruit the vegetable process has come to its doubling of an inorganic nature
 15 which is born out of it⁶— and of its organic one; which, however, without differentiation — are opposed in the parts of the flower — and beyond these two this doubling is again the *gemma*, as the immediately living immediately sprouting gemma; the latter doubling of inorganic and organic nature⁷ posited in one is the animal process. Reflection

¹fruchtbaren

²*In the margin:* Especially wither the fruit falls into digestion — the parts here again of the species indifferently no individuality — leaf is often the whole plant — thorn wood

³Andre Cactus

⁴übermächtige

⁵*In the margin:* Life of the individual living vegetable mineral animal organism; the universality does not yet exists in it as such

⁶*In the margin:* doubled organic self

⁷*Tr. note:* e.g., the doubling of an inorganic nature born out of the vegetable process and of the organic one of the vegetable process in the fruit.

[148] *into itself*, unity of the animal processes' inorganic and organic nature, so that both are the whole, — true sex relationship — true viscera¹ — and senses, and the being of the singular for the animal process.

10

The² animal universal organism is the reconstruction of the physical elements into singulars α) abstract physical bodies β) organic, vegetable bodies — the former is the positing of the latter, it throws itself out of itself as inorganic nature; and as the doubled, it posits the opposition of the universal and the singular, which latter,
15 stepped apart in the former.³ It thus comports itself negatively to them; β) as vegetable organism, an immediate sublation, an immediate flowing in, — α) to hold this negativity wholly away from oneself, to be indifferent; to merely stand in relation to it through space and time — free movement γ) to posit this negativity as one with itself through the mediated movement; — to exclude this negativity from itself in the
20 mechanical moment as indifferent independent singular; — and in digestion to posit itself as one with itself.

The animal is *a true exclusive self*, which attains *individuality*, it *excludes*, it separates itself out, and detaches itself from the universal substance of the earth,
25 individuality has an external determinate being for the animal; the animal comes to free⁴ movement; the external which has not come under the rule of its self is the negative of itself for the animal, something indifferent; the absolute indifference is the subsisting as spatial; the latter is a relationship determinate through itself, thereby the animal proves its freedom from the earth. Immediately connected to this, is that
30 the latter, the animal's inorganic nature, has itself isolated the animal;

¹Eingeweide

²In the margin: The animal *comes to* self-production—as species it goes forth out of itself to transcend itself— (*fear*) *anxiety* of the animal — desire; it desires or is desired.

α) relationship of the singularity to external inorganic nature

β) process of individuality $\alpha\alpha$) shape $\beta\beta$) digestion $\gamma\gamma$) living, inner organism, active organism producing itself

³Tr. note: e.g., in the animal universal organism. In other words, the universal animal organism posits the physical elements as singulars, it throws itself out of itself as inorganic nature, and as this doubled form it posits them in their opposition of universal and the singular, both of which stepped apart from each other in the animal universal organism.

⁴willkürlich

[149] for there is no distance from the element; what lives in the element as such has no movement.

The latter relationship to inorganic nature is the universal concept of the animal —
 5 the animal is a singular, that comports itself to the singular as such; a unity reflected into itself of different singularities; it exists as purpose, which produces itself — it is a movement, which goes back into *this* individual — the process of individuality is a closed circuit;¹ in the organic generally the process of individuality is the sphere of being-for-itself. — Because the latter² is the concept of the animal, is its *essence*, its
 10 inorganic nature is isolated for it.

The vegetable organism is the selfless life: in this life the individuality is not yet actual — the vegetable organism has first represented this individuality; out of itself it has represented the unity of the individual and the species — which unity however
 15 still remains in the element of the species — and lets what is individual, what is sexual — fall outside the perfection of the independence. The animal organism is life *determinately existing* as life (the mineral is not there³ as life;) which is the unity of two living things. The movement of this life is α) the process within which the living is abstract singularity, relationship to inorganic nature, active shape and digestion. —
 20 shaping of the *limbs*.⁴

B) The process of individuality in itself is the shaping of the viscera. The digestion process of the lymph is the motion of self consumption — the plant lets its wood, its bark, become dead, and the leaves fall off. The animal is this negativity itself — the
 25 plant⁵ does not know how to save itself against its becoming other, other than by letting it remain indifferent; the animal is the negativity of itself, which reaches out over its shape, and the cessation of growth does not interrupt in its digestive and sexual processes, — as the negativity of itself [the animal] is its own inner process, the shaping itself into viscera. In that it thus forms itself as individual, it is unity of
 30 the shape and individuality, — the being of the shape made into a moment, is universal being— it is reflected in itself, has senses, and is *sex*.

I. The animal organism immediately divided in the organic one

¹Kraislauff

²Tr. Note: e.g., the sphere of being-for-itself

³Tr. note: "da"; in accord with my translation of "daseyende" as "determinately existing" this might also be translated as, "the mineral is not determinate as life."

⁴Glieder

⁵jene

[150] into its determinate being and into its inner concept, the latter is something external precisely for this reason; it is inorganic nature — the latter is α) universal nature, the organic one is the physical elements;¹ β) the self's negative other — its own free shape, and γ) the singular. — These three moments lie in the concept of the

5 animal in general, that unfolds its moments. α) As comporting itself towards the physical elements it is vegetable process, a formless gellatine, an active slime² which is reflected in itself; many animals are nothing but this slime. The animal's relatedness is to be immediately reflected in itself in its swimming in the universal fluidity, or to transform the latter in itself, — in the organic one. *Sensibility*; like the

10 plant. But β) the concept of the animal in general³ is likewise *irritable*, elastic, it is a movement which comports itself as exclusive active shape, for which the other is a negative of itself — the animal *relates* itself to the element, as another, as the plant does not do. — It is thus this elasticity of excluding the element from itself, and through this it has its characteristic *movement*; it is free indifferent shape, which is not

15 only indifferent, but *posits* itself as indifferent. γ) the animal is however, reproductive in the same way;⁴ it posits itself as indifferent, not only through the distancing from others, but rather as its own indifference, its *shape*, it brings itself forth; — its sensibility is totality; it is receptivity which receives an *other determinately existing* thing, the determinately existing other is for its receptivity; and sublates the latter

20 being other, it is distance, but positive distance, such that it makes this determinately existing other being into itself; the indifference of the other, just as the proper *immediate being* of the other, ceases. The latter are the universal animal moments; they are therefore not to be taken as properties, so that each, as it were, should work particularly — as color works particularly on the face — taste works particularly on

25 the tongue, etc. — just as one says the nerve is sensible, the muscle is irritable — to be sure nature also unfolds the moments thus indifferently, but solely

¹diese ist α) allgemeine Natur, es sind die physischen Elemente

²Schleim

³Tr. Note: "er", which refers to "the concept of the animal in general, " of which this is the second moment.

⁴In the margin: Reproduction

[151] in the shape — i.e., in the dead being of the organism. — The reproduction is the unity of sensibility and irritability, i.e., sensibility is immediately irritability, and vice-versa. The organism is reproductive, it is *essentially* the latter, or the latter is its actuality; it brings itself forth — it is for another — and sublates this other and posits
 5 itself as the same as this other¹ — the latter is its bringing forth. Sensibility is the immediate reproduction — vegetation — irritability, the negative excluding, the totality is the immediate, which mediates itself through the other. —

The unity of these abstract moments is the *animal lymph*, they do not bring the
 10 animal² any farther; and the animal lymph is immediately shape, singular in general. It is shape, it is dead *static* organism, more external, which is the inorganic nature for the individuality. Because it is this static thing, thus, the concept, the self, is not yet actual, not yet posited in its production,³ — or it is something inner, and we are the self which must interpret this inner something. In its determination, inorganic nature,
 15 or the external organism is relatedness against similarly indifferent forms. It is the mechanism of the whole. Its activity is the excluding and sublating of the external.

Its parts are *members*, subsisting things, not viscera, nor senses. It is a whole of articulation. Distinguishing itself from itself, the lymph encloses itself with skin,⁴ as
 20 its surface, or the universal relatedness of the vegetable organism to inorganic nature, the inner articulates itself into the sensible, or the skeltetal system, the irritable, the muscular system; the skin is the reproduction. The *bone* is the shape as such which belongs to sensibility, i.e., the wood of the plant; the simple and therefore dead force, the force which is not yet process. It is, however, at the same time the *dead force* that
 25 is reflected in itself, or it is the

¹Und setzt es sich gleich

²es

³Noch nicht sein Erzeugen gesetzt

⁴*In the margin:* Skin lengthens itself to nails; bones reflected into themselves — Worm (crawler) heels — insects — indestructibility of the skin, after everything in a corpse disintegrates into dust, the skin is still visible in some parts —

[152] vegetable gemmation, that brings itself forth, such that what is brought forth becomes another. Its form is first to be the core of the bone; this is how all bones begin; the latter passes into length, like the vegetable nodule: (wood fibers) — the bone cores remains in the extremity of the limbs; — they multiply themselves and draw themselves out into length — they have marrow in them, as their not yet properly born out nerves — the periosteum¹ is their proper life; the gemmation² is a production going wholly outwards, which for this reason dies away in itself;³ only lives on its surface; — the hollow force in itself. — Going onwards to totality, out of core and line, the bone breaks open. — The nerve takes the place of the marrow, it is a core which lets its length sprout out from its center — but with this totality it ceases to belong to the shape as shape, its marrow becomes living sensibility, a point which widens itself into lines, totality as point from which the dimensions proceed — and finally the levelling off, which is mere encompassing surface.

As core the bone is the immediately sensitive of the shape, comporting itself to the outside as the stationary fixed, as the hard — its lengthening is the middle, the transition, such that the shape sinks down to the outer shape, which has another inside. In the limbs the bone is the inside, the immediately fixed — but further on it ceases being the inside — like the wood of the plant is the inside and the bark is the outside — in the seed in contrast the wood is overcome — it is only the outer shell — in the same way the bone becomes the outer shell for the viscera, that no longer has its proper center, but in the first instance is still interrupted and hangs together [neither through] through a line of its own, (sternum), nor [does it have] an articulation of its own — but finally becomes pure surface, without its own inwardness — core, line, plane — change into the point, or line from which lines proceed — the latter is the totality, which has not yet completed itself⁴ — still the latter within in it has to turn itself outward — at the same time (dorsal vertebrae) break through the nodule⁵ of the center — now turning back into itself — but the turning back into itself of the hollow skull —

¹beinhaut

²es

³Die desswegen in sich erstirbt

⁴Die sich noch nicht gerundet hat

⁵Der Knoten

[153] the skull bone is based upon the form of the dorsal vertebrae, they can be made plain in it (*os spenoideum* Bat¹) but after that it sets to work to overcome the center and to level it off — without its own center — but at the same time this complete sublation of the coredness² passes over into the restoration of the core³ — *teeth* —
 5 return into itself, restoration — the latter are then restored *cores*, which run through the process and hence are actively effective as negative; the immediate sensibility become irritability.⁴ — The periosteum is no longer external, but rather only inner membrane; they cease, being the passive separation — the bones like the periosteum are without feeling,⁵ but in the (syphylitic) *lymph* illnesses they gain such feeling —
 10 marrow is mere *fat*, there is little in lean, much in fatter men.

The sensibility of the external organism passes over into differentiation of irritability,⁷ relationship to other movement — ⁸its subdued simplicity goes over into the opposite, into the muscular system; it is the doubled system of the tensor and flexor muscles; the line, holding itself braced,⁹ and that taking itself back [is] the
 15 organic elasticity, is the weakness, which takes itself back into itself upon stimulation, and in the same way sublates this giving back, and restores itself.¹⁰ The muscle is the unity of the latter two moments, and these moments also exist as muscles, as kinds of movement.

This¹¹ shape has *the skin* for its organic activity — it is only first still posited as
 20 the

¹Fledermaus

²Kernigkeit

³Zugleich geht aber dieses völlige Aufheben der Kernigkeit in die Wiederherstellung über

⁴*In the margin:* bone marrow is fat. It becomes cut off from the periosteum, and thus builds a new bone around it

⁵Empfindung

⁶*In the margin:* tooth aches into the vegetable immediate process of *reumatic* pains

⁷Irritabilität Differenz

⁸*In the margin:* The gemmation of the bone is taken back into the simple differentiation of the muscle

⁹Anstemmen haltend

¹⁰Die Linie, Anstemmen haltend, ybd das sich zurücknehmend due organische Elasticität [ist], die Weichheit, die auf einen Reitz sich in sich zur'knimmt, und ebenso dieses Nachgeben aufhebt, und sich wiederherstellt.

¹¹*In the margin:* The *immediate* return of the latter external organism into itself is skin; th e latter is universality, simple totality; the separating is one; and a not distinguished whole.

[154] *concept* of the inner organism, it is *for this reason the outside* of the shape, the *skin, skin* can be and become everything — wounding produces a multitude of vessels, nerves, blood vessels; if it is fixed, as a particular activity, in its wounding — it is the universal digestive organ of the vegetative organism.

But¹ the organism does not only comport itself to the outside as universal element, but comports itself to the outside as the isolated;² the shape, it passes over into the process, and the latter is the becoming of the shape. The *process* is determined through the *being* of the organism's vegetative organism; the latter being must be
 10 expressed beforehand for this reason. The process comports itself against singulars and is itself the mediated movement which distinguishes the moments of the transformation.

(The skin has given itself a different relationship in claws, bones and muscles, and is something singular, *it interrupts the absorbing*, and comports itself as singular to
 15 air and water—)

(The process of the skin is a relationship to water; (as subjugated to water; and evaporating it³) — the movement of the muscles is the elastic irritability, which [as] a moment of the whole is a free, characteristically self-separating, relationship, which
 20 posits a movement which inhibits the flowing in, and as implicit movement itself, it is a fire process, which sublates the former inert subsisting, and posits and produces out of itself. — The latter dissolution of the subsisting of the true process is the relationship to air; it is the proper self moving of the organism, which presses in and is expelled, as elasticity).⁴

The latter immediate transformation, *sensibility of the whole*, is likewise *irritability* of the whole, a *self-interrupting, self-mediating*,

¹*In the margin:* This return into itself is distinct from its determinate being, it steps out over against it.

The return of the shape in itself begins in the skin; the latter is that in itself,[that] takes [itself] back into itself out of externality, and becomes relatedness to itself.

²Vereinzeltem

³ausdustend

⁴*In the margin:* skin process

[155] distinguishing movement of the single moments, true elasticity, the former elasticity of the muscles is the formal¹ elasticity — a relationship that isolates and comports itself to singulars, even if it is only the *single* swallow of water. *The skin throws itself open*² *towards the inside*, it forms, as it is otherwise wholly opening, a
 5 *single* opening, and the inorganic is grasped³ as singular and taken in. The individual itself takes possession of the latter, crushes it as shape and transforms it in itself, not through immediate infection, but through the infection as *mediating* movement, which the infection lets run through the various moments.⁴ The animal *warmth* is generally posited through this, such that it is *shapes*, that are singular in general,
 10 which are sublated through it;⁵ an organic one — as unity of singularities. — The *stomach* is immediately this digesting warmth in general, and the intestinal tract is the division of the digested. The division in general into the wholly inorganic that is to be eliminated and the perfectly animalized, which likewise is the unity of the *subsisting shape* as the warmth of the dissolution — *Blood*.

Here the inner organism begins; it is the unity of the mechanically organic and the chemically organic — the former is the shaping of the external organism, the latter is that of the digested warmth. Thus the living organism is first a one which is alive —
 20 *The blood is the result* of the external organism in itself implicitly returning into itself through itself of its own accord.⁶ — The latter result,⁷ then, is the living individuality, the *positing* which brings forth, of the external

¹*In the margin:* The external is something turned back into itself in the same way

²sich zurückschlägt

³gefasst

⁴Das Individuum bemächtigt sich desselben, zermalmt es als Gestalt, und verwandelt es in sich nicht durch die unmittelbare Infection, sondern sie als *vermittelnde* Bewegung, welche sie die verschiedenen Momente durchlaufen lässt.

⁵*In the margin:* This warmth is the absolutely *mediated movement* of the organism reflected in itself, which has the elements within itself, and comports itself actively through the latter, attacks the singular with the movement of all α) crushes them according to the pure externality, β) αα infects them with the organic lymph, saliva, ββ) with the neutrality of the barren and acidic, juices of the stomach and pancreas — finally with the fire of the gall. Constituting of the abstracts, i.e., inwardness directed outwards — therein the latter relatedness thus goes back into itself through this process.

⁶der in sich an sich selbst, durch sich selbst zurückkehrende äussere Organismus

⁷Dieser

[156], of the actual concept; which makes¹ the members into viscera — the result is the solar system born again into the self, it is α)² the blood, as the axis turning movement chasing itself around itself, this absolute pulsing and trembling in itself — the individual life of the whole, in which nothing is distinguished —

B) Thereupon this axis turning process divides itself in the cometary process and in the inner, — the atmospheric and the vulcanic processes. The lung is the animal leaf, which comports itself to the atmosphere, and makes the skin process into an isolated, self-interrupting and self- procuding, inhaling and exhaling, reduced from
 10 out of sensibility,³ into irritability and into ONE single moment of life. — The *liver* in contrast is the return out of the cometary into the being-for-itself, into the lunar, it is the being-for-itself which seeks its center, the heat of the being-for-itself, the wrath against the being-other and the burning of the latter.

15 Lung and liver process stand in the closest connection with one another — the fleeting, loose process of the lungs mitigates the heat of the liver; the latter enlivens the former⁴ — The lung is in danger of going over into the liver, to entangle itself,⁵ and then to consume itself, when it receives the heat of the being for itself into itself. — The blood dirempts itself in these two processes, the latter is its real cycle; to be
 20 this three fold cycle, one for itself, the other the cycle of the lungs, the third the cycle of the liver — in each a cycle of its own, within which what enters as artery into the cycle of the lungs, appears as a vein, — and the reverse in the portal vein system, the entering veins appear as arteries.

25 The latter⁶ system of the living movement is that which is opposed to the external organism

¹erzeugt

²In the margin: α) organization of the latter inner organism in itself

³herunter gesetzt aus der Sensibilität

⁴Tr. Note: e.g., the heat of the liver enlivens the process of the lungs

⁵sich zu verknoten

⁶In the margin: Blood, the life of the animal, which it is forbidden to enjoy — indians let the whole animal live.

[157]. — It is the *force* of the digestion; it is the earth, the root in itself; — the force to subdue the external organism — this inorganic nature is here necessarily the three fold α) the external, *the universal*, the lung is turned against it, β) the particularized, the universal reduced to the organic moment, the lymph and the whole existing
 5 organism, γ) against the isolated. The blood prepares itself out of the air, the lymph and from the digestion; transformation of these three moments; out of air the blood takes on the pure dissolution, the light of the latter, oxygen — out of the lymph, the blood takes on the neutral fluidity, out of digestion it takes on the singularity, the substantial. And thus the whole individuality itself posits the blood against itself
 10 again — it produces the α) *shape*, its own inorganic nature β) the negative of its shape [, the] foreign inorganic nature, excretions γ) and the whole, the sense.

α)¹ the blood, in the cycle of the lungs it is the latter purely negative life of an immaterial nature, for which the nature is air, and here the blood has the pure
 15 overcoming of the air; the first breath is the properly individual life of the offspring, which previously swam in the lymph, and maintained itself through absorption in vegetable fashion; stepping forth out of the egg or the maternal womb it breathes, it comports itself to nature as something which has become air, and is not this continual stream, but rather the interruption of the latter; organic irritability. Activity, through
 20 which the blood proves itself and becomes pure fire.

β) the blood is the sublating on the part of the neutrality, of the swimming in the lymph, it overcomes the latter, in that it excites the whole external organism, moves it, arranges it into its to its going back into itself.— This movement is in the same
 25 way a system of digestion — a cycle of distinct moments. The lymphatic vessels everywhere form their own nodules, their own stomach, within which the lymph digests itself, and finally

¹In the margin: *its own movement*

[158] leads into the *thoracic duct*;¹ the blood gives itself its fluidity in general therein—

γ) Finally the blood is the proper digestive process, of the singular, — peristaltic movement in general. As this process of singularization it separates [itself] into the
 5 three moments, that of the apathetic² inner being-for-itself, the becoming hypochondriacal—melancholic, and its sleep, — venous blood in general, that becomes this midnightly force in *the spleen*; it is said to become carbonated therein; this carbonization is precisely its earth becoming absolute subject;³ — from here its middle is the portal vein system, where its subjectivity is movement, and where its
 10 subjectivity becomes activity, becomes the consuming volcano — Thus operative in the liver it comports itself towards the food pulp⁴ cooked in the stomach — *The digestion begins with the prior chewing*⁵ and penetrating with the lymph of the saliva, in the *stomach*; *the juice of the stomach and pancreas*⁶ — are as it were the dissolving, the *acids* which promote the fermentation of the food;⁷ it is the lymphing⁸
 15 and warming⁹ — chemical-organic moment — in the duodenum the complete overcoming proper proceeds through the *gall*; the externally directed process which still falls in the lymph becomes the *being-for-itself*, and now transforms itself into the *animal self*; the chyle, the latter process of the *blood* turns back into blood — the blood has produced itself.¹⁰

The latter is the great inner circulation of individuality — the middle in the latter is the *blood* itself, it is the *individual life* itself; it has been said that the juices, because they were excluded, were inorganic, and

¹*Ductus thoracicus*

²stumpfen

³Diese Carbonization ist eben sein Erde, absolut Subject werden

⁴speisenbrey

⁵Vorkauen

⁶der Magen — und pancreatische Saft

⁷die Speisen in Gährung versetzenden Säuren

⁸lymphiren

⁹In the margin: double stomachs, do ruminating animals have a pancreas?

¹⁰In the margin: α) clyce [Next to this: the organism requires ankyloses* of the external movement, the whitening of the muscle — in the eye the nests of arteries without blood globules in the venous, which have blood again.] β) it brings forth αα) the members of the shape as existing

*Tr. note: e.g., the consolidation of bones to form a single unit

[159] that life alone belonged to the fixed parts; only partly are such distinctions something implicitly senseless, partly the blood is the universal — not the *life*, but the living, the *subject* as such, in opposition against the species — the weak flower people, the Indians consume no animal, the Jewish lawgiver forbade only the
 5 consumption of the blood of animals — because, so the reason goes, the life of the animal is in the blood. α) the blood is the *universal* substance, which contains all the parts dissolved in itself, the essence of of them all — β)¹ the blood is the absolute movement, the naturally living self, the process itself; it is not moved, rather it is the movement — that it should be moved — the physiologists seek all manner of forces
 10 to that end; the heart muscle first expels the blood, and the walls of the arteries and veins help as well, and the pressure of the fixed parts which drive it; admittedly in the veins the heart beat does not help any further — as this must be solely accomplished by the pressure of the arterial walls — this elastic pressure of the latter, and of the heart, where does this come from? from the stimulus of the blood — the heart thus
 15 moves the blood, and the movement of the blood is again the movement of the heart — it is a circle — a **perpetuum mobile**, which instantly stands still, because the forces are in equilibrium.² For just this reason the blood itself is the principle of movement, it is the salient point — nothing inconceivable, nothing unknown — except for if conceiving is taken in the sense, that something else, namely the cause is
 20 shown, from which it is effected — always something *other*; the latter, however, is only the external, *i.e.*, it is not at all a necessity, not the *ground*; the cause is again itself a thing whose cause is to be enquired after, and so on into a bad infinity — incapacity to think and represent the *universal*, the ground. — $\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma$ is the *essence* of the world, *i.e.*, the universal — the simple, which is the unity of opposites — and for
 25 this reason, the unmovable, which nevertheless moves — this is the blood, it is the subject, as much as the one *for whose sake* a movement begins — representations move

¹In the margin: it has taken over the *muscle* from out of the external shape—

²In the margin: the drawing together of the arteries coincides with the abatement of the heart ventricle.

[160] me — precisely because they are conformable¹ with my I — as *representations*, that is, as *mine*, as *I*; not as things, mere content from which I can abstract — the self is the form, is the unity, the universal is the ground,² and the movement itself³ — the latter is the *blood* — But it is the *whole* movement; it steps to the side in the same way, like time against space; as a moment, for it is the distinction of its movement⁴ from itself; the movement is precisely the latter stepping to the side of its self, through which it is subject, though which it is thing, and the sublation of its standing on the side, and of its spreading beyond itself, and the opposed. Thus it appears as a part, and as a *result* in that the opposed implicitly sublates itself of its own accord,⁵ the going back occurs from the side of the opposed. In this way the living and enlivening force of the blood becomes out of the shape — and its inner movement also demands the properly mechanical external movement — the blood *moves*, it holds the qualities in their negative *qualitative* distinction —⁶ But stands in need of the simple negative of the *external* movement; someone sick, who has not moved for a long time, (in amputations) receives ankyloses,⁷ the fluid of the joint decreases, the cartilage hardens itself into bones; the muscles become white through this external stasis.

The blood circulation itself is in part to be taken as the latter universal cycle, through which each part takes this circular course; only it is likewise something wholly pulsating, trembling, elastic that is not only the former circular course — already the course is something completely different in different parts, in the portal vein system it is slower, likewise it is slower within the skull than in the remaining parts, in the lungs on the the other hand it is quicker; in a panaritium the artery has (*radialis*) one hundred pulse beats in a minute, while those on the healthy side have only 70 pulse beats simultaneous with the pulse of the heart — further the transition of the arteries and veins into each other occurs through the finest capillaries,⁸ which are in part so small

¹Gemäss

²Grund

³Das Selbst die Form ist die Einheit, das Allgemeine der Grund, und die Bewegung selbst

⁴es tritt ebenso auf die Seite, wie die Zeit gegen den Raum; als ein Moment, denn es ist die Unterschiedung seiner von sich selbst

⁵an sich selbst sich aufhebt

⁶*In the margin:* three [Next to this: vurmicular peristaltic blood] different movements β) breathing γ) brain from the blood

⁷*Tr. note:* e.g., consolidations of the bones or joints

⁸*In the margin:* in insects no cycle appears to take place — Autenrieth §. 346

[161] that they contain no more red blood cells,¹ but only bleached blood-fluid² — Sömmering §72. “in the eye it appears to be the case that no more branches containing red blood are continued in the fine parts of the arteries, which begin in a similar vein but end by passing over into tiny veins guiding red blood.” Here the thing which is properly called blood does not pass over, rather [it is] posited as a movement³ within which it disappears, and again steps forth, or an elastic trembling, that is not a continuation — furthermore the arteries especially *anastomose*, the veins also do so frequently, partly in larger branches, partly they form whole large tissues, where absolutely no more proper circulation is thus thinkable; in the anastomosing branch the blood drives in⁴ from both sides, it is an equilibrium, that is not a running to either side, but only a trembling in itself; in some branches one could perhaps think that here one direction is preponderant, only in many whole garlands,⁵ one direction of the tissues of anastomoses sublates the other, and makes the movement into a universal pulsing in itself.

The distinction between the arterial and the venous blood comes to its reality in the lung and liver — it is the antithesis of the tensor and flexor muscles; — the arterial blood is the transcending dissolving activity, the venous blood is the going into itself; lung and liver are the blood's distinction, as systems, they are its characteristic⁶ life. — Chemistry exhibits the distinction such that the arterial blood would contain more oxygen, and therefore be a brighter red — venous blood would be more carbonized, and therefore — when agitated in oxygen gas — it also becomes a brighter red — a distinction which only expresses the thing, not its nature, its relationship in the whole system.

The⁷ universal process is the latter return of the self to itself out of its cometary, lunar and earthly orbit, out of its viscera to its

¹Blutkügelchen

²Blutwasser

³es ist eine Bewegung Gesetzt

⁴Treibt sich

⁵Kränze

⁶eigentliches

⁷In the margin: Relationship of the inner organism to the *external* organism. α) the inner consumes the inert lymph of the external; β the inner is the universal *enlivening* of the outer so that the latter has its own digestion with in itself, its own glandular system, and transformation of the lymph into fat — the external comports itself in this way αα) universally digesting through the skin towards the outside, to the air ββ the lymph contains the oily in it like the plant; γγ) the lymph is the digestive system in the glands. β) bringing forth of the *shape* as such.

[162] unity. This return *is then the self's universal digestion, and thus having come back*¹ *its determinate being is stasis; it returns to its stasis, — i.e., to shape* in general; the latter is its result — the former is the shape subsuming process — which only divides itself in viscera,² it³ shapes itself, and is the process of nutrition; 5 the shape is its product in the same way; the shape is not only the immediate, but rather posited as the immediate, it is the *nutrition* of the whole.⁴ The latter does not now consist in the fact that the arterial blood should drop its oxydized fiber material. — Only⁵ the exhaling vessels of the arteries are more vapor, which is processed,⁶ and wholly universal foodstuff, out of which every singular part takes its nutrition, and 10 makes out of it what it is in the whole; the latter *lymph which is born out of the blood is the enlivening means of nourishment*, or much rather it is the universal enlivening, the being-for-itself of each one⁷ — the inorganic nature, to be transformed into the universal organism itself⁸; the blood does not result in materials,⁹ rather it is the enlivening of each one¹⁰ — the form is the main point; and not only

¹zurückgekehrt

²In the margin: the immediate ly absolute unity of both is the latter in the external organism, so that the external organism itself is productive in itself; and in the inner organism, so that the inner organism is the shaping.

³Tr. note: e.g., the shape subsuming process

⁴In the margin: A. reciprocal action of the inner and outer α) transition of each one into the other. β) similar substantiality of both αα) of the external, itself enlivened, ββ) of the inner the whole is together with the external; self-digestion

⁵In the margin: venous blood of the portal vein brings forth gall

⁶verarbeitet

⁷eines jeden

⁸die unorganische Natur, den allgemeinen Organismus in sich zu verwandeln

⁹führt nicht Materien zu

¹⁰In the margin: The existing other in which the process sinks back, collapses into two parts α) shape, the organic β) the inorganic elimination of urine and putrefaction of excrement; — calculi* in northern damp climates (sweatbaths), in southern climates skin diseases — in the north the inorganic is in the earthly neutrality (calcium) instead of the elementary neutrality (in the south it is in the latter instead of the former, in the south there is more vegetation)

*Tr. note: "Blasensteine" or a calculi are abnormal concretions formed of mineral salts and found in the gallbladder, kidney, or urinary bladder.

[163] the artery, but precisely the blood as this doubled vein and artery; In this way the heart is everywhere, and the fire is in the gall;¹ each part the specified force of itself.²

5 It is according to the *universal shaping* of the Form, that the blood lets itself sink into the *lymph* in its exhaling; but the inert indeterminate fluidity divides into the opposite, or into the opposed line of the muscles, which is a movement immanent in the shape — the shape is the subsisting in space; the movement in the blood is what remains in itself;³ but also a movement against what is outside the inert whole; it finally takes itself back into the stasis of the bones on the other side — The fluidity of
10 the lymph fortifies and segments. The fat, marrow of the bones is the former vegetable, which continues forth into oil, and secretes the neutrality from itself,⁴ not as water, but as the an earthed⁵

¹so ist das Herz allenthalben, und das Feuer, die Galle

²In the margin: Functions [Next to this: bringing forth of shape] of nutrition, not useful spleen, gall, but rather so that it have this moment within it — *being in itself*, fiery force.

³In the margin: Bone formation **Richerand** 2. 256. if the inner *periosteum* is disturbed, — with a *stylet*, the external separates itself from the bone, from the covered, it appropriates the calcium phosphate, which the vessels, which are diffused in its tissue, guide, and forms a new bone around the other one. — having removed the external, excrescences and vegetation form on the bone. Thin people have little or fluid marrow in their bones. Birds have none, thus its does not serve for the nourishment of the bones; birds vegetate towards the outside.

⁴In the margin: Excluding inner individuality, is bringing forth — α) its self, *the shape* β) Excretion of its *inorganic nature* — *bone is dead neutrality* unlocked between the lymph and marrow (THE WHOLE is turned outward γ) *arming* of the shape, turning of the inner organism against the external thing; (*desire* as such does not yet belong here) here the excluding relatedness towards others is posited through itself); its own movement of the whole form. The organism has movement, it falls into space and time, because it is become the *pure abstract* unity of itself — *free* movement is the raising up into ideality. The for-itself is time — the implicit, the shape is space. Space has, as *space*, as distance, meaning for the organism; but time has not stepped forth out of it; (animals know the hour when they receive food) — ideality of the organism as *existing*; *outwardly*.

⁵erdigte

[164] neutrality, as calcium — the plant already continues forth to the production of silica,¹ not only air and water — likewise the animal organism, which posits the isolated inorganic nature out of itself, continues forth to an earthed (isolated) neutrality. *Self-digestion, self-consumption* of the organism.

(The organism has brought itself forth as this whole — it is something directed outward; animal *desire*; the organism is being for itself, that has the certainty, that the excluded is not *implicit*, but rather is implicitly something sublated.² Its blood is the *simple dissolution*, which *not only contains everything*, but is the warmth and unity of
 10 its dissolution and of the shape; the consuming of *itself of its own accord*; through this it is tensed as a whole individual against the outside, it has hunger and thirst; — the organism is a whole, which consumes itself, and so the feeling of its negativity, of its empty being-for-itself; it directed to the sublating of the alienation of its substance, its simple being. The formation of its blood is the production of desire, the
 15 organism's substance is alienated from it, and has become a singular, against which it maintains itself as forceful³ shape, which *maintains itself fixed for itself in the bones*, which contracts its skin into *claws*, and which *tenses the differentiation of the muscle*; — all sides of its shape turned outwards, they are given the fire of the heart, its shape inverts the static subsisting into weaponry — and according to the *essence* (in

¹ Kiesel

² dass das ausgeschlossene nicht *an sich*, sondern an sich aufgehobenes ist

³ Kräftige

[165] inorganic nature) shows itself as reflected in itself; *according to the essence*, such that the singular has no *being* for it, the latter *essence* is *implicit*,¹ it is *being*, it is *shape*, the latter is itself a *weapon*; skin is a *paroxysm* of the claw turned outward, muscle, the heart, are the middle term, are the self² and the *paroxysm* of the sensible
 5 bones is a tooth, the crushing is the return into self. The conclusion of the syllogism is *skin (claw) bundle*, the universally extreme *middle term* is muscle— the extreme of singularity is the *tooth*.³

(The animal's⁴ desire; its pure being-for-itself, is the positing of something excluded;⁵ the animal itself⁶ is the pure concept, is the negative; this exclusion is not
 10 posited through the animal's concept, but through its actuality and its determinate being; the animal is its acting⁷ for it⁸ is *there*, as something negative. The animal, however, is only the individual; it is desire, or it becomes desired, or sleeps and digests; it lives in this fear, in this restless relation, within which it is not universal, and the objective self-moving non-thinghood, is static universality for it.
 15 The sated desire, however, is its sleep, its being-in-itself;⁹ the night,

¹ Ansich

²In the margin: This organism is thus the *determinately existing force*. Force which as such has *shape*; immediately turned back in into itself. Inwardness, which likewise is immediately externality; externality which likewise is immediately Inwardness.

³Haut ein Krampf der Klaue nach aussen gekehrt, Muskel, das Herz, Mitte, Selbst und der sensible Knochen ein Zahn, das Zermahlen das Rückkehr in sich. Schluss ist Haut (Klaue) Packen allgemeines Extrem Mitte Muskel - Extrem der Einzelheit, Zahn.

⁴In the margin: *inward ideality* of the latter; it exists as ideal, returned into its simplicity; simple selfly substance of the whole — whose self is completely transparent to the other being, because it brings itself forth; the cycle of the blood, that of the other which it consumes, just as it produces it, is the same; — it distinguishes its members from itself.

This ideality is immediately the organism. Space and time are forms of its intuition; unobjective objectivity, the sense.

(This being reflected in itself is the nerve; — it is system — α) motor nerves of the shape β) digestive nerves, ganglia, epigastric centre γ) sensory nerves brain)

⁵eines ausgeschlossenen

⁶Tr. note: or possibly "the positing itself"

⁷Thun

⁸Tr. Note: or possibly "its acting"

⁹insichseyn

[166] which the self is. — First, in the latter return out of the *implicit* into the being for-self, and such that the *implicit* is posited through the self, is the organism the self, which is the unity of its return and of its different implicit-being.¹

As² this unity the organism is a whole, returned into itself as the unity of two
 5 selves — first wholly as individual; as feeling itself in desire; and then it is a whole, which the latter abstract *I* excludes out of itself, for which an other is; which in the latter's other-being being *immediately* reflected into itself, is *representation* in general, so that what is, is immediately the latter doubled, *implicitly freely existing*,
 10 and what *pertains to it*;³ feeling of another in general, as other — sense — through digestion the feeling has developed into this abstraction — it is grasped, it has passed through the self;⁴ in this way it is in the *sense*. It is the satisfied desire, because the object is *mine*.

But the later other as *something universal* is as something universal at the same time the whole⁵; ⁶ the *sense* passes over into the sex, after which it traverses the scale
 15 from feeling to the face, and in the latter it has set free reflection in itself; the totality of reflection — the principle⁷ of sense is; the object is mine; the opposite: I am the object, is the principle of sex — the traversing of the sense makes the object, which first has mine as a predicate, into something wholly mine, into the sex relationship.

The latter⁸ category, or simple immediate unity of being and what pertains to it,—

¹ Erst in dieser Rückkehr aus dem Ansich, in das Für sichseyn und dass das Ansich durch das Selbst gesetzt ist, ist er das Selbst, das Einheit seiner und seines unterschiednen Ansichseyns ist.

² In the margin: The latter such that the moments of *static shape and of the being-for-self* are refined into pure abstractions, composes the sense — the former in the inner organism, the latter in the latter self, such that the self is something *brought forth*.

³ das in seinem Andersseyn *unmittelbar* in sich reflectirtseyn, *Vorstellung* überhaupt, so daß was ist, unmittelbar diß dedoppelte ist, an *sich frey seyendes, und das Seinige*.

⁴ durchs selbst hindurchgegangen

⁵ Aber diß Andre als allgemeines ist es zugleich das Ganze

⁶ In the margin: *sense desire and sex*

⁷ Satz

⁸ In the margin: The indifference in *space* goes back into itself in time. Space and time are themselves thus held as indifferently apart from each other; now only spatial relationship, then temporal; — space, the indifferent disintegrating consisting — time the sublation of the latter disintegration — αα) *disappearing* of subject and object for each other, merely negative empty meaning of negation; — but determinate negation of form, of *disintegration*; — immediate *touching* in the indifference of the consisting of both — Sense of *shape*; the *determinacy* of the spatial being-for-self, so that they step into opposition; the opposition is as the determinacy within each itself; the time which emerges out of it, which is *the middle* of the determinacy; as middle, as simple point of unity, the distinctions of time* are within the fulfilled spatial being-for-self.

*Tr. note: or possibly "the distinctions of the determinacy." In any event, Hegel's point is that determinate negation reveals that time's sublation of space is not to be grasped as the mere destruction of space, but rather, as revealing the determination of space by time. Inasmuch as the determinacy of spatial

[167] *sense* is at first *feeling*, the unobjective unity with the object, within which the latter has not yet stepped back for itself; this unity is therefore the doubled, the sense of the shape as shape, figure, and sense of *warmth*. It is the hollow distinction; the other is *something other* in general, not yet distinguished in itself; the distinction —
 5 the positive and the negative falls apart — Figure and warmth; it does not have the distinction within itself¹ — subsisting and being dissolved — space and time are immediate unity.

But in truth it has the distinction within itself;² the animal is *neutral* subsisting;
 10 the two indifferent sides connect themselves in a universal medium, within which they penetrate themselves — it has *taste*;³ the distinctness⁴ of time and of space — the distinctness of the opposite *as* opposite — enters into the object itself; and hence into the relationship of the organic to the latter; — but the relationship is only

being-for-self is constituted by the opposition of space and time, the determinate negation of time's sublation of space shows that time is thus present in space as a simple point constituting the determinacy of spatial being. Thus, space can be said to go back into itself in time, for time is the center of its determinacy.

¹es hat ihn nicht an ihm selbst

²Aber es hat ihn in Wahrheit an ihm selbst

³In the margin: *Particularization of intuiting* is sense. In feeling all is united, so that the seat of the particularization of intuition can be in the finger — seeing, hearing with the finger

α) *Touch*, immediate indeterminate determinate being, immediate weight and warmth, simple taste
 β) the distinction in itself γ) being-reflected into itself in general, *simple individuality* immediately [Next to this: *Particularity* — the whole individuality is *singularity*] determined as not yet reflected in itself

⁴Unterschiedenheit

[168] something neutral; the taste is the sublation of the figure; it is the *immediately* indifferent determinate being, that precisely for this reason is to be the externally sublated, and first becomes feeling through this mediation.

- 5 The penetration of the indiffererent is its perfect porosity, or its differentiation gone into one, which itself takes possession of the reality of the indiffererent, and has dissolved it;¹ the sense of *airiness*, of smell, corresponds to warmth, but is itself implicitly a being dissolved of the shape;² like the neutrality airiness is a subsisting within the shape self — a subsisting, in so far as the neutrality has overcome the
10 distinction within the shape^{3,4}

This dissolution, however, is finally the simple whole, the *actual light reflected* in itself;⁵ Face, is the sense of *actuality*, which is presently reflected in itself.⁶ It is the sense *itself*,⁷ which is object.

Hearing is the latter taking back into itself of the sense which still determinately exists as object;

¹*In the margin:* Individuality is general ly a syllogism, externality β) organ γ) nerves

²aber ist aufgelöstseyn der Gestalt an sich selbst

³Sinn der Luftigkeit, des Geruchs, entspricht der Wärme, aber is aufgelöstseyn der Gestalt an sich selbst; wie die Neutralität Bestehen an ihr selbst — Bestehen, insofern der Unterschied an ihr, sie ihn überwunden.

⁴*In the margin:* in the sense organ, in the sense is to be distinguished α) the latter's being as activity — skin — nerve

⁵*In the margin:* α) skin the *external organ* of sense, subject of the object body, in the same way is totality of the senses

⁶*In the margin:* α) universal elementary relation to others — subject of sense *subject as existing* nerve β) absolute unity of both *soul* is a *thing*, thus the subject of sense is brain but subjectively it is pure space — space is no thing — the animal is *soul*

⁷*In the margin:* α) *Touch* skin in general β) taste muscle γ) smell cartilage δ) face organized skin, lymphatic crystalline *muscle* *ε) Bones — pure going into itself; unswaying self-sameness

*lymphatische Muskel Crystalline

[169] the sense existing for its self. — Hearing perceives the *pure, the self which is of an ideal nature*¹ — here the object ceases to be a thing. —

- Animal desire* is idealism, of objectivity; certainty, that desire is nothing alien.
- 5 The reaction to something other is only present as desire through this *One of an ideal nature*— it is a feeling of self, — what is missing, it itself is; an inner *lack*, hunger, thirst — the individual excludes itself from itself, consumes itself; and steps over against itself as alien; the negative is the individual's own negativity, that is, its negativity is for the individual. ² (—Excretion α) of the individual's inorganic nature
- 10 in general — β) the single excrement proper γ) the individual's whole other individual)

- The³ sense organs ⁴ as feeling are the universal sense of the skin; *taste* is the muscle of the tongue — muscle, neutrality, connects itself with the mouth — the skin
- 15 beginning to become inward. — smell, connects the nose with airiness, breathing — the face is not the sense of an earlier function, but rather like hearing, it is the sense of the brain; ideality set free. — Feeling, is the sense of shape generally

¹In the margin: *small and large brain*; the former more of sensation, the latter more of the *will*; of the transition

²In the margin: sensory tools; doubled as *consisting* being-reflected into itself, distinction not difference, *two* are as in the members of the viscera perfectly similar to feet; arms of the will are unsimilar to *viscera* of the self, senses *distinctly attuned*, *ear eye*

³In the margin: α Skin, touch; universal β *taste*, neutral object muscle γ) smell cartilage spiralling air and brain, still imperfect — touching upon itself. δ) face, organized skin — muscle lymph skin, blood body of light callous *blood, vessel skin*

⁴Tr. note: or "tools of the senses", "Sinneswerkzeuge."

[170] — taste is the sense of digestion, of the the external going into itself of— *smell* is the sense of the inner organism, of airiness. *Sight* and hearing, are the senses of oneself.

- 5 Feeling, occurs¹ in two ways; — smell and taste — sight, the objective reality, as self, which is indifferent — hearing, as the self sublating itself; the voice is *active hearing* — pure self *that posits itself as universal*. Pain, desire; joy, contentment are sublating of the singular self — *the first² is a consciousness of the contradiction, ³The second is a being reversed into itself, equality* — every animal has a voice in violent
10 death; expresses itself as a sublated self — (birds have the *songs*, which relieve the others, because the birds⁴ belong to the element of air; — articulating voice; a dissolved self.)

- 15 In the voice the sense returns into its innerness — it is negative self — *desire*. — The sense is lack, substancelessness within itself,⁵ it is itself as mere space of an ideal nature in opposition to its fulfillment.⁶ *The senses are the sated fulfilled space*; — desire is movement, which is not only sublated space, but sublated *fulfilled space*. — The latter itself is the lacking; the feeling of one's self in hunger. Thurst.

- 20 The organism is in this way something which turns itself outwards — it itself is negative to itself — *the inorganic nature is the latter other*; what is missing steps out of the latter at the same time⁷ — *the other is the whole, that the organism lacks*; — the reflection out of the *theoretical* is the *practical* — because in this the whole first steps out of itself as

¹Tr. note: "Gefühl, in zwei Arten." The word 'feeling' is interpolated.

²dort ... hier

³In the margin: What I see, hear, is sublated in me — in the same way free from it

⁴Tr. note: "sie," which could also possibly refer to "the others"

⁵Tr. note: or "implicitly substanceless"

⁶In the margin: it knows its unfulfilled self: the fulfilling an other; — in the theoretical it has acquired the certainty that the object disappears — self is, it has heard it, as pure self it has become it

⁷In the margin: Inner organism is the *form of the whole* that does not stand over against the shape, as in the abstract consideration; or what does not compose one side against the shape, into which the shape passes over, or which passes over into the shape — but totality, *determined* as being for itself. — it is lacking precisely for this reason *as subsisting*.

[171] whole; here the latter is the singular moving itself against others for the first time.

In the desiring organic is the *shape* subsumed under the being-for-self; the
 5 *universal* self, i.e., that knows itself, as the unity of its self and of the implicit or of the
 objective — *the universal self looks through the determinate being of the other*.¹ The
 shape is the armed turned outwards — the bones are *teeth* — the skin is *claws*, and
 the *force* in general is the muscles, the inner; the sensibility of the bone is overcome,
 just as the universal is only the relatedness which flows in and out of the skin.² The
 10 *skin* is the weapon of the external organism, the bone of the inner organism; — the lip
 the receiving, however, does not only kiss, but rather seizes through *the teeth*. —
 (Fiery inflamed eyes)

Here the nerves are only the inner, the serving; motor and *digestive* nerves —
 15 *ganglia* are epigastric centers, the brain, which belong to the abdomen³ —
 sympathetic nerves, *splanchnicus Phrenicus*⁴ —⁵ anastomoses of the latter ganglia.

The sated desire does not here have the meaning of itself as this singular
 producing individual; but rather as something universal,⁶ as the ground of the same,
 20 in which the individuality is only form; the inner organism, the being-for-self, that
 has

¹*In the margin: Syllogism*; the whole under the rule of desire, its mere inert consisting, the shape
 posited under the being-for-self

²nur ein und ausströmende Verhalten der Haut

³Die Nerven sind hier nur das innre, dienende; Bewegungs— und Verdauungsnerven —
Ganglien, epigastrische die dem Unterleib angehören

⁴*Tr. Note:* e.g., *splanchnic* — visceral; *Phrenicus* — relating to the mind; yielding: viscera related
 to the mind. The reference is to the gastric brain in the abdomen.

⁵*In the margin:* Bichat — sympathetic nerves, anastomoses often interrupted, thicker as that upon
 which it should arise.

⁶*In the margin:* The inorganic nature is gone through throughout the individual's whole —
digestion is here of the *whole*, that digests itself; *sleep*; the individual's universal night; its activity towards
 the outside, likewise against itself; — for the other is the individual itself, confirmation of the individual's
 self in the other, through the inner consumption of its own self

- [172] become externality. The satisfied desire is for this reason the *universal returned to itself* — that immediately has *individuality* in it; — the theoretical return — of the sense to itself only brings forth the *lack* in the *universal*; the return of the individuality into itself however, brings forth the universal, as positive. The latter¹
- 5 lacking is fulfilled with itself — it is a doubled individual. Sex — α) ideality of both is the same² — the universal, the species, (Hearing) — β) and both are independent — (the lack of pure self fulfilled) — the universal³ steps out opposite the immediately shaped organism, and the inner being-for-self of each other;⁴ both, however, no longer step forth as imperfect sides of the whole, but as perfected sides. —
- 10 Contraction of the whole organism is a simple type⁵ of the latter — Excretion of the whole — α) testicles, system of lymphatic vessels as brain — and β) Penis, heart muscle — brain and being-for-self — the female uterus corresponds to the prostate, which in the man is merely a gland — the whole's receiving, its simple relatedness is divided into the producing brain — and the external heart.
- (Their unification is the disappearance of the sexes — the becoming of the simple species. (Assimilation as absorption, excretion, and nutrition corresponds to sensibility, irritability and reproduction)
- 20 — The succession of the processes is illness;⁶ the organism cannot bear this; the species, the universal steps opposite them; — the animal dies; the death of the animal is the becoming of consciousness; it is the universal that can itself be analysed, which the processes bear separately in themselves;⁷ the space, within which its unfolded life subsists — as members, the simple processes in themselves — or processes which are
- 25 immediately stationary, universal.)
- Sexual parts, male and female, are based upon the same type⁸ — only such that in the one or the other, the one or the other part constitutes

¹In the margin: inner organ. blood vessel system* — heart brain and digestion — the whole organism formed according to it

*Gefäß Blut System

²Tr. Note: This could perhaps also be translated as "the ideality of both is the latter" (e.g., a doubled individual, which is) "— the universal, the species, (hearing)." In any event, the point is that the ideality of both is the universal, the species.

³Tr. note: "es" which refers to "das Allgemeine"

⁴Tr. note: "Es tritt der unmittelbare gestaltete Organismus, und der innre fürsichseyende einander gegenüber." One might also translate this as: "the universal steps out opposite the immediately shaped organism and the inner being -for-itself of both."

⁵Typus

⁶Krankheit ist Succession der Prozesse

⁷Es ist das allgemeine das die Prozesse geschieden in sich ertragen, sich analysieren kann

⁸liegt derselben Typus zum Grunde

[173] the essential; in the woman it is necessarily the indifferent, in the man it is the *divided* — opposition — in the woman, the *uterus*;¹ to discover the latter in the male parts has brought the most difficulties; the scrotum has been clumsily taken for it; since indeed the *testicles* definitely manifest themselves² as corresponding to the
 5 feminine ovaries,³ [which] in many animals — is a row of vesicles;⁴ regarded⁵ not out of the conceptless corresponding, but through⁶ the distinction which is posited through the concept — in this way in the man the uterus sinks down into a gland, into the indifferent universality; it is the prostate in the man — Akermann has shown this very well in his hermaphrodites; he has a uterus in otherwise masculine formations;
 10 but this uterus is not only in the place of the prostate, but the “*conduits éjaculateurs traversent la prostate et s’ouvrent séparément dans l’urètre au fond d’une lacune appelée venumontanum*;⁷” excretory ducts of the semen go through its substance and open onto the *crista galli* in the *urethra* (urinary tract). The feminine vulva contain the testicles; — the middle line of the *Scrotum* in contrast is split, and
 15 forms the *vagina*. In this way one completely understands the reconstruction⁸ of both sexual parts. — As in the man the uterus sinks down into a mere gland, so in contrast the masculine testicle remains closed up in the ovaries,⁹ it does not step into

¹dort der Uterus

²sich ...ankündigen

³*In the margin*: Schubert page 185. in grasshoppers *Grillus verruccivorus* the large testicle in bundled, rolled together vessels,* the equally large *ovaries* subsisting of similarly bundled, rolled egg-ladders — *edge* of the testicles are not only wholly shaped in the same way as the crude, large ovaries in their contour; they also subsist of almost egg-formed longish tender vesicles, which stand upon the substance of the testicles with their base, like eggs in an ovary. Vegetative entangling.

*bündelweis zusammengerollte gefäße

⁴Bläschen

⁵*Tr. note*: This word is interpolated.

⁶*Tr. note*: This word is interpolated.

⁷*Tr. note*: the ejaculatory conduits traverse the prostate and open separately within the urethra at the bottom of a gap called *venumontanum* (e.g., the mountain of venus).

⁸Umbildung

⁹*Tr. note*: Sic!

[174] opposition, it does not change itself into the active brain, and the clitoris¹ in the woman is the inactive² feeling in general; that in the man in contrast is the active feeling,³ the swelling heart, the filling with blood of the **corpora cavernosa** and the meshing of the spongy tissue of the urethra — the man is thus the active — through
 5 the fact that this distinction has its activity; the woman, however, is the receptive and conceiving,^{4 5} because she remains in her undeveloped unity.

The conception⁶ is the contraction of the whole individual in the simple self-surrendering⁷ unity,⁸ in the individual's representation; the seed is the simple physical
 10 representation — wholly one point, like the receiving⁹ and the whole self; — conception is nothing other than that the latter opposites,¹⁰ these abstract representations, become one.¹¹

Thus the animal organism has run through its cycle; it is now the

¹Kitzler

²*Tr. note:* or "passive"

³*In the margin:* feminine blood flow — corresponds to the masculine blood-filling

⁴*Tr. note:* "empfangende" which means both "to receive" and "to conceive," or become pregnant,

⁵*In the margin:* digestion turned outwards [*Next to this:* metaphorical surrender of the heart and soul to the woman] — woman the milk of the breast; man, beard growth external meaninglessness, blunted weapons

⁶Empfängniss

⁷sich hingebende

⁸*In the margin:* Fire, water, simple representations — thus is organic nature, not *analyzed* in its abstract moments — carving up into the chemical — irrelevant details; — but its force precisely *universal*; not *acid*, *potassium* without blunting oneself.

⁹Nahme

¹⁰*In the margin:* part is means, essentially mediation

¹¹*In the margin:* every organ serves, but simultaneously the latter is brought into position in a simple way (embryos life; necessity of one or another function is disproved through the case where this function does not occur —) the distinction of the parts is such that these arrangements are not simpler — machines can be simplified, and are thus the more perfect for it — but this is not the case with the organism; actuality is the latter moments means nothing [*Next to this:* to the material proof] that they have evolved this way; the mere result is nothing — like believing in a geometric proposition

[175] sexless universal, which is fertilized; it has become absolute species. The latter is the death of *this* individual. Lower animal organisms die immediately after mating;¹ like the parts of a flower, the pure viscera are not individuals; higher individuals preserve themselves, they have higher independence, and their death is
 5 the developed process implicit in² their shape. The latter is the change of the individual into the the species³ α) the still unactual, but the existing simple unity of the universal and the individuality, of the offspring; β) the not *actual*, but abstractly existing; in the animal the latter is not yet unified, so that the *actual* species is immediately there as simple-universal, as something abstract; but rather both fall
 10 asunder; the universal has the form of the individuality, and where it discards the latter, and is as species, it is unactual, it is not subject, and it collapses into the extremess of the total species *resolved* in itself,⁴ and the abstract *existing*; *concept* and *being* are separated, and the *actual* life that is their middle term lies between these extremes.

In their sublation of themselves the individuality divides itself into these two extremes; we have seen the movement to the first⁵ — the movement to the other⁶ is the sickness which leads to death; — the organism abandoned by the self; itself dies out implicitly of its own accord.⁷ — actual illness insofar as it is not dying off, is

¹In the margin: Sex relationship is totality — *species*, α) *the sameness* of the whole perfect implicit unity — β) opposition; reality of species, independent individuals which are immediately desiring, i.e., for whom the *species* is purpose, who know the *universal* outside of themselves; [Between these: implicitly something inner not yet within them] their mating is the *existence of the species*. But the animal *self* as such is not as such the species' existence; the species collapses within the self in three sides α) offspring, completed whole in itself — *immediately* determinately existing β) whole, as movement — in the not immediate unity; stepping apart of the two *selves within the One*; its result γ) death — the pure negativity; immediate *not-being*.

²Tr. Note: "an ihrer Gestalt" or "within their shape."

³Tr. note: "Er ist das Werden des Individuums zur Gattung" which might also be translated as "The latter is the individual becoming the species."

⁴in die Extreme der in sich beschlossenen totalen Gattung

⁵Tr. note: e.g., to α).

⁶Tr. note: e.g., to β).

⁷stirbt aus sich, an sich selbst

[176] the external existing *process*. — The necessity of death does not subsist in single causes, as does nothing in the organic in general; against singulars there is always more help; death is weak it is not the *ground*.¹ The latter is the necessity of the *transition* from individuality into universality; for the living is as living;² the one-sidedness of the *determinate being* as self — the species is the movement which itself becomes out of the sublation of the *single existing self*, and falls back into the latter — the *existing* singular goes to ground in it³ — *being* is this abstraction, which passes over into its opposite.

Thus death out of age is generally *lack of strength*; universal simple condition, decrease⁴ — the external appearance is the increase of ossification; and the reduction of the tautness of the muscles and tendons, bad digestion, weak sensation; return out of the individual to the merely vegetative life. — The latter⁵ merely quantitative relatedness however, as something qualitative, as determinate process, is the proper disease;⁶ — not *weakness*, or enormous *strength* which are perfect superficiality.—⁷

Health consists α) in proportionate relationships of the *organic* to the *inorganic* — so that there is nothing inorganic for the organism that it cannot overcome; — not in the fact that a stimulus is too large or small for the stimulus reception — the organism receives the stimulus which is too large or too small. — As the organism is itself

¹In the margin: without external *cause*; that the external would be cause, itself lies in the organism

²Tr. Note: e.g., for the living is as living in the sense that its principle or ground is not its death, but rather, the principle of life which sustains it. What Hegel will describe here is the return of the individual to its principle, or ground. That this return is also bound up with the individual's destruction (its *zugrundegehen*, or its going to ground), arises from the attempt to give a comprehensive account of the principle determining the individual's life cycle.

³Tr. note: e.g., which is destroyed in it. Hegel is exploiting the double meaning of the word ground in "zugrundegehen" (to be destroyed), and "Grund"(principle, or ground). The existing singular goes to its principal, or ground in the very moment when it is destroyed because its destruction returns it to the extremes of abstract existence and of the total species in which the individual is contained. By thus returning the individual to its concept, its death returns it to its principle, or *Grund*.

⁴Abnehmen

⁵In the margin: Species

⁶Tr. note: e.g., quantitative relatedness refers to the notion that death is caused by singular causes like the loss of weight, etc. Because disease is grasped as the powerlessness of the individual to maintain its opposition to the species, it is, in effect, a degeneration of the individual's capacity to instantiate the concept as something particular and determinate. It is grasped as a relapse into the vegetable, just as death is grasped as a relapse into the species which is its ground. Thus, quantitative decrease is not the cause of disease, but it is the disease itself, qua qualitative condition. The true cause of the disease is only to be found in the concept.

⁷In the margin: α) [Next to this: brownian merit *, universal recapitulation in general, the more universal effect is cruder — specification in the same way] health is *proportion* of the organic self to its determinate being; or that as one it does not step apart into two selves; — *determinately existing self*, *universal self* — how is its determinate being receptive to this disproportion? — according to the concept we have seen the necessity. — now grasped in the opposite.

*Tr. note: the reference is to John Brown's determination of health and illness in his *System of Healing*, not to Scottish botanist Robert Brown, discoverer of Brownian motion and the first person to describe the general occurrence of the nucleus in living cells (Cf. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke* 8, 343).

[177] implicitly inorganic it is capable of increase or decrease — disproportion of its *being* and *its self* — i.e., the becoming free of its determinate being¹ — there is no disproportion between factors, which step apart within its disproportion, factors are are abstract moments and cannot step apart α) also one should no longer to quarrel
 5 with the *disposition*² — which is *implicitly* diseased in its determinate being, without being so for its self — without actually being infected, without *being ill*;³ essential distinction; — the organism makes this reflection itself, so that what is *implicit*, is also actual. β) Cause in the organism itself (age, dying, inborn flaws — γ many think it wondrous if [they] have caught hold of or refuted such a conceptual determination⁴)
 10 — disease,⁵ if the organism as *existing organism*⁶ separates itself from the inner organism — not factors, but wholly real sides — the existing organism is capable of external influences, such that one side can become increased — which is not proportionate to that of the force of the *inner organism*. The organism is a *determinate* force — thus the former, the existing organism, appears to have nothing
 15 to do with the force, the external organism is only the content, the substance of the force — the organism is in the opposed forms *of being* and *of the self*; according to the former for the external, and distinct⁷ for the sake of the opposition — the organism's substance then cannot overcome the self. *The self is precisely the latter, FOR WHICH* the negative of itself is;⁸ the self is not indifferent, the other is not
 20 completely nothing for the self; but rather the other is its might; the other is *for the self* as the negative of itself — the other is in opposition against the self. The stone cannot become diseased, because it perishes in the negative of itself, it becomes chemically dissolved, the stone's form does not remain; its form is not the negative of itself that reaches out over its opposite — *being ill, self-feeling*, like desire,

¹*In the margin:* elevation of the excitation and diminishing of the excitability — opposite of size must instantly be suspicious — the larger the one, the slighter the other, as the one rises, the other falls.

²auch is sich nicht mit der Disposition herumzustreiten

³*Tr. note:* "in seinem Daseyn, ohne für sein Selbst." In otherwords it is possible to maintain that there may be dispositions which are neither ill or infected in themselves, which may nevertheless be infected in their determinate being. This follows from Hegel's thesis that death from old age emerges out of *powerlessness*. If the concept can loosen its hold in old age, then it can also have a weak hold from the outset. Hence, certain dispositions may be ill without being sick. Such a disposition, "which is implicitly diseased in its determinate being, without being so for its self," although not sick "for itself" is nevertheless sick implicitly, because what is implicit in the organism is also real.

⁴*Tr. note:* One might, for example, catch hold of, or attempt to refute this conceptual determination by showing that someone is not sick, and therefore, cannot be ill.

⁵*In the margin:* The whole is to be taken much more coarsely

⁶Der seyende Organismus

⁷verschieden

⁸*Tr. note:* "Das Selbst ist eben diese, FÜR WELCHES das negative seiner selbst." This might also be translated as follows: the self is precisely the latter, THAT FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH the negative of itself is." The point is that the self is the concept for which the organism, qua negative of the self, exists.

[178] is a feeling of lack, i.e., self-feeling is as something *negative* to itself; it relates itself to itself as something negative, this lacking is itself, and it is itself as lacking;¹ only such that in desire, this lack is something EXTERNAL, or the self is not set against its *shape* as such; in disease however the negative is thing, the shape. Disease² is thus a disproportion between *stimuli* and *the capacity for action*³ — the latter is the true determination — the latter are true oppositions, stimuli are merely⁴ the form of determinate being;⁵ the organism can be stimulated beyond its potential,⁶ because it is just as much the whole unity of possibility, substance, and actuality, of the self, wholly under the one and the other form; the former⁷ is the theoretical organism, the latter⁸ is the practical. The opposition of the sexes separates the latter, divides the practical organism into two organic individuals, *efficacy*, and *Stimuli*; the organic individual is itself both, and the latter is *itself the implicit possibility of its death*;⁹ such that the organism steps apart from itself under these forms; in sexual oppositions only the separate¹⁰ sexual members die immediately — the parts of the plant. They die here through their onesidedness; not as a whole; as a whole they die through the opposition of masculinity and femininity, which each has within itself.¹¹ — As in the plant the Stamina swells up into passive thalamus,¹² while the passive side of the pistil swells into that which bears, so now every individual is itself the unity of both sexes; but this is the individual's death; the individual is *only individuality*, this is its essential determinacy; only the species is in *one* unity, in a *one*, the unity of complete wholes. In individuality this movement of both is the process which sublates them and of which the result is consciousness, the unity which implicitly and for itself is itself the unity of both complete individualities, — as self, not only as species

¹In the margin: *digestive fever* — digestion of the whole

²In the margin: Heraclitus 144. β οσα εν ημιν εκαστου κρατος νοσημα υπερβολη θερμου, πυρετος υπερβολη ψυχρου παραλυσισ, — υπερβολη πυρευματος, πνιγος.

³Wirkungsvermögen

⁴Tr. Note: "Reitze, die Form des Daseyns" or "stimuli, the form of determinate being." The verb is elided, so that it establishes an opposition: Stimuli and the capacity for action are true opposites, whereas stimuli alone are merely the form of determinate being.

⁵In the margin: *abstract moments*

⁶Möglichkeit

⁷Tr. Note: e.g., the organism in its true determination in the opposition between stimuli and the capacity for action.

⁸Tr. note: e.g., the organism as subjected to stimuli, which are the form of its determinate being.

⁹Tr. note: "die Möglichkeit seines Todes an ihm selbst." Stimuli are implicitly the possibility of the organic Individuals death because they can be stimulated beyond their potential. Thus, the individual, which is for the sake of the self, can cease to exist without disturbing the life of the self which perdures in the form of its extremes of abstract existence and the total species. The death of the individual can be interpreted in light of the self which is the true actuality towards which the merely potential of the individual aims.

¹⁰aussgesonderten

¹¹an ihm selbst hat

¹²Tr. Note: "Fruchtboden," which is translated as "thalamus" in this botanical context, and as "ovaries" in the earlier zoological context.

[179] in the self's inner concept. The possibility of disease is such that the individual is the latter two individualities¹ — in the sex relationship, the individual has given up its essential determination *to the outside*, in so far as it is in relationship to these individualities; now implicitly and of its own accord, it itself, as it were, is mating
 5 itself with itself.²

The organism thus *stepping asunder* in this way implicitly and of its own accord, *the latter is the concept of disease*, which is to be considered in its more specific³ process; — freedom, independence of both sides, — like individual and state, and the latter is the substance of the former;⁴ the former IS *determinate* substance insofar as
 10 the substance stands beneath the individual,⁵ the Individual is, as in desire, power over its shape, its implicit-being;⁶ determinate shape, but it is at the same time the *transcending beyond that*, the *implicitly* universal; to which the individuality succumbs, over which it cannot become master, — because that over which individuality is master, is a determinate size; the individuality, the self as such, is not
 15 universal, but only *implicit*. — its implicitness steps out *beyond* that,⁷ which the individuality is as self, *i.e.*, it steps generally into *opposition* — as universal essence— or the organism itself becomes object to itself, is for the organism in the form of the negative of its self

20 It has a *selfless* subsisting of the systems; it is *stimulated* against the

¹Tr. note: *e.g.*, that of the individual and that of the species. The unity of these two individualities in the species should not be confused with the unity of both complete individualities in the self's inner concept which Hegel has just described. Rather than discussing the unity of both these individualities in the self's inner concept, Hegel is now talking about disease as the failure to properly realize this unity between determinate being and the self in the form of the species.

²Itzt an sich selbst, sich gleichsam mit sich selbst begattend.

³nähern

⁴Tr. note: As the species is the substance of the individual, so the state is the substance of the individual as well (a perfect reversal of the opening metaphor of Hobbes' *Leviathan*). Sickness follows sexual reproduction, because, like old age, it is understood as the powerlessness of the individual to the might if the self instanced in the species. Thus, even though the species is the individual's substance, it now appears as the opposite of the individual, or as its death.

⁵In the margin: *Substance as subject*, the former as existing; the latter as negative; subject is a *determinate negativity* if the determination of the substance, becomes unequal to the determination of the subject, — thus is the former greater still for the subject because the latter as negativity is the *universal*, but the universal that is essentially something determinate which then is not appropriate to the subject's determinate being and to this extent stands under it.

⁶Ansichseyn

⁷In the margin: First stage, implicit disease without being ill

Second stage, is that the implicit becomes for the self, that is to say, the implicit is itself as fixed self. Against the self as something universal, the implicit itself posits a *fixed* determinacy in the self, *i.e.*, the determinacy makes itself into self; or the self of the implicit becomes a fixed determinate being, a *determinate* part of the whole

[180] capacity for action. The beginning of disease is that *from any side at all*, the part, the single system, wins subsistence against the self. — Disease can begin in the whole, *indigestibility* generally, for digestion is indeed the main point;¹ or on one side, that the latter fortifies itself, gall — process of the lungs — the *existing* whole in
 5 a determinacy; its universal determinacy is to *subsist* against the self; but the existing determinacy, a singular, which takes possession of the whole, instead of the self; — thus immediately as isolated, the disease is still in its *first stages*.² But to this extent the determinacy has become the center, the self of the whole, instead of the free self, the determinate self — in this way the disease proper is posited.³ There accordingly
 10 external means also help, vomitives, purgatives, the self is the digestion in general, — the *self* is the power⁴ of the shape,⁵ — that is affected. Second stage.

Henceforth the⁶ proper constitution of disease is such that⁷ the organic process now proceeds in the latter fortified shape, in the latter subsisting, *i.e.*, such that the
 15 processes form a *succession*; — and indeed the universal systems are torn apart, are not immediately one, but rather, the latter unity exhibits the transition of the one into the other through movement. *Fever*, then is the pure disease proper, or the diseased individual organism, which

¹denn aufs Verdauen kommt es doch an

²in ihren ersten Wegen

³*In the margin:* Universal convulsion vehement attack of the whole upon skin, influence of skin-digestion

⁴Macht

⁵Das Selbst Macht der Gestalt

⁶*In the margin:* Third stage; over against the STATIC universal self the whole becomes as distinguishing movement, *Fever*.

⁷*In the margin:* The organism posits itself as whole against the determinacy; — the organism as a whole becomes a subsisting, the single diseased Affection transforms itself into *the whole*, and this disease of the whole is at the same time *healing*, for it is the whole, which falls into movement; — which breaks itself apart in the cycle of necessity; because the whole is cycle, is the whole.

[181] has set itself free, from its *determinate disease*,¹ like the healthy organism has freed itself from its determinate processes; fever is thus the pure life of the diseased organism; at the same time as this flow of functions the fever is the *movement*, the fluidization of the latter, so that through this movement, even the fixing of a function becomes sublated, and the disease is digested; Fever is a process in itself, and a process turned against its *inorganic* nature, a digestion of medicines.² α) Fever for itself is the succession of the sides of the organism; first the whole organism falls into the nervous system, in the universal organism; then in the inner organism, then in the shape; — *shivering fits*;³ heaviness in the head, rheumatic pain in the backbone, skin cramps, shuddering is setting free of the muscles, which [have] their own irritability, unrestrained trembling is weakness of the muscle — heaviness of the bones is tiredness of the limbs; receding of the blood from the skin — the feeling of cold, by the shape; the *simple*, subsisting of the organism wholly reflected into itself isolates itself, it has the whole in its sway — but precisely the latter is much more than a dissolution of the whole, a negative force; — through the latter concept the latter veined⁴ organism passes over into the warm blooded⁵ organism — just the former withdrawal is the transformation into *heat*, into negativity; blood is now what rules. — But thirdly, this dissolution passes over, into shaping, into product, the organism falls downward into the lymph, *into sweat*; the fluid subsisting. The latter product has the meaning, such that that in it the isolating, the singular, the *determinacy ceases*, the organism has brought itself forth as whole,⁶ it has generally digested itself; the organism is *cooked disease-material*,⁷ as the ancients expressed themselves; a very good concept, — the whole is *critical elimination*;

¹In the margin: Precisely because the sick individual organism makes the whole sick

²Es ist ein Verlauff in sich, und gegen seine *unorganische* Natur gekehrt, Verdaung von Arzneimitteln.

³Fieberfrost

⁴nervigte

⁵In den hitzigen Blutorganismus

⁶In the margin: In the disease the organic one is its self object

⁷Krankheitsmaterie

[182] — the *crisis* is the organism become master over itself, which reproduces itself, and proves this force through excretion;¹ — it is admittedly not the disease-material which is eliminated, such that if this material were not in the body, or could be scooped out with a spoon, it would have been healthy, rather crisis, like digestion in
 5 general, is simultaneously an elimination² — *the product is doubled*. *Critical eliminations* are for this reason very different from the eliminations from lack of strength,³ which are no actual eliminations, but rather dissolutions of the organism, which have exactly the opposite meaning. — The organism which thus comes to stand⁴ has become as *something universal*, not as the latter diseased organism; — the
 10 determinacy transforms itself first into movement, into necessity, into a whole process, and the latter into the whole product, and through this in the same way into the whole self; — the product is simple negativity—

In this way the *inner* organism is made⁵; The inner organism is precisely the latter
 15 process.⁶ — But the inner organism is also *more active* towards the outside; *it digests* the powerful⁷ determinacy in it, *as something inorganic, something selfless* — The determinacy thus offered is the *medicine* for the organism. The instinct⁸ of the animal feels the determinacy posited in it, feels the drive to self-preservation, precisely the whole organism which relates itself to itself has the *determinate* feeling of its lack;
 20 the organism which relates itself to itself thereupon proceeds to consume the latter determinacy;⁹

¹Excemiren

²*In the margin:* because the self fell into all the systems one after the other — merely for this reason, the latter is the *ground* excluding a doubled *self*

³Krafftlosigkeit

⁴*Tr. Note:* "Er so zu Stande kommend" which would normally be translated as "comes to be realized." But Hegel is implying that the organism comes to stand, or realize itself, in the crisis which it survives.

⁵*In the margin:* The object is implicitly of its own accord turned against the determinacy in its self as against an *external inorganic nature*

⁶*In the margin:* *Chronic* illness, through fever unsubduable determinacies, creeping fever, then the latter process does not have the superiority.

⁷mächtige

⁸Instinct

⁹*In the margin:* in many cases only a universal *convulsion*; [*Next to this:* Moxa] a means as good as the opposite, pre-brownian manner, Hoven has acknowledged this.

[183] it seeks this determinacy as something to be consumed, as inorganic nature, thus it is present for the organism in a less powerful form, — in a simple existing form.¹

5 (2 Death, however, is the latter dissolution, such that the series of processes becomes the empty process that does not return into itself, the fever, that *only* remains *creeping*, or all single *processes of the digesting* organism produce themselves as unbound, and each operates for itself.³ Here the fever is only the superficial process, which does not subjugate these parts.⁴ *High* fever,⁵ the main power falls into the
10 vascular system⁶— asthenic fever falls into the nervous system; the latter comes to no genuine fever in chronic diseases.)

As at first *the opposition of masculinity and femininity* fell into the organism *without being overcome*, so the more determinate is the opposition of the latter
15 *abstract forms* of the whole, which appear in fever, or the more determinate is the opposition of the whole posited in these forms, abstractions which are filled with the whole — *individuality* can *not split itself in this way*, because it is not a universal. (The *sentient* organism does not exist at the same time as the shuddering of the fever organism, which in itself, dissolved into the simplicity of the nerve, itself feels all of
20 its parts go back into the simple substance. — The desiring organism is

¹*In the margin:* Periods of fever, free of space and time —

²*In the margin:* disease goes into the self, the one is behind;

³*In the margin:* The *self* that falls into the *external diseased organism*, as simple it falls out of the latter as simple, as simple it falls into the finger tips of the *mesmerist*, who leads the self everywhere through the organism, and *fluidize*s the latter in this manner. — Rubbing, which brings forth electrical sparks.

⁴der diese Theile nicht unterkriegt

⁵Hitziges Fieber

⁶Gefäßsystem

[184] directed towards the outside in the same way; it is not the heat of the fever,¹ the being-for-self, which is itself the object, and desires its own substance and essence, of which it itself is the negative. — The crisis

The manuscript ends here

¹*Tr. note:* "Die Hitze," which refers to the heat of the fever.

German – English Glossary

abscheiden -	secrete, separate
abschliessen -	to enclose
absondern -	to separate
abtrennen -	separate
Allgemeinheit -	universality
an und für sich -	implicitly and for itself
Anschauern -	intuit
Anschauung -	intuition
An sich -	implicit
Ansichseyn-	being-in-itself
AssimilationsGeschäftes-	task of assimilation
aufdrehen -	untwist
Aufgehobenseyn -	sublatedness, being sublated
Aufheben -	sublate
Aufnehmen -	take up, assimilate
aufschliessen-	unlock
Aufschwellende -	swelling
aufsteigen -	mount, ascend, rise.
aufzehren -	consumes, absorbs, saps
aufzeigen -	exhibit
ausbilden -	form, develop
Ausblidung -	formation
Auseinanderlegen -	interpret, unfold
Auseinanderseyn -	juxtaposition, sunderedness
auseinanderfallen -	fall apart, disintegrate
auseinandergehen -	disperse
auscheiden -	exclude, excrete
Ausdehnen -	expansion
aushalten -	to endure
Ausleerungen-	evacuations
äussern -	external, outer
Aussersichseyn -	self-externality
Auszehren -	consumes
Bedingung -	condition
Bedingtheit	conditionality
Begriff -	concept
begreifen -	to grasp, comprehend, conceive
Begreifen-	comprehension
Beleben -	enliven
beruhigen -	to still
beschaffen -	made
Besonder -	particular
besondern -	particularize
Besonderung-	particularization

bestehen-	consist, subsist
Bestehen -	subsistence
bestimmen -	to determine
bestimmte -	determinate
Bestimmtheit -	determinacy
Bestimmtsein -	determinedness
Bestimmung -	determination
beziehen -	to relate
sich beziehen -	to comport oneself
Beziehung -	relation
Bildung -	formation
Bildungen -	formations
Blutkugelnchen-	blood globules
Brei -	pulp
Brennbar -	combustible
Cohärenz -	coherence
Dammerde-	mould
Daseyn -	determinate being
daseyendes -	determinately being, determinately existing
Differenz -	differentiation
different -	different
differentierenden -	differentiating
Ding -	thing
dirimiren -	to dirempt, to interrupt, separate
Dumpfe -	hollow
Eigentlich -	proper, properly
Eigenschaften -	properties
Eingeweide -	viscera
Einheit -	unity
einsaugen -	to absorb
einteilen -	classification
Einzel -	single
Einzelinheit-	singularity
Empfindung -	sensation
das Empfinden-	sensing
empfindend-	sentient
entgegengesetzt -	opposed, set over against
Entladen -	release
Entfaltung-	unfolding
entwickelt -	developed
entzweyt -	divided, doubled, separated, parted
erhalten -	preserve
Ernährung-	nourishment, nutrition
Erregen-	to excite
Erregung-	excitation
Erregend -	exciting
Erschlaffung -	ennervation, slackening

ertsterben -	to mortify
Erzeugung -	production
erzeugen -	produce, create
Erzittern -	Trembling
Existenz -	existence
Fasern -	filaments
Feste-	solid
Figur -	figure
Form -	form
Formal -	formal
formell-	in a formal way, of a formal nature
Fruchtknoten -	ovary, seed vessel
Für sich -	for itself
Fürsichseyn -	being-for-itself
Gallerte-	gelatine, jelly
Ganze -	whole
Gattung-	species
Gebilde -	formation
Gebirge -	mountain range, rock
Gediehen -	flourish, thrive
Gefäße -	vessels
Gegensatz -	opposite, opposition
Gegenstand -	object
Gegliederung -	articulation, organic construction, articulation into parts
Getheiltsein -	dividedness
Geschlecht -	sex
GeschlechtsVerhältnis -	sex relationship
Gestalt-	shape
das Gestalten	shaping
Gestaltender Kraft -	formative energy
Gestaltung -	Shaping
Gestaltungsprocess-	process of shaping
Gewalt -	dominion
geworden -	has become, has grown
gleichheit-	sameness
Gleichgültig -	indifferent
Gleichgültigkeit -	indifference
Glieder -	members, limbs
gliedern -	segment, classify, articulate
hemmen -	impede, inhibit
sich herausbilden -	forms oneself
herabsinken -	sink down, debase
herstellen -	establish
heruntersetzen -	reduce
holzigte -	woody, lignified
Idealität -	ideality

Ideell -	of an ideal nature
Indifferenz -	undifferentiation
indifferent -	indifferent
indifferentiiren -	indifferentiate
Innerlichkeit -	inwardness
innerlich-	inward
Irritabilität -	Irritability
Keim -	Sprout
Kern -	core
Kohlensäure -	carbonic acid
Kohlensäuregas -	carbon dioxide
Körper -	body
Körperlichkeit -	corporality
die Knospe -	gemma,
die Knospen -	gemmae
das Knospen -	gemination
Knospentreiben -	shoots, sprouts
Knoten -	nodule, knot
Krankseyn-	being-diseased
Kraft -	force
Krafttge -	forceful
Kraftlosigkeit -	lack of strength
Krais-	circle, cycle
Kraislauff -	cycle, circulation
Lagerungen -	strata, layers, deposits
Laufbahn -	orbit
Lebendig -	living, alive
Lebendigkeit-	liveliness
Macht -	power
Mannigfaltigkeit -	multiplicity
Mark -	marrow, pith (depending on whether animal or plant)
mittheilen -	to communicate
Mittheilung -	communication, information
Nahrung -	nourishment
Nahrungsmittel -	means of nourishment
Nahrungsstoff-	nourishing material
Niederschlag-	precipitate
Potenz-	potency
potentiiren-	to potentiate
Punktualität -	punctuality,
Punktuelle -	punctual
Raumgestalt -	spatial configuration
Realität -	reality
Reell -	of a real nature
Reiz-	stimulus, stimulation
Resumtion-	recapitulation

Röhern -	ducts
röhrige -	tubular
Ruhe -	rest, stasis,
ruhige -	still, static, quiet
Ruhend -	static, stationary
Saamenkorn -	kernel of seed
Schiefer -	shale
Selbst -	self
Selbstigkeit -	selfhood
Selbstständig -	autonomous
schaudern -	to shiver
Scheidewand -	partition
Schlußsatz -	consequence
Sinn -	sense
Sinne -	Senses
Sinneswerkzeuge -	sense organs
sensible -	sensitive
Spannung -	tension
Spröde -	brittle, inflexible
Steigerung -	intensification
Stoff -	material, substance
Substanz -	substance
Teilung -	division
Ton -	clay
Tonschiefer -	argillaceous shale, clay shale
Totalität -	totality
Torf -	Peat
trennen -	to separate
Träge -	inert
Trägheit -	inertia
Trieb -	drive, but in an horticultural context it can also mean, sprout, young shoot, germinating power, etc.
überhaupt -	in general, generally
überwindern -	subdue, overcome
umschliessen -	to surround, enclose
Ungegenständlichkeit -	unobjectivity
Unmittelbar -	immediate
unterschieden -	distinguish
Unterschied -	distinction
unterschiedener -	distinct
Unterscheidung -	distinction
unvergänglich -	imperishable
Verbindung -	combination
Vereinzeln -	isolate
Verdauung -	digestion
verfluchtigen -	volatilized, evaporated
vergehen -	vanishes, passes over, is consumed

Verhältnis -	relationship
Verhalten -	relatedness
(sich) verhalten -	to comport
Verhältnis -	relationship
Verknoten -	entangling, knotting
verknoten -	to entangle, knot
verlaufen -	proceed
Verlauff -	process, course
Verlegenheit-	predicament
verlegen -	misplace
vermitteln -	mediate
Vermittlung -	mediation
Verschiedene -	diverse, various, different
Verschiedenheit -	diversity, variety
verschwinden-	disappear, fade away,
Vertheilung -	dispersion
Verwandlung-	transformation
Vervielfältigung-	duplication
verzehren -	consume
Vielheit -	plurality
Vorhanden -	present, present at hand
Vorzuglich-	predominant, principal
werden -	become, grow
Wiederkehren -	turn back
Willkuhr -	choice
willkuhrlich-	free (as in "free movement". This is the only context in which its used)
Wirkung -	action
Wirkungsvermögen -	capacity for action
Wirklich -	actual
Wirklichkeit -	actuality
Wirksam -	efficacious
Wurzelknoten -	root nodules
Zerfall -	collapse, decomposition
zerlegen-	dissect
zerreißen -	break apart
Zufällig -	contingent
Zunichte machen -	thwart; destroy
Zurückgehen-	revert
Zurückkehren -	turn back
Zurücknehmen -	take back
Zusammenfassen -	collect
Zusammenhang -	connection, connectedness
Zusammensetzung -	composition
Zusammenziehen -	contraction
Zweck -	purpose

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